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PREFACE
That Democritus is not a Pre-socratic is a starting-point to
be emphasised before any attempt is made to understand and explain at
least two aspects of his philosophical activity: his epistemology and
his ethical theory.
All the information we have about his life permits a chrono¬
logical position between 470/460 BC - 370 BC} he is probably a you.<a<jer-
contemporary of Socrates (469 - 399 BC). The reasons which led scholars
of previous generations to classify D. amongst Pre-socratics are obvious
and reasonable but misleading for the estimation of his epistemological
and ethical views.
His main work (it must be confessed), his physics, is
correctly classified with that of the Pre-socratics; he is the last of
the Ionian philosophers and scientists; his teacher, Leukippus, is not
only from a systematic point of view but also chronologically a
Pre-socratic. Leukippus* brilliant hypothesis about the atomic
structure of the world was adopted by D., who tried to explain, expand
and apply it in all fields of scientific knowledge. It is one part of
his many-sided activity.
But an account of D.'s epistemology and ethical theory seems
to be impossible unless it is explained a3 a reply to the Sophists,
1. DL.ix.41 ( VS68B5).
S.Luria, Wann hat Demokrit gelebt? (in Hermes, 31 (1928) pp. 205-238.
J. Ferguson, On the date of D. (in Symbolae Osloenses, 40 (1965)
pp. 17-726.
W.K.C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, II (1965) pp. 386-7.
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especially Protagoras# His aim is clear enough: to reconstruct confid¬
ence in the possibility of human knowledge, to overcome relativism and
unlimited subjectivism in moral relations. He is a child of the
Enlightenment but, of all the famous teachers of his generation, he
survived; he lived long enough to see the results of the "demolition"
of the old ideas. Any such desiolition is accompanied by pains in the
delivery of new ones.
On the other hand his experience of Pelop. War (431-404 BC)
is a condicio sine qua non for the understanding of a number of fragments
referring to social and political life in the city-states during the war
and after it. These considerations, and other reasons to be mentioned
in detail in the following pa es, led me to think that D.'s ethical theory
is a result of long experience and belongs to the later decades of his life.
For similar reasons one might reach the same conclusion about D.'s
epistemology•
In both these philosophical fields his work should be compared
with that of Socrates. Not only in general terms, but also in some
details surprising similarities can be traced in their views. Which
influenced the other is difficult to say. But, as a matter of fact,
they had in front of them similar problems and similar situations to live
in and think of. At any rate, if for some expressions, in marginal
points and in those of less importance, I had to answer the question of
influences, I incline to the following formula: both were influenced
by their environment or it was D. who was directly or indirectly the
1. J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London, (1968) [ 1914], p.157.
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recipient.*'
Nevertheless D. did not insist on the demand of defining moral
ideas; he founded an optimistic critical epistemology and left this field
behind him in order to found an ethical theory on good will, believing that
it is the main or a necessary factor of moral life. It was enough, he
thought, to begin his ethical theory with an axiom; what is true and
good is well known to all as far as it concerns their practical life; the
2
question is: how to act in accordance with that knowledge.
To make sense of philosophical fragments is like deciphering
coded messages. Disjecta membra lie in front of the student. Kis
task is to decipher them, to ascribe to them the correct meaning given by
their creator, to reconstruct a system. In his effort to understand these
fragmentary pieces of thought, he has, instead of context, a family of
fragments.
A first criterion is to find - if possible - their consistency,
the coherence of those members with some leading ideas.
A second criterion is to find the compatibility of such a system
with the remaining work of the same author.
A third one — and perhaps of more importance from the point of
view of authenticity — is to ascertain the compatibility with what we
call the "cultural or historical environment" of the author.
Philosophical terminology is D.'s days was in a state of flux,
was being developed; a working vocabulary was a difficult problem for* the
1. See: DL ix.36 ( VS683116).
Cf. G.J.D. Aalders, The political faith of D. (in MNEMOSYNE, 4/3 1950,
p. 305 footn. 15.
V
2. See: irt. 69t 173#
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additional reason of an unprecedented philosophical upheaval. A great
thinker, of course, will find the way to express his ideas; his ideas can
survive, but vocabulary chenges. In such a case a scholar's task is to
understand not only what is expressed but what was meant to be expressed.
Moral ideas are generated only in the frame of a social structure
and corresponding social relations. In D.'s days social life was closely
connected with political life in the narrow frame and shortsighted view of
Greek city-states. Unsolved and perplexed social problems were fervently
debated, during a turbulent political life, in connection with educational
ideas. So, ethical theories, political thought, and educational ideals
are closely connected in the same system. On the other hand D.'s
scientific views, especially his mechanistic explanation of the Universe,
extended to a consistent theory of sensation and a rejection of "chance"
and the gods, oblige us to pay attention to and give a 3hort account of
these aspects of his thought. From this two questions arise: what is,
if any, the metaphysical foundation of Democritean ethics? is it
compatible with his physics?
A final point: sometimes it is said that progress in every
department is attained only by making good use of the experience of the
past. In the case of our subject many contributions have been made by
famous scholars; our task is to know their views but to return Immediately
to the original text; it is the ions et origo of what ia to be said,
the beginning and end of this inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION
1. History of the problem. Some points for research.
Traditionally D.'s name is mainly mentioned in connection with
his physics; it is a general belief that he expounded, generalised and
improved his teacher's theory of atoms. Secondarily, his theory of
knowledge has drawn the attention of scholars, who much less frequently
have attempted an explanation or evaluation and appraisal of his moral
philosophy.
The main factors leading to that result were the following:
a. D.'s moral philosophy was overshadowed by the more surprising and
striking part of his own work.
b. D.'s moral doctrines are not mentioned at all in Plato's dialogues
and Aristotle's systematic writin s on ethics.
c. On the contrary, i.ocrates is presented (Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle)
as the paramount personality in the field of ethics, and as pioneer and
champion in the battle against subjectivism and relativism.
d. hat we know about D.'s moral philosophy is fragmentary (nearly
230 fragments, preserved by later writers, mainly in John Stobaeus'
Plorileglum; many of these fragments have been excluded by some scholars
as non-authentic (see paragraph 3 of this introduction).
e. Finally, another reason for misunderstanding, belittling and
disparaging D.'s moral philosophy was that all efforts for a new study
and explanation have generally started with the terminology and




During the 192o's C. Bailey* in the preface to his monumental
work on Epicurus' philosophy emphasised that: "as soon as one sets about
that task (of writing about ,picurus) it becomes clear that it would be
incomplete and unsatisfactory without an account of the atomic
philosophers who preceded him". Having studied D.'s ethics as a
condicio sine qua non for his main work, Bailey concluded (p.212):
"The moral teaching of D. is not based on any profound metaphysical or
ethical basis, nor is it, as far as we can judge from detached fragments,
in any sense a complete system: it does not attempt to grip together
the whole of life in any reasoned deductions from a simple principle.....
(p.214): Finally he (hem.) added, if only in loose connection, a
ii 2
moral theory to the physical •
During the last decades another aspect of the problem was
emphasised by social scientists or rather by left wing scholars and
1. C. Bailey, "ureek Atomists and Epicurus", Oxford, 1928.
i.J.
2. Zeller-Festle (Die Philos. der Griechen, 1154) had summarised:
"brei l-ragen sind es hauptsSchlich uij die sich auch heute noch
der streit uber die demokritische Ethik dreht: (a) ob sie ein
System bilde, (b) was allenfalls als der Kernnunkt dieses Systems
bezeichnet werden kSnne, und (c) ob oder inwiefern ein
Zusammenhang der Ethik mit der Physik Demokrits bestehe".
7.
intellectuals who did their best to label Democritus as a forerunner of
their own beliefs.1
It seems that the main points of the problem can be summarised
as follows:
a. authenticity of the fra ments
b. consistency of the fra ments in themselves
c. compatibility of ethics with the whole emocritean system
d. place of emocritean ethics in the history of ethics.
For a bett r evaluation and correct explanation 1 think that
more recent studies focusing light on special aspects of the whole
subject might be very helpful. They can be classified in tv;o groups:
a. Contributions to particular problems of O.'s ethical theory,
political faith, religious faith, theory of cognition and
2
knowledge.
1. U.E. Timoschenco, Materialisme de Democrite, La Pensfie, 62 (1955).
Grosju Grosew, Der Materialismus des Demokrits, ALTERTUM 4 (1958),
215ff.
S. Luria, Eur Frage der materialistischen Begrttndung der thik
bei Pemokrit, Berlin, 1964.
S. Luria, Democritea, Leningrad, 1970.
2. G.J.0. Aalders, "The political faith of D." In: MNEMOSYNE 4 3
(1950) 302-13.
D. McG -ibbon, "The religious thought of D." In: Hermes 93 (1965),
385-97.
Eric v.olf, Griechisches Rechtsdenken, II, 337 ff.
G. Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in D." In: Phil6<f« ReV/'C-^,
54 (1945) 578 ff. (part 1)^
55 (1946) 53 ff (part II).
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b. Terminological explanations given by scholars whose main interest
was concentrated on the history of some philosophical concepts
and connections of language with philosophy.*
After all the elucidations mentioned above, taking one more
source (Thucydides), important for useful comparisons, having in mind
a principle of the philosophy of language (don't ask about the meaning
but about the use of the words), I think that a research might be
fruitful leading to the following points:
a. The Corpus of the fragments should be accepted as authentic and
in O.'s own words or at least as mirroring his genuine thought.
b» They are consistent in themselves and compatible with the
2
whole Jemocritean view of the World and of Life.
1. • Heinimann, "Nomos unci Phyis", Basel. 1945.
K.V.Fritz, "Philosophic vmd sprachlicherAusdruck", N. York, 1939.
C.E.v. Erffa, " und Verwandte Begriffe".
In: Philologus, Suppl. 30/2 (1937) 197 ff.
C.J. Classen, "The Study of language amongst Socrates'
contemporaries". In: PACA (1959) 33-49.
2. It should be remembered in this place that the problem of Freewill
and the connected implications is a discovery of later centuries.
See: P. Huby, "The first discovery of the Freewill Problem",
Philosophy, 42 (1967) 353-62.
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c. D.'s ethical theory will be explained in detail.
d. Tnls theory can be classified side by side with ;>ocrates',
not with that of the Pre-socratics.1 D. often expresses an ethic
surprisingly close to that of Socrates; his aphorisms sometimes bear
a striking resemblance to those recorded of Socrates (see e.g. frr.
45, 83, 171).
1. Cf. Burnet, op.cit., p. 162ff.
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2. Some remarks on the survival of D.'s ethical writings#
The question is closely connected with that of the authenticity
of the surviving fragments. How and "why such an extraordinary number
of short ethical frr. of oemocritus were ready at hand for inclusion in
Stobaeus' collection.••.for the real problem is to account for the ensuing
gap of some TOO years until Stobaeus."'''
The most famous historian of Greek Philosophy in our days
accepts this remark as a general argument to justify his sceptism about
2
the authenticity of the frr. attributed to Democritus.
Let us follow the facts and testimonies on the problem:
3
1. Plato nowhere mentions Democritus at all.
1. Zeph Stewart,"Democritus and the Cynics", HSCP 63 (1958) 179-180.
2. Guthrie, History, II, 489 footn.3.
3. Diog. Laertius, IX 40: 7fa\/TuW S/ T^v ex1 p/: a,tun/
o Tf o o SocjLou An l^oKf'Tou cfioc^vn, vL S L^. j V^ 7
ouS? IvV X^rimUv cJjZif ^(ol
This fact is used by Diogenes as a clear evidence that "Plato
wished to burn all the writings of D. that he could collect..(Ia 40)
Perhaps it is only an exaggeration of Plato's opposition to
D.'s theories, however it does suggest that D.'s books might not
have found a place in the Academy's library, through which other
writers survived.
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But D. is undoubtedly a historical person; therefore Plato's silence
(due either to ignorance or to refusal to recognise a'materialist'opponent)
cannot be reasonably used as an argument that D. did not write on ethics.
2. Aristotle mentions £)»'s scientific work but not his ethical
writings. It is difficult to explain his silence, given that coming
from N. Greece he was more likely to have been acquainted (familiar) with
D.'s ethical bofaks as well. Hypotheses explaining this fact could be:
a. Aristotle did not recognise D.'s ethical writings as an
important contribution in that field of thought. He himself
ignores Isocrates' "ad oeiaonicum" (a pamphlet full of admonition
similar (in form) to that coming from D.'s frr.). He ignores
Xenophon too.
b. Aristotle disregarded D.'s ethical theory because of its
materialistic foundation and lack of any allusion to teleological
views; but he could have discussed D.'s materialism and rejected
it.
llA£-
c. Seemingly improbable but notCbelievable: Aristotle did
not know D.'s ethical writings.
3. upicurus and his followers declared absolute independence from
, 1 2
D. s influence; they accused him of speaking carelessly or confusing
1. Cicero, de nat. deorum, 1.33.93: "Epicurus....in Democritum ipsum,
quern secutus est, fuerit ingratus" (Usener, Epicures, fr.235, p.175)
Cf. Cicero, de finibus 1.6.17 and 1.6.21 (Usener, fr.234).
2. Diog. Laertius X.8 (Usener, fr.238, p.176.
Arrighetti, Epicuro, p.421): A *i p o Kp i tt> v .
( foolish man?).
Cf. Plut. adv. Colot. 4 p.H08F ( VS 68.B 156).
12.
life, and tried to emphasise Epicurus' Improvements on n.'e theories#''
4# Only Cynics favoured D.'s ethics as far »s they found interest
in them and "it was a:jong them and their allies that his frr. were
preserved*••and probably deformed for more convenient use." Of more
specific Cynic interest is D.'b valuation of pain an: uutnrkela - both
Cynic bywords - and off ' etaasubia, his concern .ith novtunc
(Stewart p. lt>l).
Stewart*® argument is that Seneca in a number of passages
3
similar (In content) to D.V. frr." • ;uot« J his Cynic friend, r.sotriua*
1* Dlog. of Oino&ndu, fr. 6*11. $ ff. w (ahein f.'us. 47 < 189*2) p.436;
Chilton 13; Orilli 40J) facp'Xri fi'AveTfuf dcxuxoO A. xfci
dx<5i?ouJ n<5va:S h;yx' *Xi5 etctv rlttwv fv x^Zi o&ai,
x* 5b Xoiifit vof^cered.
(allusion to frr. 9, 125).
See alsoi .of Oinn r fr. 33 111.2 (VS 68 A 50)J
xv ybp T~ Ariym ntxou xtS xptfcmxat XcSytp*
ubv fX t> fpnev cpdfcrKwv xotS lx«5|*oti nefvqatv stvot 5l\
xbv ttpbi dXXi^Xai atfvxpoumv cr6xHv» .... ' Cnoupoi 6^
\
• I.; s~» ny ry v Ti <*-^ t v k A e11 K>j v ^ r&oyjva v .
<P.hein. 'us. 17 (1392) p. 45^; Chilton, p. 57; Grilll, p. 78).
3. Stewart, op. cit., p. 184.
3. <M C&13 117, 176, 10, 284, 175, 297, 65, 62, 174, 203,
244, 264, 144, 235, 4, 285, 101, 231, 295, 24,
283, 219.
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But Stewart's parallels are not particularly imposing or persuasive
r o Le-
(his hypothesis is a speculation only, as far as it concerns the
of Seneca's friend); and it should be noted that Seneca did not need a
mediator, since he himself in another passage1 mentions a whole and
outstanding book by Democritus: "on Euthuraia".
5. To this evidence add that:
a* 0* was a provincial thinker; he was not known in Athens to
2
his own surprise as he perhaps complains. He visited Athens
some time during the last decades of the fifth century B.C. and
certainly before 399 B.C. (when Socrates was condemned to death), as
is implied from the above reference.
b. )emocritus had no famous discinles. Chance against which
3
he fought seems to have worked against his fame in both these
respects (his provincialism and lack of well-known followers).
c. A general prejudice against materialism discourr ed later
thinkers from studying D.'s system and commenting on him.
6. From the above facts and remarks the following conclusions mi ,ght
be justified:
a. The cultural environment in Greece durin the centuries after
D.'s death was such that thinkers Either ignored his theories or
fought them or did not welcome them. Two philosophical schools
at least with a long history and great influence (we know that) did
not favour D.'s teaching for different reasons (Academy- picureans).
We can also imagine that other thinkers disliked theories
with materialistic orientation.
I
1. De tranquillitate animae II.3.
2. Diog. Laertius, IX 36 ( DK 68 B 116).
3. frr. 119, 197 •
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Democritus had dethroned Fortune, but during the centuries after
his death it was deified not only by individuals but by whole
con unities.
b. Only Cynics from their point of view seemed to have found
interest in some of D.'s ideas, in so far as they^re helped by them.'
Therefore: D.'s ethical writin s were destined under such
conditions to be ignored, forgotten or corrupted.
But we have strong evidence from other sources that some eopies
of D.'s ethical book(s) survived by 3ome way or another and reached the
hands of later writers or collectors who lived during the first three
centuries of our era and whose testimony should be accepted as reliable.
1. Seneca is very clear when writing "'hanc stabilem animi sedem,
Graeci outhumiam vocant, de qua Democriti voluiaen egregium est; ego
»2
tranquillitatem voco.
This is the first item of information about the survival of one
of D."s ethical books; we find it nearly four centuries after his death.
There are strong reasons to accept that Seneca had a copy of D.'s book
at hand:
a. Seneca's expression is very clear affirmation for the
existence of such a book, 'on Euthumia", by Democritus.
b. It is also an expression of admiration (impossible if he had
not read such a book).
c. eneca was writing his own essay on the same subject; it is
reasonable to assume that he had read a book on this subject written
by a forerunner.
1. Stewart, ISO ff.
2. De tranquillitate animi, 11,3.
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It should also be remembered that seneca had some relations with
Egypt and nerhaps with the Library in Alexandria.1
2. At the end of the second century A.D. or at the beginning of the
third, Clement of Alexandria giving a summary of the Abderites's views
on the purpose of life writes: "bemocritus in his book 'on the End'
(teaches) euthuinian.••.and many times he finishes (the chapters of his
2
writing?) by saying:" (fr. 4(188) follows).
It seems improbable that a learned man like Clement could write
this, unless h© had seen and read the book referred to.
3. during the last decades of the third century A.D. Diog. Laertius
was so well informed about D.'s Chief Good (euthumia) that he knew that
others had misunderstood it and he regarded it as his duty to overthrow
> 3
the misapprehensions and give the correct meaning of D. s term. He writes:
"The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure,
1. Seneca, de tranquill. an. 9,5-6.
Cf. also: Seneca's letters (edition with comments by W. Summers,
acmillan), letter 77th^ 3: Seneca's uncle had been viceroy
(praefectus) of Egypt for 16 years} he himself must have had an
estate or business there.
2. Clem, tromata, 11.130 (DK 68B4): <7 3/) \ K ol Zejos
u-qeippUv £<- <oKou € cv * 4 n |U,o lXo $ p.. gV Zuj V Lf>i xijouS>
\ 9 0 / ^ ^ n ^ / i \
ZV)V . KflU TIGAJOLKIS LAl^li ' ~C e L5 ^ Oup
K QKA oi. X Lj> 77 /y\ o u *>S T c^v . . - - _ .
3. Diog. Laertius IX 45 ( DK GSAl.^r).
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as sonie^ by false interpretation have understood, but a state in which
the soul continues calm and strong undisturbed by any fear or super¬
stition or any other emotion."
I cannot find any reason to suppose that Diogenes could attack
previous scholars (philosophers?) and correct them in such a categorical
way, unless he had strong evidence at hand (perhaps a genuine copy of
» > 2
D. s work). lie also gives a list of D. s ethical writings and adds:
"The other works which some attribute to uemocritus are either
compilations from his writings or admittedly not genuine." This is a
further piece of evidence that he used other sources.
The following conclusions seem to be sufficiently justified:
3 ♦ ••
1. D. had written at least one book on ethics ("on euthumia"
according to ^eneca, "on the rind" according to Clement of Alexandria) •
1. Who were they? Perhaps the Cynics as Stewart (op.cit. p.187)
supposes. But why not some hedonists? Such an implication
is more probable. In any case, Diogenes had another source, more
reliable, giving him the right to correct misinterpretations.
2. oiog. Laertius, IX.49: Toe S ev^Uat, ° Tcvts
oci toV ^1' Ik -c<Zv autou rej <f* c^cjo-
, / | 3 n n/
|o u \/hjS C € Ci.V GL •W r/o Ty3 c op .
3. Even the length of some frr. (e.g. 191, 277-9) and the structure
of some others (175, 191, 238, 257, 259, 262) indicate that they
belonged to a longer context, from which they have been extracted.
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2. A copy of such a book was used by Seneca, Clement, and Diogenes;
the same book could have been available later to Stobaeus (our main source
for Beraocritus' frr.)
3* The question formulated by Stewart and accepted by Guthrie has
been answered. We have found a way (to explain the survival of D.'s
ethical writings) which covers the period from D. to Stobaeus.
4. A probable haven (reservation store) for D.'s ethical writings
was the Ptolemaic Library in Alexandria*, the doors of which were open
for Clement and which Seneca also could have visited. That library was
easily available to all citizens of the Boiuan Empire during the third and
fourth centuries A.O.
Perhaps D.'s books found in the shelves of a tolerant and
unprejudiced institution the place which was denied them in Athens.
1. The librarians of that institution would be reasonably interested
in collecting the books of the philosopher of Abdera.
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3* Some considerations on the problem of the authenticity of U.'s fragments
This question has a long history; it first anpeared in Diog.
Laertius' age. Immediately after he had given a list of D.'s genuine
books, he remarked* that other writings attributed to him are either
compilations or fabrications ("admittedly not genuine").
2
For modern scholarship the dispute begun a century ago, when
Lortzing pointed out the problem which briefly is as follows:
The frr. of 0. now included in Diels-Kranz, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker
(fifth and subsequent editions), can be divided into three groups
according to the degree of the authenticity admitted by modem scholars:
1. frr. 1-34 and 116-168 extracted from various sources (ancient
3
authors, commentators, lexicographers) are the only undisputed attributions.
1. DL, IS.49.
2. Main literature: HE Suppl. 12 (1970) col. 208 ff. [Steckel
Z. Stewart, "d. and the Cynics", HSCP 63 (1958) 179-191.
Guthrie, Hist, of Gr. Philos., II 489 footn. 3. He gives a
brief summary of earlier literature.
Schmid-StShlin, Gesch. d. Gr. Liter., 1.5. (1948) 276 ff. for
further literature.
M.L. West, "The sayings of D»", Clas. Rev., 19 (196S), p. 162.
3. Of these 15 only can be regarded as having importance for a recon¬
struction of O.'s ethical theory, namely: 2,3,4, 30, 31, 33, 118,
119, 145, 146, 149, 153, 154, 159, 160.
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2. frr. 35-115 coming from the so-called Democrates' collection1,
are strongly suspected to lack authenticity. Many of them are also
included in the third group.
3. frr. 169-297 survived in Stobaeus* Florilegium. The shadow
of suspicion is also cast on this group, on the ground that up to this
point no bridge has been found to cover the period from D.'s death to
Stobaeus' floruit (over 700 years).
Orelli had published (1819) a collection of over 200 frr.
including the last two groups.
Lortzing investigated the question of identification of the two
names Democrates and Democritus under whose names the two groups had
2 3
survived." Two other scholars of the last century assumed that most
of the surviving frr. should be accepted as authentically Democritean
and tried to reconstruct D.'s ethical work (theory). Their attempt
produced two other problems: the consistency of an ethical theory to
be reconstructed from the surviving frr. and the compatibility of such a
* 4
theory with the rest of D. s system.
1. XpvirocZ were published for the first time
by L. Holsten ius, Home 1638, from a Barberini codex and by
C.J. Orelli, Leipzig 1819, froii a Palatine MS.
2. Lortzing,"liber die etiiischen ir. Demokrits," Sophien-Gymnasium (Berlin,
1873) pp. 1 ff.
3. R. Hirzel, "V-emokr ts Gchrift ft tf>} Eud-U^i^ ", hermes 15 (la79)
354-407.
P. Natorp, Die Ethika des Uemokritos, Marburg (1893).
4. A. Dyroff, Demokritstudien, Munchcn (1899). As it concerns our inquiry
these two questions will find an answer during the research which
follows.
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Important contributions to the question of authenticity were
made by two scholars during the 192c's; one attacking the authenticity,
the other defending it;* both in somewhat polemical tone. li. -iels
had included both these collection.?in his second edition of rr. nonte der
Vorsokratiker" and found a conciliatory but "vague compromise" by saying
that: "investigat on of the content forbids us either to accept them
»♦ 2
all uncritically or to reject them wholesale"" (transl. by Guthrie, Hist.
II, 490).
The controversy continues; all later scholars who study
D.'s moral frr. must first give their opinion on the problem of
authenticity and the nature of the material itself, before saying anything
else about it. Separate investigations into the problem of authenticity
3
have made their appearance too.
4
Stewart casts doubt upon the "foolish men's series" of frr.
1. H. Lalie,"lje beroocriti fragmentis ethicis,"(diss.) Jahroucfa aer
Philosophischen 1'aktiltat in Gottingen, 1922.
H. Philippson, "bemokrits Sittensprfiche", Hermes 59 (1^24), pp- 36?-1 ■
2. UK Fragments 11, 154: Die inhaltliche PrUfung der Democrates-
sammlung gestattet weder alles kritiklos fur echt noch alles xfur
unecht zu halten.
3. 2. Stewart, "ueniocritus and the Cynics", HSCP, 63 (1958), 179-191.
M.L. .test, "The sayings of emocritus", bias. nav* 19 (1969), 142.
C.C.W. Taylor, "pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in .jemocritus",
Phronesis 12 (1967) pp. 6-27.
4. op. cit. p. 191 footn.39. HE 12 col.9 [Helm •
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(197-206), for which Friedl&nder* had shown that they may have been
lifted in their present state from the original work. Stewart argues
that this group "is much more easily explained as part of the well known
Cynic division of the world into wise men and fools or madmen"• His
reference to Diog. Laertius VI.71 does not help his interpretation.
On the contrary, the following remarks support the attribution
made by Stobaeus:
a. fr. 197 is authenticated in its content and terminology by
2
its similarity to other frr. attributed to I). beyond doubt.
b. the content of fr. 202 is included in that of 191 (dovetails
with that of 191).
c. the word X Lp-n'c p,tvot (frr. 2G0, 201) is confirmed by many




d. the tradition about the laughing philosopher —and there are
abundant stories about him — would encourage us to attribute these frr.
1. P. FriedlSnder, "Aufsatz zum 'Ync $K«a. Problem", Hermes 4b (1913)
603-616, (particularly pp. 610-611).
2. fr. 119, fr. 33 (cf. Cp U£-j_co-uvt auc - ^eta-pucr^ol J
fr. 7 C £TUp . Cf. Simpl. Ihys., 28.15 ( DE 68 A 38)
where p u € p- o S ■
3. frr. 4, 146, 232, 211, 191, 194, 235, 188. tore about it in the
paragr. "on Criterion".
4. [Hippocr.] Epist. 10 (IX p. 320 LittrS):... o (sc. A -vj j^o k p i xv sj
j-'t/Jot T7a/toe o p A V .
' <_ \ r\ \ ^ n / ,
Epist. 17 (IX p. 360 LittrS) : . .. X 1.5 ^ F-tv-vj K«.i 6z cS^
0' / r /
pt-^ot-v' p«.<aLVL>|S a oil G «-
Wore examples in EK 68 A 21 and S. Luria, Deuiocritea, pp. 21-22.
C-f. C.F-Lu^, 0. H tree (( C LocfS. J iCzr^ezL ^ V ? {if 5'3'^'J 3-°^ •
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to 0* even if wo lacked the attribution by ;>toba©us* At least the
question arises: why deny the attribution? because of the stylo?
w* i-riecilender1 correctly made a comparison to the well known
beatitudes (.frost the hereon an the i ount) with their repetitive
stylistic device#
4&
one might also recall Kipling's poem "if" with its numerous lfs.~
Finally in defending their authenticity we don't insist that
these frr# were a continuous part of a text; possibly they belonged to
a series of chapters} after each of them a longer text explaining and
justifying each aphorism might have been attached* The collector may
3
then have abstracted for his purpose the aphorisms as they are known to us*
1* op#cit* p* ©10-011*
See Matthew, ch* £ 3*
2* ',» Kipling's Verse, Inclusive edition (2nd impression, London, 1934)
p* 56C•
one more exs pie from Nietzche, given by FriedlHnder (op* eit.
p* ©11): "ich iieb© die, welche, •••• Ich liebe den, welcher
,.»."usw.
3. tewart in is final page (ifll, footn* 44) accepts that "not
all fragments In . tobaeus and the other gnomologies were
preserved, and therefor© subjected to sifting and alteration,
in the same way* omo of the political ones (e«g* B 266),
and some of the longer ones (e*g* B 191), seem pretty surely to
have come to h tobaeus throu^i another an better protected,
excerpting tradition****'*
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Guthrie casts a general suspicion on the authenticity of both groups
arguing (summarising previous literature) that:
"The grounds for suspicion are strong:
1* Many (of the frr.) are, even for their time, extremely commonplace
and banal (36, 50, 53a, 54, 66, 81, 101, 268 and so forth).
2. Some are unoriginal (64, 65, 171, 236) echoing Heraclitus
(40, 119, 85).
3. Some are astonish ing^>ocratic or Platonic: 45 (cf. Gorgias
479 E), 40, 77, 171 (cf. Apol. 30&), 173 (Meno 88A)
The existence of these examples must cast considerable doubt
1. History, II, 489-91. Cf. Stewart op. cit. p. 188 and footn. 42
24
on the selector's trustworthiness."*
1. (a) I shall explain later (in the paragr. on Happiness) that the
similarity (between D.'s fr. 171 and Heracl. fr. 119) is only
apparent and deceptive; the meaning is different.
(b) fr. 268 is not commonplace wisdom more than Lord Acton's
aphorism: "All power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely." Both belong to that kind of wisdom which men
know only after bitter experience.
(c) fr. 236 (and Heraclitus' 85) might have a common origin in
everyday parlance (cf. Chilon's 15: ■ Their
similarity is only apparent and misleading; their meaning is
quite different. According, to Heraclitus fighting desire is
v\ c a p 0 *5' bit
very difficult'; Democritus says it is difficult but it is the
3 /
proper achievement of a reasonable man ( ). He
uses a term of importance in his system of virtues (cf.
in frr. 187, 290). It is reasonable that both these
thinkers make a comment on a common problem, beginning with
the same formula but expressing different aspects (on it).
25
He also seems to accept Stewart's conclusion that D»'s frr.
survived through a Cynic "sieve" and to adopt the following statement
"if the sayings are genuine, the problan is to account for their
survival over 700 years, when neither Plato nor Aristotle shows any
1
knowledge of them."
An account of the survival of O.'s ethical writings is given in
pY-evifK-*
the paragr• Here the grounds for suspicion presented by Guthrie
will be briefly discussed.
1. The fact that some frr. seem to contain commonplace wisdom
is no reason to suspect their authenticity. They beccfne banal because
2
they were true and simple apophthegms.
2. Similarities or even excessive imitation between thinkers
of the same or different ages is not an argument that the work of either
of them is not authentic, particularly when the points of similarity
/ 3
represent less than 3 % of the surviving work under discussion. D. at
least, for his part, confessed that he had visited Athens for the purpose
4
of listening to Bocrates and perhaps he did hear him teaching. Since
1. Guthrie, History, II 489 footn. 3. He repeats his opinion in the
third vol. of his History of Gr. Philos., p, 470 footn. 1.
2. Philippson (Henries, 59 (1924) p. 418) in reply to Lane argues:
"Die AlltSglichkeit vieler SprUcne beweist also nichts gegen
ihre Echtheit....Weil es wahr war, wurde es banal.
3. 5 frr. of uesaocrates' collection (64, 65, 45, 40, 77),
3 frr. of Stobaeus' collection (236, 171, 173).
4. DL 36. Cf. IS 68 B 116.
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they are contemporary, either of the two might be a lender; 3. is
the likelier borrower. It would not be strange if he was influenced
by that acquaintance with a famous and original thinker.
Less fikrprise is justified if we remember that ancient sources
pointed out the parallel between D. and Plato in their co mon doctrines,
1
without suspecting the originality of D.'s work. Guthrie's grounds
0
for suspicion fall mainly on frr. of , emocrates' collection.
It is more perplexing (and I am afraid almost impossible) to
free Democrates* collection from the suspicion of non-authenticity. So
a separate discussion on it might be justified.
Tacts and evidence have priority:
1. All these frr. (DK 68 B 35-115) are short aphorisms very likely
to be instructions for memorising; many are hardly longer than one line.
1. Cic., de orat. II 46, 194. De divin. I. 38. 80( DK 6g Q n)-
Horat., de art. poet. 295 ( DK 68 B 17).
Clement, Strom. VI 168 ( DK 68 B 18).
Cf. RE. Suppl. 12 (1970) col. 208 [Steckelj.
2. To Guthrie's list of common ideas between D. and Socrates should-a^-
be added fr. 83 which sounds very Socratic. Cf. Guthrie, History,
III 450 ff. or Socrates, 130 ff. The idea of close connection
between knowledge and virtue — is remembered — was a widespread
doctrine during that period.
27.
2. Compilations from D.'s books or selections of aphorisms attributed
to him were in circulation in Diog. Laertius' clays, which were perhaps
fabrications.1
3. The only thinkers who v/ere interested in some of D.'s moral sayings
during that period were Cynics (according to a recent and valuable
2 ,
publication on the subject). But is it not possible that D. s
followers would abstract a collection of aphorisms from the writings of
3
their teacher? It could equally have been a hedonist, if we draw
the logical implications from D. Laertius* elucidation of D.'s euthumia.4
But there are some more important difficulties connected
with these frr.
1. DL, IX. 49 ( DK 68 A 33 end).
2. Stewart, 184.
3. We have evidence about the existence of a School of Abdera during
the fourth century B.C.
Cf. Burnet, 157.
See; UK, Fragniente, II . 230—251.
4. DL, IX 45 ( DK 68 AI, 45)i X £. /)o5 E1 v ooc x\a La $ v f+t coV J
9 | ? t T — c r o ? ^
oo r»"|>/ ecu ouGqov ^ o J coj tvio( vol^qc-
K o C <s CLAS r L.S eJtSeJe^-Cc^ ^ 33a KOLA) V
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4. A large proportion of them are included also in Stobaeus* Florilegiuta1
whose source is obviously different and certainly larger (not only
because he preserves many more frr. but also (principally) because most
of his abstracts caenot be characterised as aphorisms to be memorised;
2 3
their structure" or their length show that they are parts of a larger
context, abstracted from it by the collector for his purpose).
5. Some of them are in some way siiiilar to frr. known also from Stobaeus*




G. Democrates frr., it is remarked by Laue, are centred round the
meaning of Koolov Ka,^ou)oV * but this is not accurate, since these
notions are (more) equally frequent in the frr. of Stobaeus' collection.6
1. 31 altogether (namely): 36, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46-49, 51-2, 53a, 55,
57-64, 73, 75-7, 81, 85-6, 88, 108, 111.
fr. 39 is in Stob. Ill.37.22 (not in 25 which DK refer to).
2. 175, 191, 238, 257, 259, 262.
3. 191, 228, 235, 252, 253, 266, 277-9.
4. 84 (244, 264), 44 (225), 107a (293), 43 (174 end), 37 (189), 51 (181),
40 (170-171), 102 (191), 104 (294).
5. Laue, De Democriti fragmentis ethicis, p. 15.
6* Ka/lov ; 38 , 56 , 63 , 73, 102, 112 // 182, 194 , 207 , 274.
d* OL#o V . 35, 37, 39, 48, 62, 69, 79, 93, 108 // 172, 173, 175,
177, 229, 242, 247, 255, 261, 266, 294, 295.
Underlined frr. are included in the two collections.
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By contrast (Lake remarked) Stobaeus' frr. are centred round the concept
of euthumia (and egoism); but this is not an acceptable generalisation.
huthuinia is an important concept1; but justice is also strongly
emphasised as an obligation toward others, indispensable for individual
2
happiness and the life of the community.
7. There remain less tnan half" of the frr. of Democrates'
collection which: (a) are not included in the Florilegiura of Stobaeus,
(b) do not have evident similarity with frr. in it, (c) are not implied
from frr. in it, but (d) which also don't contain ideas which should be
excluded from D.'s teaching on the ground of incompatibility, if the
rest of the Corpus Democriteuin is accepted as genuine.
4
8. Jemocrates collection has a different style, structure of
statements, vocabulary. Namely:
9
a. The conclusive word °vv (therefore) is never used in
» S
Democrates frr. although it is met several times, in Stobaeus.
1. frr. 3, 189, 191, 279, 286, 258, 174.
2. 261, 174, 215, 265, 256, 268, 263, 266.
More about this problem in the Meaning of Good(s).
3. These are: 38, ^5, 50, 53, 54, 56, 65-70, 7?, 74, 76, 79, 82,
83, 87, 89-97, 99, 101, 103, 105-7, 109-110, 112-115.
4. Lake, De Dem. fragm. ethicis, pp. 13-14.
Cf. Diels-Kranz, II 154: Ob der von Laite statuierte
Stilunterschied....muss eine genauere untersuchung lehren.
5. frr. 172, 182, 191, 295 173.
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b. Democrates' aphorisms are categorical instructions; no case of
1
demonstration and conclusion can be traced.
c. Nowhere in Democrates is there an if-then construction leading
2
from a condition to be fulfilled to a result to be attained (aimed at).
d. Words like x * x b, 'p u x ^ '5 o< v <L ^ ^
showing a very probable connection to D.'s genuine vocabulary (used in
3
his physics) are frequent in Stobaeus but non-existent in Democrates.
> d / ' i /
e. The concepts of £ u vv ^ f3 j °< tp tt 1 r-j
can frequently be traced in tobaeus' frr. (and frr. attributed to
4
Democritus by other sources beyond doubt) but not in Democrates.
? / n / /
f. CLu ~C <x.jOk il cc (selfreliance) , d l x ^ ^ fwtppo iri/
» 5
are found only in btobaeus collection.
1. Cf. (on the contrary); 173, 191, 179, 181, 187, 228, 235, 252,
253, 264-266, 275-9.
2* Except the introductory fr. 35. But compares frr. 189, 233, 245,
253, 204.
3. Ko<£ |Uo5 in frr. 5G, 21, 34, 130, 195, 247, 258, 259, 274.
-r'xn in frr. 3(2), 119(2), 176, 197, 210, 269, 293.
p o € p*-o5 in frr. 197 (jo u if*. o<7 vncu.) » 7 £tt ipu jrpu ^ ) »
33 IZ-cc^o S~ fc oT J .
7 /
ln frr. 1B1| 230, 253, 262, 277, 289.
4. Ttp^iS t 4, 146, 188, 194, 235 (cf. also; 211, 200 , 201, 232).
OL Ttp TT \y\ : 4, 174, 188 (cf. also fr. 233).
s 20, 191, 258 (cf. also; 174 , 3, 189 , 279 , 286)
5. OlJ X K U eu S 4 , 209 , 246 (cf. 176, 210; OCu Z dtp K b S J .
: 159, 174, 215, 256, 258, 263.
£ uj <p> p <a S 208, 210, 211, 294.
31.
g. home forms characteristic of the Ionic dialect are found only in
Ktobaaus' collection.*
h. On the other hand some terms describing human character are found
%
in Democratas* collection, but nowhere in Stobaeu*.
9. Additionally, it should be rem*'rked here that, all testimony about
style, particularly his clarity and figurative way of expression
(in frr. like 30, 119, 13S, 159, all coming from other sources than the two
collections) permit the assum tion that his writings were a rich fountain
3
for collectors of epigrams*
From these facts and remarks (ahove 1-8) the following
conclusions might well be Justified:
1* Detiocrates' collection has an obviously different style from
that of 'itobaeus (remark 8)* It seems also to have a different purpose
(rejtark 1)*
HtoS (266), ^xofwv (235), (235),
OH0»s 191, 266, 280 , 209, 288,
(5H(5 a 175, 191, 198, 223, 235, 251, 254.
2* MxmoS 67» ®®» ^6<5xi,|ioS 68 >
K£<fn3 oS 63 , 82, 93 •
3* Cic* de oorat* I•2*49* Orat* 20.67. do d6vin. 11*64. 133i valde
Horaclitus obscurus, minima D*
Dianys * de compos it ione verborum, 24: ,~ % , , .'
(piAoaocpwv 5e HCCX EIITJV
5slav At)u<5xp it(5s xe xat IlXdfrwv xat ' 4.p i ax x * *
todto)V y&p ^xepouS et)pefv diipyavov apcivov xepaaavxa*
xobs XdyouS.
( DK 68 A 34).
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2. Either Democrates' source is considerably poorer than that of
Stobaeus (1, 4) or the intentions of the collector were different. It
is possibly (but not necessarily) the work of a Cynic (3).
3. Characteristic terminology of D. is non-existent in Qemocrates,
abundant in Stobaeus (remarks 8 d-e)•
4. Stobaeus' collection in its style and structure shows that it
might consist of genuine frr. abstracted from a book rich in ideas and
distinguished in style (4, 9, 8 a-c).
5. Though the two collections are dissimilar for the reasons noted
above, they are not unalike in content (remarks 4-7)•*
6. Finally, from all the above evidence, there are strong grounds
for recognising Stobaeus* collection as the genuine work of D. in style
2
and content. And there are strong grounds for the suspicion that
Democrates' collection, at least in the form we know, is not genuine
work of D., although mirroring D.'s ideas; we cannot overlook the
facts (of remarks 4,5,7).
Aalders's opinion seems to be justifiable: "So long as a
fr. has not been clearly proved to be spurious, we have to accept it as
«3
a part of D.'s writings and may not neglect it." In the final analysis
.. 4
the onus proband! falls on the shoulders of those who deny authenticity.
1. Cf. DK II 154: Die inhaltliche PrQfung der Demokrates Satmalung...
2. For some remarks on its survival see in the previous paragraph.
3. G.J.D. Aalders, "The political faith of Democritus". In:
Mnemosyne 4/3 (1950) p. 302.
4. S. Luria, Sur Frage der material is isclien flegriindung der Dthik bei
Demokrit, 3erlin (1964) p.l.
33*
As far as it concerns our research these rules will be followed:
1. frr. 1-34, 116-168, 169-297 are taken as authentic# Our
inquiries will begin with them.
2. From Democrates* collection those frr. will be used without hesitation
which are included also in Stobaeus (e.g. 41, 42, 44, and so forth).
3. From the sap->e group those frr. will be used which show obvious
similarity to those in Stobaeus e.g. 84 (244, 264) or might have similar
implications 107a (293).
4. Some of the remaining fragments of D©;ocrates' collection (nearly
40) will be used if and only if they are not contrary to D.'s ideas.
5. Fr. 299 (sourious in DK edition) will be defended as genuine.
Occasionally also some remarks will be made on the authenticity of other
frr. (e.g. 69, 83).
34.
CHAPTER ONE
emocritus* attitude towards Religion.
The evidence we possess (D.'s own fragments or testimony
coming from other sources) about his belief or disbelief in gods
may be discussed under the following heads:
1. Exclusion of gods from his riacroco3inos.
2. Cautious criticism of traditional rel ious ideas.
3. Explanation of an epistemolo^ical problem: a rationalistic
solution in the Jemocritean J. icrocosntos.
. The problem of Fortune. Theory of Eidola.
5. Implications for his ethical theory and political views.
1. Exclusion of gods.
In the Atomists' Universe necessity is omnipotent and
displaces gods; according to Leukippus* formula: "nothing occurs
at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity."* The
testimony of authors from antiquity leaves no doubt that E. held the
same view. Necessity, we are informed, is the only cause for
2
everything that has happened, is happening or will happen.
1. VS 07 a 2 ( A«St. I. 25. 4 Dox. 321): y iV t
/ In/ 1 c. , ? /
TTOM/CCS a Aofou to I<CU uV Oc v K1J.
2. 68 A 39 ( [Plutarch] Strom. 7 Dox. 581).' TtpoKo-rtX "dp '^vo
/ Q>~? ^ f t 1 / t 17 (
—rf oe^vv ot tT /)^ S T ^ yCyo v o K oc^ t o V Ten. K om_ ££0 p. ,
35.
1 2
Similar information is provided by D. Laertius and Aristotle.'
U.'s description of nature leaves no room for deities. "on
the whole he was inclined to regard the course of the universe as
..3
unaffected oy the gods.
2• Cautious criticism of traditional reli ious ideas.
Let us see whether his Microcosmos is created, or governed,
or in any way affected by gods. He rejects any divine intervention
in human affairs; but he does not attack nopular views in such a way
as to provoke reaction and possibly persecution; at least no such
attack is to be traced.
D. seems to have attempted to make man responsible for his
decisions and actions. Of course such an aim cannot be attained without
denial of popular superstitions and prejudices. In that direction a wide
road had been opened by other thinkers. Xenophanes e.g. was quite
definite in his criticism of the traditional conception of the gods
who mirrored human vices. He attacked outspokenly very respected
poets, Homer and Hesiod, on the ground that they had "attributed to
the gods all qualities that are shameful and a reproach among mankind:
theft, adultery, and mutual deception."^
1. vs 68 a l, 45 (dl ix 45): to£vtoc x£ xoct' &vay>fnv ytVCCT at,
-tffs SCvriS aixCaS ouanS xflS yeveaew^ toxvtwv , t]v dvayktiv
xa\£ t.
2. VS 68 A 66 ( De gener. animal. 789 b 2): A. ... XOCVTa dvayst
els dvayxriv ot* XPTjtofL r\ cpuaiS.
3. Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, I. 355.
4. vs 21 b 11: irdvra 9eo£s dvsGrixav "opripos 9' chato66s te,
ocTcra nap' dv pamotcrtv AvetAea xat \i/oyo* tax^v,
xX'titeiv |iotxe:t5eLV te xat (bnocxetieiv.
36.
During the fifth century DC scientists, rationalists,
realists, and politicians united their voices or actions in their effort
to give a rationalistic explanation of human affairs1 and to deprive
traditional religion of its customary respect. Atheism or
scepticism about the existence of gods and their function or suspicion
of having such irreligious ideas was quite common. Anaxagoras was
1. F.M. Cornford, Greek Religious Thought, London (1950) [1923 ,
pp. 131-157 ( Chs. XII-XIII).
"The fifth century had an almost limitless faith in the powers
of the mind"(W. Jaeger, Paideia, 1.287). The causes and consequences
. of the age of rationalism cannot be analysed here. Only some
repercussions of this movement in the field of ethics will be briefly
outlined.
Scientific ideas about the Universe displaced or at least
reitioved gods ant the connected fear of the gods.
In education nature was accepted as the ground on which
teaching, learning, practice will come to build a human personality;
the aristocratic view of inherited character and morality is
attacked.
This is perhaps the result of some political events and the
cause of others; every citizen in a city-state is entitled to the
right to get into power by vote and/or "'lot", to express opinion
about state affairs, to propose laws. Perhaps it was one (possible)
interpretation of Protagoras' "Homo-mensura" aphorism (V8 80 B 1).
A sense of arrogance was unavoidable; the Greek victory
over the Persians (490-449 SC) was another source of national
36a
arrogance; the consti*uction of a naval empire (of Athens) and the
wealth, in which the new generation grew, led to more arrogance and
misuse of power#
In a period of commercial and political competition the
ethical qualities were gradually pushed to the background and strong
emphasis was laid on intellectual qualities* Absence or displacement
of deities was deeply felt in private, social, political life (Cf*
Sophocles' Antigone, I34f ff.)*
See-Jaeger, op. cit* 1* 287 ff* (Sophists)
1* 382 ff. (Thucydides).
prosecuted for impiety perhaps during the last years of i erieles' office.1
Alcibiades was accused on suspicion that he and his friends mutilated
the " iermae" before the expedition to oicily (-115 .X). Protagoras had
1* The date of this p^o seculiov^ is controversial. According to
Burnet (Greek Philosophy, p. 61) the trial could have taken place
at the beginning of the Periclean Age (before 450 BC). This
dating is shared by Copleston (History of Philosophy, I. 1*83).
It is not intended here to discuss this problem in detail;
a brief review only will be presented. 0. Laertius (11.12) does
not give any hint for dating the trial. Testimony from Plutarch
(Pericles 32.3) allows Victor ^hrenberg (iroin Solon to Socrates,
London, 1969, p» 244) to conclude that "the decree of fliopeithes
concerning atheism has to be dated in 433-2 or 432-1". He goes
on: "jiopeithes, one of the charlatan soothsayers who were
trusted by the people, acted on the instigation of Cleon... The
decree was most likely directed in particular against Anaxagoras."
buch a late dating of the trial was adopted much earlier by
J.b. bury (History of Greece, 3rd. ed., 5 (1956) [ 1951, p. 409)
who connects it with two other prosecutions (of Pheidias and
Aspasia) and writes: "in his last years Pericles had been
ax licted by the indirect attacks of his enemies."
3a*
declared hit* scepticism,1 Kritiae, the fsuaoua oligarchic politician,
2
pWMMir.teu on the stage the view that gods are a huuian invention and
3 rt
Euripides portrayed the debate on the stage#" "The tine, it seemed,
„4
had coswj for the tragic conflict between «mm» ana god to e* resumed*
Toe reasons for the whole a*»ve»«mt cannot be- discussed here,
but the results are of importance, if we are to understand u*'s attempt
to reconstruct huuun Morality on an earthly basis* In Join o, he
was in accordance with his scientific syste® end in agreement with
his a e*
First of alls he played his part in the criticism of trad¬
itional ueliefs* A kino of Theodicy c m he seen in fr* 175j " ut
the gods are th- givers of all good things, both in the past and now*
They are not, however, the givers of things which are bad, harmful,
or not beneficial, either in the past or now, but men themselves fall
•• 5
into tueso through blindness of mirt- and lack of prudence (sens*)"*
1* Vo so b 4s nepl |i£v Qewv o<w e%u) ElS'vai...
2* V.; od b uii (vers* 12-l^j . ..tcuhvoS TtS nat eroepbs yv<'|ir]v
4vi|p*.*t6 Geiov etcytiy^aaxo.
3* fr. ■, vers* 7t cl ncoi'tl 5p~atv ataxp<5v, ouh elatv Oeot •
ataxpbv y&p oti5bv (Tv tfcprjYoOvxai GeoC.
j different views uti the world are .airrorcj above; ©t ileal
absclutisci and religious absolutism*
4* |>* .jaeger, i'aldeia, I* 342*
5* fr* 1731 ot 5b Gsot toicti AvQp'itoicrt 6i6oucri -rdyaQb: navxa
nat it'Xat xat vuv. uXtjv on<5aa M.an\ nat pXapEpSc xat
<Sv(i>qpe\£oc f t'5e 51: ou<te> itaXat oute vuv Gtot AvQpwitoicJt
5f.'po0vtai, &XX' x&xot Tota5Eaiv iiiiteXdSCouat 5i& votf
xu®X ^tt)toc nat dyvaipoauvriv.
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Two implications are clear and distinct:
a* the gods are acquitted,
b. human responsibility is founded on human capacity.
■ e have not yet a rejection of the gods, but an optimistic
vision of human capacity is asserted. I,nn is not predestined to live
in pain and torture, but he must be persuaded that he alone is able to
make his decisions, be responsible for his actions, and guilty for
his misfortunes. This is a form of rationalism.
A question should be raised: bid 0. accept the existence of
gods by writing what is for us fr. 175? Did he infer that gods are
responsible only for good i'rota a previous affirmation of their divinity
and perfection of the. ir nature? Human responsibility emerges so
strongly (from the passa e under discussion) and any intervention of
divine powers is so categorically rejected in other passages (to be
discussed, fr. 119 e.g.) that there remains no probability for an
affirmative answer to the question above. Expressions like that (in
fr. 175J cf. also 217, 234) constitute concessions only to popular
beliefs.* Natura nor, vincitur nisi parenrio and human nature is not
persuaded except by way of concession.
That us in . the word "gods" is only a motto of expression for
D. seems clearer in this passage: "Men ask in their prayers for health
from the gods, but do not know that the power to attain this lies in
1. I. Lana, l/etica dl Uemocrito, in Rivlsta di Filosoficl -i2 (1951)
pp. 20-21.
Cf • H. uiaenberger, benokrits Voretcllung voja bein unci - irkung
der Glitter (in iihein. Mus. 113 (197u) pp. 14d~9).
in themselves; and by doing the opposite through lack of self-control,
they themselves become the betrayers of their own health to their desires."1
Here again gods are not rejected but it is denied that they give help to
men; if men believe so, it is due to human ignorance, lack of self-
control, stupi ity (cf. fr. 197).
In both passages presented above the last proposition
gives the important point which D. aimed to emphasises human capacity
and therefore responsibility. "Nous" in the first case (175), strong
It
will or self-control (egrateia) in the second (2J4) are described and
demanded as human qualities leading to what is good and to health. And
both passages seem to be addressed to people obviously failing to use
their "nous" and e <j Kra^ei
In some other passages D. uses expressions from which it
might be inferred, at first sight, that his attitude towards religious
ideas of his age was friendly rather than hostile (negative). Y/e read:
"it is the mark of divine intellect to be calculating always something
2 ^
noble" or "they think divine thoughts with their mind" or "Homer,
having been gifted with a divine nature..."**. It seems that he found
1. fr. 234: tfyLE'riv 7tap& GeSv alx'ovxai avGpwuoL, t^v
T<xt'TT}s 6i5va|iiv £v dautoLS eyovTeS oi!m laaaiv • Axpaatrj 6£
T&vav-ria -rcpifacrovTeS nnobSxai TtjS iSyiftTis tpctlv
£tci9u]i l jcriv y'vovxaL.
/
2. fr. 112: QsCou vo0 t?> ifi xi 5tocXoytCectGpt vpX<5v.
3. fr. 129: (ppEvl Ge~a voOvtpi.
4. fr. 21: "Opppo^ oiVeMS Xoty* v Qe i,ctCoi5cT)S. ..
Cf. also: frr. 37, 189 (last sentence).
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more convenience in using such expressions for his ideas and hoped at
the same time by expressing them in current terms to v/in a wider
audience. In the final analysis he was not a dogmatic (opponent)
persecutor of religious ideas but a tolerant tninker; according to
tradition he used to laugh at and not get angry with human absurdities,
expressions like these in the passages above are used in everyday
parlance to emphasise nobility and greatness. with the same meaning and
In accordance with the same tendency Epicurus writes: "&o you will
live like a god amongst men.
D.'s rationalism is obvious when he allegorises Athenas'
epithet "Trito enela"; "he identifies the goddess with the three
excellences (by saying that): Prudence...(is) good counsel, unerring
speech and right action.Such allegorising was popular in the
fifth century; but it is difficult to accept that this phenomenon does
not express a disbelief or a shaken belief. D.'s fr. 2 must be
discussed and understood In connection with hiu effort to explain how
people came to believe in gods; behind their names he saw powers
of nature and moral conceptions as will be argued in the following
paragraph.
1. Third Lette : To Menoiceus (paragraph 135) (Usener, Epicurea, p.66,
Arrlghetti, Epicuro, p. 117): . ..t'Hcrfl wS 0£<!>£ £v
<£v9p'J)7ioiS.
2. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 196.
Fr. 2: iToy 've ta r) 'AOnva".... in xov ypoveZv xp'a xavxa
PouXetfecrOai xtrXu?, Xryr.tv dvanncpxrfxr'S naX ixoaxxEiv
a 5e t. Cf- G 8 A /(> ■
3. Per contra Bee KicGlbbon, The Religious Thought of Democritus (in
Hermes, 93 (1965) p. 397, footn. 1.
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On the other hand, to characterise the A derite thinker as
"ein liSmpferi3Ciier Atheist....unversShnlichste Gegner des Theologismus"*
is — in view of his own fragments and of what is recorded of him —
a onesided and biassed explanation. He was a thinker independent enough
to be an agnostic on religious problems and tolerant to other people's
beliefs, while he faced another difficulty with the very existence of
.
religious beliefs.
1. Grosju Grosew, Der Materialisnus des D«, pp. 217-8.
43.
/
3. Explanation of an epistemological problem: a rationalistic
solution in the Jemocritean Liicrocosmos.
D. was first of all a physicist, i.e. a scientist seeking
an explanation for everything; his teacher, Leukippus, was the first
to formulate what we call the principle of sufficient reason:
"everything happens out of reason.D. tried to find a cause
for every phenomenon in nature and event in human life; the
2
enthusiastic spirit of investigation inherent in his vast scientific
programme is beautifully expressed in fr. lid; he used to say that
» 3
"he would rather discover one cause than gain the kingdom of Persia."
All his life was a restless attempt to find truth in the ?»-acrocosmos
and Microcosraos. He tried to form an episternology consistent with
his scientific system and a corresponding theory of sensation, according
to which perceptions must correspond to external realities. Now he
4
was confronted with an epistemological problem. In the Macrocosmos
gods had no function, either in the creation or in the government of the
universe; but expelled through the door gods returned through the
window of the Democritean Microcosmos. Belief in gods is an
1* vs 67 b 2: o{>5£v xoripoc patriv y'vexaL, i\\& x'vtoe £x
\oyou re hoc I t3tc' ivdcyvr)*.
2. Kurt v. Fritz,'TouS, vosiv and their derivatives, p. 26 n. 161.
3. fr. lis: A. . ..e\eye jSouXea ctt |iaUov pa • v euoeiv octxio-
Xoytav p t?]v Hepawv ot pacriXeiav yeveaGai.
4. W. Jaeger, The Theology of early Greek philosophers, p. 180.
44.
undeniable fact. O. had to meet this problem not only because of his
scientific inclination but also in order to (protect) defend his
whole system. If the existence of gods was asserted explicitly or
silently in the " icrocosmos, why should they not have a place in the
I.;acrocosmos? An adequate solution should be acco >v p •'«Wd in two
stages:
a. a persuasive explanation of the fact that many people believe in
gods and perform a variety of religious actions,
b. an explanation of some other phenomena, which, without.,
belonging to religious concepts strictly speaking, are nonetheless in
many cases closely connected with religion (prophetic dreams, belief
in Chance)•
According to §extus Empiricus1 0. shared with other t inkers
the view that men came to form conceptions of divine beings because of
the fear which they felt when confronted with powerful, astonishing
and sometimes dangerous natural phenomena (e.g. lightning, thunder,
etc.); i.e. men believed that such phenomena were caused by divine
beings or gods• There is noreason for doubting that D. adopted this
opinion. But in some fragments of his more elaborate views are
expressed. In a beautiful passage (fr. 30), which probably
c
. _\
1. IX. 24 (VS 68 A 75) : oAw/taj ... . z o as ^£rt-
"H ec.-9" JVZ° J~LouS °Lo/e£-
V/OL tcoaec.
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belonged to a book on the History of Civilisation.1 D. says: "of the
1. See oiels-Kranz comments on both B 30 and B 5.
Cf• G# Pfligersdorffer, und die Aoflioi orvUpwiroi bei
Demokrits Fr» 30, p. 6: "oas Fr« als Bruchsttick einer
Beligionsgeschichtlichen Darstellung."
For reasons to be explained in the discussion which follows
it seems purposeful (interesting) to quote here the two
versions of this fragment which survived in Clement Alexandrinus'
writings, from which DK*s 68 B 30 (combination of terms and
syntax):
a* Protr. 68: oQev otix due ihc5xms o at)}io'o txoS nxtov
Xoy uov dvQpwirwv AXCyouS 9r)cn'v dvaxEivovxas x&S x£~PaS
£vxauQcc, ov vuv i^epa KaXeoitev ot w,1XXt]veS» ! itavxa]
a ca yvqetooa i....
b. stromata V. 102: "H6r) wS ^txEiv t3xt' a&yotw
o Ari|i'xpixOa ctvat x'verS AX'youS yo'fPEi xvv
dvPpf'mov , o't dvaxe ivotvxeS x*/s xr~PaS £vxa09a,
ov vuv f)£na xxXsoprv ot "eXXtiveS , <90071^ Ttavxa ZsbS
ud0EExat• ■ • •
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learned men, a few, lifting their hands thither to what we Greeks call
the Air nowadays, said: *£eus thinks of all things and he knows all
and gives and takes away all and is king of all*."*
dome questions of exegesis arise:
a* Who are meant by the term "Logioi"? G. Pfligersdorffer
discusses a variety of interpretations: religious leaders,
learned men, inventors, great personalities in human civilisation;
it seems that only the first interpretation is well fitted to
the context*
1* fr. 30 (Clem* Protr* 68. Strom. V. 102): XoyffoV
dv0p(OTCojv 6\Cyoi dva-ueivavxe* x&w xr-~PaS ivxafiQa, ov
vuv f)',pa HaXco|iev ol EM vei * "rAvxa, -£tx;av>,
Sebs p.u0£xai (?) Hat navB' obxoi ot6e xat 61601 nat
(i^aLpcexat xal (3aai\ebS oSxoS x~v mxvxwvl
E. Norden (Agnostos Theos, Leipzig-Berlin, 1913, p. 163 footn. 2)
divided it in 3 semicola as shown above; he showed that the first
<Je.j-/vt£n^
is similiter -oadonc (homoiteleuton) with the second and that the
whole passage is a rounded sentence ( xfolvtac - a,^ tujV ) •
2* /\c^<-°S und die /jc^io/ clvfipuj-q 0(_ bei )emokrit, in ioner
Studien, 61 (1943) pp. 5 ff.
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The same term ''logioi", with a second meaning (learned men) is
repeated in fr. 299 where D. is recorded as saying: "...I have heard
very many logioi..."
1. fr. 299 ( CIement 1. lo.69): K* i. ll~v uOV T[^| t L ~
1 /
£TTV||<-eu <S ol. - ■ ■ ■
Authenticity of the passage is denied by DK who include it in the
list of "Unechte" (VS 11.208); its content is not in accord with D.'s
expected modesty. Nevertheless his expressions (seen from a
psychological point of view)could be uttered by a man who:
a. was not accepted by Anaxagoras (DL IX.41; VS 68 B 5) and
consequently travelled to foreign countries for his education and
became an outstanding scientist,
b. visited Athens some time before 399 cC and to his surprise was
not known there by anyone (DL IX.36j VS 68 B 116) although he was
then one of the most important scientists of his day. (Cf. F.M.
Cleve, The Giants of Presocratic Philosophy, pp. 399-400. Also:
F. dnriques - M. Mazziotti, Le Dottrine di Democrito, Bologna
(1948) p. 3). See also Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 1.318:
"•Jhe emphasis that was laid here on the mere scope of his culture and
achievements is in full accord with our conception of the man in
whom we recognise less of the initiative faculty of invention
than of the erudition which continues and expands it. Nor w ould
we be repelled by the boastful tone that is taken...."
Two more reasons to accept the authenticity of the passage are:
a. the content of it is confirmed by other sources (DL IX 35. See
also: Luria, Democritea, pp. 15-16),
b. in it is found the tern logioi (which led us to this reference);
and this term is unique in the Presocratics.
cf. ctUc p. 3 ir of iiu sjicc/y.
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Seinhardt* thinks and Diels-Kranz accept (VS 68 B 30,
commentary) that "mit dm Logioi, die Zeus als Gott des Himmels
verehren, meint er die Weisen der vorhellenischen Urzeit."
Luria (Desnocritea, Leningrad, 1970, p. 576, ho.580~) asks
himself whether logioi belonged to the original text of D. or was added
by Clement (who preserved both B 30 and B 299); but in B 299 this
term is found in the middle of the passage; therefore we have no
reason to doubt that he copied this term with the passages mentioned.
Luria rejects any relation between fr. 30 and Lucr. V.1105 (op. cit.
p. 577).
On the other hand, the use of the national name Hellenes
gives us the impression that D. opposes them to non-Hellenes; it is
reasonable to accept that he makes an allusion to the oriental origin
2
of religious beliefs.
1. Hermes 47 (1912) 511. Cf. Lucr. V. 1105J particularly
interesting for the origins of religious belief and tradition
is Lucretius V. 1155 ff.
2. Herodot (11.52 ff.) shares such a view.
It is not irrelevant that Zeus' name is of oriental
origin (Sanskrit, dyau s> sky). See: E. Boisacq,
Dictionaire Etymologique de la Langue Grecque, p. 308.
H. Frisk, Griech. Etym. Worterbuch, 1.610.
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b. What is the meaning of fr. 30? Clement uses the extract in
order to support his views that ancient philosophy was but a
preparation for Christian doctrines.1 0. Gilbert (Griechische
Religionsphilosophie, p. 478) accepted such an interpretation and
presented D. as a theist and dualist. McGibbon (op. cit. p. 397,
footn. i) saw the fragment as an expression of respectfulness. Bailey
•
. k • .
(op. cit. p. 175), on the contrary, saw in it an ironical tone and
noted: "D......says with an obvious note of contempt....logion".
c. It seems that by examining the fragment itself one might
discover a clearer answer to D.'s purpose (and the meaning of his
allusion)•
1. "what we call the Air nowadays"...: a reasonable
implication is that: now we have recognised that it is the Air;
therefore Zeus is displaced and whatever the "logioi" have said
2
about Zeus is unacceptable.
2. "Logioi...said"•«•: it is more than evident that D.
comments on how religious ideas were ori inated; it does not
mean that he accepts them. [On the meaning of the passage there
can be no doubt: it is certainly a reference to the origin of
religion." Lifting the hands implies an expression of thanksgiving
1. P. BShner - E. Gilson, Christliche Philosophie, zweite Auflage,
Paderborn (1954) pp. 33 ff.
2. Cf. Euripides fr. 941: toutov (sc. tbv atOcpce) v<5|tiCE
Zffva, t<5v5' tY/oA 9eov.
fr. 877: at0T)p.... Zebs oi &v9p'-rtoi J vo\iCZsTai.
Aristophanes, Clouds, 828: AtvoS j3aai\£U£l T?)V ACa
£F,£\r)\aHwS.
Cf. also: VS 64 (Diog. of Apollonia) B 4, B 5.
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or supplication; ther fore thankful feelings and/or supplicatory
disposition are regarded as sources of religious beliefs.
D.'s intention seems to have been rather to criticise the
very existence of belief in divine beings and to find a solution to
the question: how this belief came into existence; it was an
epistemological problem for him. Despite the fact that Clement used
the extract under dispute for his own purpose,1 the very wording of
it regains witness of the original purpose intended by its author;
and it is very reasonable that the meaning of the passage should agree
with the whole system and the general plan not of the excerptor but of
the original author, whose views are known from other passages of his
own (explicitly or by implication).
5harp criticism e.g. is directed by D. against persons who
create fables about retribution in the hereafter, because of their own
bad conscience: "some men, not knowing about the dissolution of mortal
nature, but acting on knowledge of their sins, afflict the period of
life with anxieties and fears, inventing false tales about the period
1. For the way in which Clement uses D.'s text (fr. 3a) a comparison
would be useful with another passage (fr. 33 in btromata vi.151j
Patr. Gr. viii. .1357) where Clement commenting on D.'s text explains:
hoc! Sniveyxev oOSbv p couctel ir\acr0f)vai tol(5v6e rj xp<5vw
at paQifaet tiETffTUTCooBffvoct' ajjicpro yap o upiOb TmoEOX^xai
-tb pbv vrx\ t^)V SrpiLO'jpyCav xb 5b wxxh t?)v TffS
AiaQi^xr|s ivaXTfcxfv te Hat AvavEumv.
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after the end of life."^
A number of important problems are touched on in this passage;
and they have equally important implications in Oemocritean Ethics:
1. fr. 297: evioi Qv^ttK <purrea)S 5i<fXucriv obx g: £.<5f5xe:S
avHo-imoi, oweiS^frrt 6b xtK £v x~ 3t; xaxoxpaYIROcruvriS xbv
* *
r r
xrfs ptoxf)S xn(5vov "taper/ . xal tp^BotS xaXamiopEOUcri,
\lrr\55ra itepl tou |1ex\ xb)V xeXeux^v liuBoxXaPx^ovxeS
yp<5vou.
Nilssan (Greek Piety, transl. by H.J. Rose, Oxford, 1948
p. 83) characterises it as a "protest" against beliefs in the
underworld an 1 the punishments expected there; he also recalls
(in connection with this passage) Plato's Introduction to the
Republic where the old Kephalos is represented as saying "that
when death draws near, a man who formerly gave no thought to
such matters is seized with fear about the myths of the punishment
of evil-doers in the underworld." It is obvious that Nilsson
refers to Rep. 330 D-E. Gf. his Greek Popular Religion,
New York, 1940, pp. 118-119.
Cf. also: Aeschylus' Persae, 497-99 (the Persian messenger is
speaking): ... Qeob* 51 xtS
xb xplv vop'Cuv c&6a|iot> x<5x* "nuyexo
Xixafpi, y/Lav otipavov te 7ipoaHUV~v.
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a. Soul is mortal} this declaration is in complete agreement
with the atomic theory.^
b. Bad conscience is the origin of a retribution in the hereafter.
c. Therefore, religious conceptions are the unreal offspring of a
bad conscience. ^
d. Fables about retribution hereafter disturb life; such
disturbances abolish what is for D. the "sunaaum bonum", i.e.
euthumia.3
e. Retribution, according to D., comes in man's own inner life,
4
which constitutes his own Hell. The road is left open for
freedom and responsibility.
Remarks c and d above perhaps explain the angry and polemical
tone — unusual in D.'s manner — of fr. 297.
It should be remembered that this fragment has been declared
unauthentic on the ground that the word syneidesis was not used up
to D.'s days in the meaning which it must bear in this case.' This is
partly true; but the corresponding verb "synoida" can be found with
1. 68# 109 ( A*et. IV.7.4;Dox. 393) I A. (sc. ^
~Cuj 6,WcTcO(,C|3'l5"fc.upo(U.£.>'^V-
See the paragraphs "rind-body problem".
2. W. Jaeger, The Theology, p. 181.
3. See the paragraphs: "duthumia", "Presuppositions of Eu."
4. Jaeger, op. cit. 181. Cf. fr. 174 (ad fin.)
5. P.W. Schonlein, Zur Entstehung eines Gewissensbegriffes bei
Griechen und Romern (in Rhein. Mus. 112 (1969) 289-305).
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with the aarae meaning in Euripides' Orestes (vers. 305-6 apud ; tob.
III. 24. 5)1, where Venelaus asks: iserahle Orestes what Illness
destroys you? and Orestes answ rs: "lemorse, that I am conscious
(synoida) that 1 have committed horrible actions".
2
Since the term syneidesis is perhaps not a new one in the
case of fr. 297, but is only used with a modified ineanir;-,;, our interest
must reasonably be limited to the questions what is here the sense of
the word?
On the other hand syneidesis in D.'s ethical theory is
accompanied by other terms, e.g. metameleia (remorse, fr. 43), aid5s
(self-reppect, fr. 179), aidoisthai (to be ashamed, frr. 64, 244, 264),
and law of the soul (fr. 264), which torether constitute fundamental
conceptions in his system.
Finally, a new tern or a new meaning of an old one cannot
be regarded as anything unusual or improbable, especially in the case
of a thinker whose tendency was to use unusual or old, as well as
3
sometimes new, terms and whose aim was to cv-ectie. an ethical theory
not dependent on. the will of the ods or their caprices, but a theory
based on individual human responsibility.
*• xt XP%a isaaxEiS; TCS <T'Ait<5X*unriv v<58oS;
rj atjvECTia, ort cri5vot6a Se'v' etpyaaji'voS.
2. tob. hi. 24. 11-125 BfaS tp xpTstS xC <xv eiri t~v uaxh
•tbv Sfov aoo3ov, etnev ' 6p9?) cruvef6r|cftS. IiepfavfipoS
dp: ttjQeCs xC tiv £XEuOepiToc, etitev " dyotB?) auveCSricri^.
3. Cf. frr. 129 ff.
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So D.*s attempt to explain actual religious belief can be
summarised in two points:
a. mistaken inference from terrifying natural phenomena.
b. psychological projection (expression of thanksgiving or
supplicatory feeling or fear of retribution in the hereafter).
A third (parapsychological) explanation will be discussed in
the following pages (on Eidola).
4. The problem of Fprtune. Theory of Eidola.
If D. was finally to have cleared his Microcosmos of gods
and any substitute for them, he had to provide an explanation for some
further phenomena and superstitions, e.g. dreams, prophetic dreams,
influence of Chance, precognition.1
There is a beautiful at ack on the deification of Fortune in
fr. 119: 'men have fashioned an image of fortune as an excuse for
their own stupidity. For fortune rarely conflicts with intelligence,
1. On these problems important contributions have been published
in recent years by P. J. Bicknell: D.'s theory of precognition,
REG, 82 (1969) pp. 319-26 and Democritus: Parapsychology again,
REG, 83 (1970), pp. 301-304.
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and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent
sharpsightedness•"*
The rationalist character of D.'s thought is evident here;
fortune, according to him, is an "idol" ^e. 7 )
which men created as an excuse for their laziness of mind and
consequently for their failure. But, as a matter of fact, in human
affairs an intelligent and active mind can exercise foresight, with
2
success. Chance is only the measure and offspring of our ignorance
1. fr. 119: av"nwrcot xtSxT* elfitrXov £*n;XacravTO 7Tp<5<pacn,v l5'r)S
<*!3ouXrnS. y&p cppoviicrei tux1! paxetai., T& 6£ TiXeiaxa
£v fiCc E&F,t5vexoS 6l;u5epHELr) HaxiGuvei.
Meineke's writing ( see V3 II 167, co mentary) raises a
difficulty of interpretation: if phronesis is weak ( vouvi as
dative of the adjective refers to Cfpov^et ), it must be defeated
by fortune, which contradicts the following sentence of the passage.
If is an adverb, then #<u>t equals &eu.ot, .
Cf. Epicurus* sent. 16 (Usener, p. 17, Arrighetti, p. 127)1 ppct
<709$ ti5xt) n<xpe\XTiCizxE i, -c3c 61; peyi^xa Hal xupidoTocxa o
Xoyocrpbi 6 iwxricje... . ,r
2. It is strange that Langcrbeck ( Aoji.; ' titr i|0 u r p.i ^ P* 53)
found a contradiction in this fragment: "Auf Grund ihrer eigenen
i atlosigkeit haben die Menschen das Jild der Tyche gebildet. Und
unmittelbar darauf....sie kSmpft mit der Phronesis". But in th
second proposition fortune is not a reality — as Langerbeck wrongly
supposed — it is in D.'s view the personification (conceptualisation)
of what is incalculable in human affairs (as they concern the future
or the intentions of other people)•
J
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(of causes, of future conditions, of changing situations, of intentions
of other people). Fortune had no room in D.'s Physics;''' now it is
expelled from the field of ethics; necessity rules there; phronesis will
be recognised as the ruler here.
Another famous thinker of the late fifth century BC, the
historian Thucydides, fought no less persistently to dethrone the idol
of fortune. His thoroughgoing observations aimed at explaining how
that image is exalted by men, although it represents nothing at all in
reality. He says: we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for
2
whatever turns out contrary to our calculations. Elsewhere he
emphasises human capaciti s as opposed to fortune and hope, which is
3
strong in perplexity only, where there are incalculable conditions.
Do's aphorism seems to be the first appearance of a conscious
4 5
attack against this popular idol. Neither in the Presocratics
1. See Arist. Physics 195 b 36 ( VS 68 A 68)
and ae generat, animal, 789 b 2 ( VS 68 A 66),
Cf. VS 67 B 2,
2. Thucyd, 1, 140.1: .„.T^V tuynv, oaa av napSc Xoyov
etwQapev atxtacfQai.
3. Thuc. II. 62.5. Cf. IV.62.4, II. 87. 2-3, III.45.6.
4. Vie cannot say with certainty that it is prior to Thucydides'writing;
but D.'s view of fortune is connected with his (and Leukippus') Physics,
which in all probability is a theory prior to the work of Thuc.
5. Two cases can "accompany" D.'s radical attack against any conception
of fatalism:
a. VS 88 B 21 (Kritias): ... toictiv e6 cppovoffcn aupiaaxet xi5yr).
b. VS 85 B 1 (Thrasyraachus): ^ a 9EWV eoya stvotL
|Tn5£ xuynS AXX& x~v £7U|ieXr)9£vxu)v( V.S TL-32i-f-it) .
57.
nor in classical tragedy can such an outspoken opposition to the phantom
2
of fortune be found.
1. A kind of fatalism is sometimes apparent in Greek Tra edy. See
e.g. Aeschylus' Persae 345 ff., 405 ff., Sophocles' OT, 977-9, Antig.
1158 ff. Of course these and numerous other examples should not
be pushed to logical consequences, which would transform the
characters of the Tra edy into simple puppets (See D. Page,
Introduction to the Agamemnon, Oxford, 1960, particularly pp. XXIII-
XXVIII• I express my thanks to Prof. A. J. Beattie, who drew my
attention to D. Page's pages). In many cases fortune is only
another personification of Justice (for wrongdoings committed by men).
"The Gods only pre ict; they do not compel". (H.O.F. Kitto, Greek
Tragedy, 3rd. ed."(1966), p. 147) The only case of direct divine
intervention is that of Athena in the Ajax where she makes Ajax mad.
Otherwise the characters are acting according to their decisions.
( ee Kitto's remarks on OT and Heracles on p. 148 of his book).
But straight and clear denial of Fortune's existence and intervention
is nowhere traceable before D.'s fr. 119. Sophocles touches in some
way this problem sub personae Iocastae (OT 915-6).
2. Aristotle shared siftilar views; he observes (Metaph. 1065 a 30-35)s
chance is....a cause only accidentally, but in the strictest sense
is a cause of nothing.
It seems that D.'s aim was to dethrone fortune in order to
give a place to human virtues and responsibility# lie remarks elsewhere:
"fools are shaped by the gifts of fortune; but those who understand
these thin s, by the gifts of wisdom."1 Wisdom (197) and phronesis
(119) are opposed to fortune; i.e. human capacity is opposed to tie
caprices of a hantom.
Having free his Universe of the presence and intervention
of gods and his f icrocosmos of the caprices of fortune D. was finally
confronted with a class of phenomena which in modern terms are called
parapsychological. He tried to find a cause, but he was not successful
in finding a persuasive solution to the problem. His theory of
Eidola (images, phantoms) - fragmentary as we know it — seems to be
a heroic effort on the part of a strongly scientific character to find
the answer to a problem of causation. It cannot be said that he himself
was satisfied with his solution. It seems probable that he tried at
some time to modify his own theory; at any rate, he did not avoid
criticism an misapprehension. But let us first consider the sources.
1. fr. 197: AVOI^jiO V £ a fcuOpOUVTat TOti TT) 5 TUXTlS XEp5e0lV,
ot 5£ t~v toi£vSe 5a^u veS toTi Tffi aocptriS.
A very characteristic term of atomic Physics seems clearly to
be behind the verb of this passage. Jf. 68 A 38 ( )»
B ¥» (£lUpU0|llTl) » B 33 (p,£TapU0p.Ol) , A 132
(|i£TappuQ(i£C£cr9oci).
59.
Accordin to Sextus bmpiricus1 "u. says that certain eidola
come ini-o contact with human beings. Some of these eidola benefit
men and others do them harm, and for this reason D. used to pray that
he might meet with well-disposed eidola. The eidola in question are
large an of e traordinary appearance (gigantic); they are not easily
destroyed, but they are (also) not indestructible; they foretell future
events; when they do this they are visually perceived and they
communicate by speaking. Perception of such entities led the men of
earlier times to surmise that a god existed. In fact there is no such
thing as a bein with an immortal nature, which is what we normally
understand by a god; the notion arises purely from misinterpretation
2.«
of impressions of the eidola.
1. Adv. ?:ath. IX 19 ( VS 68 B 166): A. £i5tr\d TlVCt cpi)cnv
£|HTe\aCetv toiS dvOo'-rcoiS xcrt tout' v x\ |f£v eTvat
dyotGoiroid hcexotcoioc* "vOev xat euyeTO eflXoyxwv
TUyrTv rt5w\wv... Tiie translation above is taken
from B. J. Bicknell, >.'s theory of precognition, REG 82
(1969) pp. 318-319.
2. cf. 68 A 78: jieaxov xe elvaci xbv depa toutoov (sc.
e 16 *Xwv).
60.
According to D.'s epistemology knowledge of objects can be
obtained either through the senses(by perception) or through the mind
by thought. In both cases the process of apprehension is exactly the
same; minute, spherical atoms within the perceiver or thinker are
disturbed and rearranged through actual physical contact with objects.
So, atomistic e istemology must preclude acquisition of knowle ge of the
future.
But the theory of eidola continues as follows: " D. says
that simulacra penetrate through Its pores into the human body and having
got there they are responsible for the things seen in sleep. These
simulacra come to us from everything, from furniture, from clothes,
from plants and especially from animals because of their motion and
warmth. The simulacra are so constructed as to be replicas of the
emitting object or creature and, according to D., in the latter case, they
incorporate and carry alon ; with them copies of the motions of his
soul* The motions include those that ar^ responsible for the
intentions, the attitudes and dispositions of whoever emits the
simulacrum reach their recipient and, just as if they themselves were
living creatures, they acquaint hira with the views, the calculations and
the impulses of the individual who is their source. All this is
likely to happen, it should b pointed out, if the simulacra are
1. See Uicknell, op. cit., p. 321*
On D.'s theory of sensation see: Aristotle, de sens. 442a 29
C VS 68 A 119), Theophr. de sens. 63 ( VS 68 A 135, 63).
Cf.Bailey, Greek Atomists, 178. Guthrie, History, II* 438-41.
c-f. Prr- (1, (if.
61.
press ved complete and undamaged when they are received."'1'
There can be no doubt that we are confronted here with a
theory of telepathy or prophetic dreams. Aristotle makes an allusion
2
to it (only to reject it);" by doing so, he confirms the attribution
of the theory to Democritus.
Combiningthe evidence given above one might remark:
a. These beingiCci ola), surpassing human standard in size,
were designed to move through the air (see 68 A 78) and enter our bodies
and reach our most diverse organs and by direct impressions on our
senses —• by appearing to us in dreams and speaking to us — they
were to exercise beneficial or malignant influences. They were not
easily destroyed, but nor were they im ortal.
b. According to Favorinus (in Plutarch's narration, 68 A 77)
eidola are emitted from objects, while according to Sextus (B 166)
eidola are described as independently existent beings themselves. An
incompatibility between the two sources, as it concerns the nature
and origin of eidola, is obvious.
1. Plutarch, uaestlones conv. VIII.10.2 p. 734 F ( VS 68 A 77): ...
o <pT)ffi A., ^yxatapvacroffaeai xh ei5co\a 6i& t~v -rttfpwv
E t s T& 0' [iTTfl. . . The translation quoted above is t iat
of Bicknell, op. cit., pp. 323-4.
2. On prophecy in sleep, 464a 5-6: TOl<5v6' uv etp |ia\\0V T) WCFTCEp
X'yei A. ei5w\a xat diroppoiaS atTtwjievoS.
62.
c. At first sight all information we have about these mysterious
phantoms seems to be irreconcilable with D.'s scientific system;
he had denied fortune strongly, but now he seems to be introducing
another external factor, on which human life is dependent.
When problems of incompatibility or inconsistency arise,
questions of authenticity or interpretation are raised. S. Luria
1 2
denied the authenticity of fr. 166 and all related testimonies;
3
H. Eisenberger unhesitatingly regards it as authentic.
On the other hand, fr. 166 presents problems of interpretation;
af
the verb £ VX£"co (he prayed or wished) may be understood in
either of two different meanings with unacceptable implications. The
first (he prayed) is irreconcilable with fr. 234; prayer for D. is
meaningless. The second still makes human life and human happiness
dependent on external powers, which is incompatible with Democritean
Ethics of individual responsibility (see frr. 119, 197, 264). How
little D. makes inward happiness dependent on fortune, we have alteady
seen; and his insistence on human responsibility is to be discussed in
detail later (when frr. 170, 171 and 264 will be analysed).
1. S. Luria, Zur Frage der materialistischen Begrlindung der Ethik bei
Demokrit, Berlin (1964), 4-5.
2. S. Luria, Democritea, pp. 571-75.
3. H. Eisenberger, Demokrits Vorstellung vom Sein und Wirken der
G'otter, in Rhein, Mus. 113 (1970) p. 142.
63.
In accordance with the meaning attributed to fr. 166 different
conclusions are inferred: (a) on the one view a kind of prophetic
1
communication by the gods to men Is to be seen in this crucial passage,
(b) on the other, "d. did not deny the gods altogether, but relegated
them to a twilight realm of 'materialised psychical phenomena', where
even though divested of their own peculiar power and significance,
„2
they could still bring about good fortune or bad#
Despite the difficulties and the uncertainty of interpretation
3
it seems very likely that the theory of eidola belongs to D. and
originally constituted an explanation of a real problem, i.e. the origin
of dreams, especially of these dreams, which were believed to foretell
the future. A part of what is recorded for D. verbally (in A 77 and
B 166) amounts to the following: the eidola visit men, enter our
bodies and so produce direct impressions; this part is compatible with
D.'s theory of sensation. But the other item of information that d.
himself wished (or prayed) to meet with fortunate eidola cannot be
accepted, unless its meaning is modified to a wish for good dreams
or good weather. For an entire surrender of life to accidental
occurrences would be irreconcilable with the rest of D.'s ethical
theory^ yee ej. -Pr. Ii<j)-
1. McGibbon, D.'s religious thought, p. 394.
2. Jaeger, The Theology, p. 181.
3. Aristotle, On prophecy in sleep. 464a 5-6.
64.
In ancient times Cicero had already c ri'-fci cised D. ■for'
wavering on the problem of divinity.* "At one moment he (D.) holds
the view (a) that the universe includes images endowed with divinity,...
at another he says (b) that there exist in this same universe the
2
elements from which the mind is compounded, and that these are gods,
••••at another (c) that they are animate images, and again (d) that
they are certain vast images."
In the actual teaching of D. these scattered doctrines
probably formed a consistent whole: the basis of the world is
particles in space; groups of them form vast beings of long life
but not everlasting; some of the particles floating off from their
place enter the soul, itself composed of similar particles.••• So
the Abderite scientist-philosopher tried to solve a parapsychological
problem; his solution is neither complete nor convincing; but it is
3
consistent with his whole system. He was looking for a cause.
His theory of eidola was no doubt mistaken, but not necessarily
irrational or unscientific.
1. Cicero, De natura deorum, I. 43. 120.
2. Perhaps only in connection with the second point of Cicero's
criticism is it possible to understand a mysterious statement of
Aetius (I. 7. 16 j Dox. 302 j VS 68 A 74): valJv rov Stow
Vv TTdp* 6 cp«if> o ii £e r.
3. For these reasons Langerbeck's view (which substantialLy repeats
Cicero's) cannot be accepted (doJiS Fmpurf* Itjj p. 52): Die
Gotterleiire Oemokrits ist in sich widerspruchsvoll und unklar.
65.
D.'s theses (formulated in fragments discussed above) may
be summarised as follows:
1. No kind of predetermination or teleology can be traced.
2. The existence of the gods is not admitted, therefore no divine
intervention in human affairs is accepted.
3. It is reasonably concluded that no retribution in the hereafter
is possible.
-4. No caprices of chance influence human actions.
5. Some forms of precognition and telepathy are explained in
terms of causation and should rather be incorporated in D.'s
epistemology.
6. No justification of human actions from external factors is
affirmed.
7. Bad conscience, not sanctions in tie hereafter, is man's Hell.
8. Nous or lack of nous (blindness) is the main factor for what is
good or bad in human life (fr. 175).
9. Phronesis is emphatically opposed to what is called fortune;
phronesis, as a rule, prevails (fr. 119).
10. Human nature is reliable and self sufficient (frr. 234, 176).
66.
5* Implications for D.'s ethical theory.
Human autonomy will be the only ground for the foundation of
an ethical theory; and it will be anthropocentric. The corner-stones
to be used are remorse, self-respect, self-control, justice. D» will
not have men's conduct based on false authorities, even if they are
derived from the laws of State; he has faith in the paramount
efficacy of some such moral force as human self-respect (264) and
corresponding responsibility.1
la his optimism (theory) reconcilable with actual human
capacities or does it exceed them? This is a question to be
answered later.
If freewill is a presupposition of responsibility and pre¬
supposes freedom from prejudices, fear, ignorance, superstition,
then 0. has prepared a good foundation.






It is a truism to say that the pursuit of happiness (eudaimonia)
is a general characteristic in Greek Ethics; and D.'s ethical theory is
no exception; different schools however had different notions of
eudairaonia and of the means by which eudaimonia was to be pursued.
D., fir reasons which will be discussed, did not pervade-
the term eudaimonia; instead he chose another, a rather unusual one:
euthuniia; **0n Euthumia" (cheerfulness) was the title of one of his works
on ethics, as is recorded by ancient sources.*
I intend to discuss the problem of happiness (or euthumia)
in Democritean Ethics under the following particular heads:
1. Nature of euthumia. Meaning of alternative terms: athambia
(freedom of alarm) and euesto (well-being) in D.'s thought.
2. Presuppositions of euthumia (eudaimonia)•
3. Measure (moderation) as a principle in em. thics.
4. Body-Mind (Soul) relations.
5. Meaning of Good(s).
6. Meaning of pleasure.
7. Hedonism or Sudaimonism?
8. Work ana Labour.
1. Seneca, de tranquill. animi, II-3: Hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci
euthumian vocant, de nua Democriti volusr.en egregrium est; ego
tranquillitatem voco.
Diog. Laertius, IX'46, ii 3 ( DK, VS 6Sg£C)
9. On Duty*
10* On Virtue* Virtue is action*
11* What is the meaning of fragment 83?
12* Tree of virtues*
13* Freewill problem*
14* What is the "Criterion"?
15* Moral autonomy, individual responsibility, the foundations
character*
G3
1. The nature of F oi ^
"On Eiuthumia" is recorded asthe title of one of D.'s writings
on ethics;1 perhaps it was his main book in this field, because:
a. This term and the related words Lofiu^,oS < L turdem. } SoS^^o-
T-ifJoV a-re tlj€. **>0 rt. Pr~t D Cri"iu-i° -f ra^ w e^jis
2
concerned with the subject of happiness and
b. eneca's characterisation: 'egregium volumen' cannot be overlooked.
The first problem to be met is a terminological one; athambia
3
is ascribed to D. as an alternative for euthumia by Cicero;
4
according to other sources D. also used the term euesto (well-being)
to describe the same conception.
1. Seneca, de tranquill. animi, 11.3: hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci
euthumian vocant, de qua Democriti voluraen egregium est; ego
tranquillitatem voco.
Cf. Diog. Laertius, IX. 46 ( DK 68 B 2C).
2. fragments: 2c, 191, 258 // 174, 191 // 3, 189, 191, 279, 2d6 // 191.
3. Cic., de fin., V. 29, 87 ( DK, 68 A 169).
<
See also:
Clem., Strom., II 130 ( X 68 B 4). Cf.fr. 215.
4. Clem., Strom., II 130 ( DK 68 B 4),
D. Laertius IX 45 ( DK 68 A 1, 45),
Stob. II 7 ( DK 68 A 167)^
Cf. frr. 140, 257.
7°
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Other terms also are recorded: ©t_pp.cvcot_ ffdpcpcerpca.,
7 <V ' 7 w 1
OLTjOt-UpcCcg't'COC. ^ OCT Ocp OC.7 L OU .
Cicero translates euthumia by the terms securitas (freedom from
care) and tranquillitas, and explains that "ista animi tranquillitas ea
.. 2
est ipsa beata vita • In another passage he affirms that euthumia
or athambia (freedom from fe&r) constitute, according to D., the summum
bonum of life.
3 ,
Lpiphanius accepts that, in D. s view, there is an end of all
things and euthumia is the highest.
4
Stobaeus , recording all the variety of terms mentioned above
and additionally eudaimonia, explains that euthumia consists in "the
ability (of the soul) to distinguish and discriminate between pleasures".
That the terra "euthumia" was misunderstood by friends or most
likely by opponents of the Democritean system we are informed from an
explicit passage from D. Laertius; he writes: "the end of action is(ecctJ,capiat)
tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by false
1. Stob. II. 7. 31 ( VS 68 A 167).
Strabo I. p. 61 ( VS 68 A 168).
2. Cic., de fin., V. 8. 23 )
) VS 68 A 169.
V. 29. 87 )
3. hpiphan. III. 2, 9. (VS 68 A 166), vox. 590).
So also DL. IX. 45.
4. Stob. II, 7. 3 i( VS 68 A 167).
5. D. Laertius, IX. 45 (VS 68 A 1. 45).
7X
interpretation have understood it, but a state in which the soul continues,
calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other
emotion (passion). This he calls well-being and many other names."
To sum up:
1. "On Euthuinia"is the title of a book (of D.'s),
'Euthuinia is identified with beata vita (Cic.),
Euthumia is the highest end (Epiphan.),
Kuthuraia consists in the ability to distinguish pleasures (Stob.),
Euthuinia is the end of action...is a state of calmness, strength,
stability (l)L),
Euthumia or athambia is the sucEium bonum (Cic.).
2. Athambia means "animum terrore liberum"(Cic. A 169).
3. Eudaimonia is to be sought in the soul (Stob. A 167).
4. Harmony, ataraxia, symmetry are alternative terms for euthuinia (Etob.,
perhaps i)L by im lication(A 1. 45).
5. Athaunsastia (absence of wonder or fear?)J perhaps this term was used
(by Strabo) as an alternative of athambia by mistake or confusion.
On the grounds of this evidence two remarks might be justified:
1. D, himself did not use one term only to connote ha pinesa, but
euthumia seemed to be the most frequent term in his texts. [Philosoph¬
ical terminology was then, it should be remembered here, not yet
standardised.
2. Euthumia seemed to be for D. the chief Good of life.
Hirzel1 using the surviving frr. of D. and tracing influences
1. "bemokrits Schrif t "n tpl E ", Hermes, 14 (1879)
pp. 354-407.
/I
to two later/vriters1 (both of them refer to D. as a forerunner on the
subject) tried to reconstruct the whole idea (content) of D.'s book
on Euthumia.
Further terminological elucidation seems to be unavoidable:
1. *A $ Oc|uUoe(r))(B4, B215, A1G9, B216)/
Although appearing as an alternative concept for euthumia, it is
explained by a scholar as a stronger one, "where stability ofthe soul
appears not as a passive state but as a dynamic quality, able to withstand
..3
external shock without losing its inner balance.
r- ' I
2. £ u 16 (well-being) (Al,45, A167, B 2c, 13140, B257)
~
■? I 4
derived from Co (well) and (£tuJ (real situation) for an atoiaist
could refer to the only accepted reality: atoms and their combinations;
therefore it might be recognised as a physical condition for euthumia.
Such a connection is nowhere expressed in the surviving frr. and
testimonies, but it is not an unreasonable hypothesis, if we keep in
5«
mind the atomic structure of the soul. D. could adopt euesto as a
1. Plutarch, TT i E v $v i aS }
Seneca, de Tranquillitate animi.
2. Gf. (amazement) tfctV d 6op o cvtas
(Ilias, 4,79).
3. G. Vlastos,MSthics and Physics in D.," Philojt. Rev. 54 (1945) p. 583.
4. Vlastos, op. cit., footnotes 29-30.
5. Aristotle, de aniina, 403b 31f.
7 3
general cognate of ''cheerfulness" only If it meant the soul's "well-being"
in an ontological, i.e. physical, sense."1
3. c/\ p ptov/oe (nowhere in D.'s frr. with ethical
connotation) appears to be of Pythagorean or Heraclitean origin, but als£
2
it was used in a medical sense.
4. SvpM-ETp la (symmetry, commensurability) is to be
found in fr. 191 in close connection with the meaning of metriotes
(moderation); it is rather a condition of cheerfulness.3
5# ' AQaupacrxCa 4 refers to a condition of freedom from
fear or surprise; it does not mean lack of OaU|iaCE IV (admiration);
5
if it were so, it would be a strikingly unphilosophical attitude.
1. Vlastos, op. cit., p. 583 and footn. 30.
2. J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London,'^(1968) p.39.
For O.'s acquaintance with medicine df. frr. 31, 32, 234
Of. also OL. IX. 33. XII.
3. fr. 191: yivexat [fexpitfx'nxi x£p\j/ioS hoc! |3tov
aruii|i£Tpi?Tl/.....
4. Strabo, I. p. 61 (partly in VS 68 A 168): HpoExtQeaai St
d^auiaaaxlav... .napav.eiTai y&p xw deapBst Hat
dV£K7t\lfyxcp.
It is very probable that this term belongs to 3trabo who used it
as an alternative to athambia.
5. Plato, Theatetus, 155D: |l«Aoc y&p <pi\OCT(5rppu XOUXO xb xdOo's ,
xb °at)|idreiv.
6. z ocpat^Loc (calmness) belongs rather to Epicurus'
philosophy.1
7. £ v &ol ij*-cv Ioz- > finally, a terra derived from Co (well)
and <£oc^u/V (daimon) could imply that human happiness was dependent on
some kind of divine being (gods or fortune). D. had left no room for
gods in his Macrocosmos and had explicitly rejected the existence of
fortune in his ■ "icrocosmos. Therefore, he could not be justified with
a term, the implications of which were unacceptable to him; so, it is
reasonable to suppose that he deliberately avoided this concept in most
2
of his writings and gave a new content to euthumia*
1. Epicurus, Epist. III. 128 (Usener, p. 62, Arrighetti, p. 111).
Bailey (Greek Atomists and Epicurus, p. 441) remarks that ataraxia
"is at once the aim and the condition of moral life" and (p. 499)
"a permanent condition of peaceful happiness". Cf. also what he
notes on pp. 369, 513.
2. "On Euthumia" is a title of book attributed to Pythagorean kipparchus
(VS 68 C, vol. II, 228.21 Stob. IV. 44. 81). The word is traced
nowhere else in the Presocratlcs. It is found in Pindar, Hippocrates,
Xenophon (Cyrop. VI. 4. 13) and later writers. See, e.g. Pind. Is.
» * / ■? a / 17 >
1.63: to e 1<D Tf ot. 6 (J-£ i/"0 V tovVf-oLCzV ju.t( Uj fetfCC-
i/ c r7 ? d , D , j—,
Cf. Hippocr. Visits, 6. 5.5: yj 01 ac(f>L£i K <1' y V.
On a physiological connotation of the term see Vlastos (Ethics and
Physics in D., part 1, notes 22, 38).
The adjective euthumos is found in Odys. 14. 63 and the adverb
euthumos Aesch. Agam. 159 2.
75'
Let as consider some frr. connected with the problem of
happiness which afford the material for constructing, a definition or at
least a description of the conception of happiness in D.'s view.
In fr. 170 he says: 'happiness or unhappiness is a property,
an achievement of the soul"'1' (tae genitive can refer to the soul
as originator or creator). Obviously D. wanted to emphasise that
happiness is not an external coincidence, but something internal and
personal. The same emphasis can be seen in the next fr. 171:
"happiness does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold. The soul is
..2
the dwelling-place of daimon.
i<rom these frr. two implications are justified and a new question
should be raised:
1. Happiness is independent of external possessions; individuals
are responsible for their own happiness.
2. Happiness, whatever might be this thing which is to be happy,
is in the soul.
3. But what is the daimon? and why does D. use this word and its
compound (eudaimonia) despite his tendency to avoid taem elsewhere?
Y)o{
If the soul isfthe dwelling-place of the daimon, and if the
daimon in current language denoted gods or fortune, then these frr. are
incompatible with D.'s system. As it seems, U. is using popular
expressions intended to emphasise his view on happiness and at the same
time to preclude the existence and interference of gods and fortune,
1. fr. 170 : tftfSaiiaoviTi HotHoSatiiovfr).
2. fr. 171.' ^tidaijiovtr) o6k £v poan-niiacTLV oinei tv
XPUCTu) ' o t i o V Sa'llOVO^.
since, in his text, the dsisaon, whatever it might be, lives in the soul*
The last proposition (assertion) of ir* 171 obviously was added in
order to preclude implications unacceptable to D»} indirectly the
concepts of dslison and eudaimonia are disapproved.
'A is closely connected with an intellectual
virtue (in fr* 216): "imparturbable wisdom is worth everything"*1
Combining this fr* and fr* lie: ("»« used to say (he would) rather
„.2
discover a cause t on gain the kingdom of Persia I cm© might reach the
conclusion that D* found great (much of) happiness in contemplation} but
he did not include the first concept in the second, as later Aristotle
did*3
The portrait of the euthumos (cheerful man) is given by D*
himself in fr* 174: "the cheerful man, who is impelled! towards works
that are just ana lawful, rejoices by day and by night and is strong and
„4
tree from care* From the passage it is unclear whether bein,
cheerful is a condition of oeiag Just and lawful or vice versa*
The first Interpretation seems more likely} but, whatever answer might
be given, t. e fact remains that l)*'s cheerful saws is juat and lawful*
1* fr* 216: tfocpi/r) aQa^BoS £rir) Ttctvt. v ; TtvuorcaTT) 060a!.
2. fr. 118: a. ...eXeye 0o(J\ecr at }ia\\ov |ifav etipElv
alt toXoyCccv ir| x?)v UepcfGv ot (SacuXEfav yev£a9at.
3* E.N. 1178 b 32: "ox* elt) aV T) E$6a tp.ov ta OEWpfa TI » • • • •
4* fr. 174: q euGu|ioi els spya ^Ttttprp^iiEvoi otuatu
Hat v<5|iiya nat uitap xatlovap yaCpEt te nat epp<.oxcrt
Hal AvaHt)54^ £0xtv.....
//
Such a close connection between virtue (or virtues) and
happiness can be found in Plato.1 And there is nothing at all s^tange
2
in the fact that Stobaeus notes the parallel in D. and Plato with
reference to placing eudaimonia in the soul.
3
f.iodern scholars have tried to give a platonizing inter¬
pretation of Democritean thics.
By pointing out these similarities and tendencies 1 am not
intending to maintain either that they constitute the main tenets of
Dem. ethics or that Plato imitated D.'s doctrines ( cerates' personality
was much more rich in this field). The following vies? can be defended:
D., living in the same age as Sccrat.es, facing the same problems in the
1. banquet 180B: ApexftS Hal t M.OV taS XT?)CTLV
aep. 576C» doe-cr] xal eOSaijiovfa...
Crito 478. dorgias 472E-473A.
2. Stob. II 7}3 i p.52 ( DK 68A 167): A. Hal II\. HOIVU)* £v
T~ il/uxtl T^v eG<$ai|10vCav xCdevxai.... (from Areios Dirtymos).
3. P. Natorp, Uie Ethika des D., Marburg (1893) pp. 88 ff.,
particularly on p. 106: Wie platonisch das alles lauten mag......
J. Ferber,"t}ber die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Ethik
'emokrits/'deltschr. f. Phllos. 132/3 (1908) pp. 82 ff., particularly
on p. 93: So beroitet sich bei D. der grossartiger Idealismus
der platonischen Philosophic vor.....
life of their time during and ,• f ter t .e Pelop# War and during the
sophistical movement (and after it in the case of D«), tried to help
in reconstruction [in two concrete fields, namely epistemology and
ethics] and conceived happiness as consisting in:
calmness, strength, stability of the soul, freedom from fear and
passions, autonomy and self-reliance, accompanied by wisdom, righteous¬
ness (justice) and lawabidingness.
71
2. Presuppositions for Euthumia
a. That euthumia (happiness) is the Chief Good in human life is
explicitly asserted in fr. 189: "The best thing for a man is to lead
his life having been cheerful on as many occasions and pained on as few
occasions as possible* This could happen if one did not find one's
"
1
pleasures in mortal tilings.
It is actually a surprise to find in the writings of a
"materialist"1 this ideal of life, and in such terminology. There is no
doubt about the raeanin of t e precept (in fr. 189). The Chief Good to
be pursued is expressed in the first proposition} in the second are
shown the means by which the Chief Good is to be attained. Yet the
expression remains too abstract until we define what is meant by "non-
mortal pleasures". First of all, we may suppose, as it v/as correctly
remarked, that P. in his ethical theory (precepts) sometimes"chose to
speak at the level of the ordinary man, without adhering too scrupulously
to the requirements of his atomic theory according to which nothing, not
ii 2
even a od, was immortal. On the other hand, by reference to frr.
3
like 194 or 207 , it can be pointed out that D. by the term non-mortal
1. fr. 189: apiotov AvGpaW) tbv Giov biaystv <K itXeiata
Eti0ti|Tn0evT t nat ^Xayiata &v itiGevt t,. touto 6' av eir),
El TlS pb itt TOl a 0VT)TO~CTl tXS rj6ov\s 7tOlO~TO.
2. Guthrie, History, II, 491, n.l.
3. fr. 194: at peyaXat Tepil/Efs dub to0 OeaoOai t& xaX&
twv epywv yfvovtai.
fr. 207: r)5ovt|V oi xaaav, &X\3c tt]v £rct t") xocXo)
af-petcrGai ype<'v.
to
(pleasures) means what we call mental joys.
Before examining them, 1 think it useful to notice the variety
of meanings welch in classical Greek are attributed to the term hedonE
(used by D. also in the fr. in question). Hedone is usually trans¬
lated by the term pleasure; its meaning is context-dependent. In many
cases this term alone leads to misunderstanding and misclassifications,
by opening the door to fallacious inferences (quatternio verborum)•
Plato enumerates four different meanings of hedesthai (the
corresponding verb) at the very beginning of his "phiiebus",* scaled from
crude bodily pleasures to the more highly valued mental activity. Much
misinterpretation and confusion is the result of identifying a
polymorphous concept with only one of its meanings. The term hedone
acquires a specific meaning according to its attributions. I insist
on this elucidation because this kind of fallacy constitutes the origin
of a serious mistake with reference to D. (and his continuator in
ancient times, 1 mean Epicurus).
Aristotle was aware of the problem when writing: "the feeling
ofbleasure is an experience of the soul....and a thing gives a man
1. Phiiebus, 3D: Tjftea'ai p.£v qpanev xbv AHoXarrxaivovxa av^pumov,
ri6ecr0ai 5h KaX tbv aruxppovoOvxa ocOt" tS aweppovefv,
riSEaGari 6' ad Kat t&v Avot)t<xt'vovxa xal
avoiycmv 50'5,wv jieptov,
r|6ea^ai 6' ad KaX tbv cppovoOvxa adx~ x~ "'poveiv.
Also in Plato's Prot. 33TB-c. (Prodicus is introduced speaking on the
meaning of hedesthai} he made a restriction (of the meaning), which
was warmly approved by his audience but ignored by Plato in his later
Phiiebus).
pleasure in regard to which he is described as 'fond of' it."^ Here
pleasure is not an experience of the body even in the case of "bodily
pleasures". This remark brings pleasure within the Aristotelean
definition of happiness as an "activity of the soul".
The Chief Good of life (is said in fr. 189) is pleasure provided
that the content of pleasure is not mortal; obviously the non-mortal
2
pleasure is intellectual satisfaction.
b. What follows (b-h) Is an attempt to define what are (according
to the evidence we possess) the necessary and sufficient conditions of
cheerfulness (euthumia)•
"The portrait of the 'cheerful'man (described in fr. 174) is
on the whole a pleasant one". It is not characterised by self-
3 i t*
centrednes of motive, as Bailey believed. The "cheerful" man is an
1. rJN 1099a 11-12: |i£v y&p rjSeaQai t"v \la)y i , iKarrxw 6'
&OXIV T}6^) TCpfcS O Xs^YETOCl atXOTOLOUTOi....
2. D. does not suggest by this expression that the soul is imnortal (per
contra cf. fr. 297); he merely wants to value more highly the pleasures
of the mind using the popular idiom to say so. Cf. frr. 118, 194, 112.
3. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 205.
fr. 174: o |il:v EU0up.o5 eIs cpya ^■rctcpep^lievo's Sfxaia
Hal v<5|ii|*a x^'pei te xat eppwxat
cf. p. 32 8 Uii
active personality who enjoys his life by doing what is legal and Just}
he is the protector of wronged fellow wen (fr* 2GJ)| as a result of his
actions he is openhearted and carefree and naturally free of any kind of
remorse*
The content of Justice and law (identified or differentiated)
will be exn. inod in another place} what is of interest here is that the
setting oi the cheerful man is a civilised society* of which he is described
as an active member, living in harmony . ith it* Moreover 0* speaks
often of the relation of the cheerful man both to domestic and public life.
c* A question should be raised here: does the cheerful man act
in such and such a way (manner) because of his cheerfulness or is his
cheerfulness the result of such and such conduct? At first sight fr*
174 suggests the former explanation, but the latter cannot be rejected
and this is also implied in the immediately following description of the
opposite character**
He is the person who disregards what Justice is and forgets his
duties (he is the truly self-centred man)} the consequence of his
negligence is immediate} he is self-punished} he suffers by remorse
for his omission and In anticipation of his punishment} he then accuses
himself* A kind of civil war breaks out in his heart* Hemorse for
the past, fear for the future make his present an actual Hell* This man
1* Actually In our text a character opposite to the cheerful man is
described but not by a specific concept named* Plato (Laws 792B)
examines the way of education of a cheerful character as opposed to
the "dyskolos" ( discontented)*
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is a prosecutor of himself. In the light of this analysis fr. 43* is
intelligible. Behind this aphorism is the notion of conscience
(syneidesis, a word used for the first time by D. with this meaning in
fr. 297). The sinnerfe (unjust man's, lawbreaker's) Hell is not remote
from him, it is in him, it is his own conscience (syneidesis)} a
voice accusing him; a kind of court in which his actions are to be
judged. No god is necessaty here to act as a prosecutor; D. did not
2
need gods to guarantee justice. The self-prosecuted person will not
3
have peace of mind until he is punished."
The portrait of the cheerful man (and the opposite) leave no
doubt that in D.'s mind they were free to decide and act in accordance
with their decisions and therefore be responsible for their actions, and
praiseworthy or guilty of negligence accordingly.
d. The results of wrongdoing and rightdoing are contrasted in
another remarkable fr. (215)J "The glory of justice is a courageous
and undismayed judgement, but the end of injustice is the fear of
1. Fr. 43: (j,ETct|j,e\£ioc in' atcrxpoicriv epyfiacriv (3lou crcjTrjpit)«
2. Schmid-Stahlin, Gescliichte der GriechiscLe Literature, 1. 5. p. 315.
3. Cf. Plato's Gorgias, 47 2 E where Socrates says:
o dSixtov xz hc.I o aSiKoS nav-ruS fi£v a9\ios, d9\tu)Tepo£
(aevtot» £a:v fi?) Slktjv fir)tuyx«v-q TifiwpfaS d6ixwv»
^ttov a9\io£, £dv 5i5q5 6'xrjv xat xuyxavn 6'xr)'» uxb
9e~v re xal dvOp'itwv.
disaster!) The striking impression from this judgement of moral
value demands, by the viay, a short comment. It does not seem to have
been an isolated precept or an aphorism; it introduces a thesis to be
analysed and defended or a conclusion drawn after a systematic inquiry;
it should be considered as a part of a longer structure.
Justice as a practice is crowned by forthright candour,
which leads to athambia, i.e. to euthumia. Thus euthumia presupposes
am activity in accordance with justice (fr. 174) and is rewarded by
2
interior seren ity. Epicurus also connected justice with his ideal
of ataraxi" in a beautiful aphorism: "the greatest|fruit of justice is
^taraxis (freedom from trouble)".
1. fr. ?,i5: xu6oS yvwiaiiS GapcroS Keel &9ap|3ir),
5e 6e~|_ia: fupcpoppS xeppa.
P. Natorp (Die Ethika des Demokritos, p. 98) explained this fr. by
giving emphasis to athambia alone and connecting it with the ideal
of knowledge with reference "to'vitam beatam... (quam) In rerum
cognition© ponebat;" it la a part only of a complete explanation.
2. For a different explanation see Bailey (Greek Atomists, p. 192):
"it is clear that the idea of cheerfulness i s one of undisturbed
serenity rather than of an active and sensational pleasure."
2. Epicurus, sent. 519 (Usener, 317): Atnal0at5vt)S HOCpltbS
UEyiPToS ^xapor^'a.
ss-
by introducing obligation (frr. 41, 181, 256, 261)1 as a motive
for avoiding crimes and in connection with his effort to define justice,
D. showed the direction of activity of his cheerful man; at the same
time he overcomes the traditional (customary) Greek view of ethics (what
am I to do if I am to fare well?) . Justice is not only to be actualized
by someone's actions, but also to be protected when so eone else is
wronged. Protecting justice is not, of course, an action of self-
centredness; it is a social conception.
According to a corrupted passage — the meaning of which is
clear enough, nontheless — cheerfulness should be a kind of reward for
persons defending the community from those creatures who do hurt (harm)
contrary to justice. There it is said; "The man who does this has the
greater share of cheerfulness."
e. "l)o not be very busy" is a second 'maxim leading to cheerfulness.
If someone is to be cheerful he must place some limits on his activities,
we are informed by fr. 3. It runs:" The man who wishes to be che rful
Should not engage in many activities either private or public, nor choose
activities beyond his powers and natural capacity. He must guard
against this, so that when good fortune strikes him and leads him on to
excess by means of (false) seeming, he must rate it low, and not attempt
c 1 i
1. otov or Xpn make a sense of ou fitness.
\ - c ? Q ' ' 7
2. fr. 258 ' Koll ~c qlv zee- c TTol ujv til V d ft, i f^S" -
r
jx o t p 0dv px €Hi tL
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things beyond his powers. A reasonable fulness is better than over-
fulness."1 Perhaps this fr. was in the beginning of D.'s book On
2
buthumia. It is regarded as one of the best attested frr. of O.:
"it receives some confirmation from other sources; it is in tobncus^
M 3
anthology but is also twice attributed to • by Seneca • '
1. fr. 3. T^V peX^ovxa XP*) Hptia^etv |jn5xe
ISltj e Zvv~, |ir)5t: aaaa av np&acr-n, vncp xe 6t5vap.iv
c 6
ft
adpetcOat xt]V £tuxoO Hat cpt5aiy' &XX& xonavxijv exei-v 9u\thtiv,
wctxe Hat xffS Tt5x"n? £tcif3aXXot5crr) S nat xb hX£ov uTrriyeopevn^
t~i 6oheiv, Haxaxt^eoPat, nat ptj npoadxxea'dai xffiv
5uvax~v. "n ydp edoyHi/n datpaXecrxepov xfjS pF-yaXoyHtpi.
Gf• M. Aurelius, The Communings with himself, IV.24.
2. Zeller-i estle, L.ie Philosophic der Griechen, 1.2. 1143 footn. 1.
3. Katorp, Die Ethika, p. 116.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, II, 491.
Seneca, De tranquillitate animae 13.1s hoc secutum puto 0. ita
coepisse: "qui tranquille volet vivere nec privatim agat multa,
nec publice."
De ira 3.6.3: proderit nobis illud D. salutare praeceptum
quo monstratur tranquillit.as, si neque privatim neque publice
multa aut majors viribus nostris egerimus.
*7
An important presupposition of euthumia (which will be repeated
and analysed in fr. 181) is not to exceed the limit of one's capacity.
Ambition compatible with one's capacity is the ideal measure. This
capacity is determined by two factors: one's strength (dynamis) and his
nature (physis). This precept is backed, I think, by the belief
that what is necessary to human life nature gives in abundance (with a
free hand), an idea explicitly expressed by fr. 223* and later by
2
Epicurus. Even if chance opens a wide road in front of you, beware
of this phantom, be a good guard of your own euthumia against this
deceiver (chance); it can trick you and lead to unhappiness.
The criterion, nonetheless, of "doing so much" and "no more" is
not obvious from the text. It seems that it is to be found in the
concepts of'dynainis" and'physis • .hat exactly is the meaning of dynamis
in D.'s terminology is difficult to define, because of lack of evidence.
Anyway, this term conjoined here (fr. 3) with physis should not be
understood as identical. Comparing this concept (of dynamis) with
its use in fr. 234 one might incline to believe that it refers to
1. fr. 223: Sv tJ> crxrjvoS naai ndpeaxiv axco
H<5x*3ou Hal taXatmjp ltiS ... •
2. Epicurus, Sententiae Sel. XV (Usener, 14. Arrighetti, 127):
o xfji cptfaewS tcXoOtoS EiH<5picrc<5s £cttiv, o tg3v hevSv
6o£wv eU aitEipov £HitCute6.
3. fr. 3: . ...uitfcp rf)v EaiUTotf Stfvapiv xal cpucnv .. L
1
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strength of will.1 Whatever the interpretation of the two terms
might be, the fact is that they (dynamis and ohysis) describe the limits
within which one must restrict his activity.
D.'s precept must not be considered similar to the Epicurean
/j OLlfa. $<■ d> 6"&£(Usener, fr. 541). It is not a doctrine of quietism. '
D. himself devoted his whole life to scientific investi ations, journeys,
work. Philodemus characterised him as the most busy man ( Vo Au 7[^ atj'^ urv)
In fact he recommends political activity (fr. 107). D. disapproved
of 7f o 2 ^ Tip vt| in the sense of interference with other people's
affairs (fr. 80). Curiosity is evidently a vice; busying oneself in
1. Clearer distinction between the two terms but not clearer
differentiation can be seen in a strikingly similar passage of an
Ckilionjp. ?- 1
Epicurean (Diogenes of Oinoanda, 56, p. 54 "illiarn, 1907.^ Vb
II. 132): o&6t:v out' S e^QuiifaS nofnxiHbv oS xb if?! itoXXSc
upbore tv Suoh^XocS £iuxe ipefv -rcpayiiaai v, ... jrriS?:
Tzaph Suvaruiv j3iaCecr0at x?iv eauxou ' toxvtgc y&p xaOxa
xaoay^S iixnoieT xt^ cpvcrei----
2. Langerbeck, A(5<;lS rE7ltpuop.lTr) j pp. 60-61.
3. fr. 144.
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the affairs of others means that one has neglected his own.*
f. Finally, fr. 3 seems to suggest the notion of the mean;
it is in accordance with s;:any other aphorisjus (233, 102 , 70, to be
reviewed later) end particularly with fr. 191 which follows:
"Cheerfulness is created for men through moderation of enjoyment and
termoriousness of life* Things that arc in excess or lacking are-apt
to charge and cause greet disturbances in the soul* Souls that are
stirred by great divergences are neither stable nor cheerful. hcrefore
one must keen one's mind on what is attainable, and«* * * If you keep
this way of thinking, you will live sore serenely* and will expel1
.,2
those not-negligible curses in life, envy, Jealousy and spite.
1. This idea was approved by Plato in the borgias (52b Jw«C.) where
it is said about iiadamanthys that:"when he discerns a philosopher
who has minded his own business and not being a busy body in
his lifatlr.t® — he is struck with admiration and sends hia off
to t;.e Isics of the blest.
u. r. 191: ivOp*iToi0L y&p y'verat nexpt<$xiiTi loi
Kat qLOV CTUIiilETP (TriV* X& 6' £^XElU0VTa Hal UTTrpftaXXoVXa
tiexairttTEiv te rptXel xrcl |i£y{£XaS xtvifataS £)iitoi£iv xvj
toy-g. at 5* £x fieyaXwv 5taaximdcxuv Htvot5|fEVai xtov
-!"ux^<hv ouxe e6axa£9£eS etatv ovxc cuOujiot xauxrji
y\p ^y<5|icvo5 x??£ yEd9uji6xEp<5v xe Sta^eii Hal
o£x 6XfyaS xffpaS £v X(p pCro Stoxreat* cp9<5vov xal CffXov
xal SucTfiEvfriv.
1o
Some remarks on it are unavoidable:
1. D. by referring to the concept of mean actually continues the Greek
tradition ofsgnomological "measure" and in some extent anticipates
Aristotle's theory of "the mean".*" The meaning of this concept
and (what is of importance for our inquiry) its moral implications in
D.'s system are to be explained in the next paragraph (on measure).
2. Interesting is the way in which I), connected measure with euthumia
(happiness). In the second and third propositions of the fr. in question
2 ,
his language can hardly be metaphorical. His term (a- £ ran i ti t £lv
3 4
is used also in his theory of sensation' and theory of knowledge.
Vihen reading propositions 2-3 in the fr. quoted above one has the impression
m 5
of a physiological conditioning of euthumia: Souls...are neither stable
b ,
1. EM 1106 36-1107ai ff.: where (1) f-L6is included in the
definition of virtue (2) ^.eeox^s is defined.
a r t ?\ I . /
Also: agna t oralia, 1186b 34-36: ui ext oioi olv o-
Cf. u.'s frr. 233, 102, VO.
2* Kurt v. Fritz, Philosophie u. sprachliche Ausdruck, pp. 33 ff.
G. Vlastos, Philos. Rev. 54 (1945) 582-4.
Guthrie, History, II, 497.
3. Theophr., de sens. 63 ( OK 68 A 135, 63): (jlix-ccxi Ftt tov .
4. extus, adv. mathem. 136 ( DK 68 L 9): t cltl l ti z o v .
5. E i? Sra)t£J is recognisable, no doubt, as the original
concept from which D. Laertius borrowed his term t v <rza. j bO $
(stably) in his description of Oemocritus' conception of euthumia.
See D.L. IX 45 ( UK 68 A 1, 45).
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nor cheerful"; which means when stability (of soul atoms?) is abolished,
then cheerfulness also is destroyed. Possibly we might see here evidence
of a connection between ethics and the rest of D.'s system. Other
points of such a connection are to be pointed out in other pages and
finally summarised (in conclusion) because: a) such liaisons make
•uver the authenticity of the fragments involved and through them of
other frr. in which D.'s technicalities are repeated, b) an ethical
theory is based (partly) on a physical one.
3. In the fr. under discussion, which, no doubt, belonged to D.'s book
on Cheerfulness (Euthumia), we see a chain of statements, which can
hardly be regarded as normative ethics (judgements of moral value or
moral obligation) alone. There is an inquiry into a problem of
metaethics; a thesis is formulated and defended, some norms (instructions)
are derived from it. We can discern a chain of reasoning, with co¬
herence and completeness. From the beginning to the end the concept
of euthumia to be (attained) aimed at is*the leading notion (the key
concept, mentioned 4 times altogether). The demonstrative character
of the reasoning can easily be traced throughout. I don't see any
reason to characterise all these statoents as aphorisms, precepts;
the whole fragment, I think, should be accepted as a part of a larger
structure.*"
2
g. bawabiding is emphatically mentioned in the middle of fr. 191;" it is
regarded as a self-evident obligation; which means that lawabidingness
1.
2 .
eej deneca, de Tranquillitate, II, 3.
fr. 191: .... "npioCgfctw tL ofv>) stfrci' ^ tjy i/op-oi
c (. $ r- • T^t: o 1 v t (*oy t-ci fyy^ £ TKf Of*. (-
/ , /
... vo O. tjU. fit .. . pe at, L P t<-
u
is a condition again for cheerfulness, a condition to be fulfilled by a
cheerful man.
ihat a. recommends is not a life of "apraxia" but a life in
harmony with natural vitality and some social conventions (to be described
later), necessary for a civilised society.
h. Although the egocentric (and nerhaps atomistic) character of
euthuraia is conspicuous at first sight, there is evidence that D.
included in the conditions of euthumia these elements, which (if)
generally applied constitute an objective basis for happiness within
the framework of the ancient city-state. His emphasis on defending
justice and being lawabiding (frr. 174, 261 ) in connection with his
strong preference for democracy (fr. 251) which was not representative
but a general assembly of the citizens, where law-giving meant complete
participation) give the measure of his conception of euthumia; it is
not an expression of selfishness; it is described in terms of the
individual because he (or she) is the unit of action; but it is planned
to be euthumia for a whole society; individual activity contributes
toward this end.
1. Finally, to attain euthumia a man needed to think little of
worldly goods (frr. 170-171) which are at the mercy of fortune, i.e.
unforseen conditions.
1. fr. 261: Cl cfl K o u/L. £ "ol £ c Ttj^^jytZv Kg. tot J~Z v ou^cv
\ \ * t
X P y < OCL yr i £ j/ otc
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To conclude! if someone is to live in euthumia* he must take
thought to limit his aspirations to his abilities* think little of
worldly goods* be lawabiding and just; it is precisely this last
(condition) quality of his conduct which puts him on good terms with
his fellownien*
3. ' easure
Two main points can be noted (distinguished) in D.'s views on
"measure in hu; an life".
1. Measure is justified by medicine and according to D. (previous
paragraph 2.f.2) it becomes a condition necessary for hanpiness (euthumia).
2* [ easure is extended to cover the whole field of human conduct
and so becomes a factor in morality#
1# "if you step over the due measure (metrion) the most agreable
things will become most disagreable."1 D. expresses here a personal
belief which was endorsed by early Greek wisdom and understood by common
2
sense people. "easure in everything is the best way" wa a well
known precept; "Nothing too much" was another one.' Only "fools
cannot understand how much greater is the half than the whole" Ilesiod
4
had written.
The concept used in the original text for the most agreable
tilings (epiterpestata) gives us the key for understanding the connotation
of fr. 233 for emocritus. At first sight it is not clear what kind of
1. fr. 23 : El TlS UU£pf3(£\Xoi xb |l£xplOV, X& IXepTcfcTXaXOC
dxepTcecrxaxa av yiyvotxo.
2. Ilav pexpov aptaxov.
3. MriSbv ayav.
4. works and Days, 40.
9 5"
agreableness or disagreableness is meant. But both here and in fr. 191
the concept of measure is conjoined with pleasure or joy.
For D. the measure of agreableness is a factor in euthumia.
He explains it in terms reminding us of medicines "Things that are in
excess or lacking are apt to change and cause disturbances in the soul
2
(191); and disturbances destroy euthuinia, as is said in the continuation.
1. fr. 191; dvGpumoiai y&p eOGupfr) yfvExai p£xpt6xr)xi
x£p\|/ioS ual pfou auiipsxpC^....
T£p\|/is in D.'s frr. is clearly identified with mental joys (cf.
fr. 194). A detailed discussion on the connotation of this concept
is given in paragr. on Criterion where frr. 4, 74, 188 are compared
and explained.
2. fr. 191; fWeuovxa Hal uuEp|3dX>ovxa iiExaTtf-rcxEiv xe
(piXst xal peya\»S hivtfata* ^piroEtv • • •
Cf. the terminology used in Hippocratean school:
a) On ancient medicine, 9: y3ep |i£xpOU xtv<^£
axoydrrarr^a i.. . .
b) On sacred disease, 8; rjv p?:v HxXCS HaGapGr) Hal tufas
rtXfav (ii^xE EXaxxov xou SeovxoS Aixoppur) ouxcoS
uytriroxxx-nv x?)v nscpaX^v eyei.
c) On reaths, 1 (definition of medical art); dcpatpECTt* xSSv
uHEppaXX<5vta)V, itpoaQEca* xiov £XXeitc<5vxu}V. ...
H e I v ej-icu-ry)
5ee Fr~. WzLrlij E Hi k cevjd. (V\ ed. j j i ^ /7
0 9 riX rr- 3 c ?f.).
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_xcess of food (fr. 235) gives a short and transient pleasure
but many (long and permanent, by implication) pains; and bodily pleasures
the more they are satisfied the more they demand satisfaction.
The consequences of such excesses make medicine necessary;
illness (bodily disorder) is a kind of revenge. Natural conditions (living
with measure) give health. This is what many people do not know or
overlook and the consequence is that "iten ask in their prayers for
health from the gods; but they do not realise that the power to attain
this (protect their health or restore it?) lies in themselves; and,
by doin , the opposite because of lack of self-control, they themselves
become the betrayers of their own health to their desires." (234)1
Thi: formulation is questionable: does it mean:
1) that natural conditions protect health by themselves, therefore
a moderate fulfilment of desires is enough to maintain health, therefore
nature itself gives the measure (through desires)? or
2) that men have the possibility (by knowing what are the healthy
conditions, by strong will and self-control) to protect their own health
as a good?
Frr. 4, 74, 1B8 in which we will try to discover the criterion
of Uemocritean bthics could answer positivelj' either of these questions;
but incontinence (lack of control, ocKrflLytot. ) and betrayers (prodotai),
terms used in fr. 234, indicate a positive answer to the second question;
l. fr. 234: uy telt)V efty/fcu fcapSt Qewv atxeovxa avQpurrcoi» x?)V
xatfmS 6i5vct|atv £v ^atfxoCi eyovxeS otiw laaaiv ' &KpccaCr\
6£ xdvovxfa ixp^craovxe's atixot Ttpo^5xat xffS uyeir)<;
x~atv iutGviiCraiv yCvovxat.
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which implies, in D.'s thought, free will and responsibility#
Moreover, the insistence on the supremacy of the soul over body, that
soul is the pilot of the vessel, is explicitly asserted in other cases
(frr. 159, 187).1
Both explanations seemed to be intended by the original
writing and can reasonably be justified in the frame of D.'s ethical
theory# A strong confidence in human nature and individual responsibility
is defended by fr. 234, which in free translation could be so: Men
do not realise that they are endowed by nature with a certain (reliable)
criterion of what is good for their health (i.e. measured fulfilment
of their desires); but because of lack of will they become slaves of
th^ir desires and so they lose (destroy) their health by their
incontinence; they are responsible for the undesirable result; they
Are to be blamed; as regards gods (if any, according to individual
attitude toward the problem), they have nothing to do with us, with our
affairs, with our incontinence. Therefore, prayers are both: in vain
and an indication of foolishness.
(hat we call Democritean ethics is denied the title by
F. ;/. Cleye on the ground that it is only a hygienic. "it would
t
almost be preferable to speak here rather of mere biotics, or art of
\A, „2 >
living, than of ethics. Clere s main interest is admittedly
I/emcicritean physics, but what he ignored or failed to understand is
that in D.'s fragments three steps (grades) can be traced, as
rr
1. Ifhey will be discussed in the paragr. on body-soul problem.
2. The Giants of Presocratics, p. 403.
Krokiewicz1 rightly argued:
1) A self-preservation (191, 88, 3, 224, 285, 286, 231),
2) A self-perfection (3, 60, 80, 191, 196, 220, 221, 254, 192, 224-5, 122,
43, 44, 53, 53a, 114, 63, 115).
3) An integral (free and responsible) personality with "verecundiam quam
hemocritus aid5s appellat" (84, 244, 264), and a strong feeling towards
justice, which implies good relations of the individual personality with
other ;i.embers of a civilised society (fr. 261).
For 0. happiness is a personal affair; morality begins with
one's way of life (his conduct to himself), the fulfilment of his desires,
in what degree it is necessary to proceed later to the formulation of
rules of ehaviour for his fellowmen; a good man socially should first
of all oe a good individual. oorne views on the aim of life an the
meaning of happiness and values of life are the personal beliefs which
lead to interpersonal relations and make a man a good or bad companion
to others.
In the surviving frr. it cannot be traced (it would not be
possible even in terms of medicine for the age when hi. lived) what actually
is the measure of needs (what is necessary for the human body); an
idea only of n.'s thought on this problem can be seen in fr. 233, which
rims: "The things needed by the body are available to all without toil
ant! trouble. hut the tilings which require toil and trouble ant. which
make life isa^ reable are not desired by the body but by the ill-
f). K ro k i e w ' cJ , ^ D Eosj
? ('?rv~rr)j rp-
constitution of the mind#"1
Here speaks the physicist and erhaps the physician or the man
who was well acquainted with the medical teaching of his days, in the
first purtj the philosopher of life, the moralist, is speaking in the
second *
An optimistic view about the possibility of the soul becoming
good pilot for bodily needs and a factor oi self-perfection is to be
four 1 in fr. Id7. The responsibility of the soul is quite explicitly
emphasised in fr. 159.
In any case, exceeding the measure brings bodily disorders
and then medicine as an art is necessary to cure them. Medicine's work
on behalf of the body is to establish harmony again.
D.'s intention was not to explain measure as a means for the
health of the body, but to emphasise the soul's responsibility to keep
measure, and >rocaed to a higher levels measure is a means to i .prove
the conduct of Individuals in their pursuits and therefore their
relations. The basic idea is that exceeding measure an- doing misdeeds
menus a misrepresentation of what is necessary for the present and the
future. In both cases soul is responsible; in the first case for lack
of control over the body (w.iich in consequence reacts by diseases); in
1. fr. 223* ft? xb tfxrWoi XP'Cr. i %o!aiv it£pe^xiv g&ftttplwS
*L foX y0u» Kola "C ot A oca. tr UJf> t *7 5
axep vi<5y^ou mt Tx\atnwpfriS'rxP^Ce~1' 4X^V€t«
xoux? v obv. t^efoexai xb cmffvoS > <$XX' r) x?5» yvwp'Ha
Hxxo°iyfr| (?).
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the second for miscalculations about the future (frr. £3 , 337, 2&1)«
tesults in both cases are undesirable} then, cure is necessary for the
body by medicine, for the soul by wisdom (fr. 31).
Here is expressed an optimistic belief in the power of
knowledge to ,;iv© wings to huaan soul, when it is said: 'Vedicine
heals 'iseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions."~
Obviously an echo of fr. S3 can be seen: "The cause of error is
ii2
ignorance of the better.
2, vfhat is more interes ing is that by this way keepin . the measure,
controlling desires, is proraoted to fee level of morality. If so .eone
le able (by wisdom) to put limits on his insatiable appetite for money,
property, he will win more euthuisia (fr. 2«6), less disappointments ( 24),
and, obviously will have no reasons for fighting against his fellow-men
(companions) or wronging the® in any way. He will be more rational
in his pursuits, since it is unreasonableness not to recognise the
»• 3
necessary conditions of life"" and confine one's activity within right
limits.
1. fr. 31: tritpiK*) |i>:v y&p <rofyaToS v<5aouS
ctocd't) s?: !'uxriv wt9~v hncc
2. fr. 33: ajaapx'riS attir) r\ duaOfrj -co# vr£mrovoS. C ^ sechox,
11 of tl|C4 ck <*. i? fey-( '■ xu, € ocr\ cyTJ 0 I tr.S 3}.
3. fr. .9: AXoyirrtir) |i*i "uyx o£eiv xatai naxSc xbv f5'ov
dvdFyttor. i£.
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All these aphorisms find their justification in fr. 285: " one
should realise that human life is brief and mixed with many cares and
difficulties, in order that one may care only for moderate possessions,
and that hardship may be measured by the standard of one's needs."1
At first sight a shadow of pessimism might be seen in it. Nevertheless
an optimistic disposition lies behind the surface, since:
a. a belief is expressed again that difficulties of life can be
conquered by measuring real needs and therefore by avoiding purposeless
conflicts,
b. what is of more importance: what could be called a seeming
sadness does not expend itself in vain complaints; it becomes a source
2
of philosophical meditation, and
c. a comparison of this fr. (285) with 223 (quoted above) leads
reasonably to the conclusion that this phrase: "with many cares and
difficulties" does not refer to the actual conditions of life, according
to b., but represents fanciful miscalculations because of lac! of wisdom.
If these thoughts are correct, it means that fr. 285 is only a
precept addressed to those people who make their lives full of mis¬
fortunes on the purpose they to help themselves by a better understanding
of the actual problems of life by replacing cares for more property with
care for more wisdom. The vocabulary usee! in the passage and the
structure itself is but a concession to those unwise men.
1. fr. 285: ytyv'fTHf.iv ypewv ^v0p(-itivpv (3iot^v rtcp-up-fiv xe
^oOcrav Kttt 6\lyoxp<5viov xe Hr)pal aupxteoupp.'v'nv
xal fiprixavr^cxtv, oxwS "v ttS iiexp xe xxifaios
£7uu£>r|xai ual (xexpfixai £irt xotS ^vayxa'cHS r\
xa\a ixcwp it).
2. L. Stella, La posizione storica di D. (Sophia^ I 0 (1941) p.218.
T.A. Sinclair, Hist, of Or. political Thought, p.66.
ii. Langerbe^ck, A<5?, IS 'ETtipuaptT), P*7(.
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In this aphorism D. seemed to be aware of the fact that in many
cases men feel a sense of deprivation not because they are actually
deprived but because they fear possible impoverishment in the future. So
they are led to a restless attempt for more and more possession making
the life difficult for themselves and other people.
D. is the first, to my knowledge, in the ancient world
who deepened^ the meaning of measure and, elevating it to a higher
2
level, introduced it into the moral life as a means:
to protect health,
to promote euthumia,
to improve conduct an< human relations.
A self-limitation, it should be noted, far from being
slavery, leads to actual freedom; lack of measure not only undermines
1. F. Mesiano, La etica materialistica di D., p. 71.
z. a. Fr. WekrLiy Etu k irjtJijLrj : Ar Arje-
sck; cUe d ey Ctrl i ■iro4 e Li s oAe*-, c s. A A y-%. (rv\ UL-
5 <L hf £, ( V £. "A L C rnvvj ^ $ 09s-0 n- 33-62).
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someone's health but also leads to conflicts with others and finally
to legal procedures which are actually a limitation of freedom (cf. fr.245).
True wisdom is to keep the measure, "to understand what is possible within
""SK-.
2
the limits of what is necessary (fr. 289).
!• Such thoughts on human nature could be opposed to Thucydides'
pessimistic views on ac tt c/o- (human nature)
according to which:
a. men are insatiable for power, therefore (are) led to conflicts;
b. t tey are sinners by nature;
c. justice is a concept understandable only in relations between
equally-powered individuals or states.
The arrogance of power is described by Thucydides as a natural
t a / i
offspring and misuse of power (See: E. Topitsch, ccv V p n clol Cf>o<ris
und Sthik bei Thukydides. In: Wiener Studien, 61 (1943) 50-67).
There is no evidence that Thucydides and D. met each other;
that they agreed or disagreed. But Thucydides lived in Thrace
during a long period of the Pelop.
war as an exile; in Thrace is Abdera, D.'s biirth place, where he
lived most of his life (in all probability the period of the Pelop.
war). Some more references (for reasons of comparison) to
Thucydides' work are to be mentioned in other pages (on Virtue, on
Political life).
2. Vlastos, op. cit., part II, p.61.
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4. Body-kind (Soul) relations.
Every discussion of this problem has to include what one
believes about the life of the soul after death. D.'s answer to this
question can reasonably be inferred from fr. 297* and confirmed by the
2
evidence we have from Aetius; according to the latter D. believed that
"the soul is perishable} it perishes with the body". 'ith a kind of
indignation hardly repressed beneath the calm certainty of his reasoning
D. says in the fr. mentioned above: "Some men ignoring (not knowing or
disregarding the fact of) the dissolution of mortal nature, but actin
3
on knowledge of their own sins, af lict the period of life with
anxieties and fears, inventing false tales about the period after the
end of life."
1. fr. 297: "ivtou 9vr)xr)S otfcrewS SiaXucrtv oiin el6<5xeS
av9purn:oi> auve&S^aei 5?: xf|s £v x$ (3u$) xaHcmpaYHoatfvT)*,
xbv xrjs fHoxfjS xP^vov xapaxat1* xa\aax;wp£ouai *
\j/euSea xepl xoiJ |iex& x^v xeXcux^v |iu9o-n;\acrxeovxeS
XP<5vou.
2. AET. IV 7.4 DK 68 A 109; iJOK. 393)'. £ ^9apX?}V
(sc. >}/ux^v) xcp a£\iaxi auvSiocg>9e:ipo|j,£vr|v.
3. K. Freeman's translation of this passage (....on knowledge of the
suffering in life...) is quite mistaken and destroys the meaning of
the fr.
ior
Soul's absolute superiority (to the body) and unique capacity
in guiding human life is explicitly asserted in one of the most beautiful
frr. of D.; he says: "if the body brought a suit against the soul, for
all the pains it had endured throughout life, and the illtreatment, and
I were to be judge of the suit, I would gladly condemn the soul, in
that it had partly ruined the body by its neglect and dissolved it with
bouts of drunkenness, and partly destroyed it and had torn it in pieces
with its passion for pleasure — as if, when a tool^or a vessel were in
2
a bad condition, I blamed the man who was usin it unsparingly*
l. fr. 159: A. ...fpr)crtv " e I xoft cp'tiocxoS atixrf 6£kt)v
Xayc^VTOS, xapd xavxa xbv (3iov tfiv (n6uvr)Tori <xal> xaxwS
itexov^ev, octix?>S y£vatxo xoO £yx\tf|iaxoS 8\.<xa.oxf\Z>,
t)6&oS av xaxatyr|<pCcJap0ai xffS >|ruxffS, £9' x& p£v dx'Xeae
xou af'iiaxoS xatS dpsXsfaS xat t^lXvaz xat* |i£0aiS,
xd 5£ xax£<p9e ipe xal 8i£crnaaz xafS <pt\T)6ovCouS, "axep
ipyavou xivoS rj ctxeuouJ xaxflS exovxoS xbv xphfyevov
dcp£t,<fe'> alxiacra T0ai.
2* It is not without interest to recall here that a similar view was
shared by Antiphon the sophist (V3 87 B2), Socrates, Plato (see:
Guthrie History III, 473 or ocrates 153 where the page title is: the
body as instrument of the Psyche), Aristotle (on part^ei^b of animals,
642 a 11: since the body is the instrument•.•)•
Cf. ..picurus, fr. 445 (us. p.29): pnSfc atxt'iiE^a x^v accpxa his
xwv peyaXwv xaxwv atxiav |ir)5^ stS xd updypocxa xpexwpcv
xdS fiumpop CaS, £v 6£ x~ \|/ux?] xds xoux.'i v alx(a$
ov C'hx^iiev.
i o £
In this quotation it is obviously implied that, in D.'s view,
soul is absolutely responsible for the conditions of the body in good
health and bad. Responsibility presupposes freewill about which 0. did
not say,as far as we know from surviving evidence, any word. Nonetheless,
his ethical theory cannot be understood, unless we accept freewill as a
postulate.
A more optimistic aspect of the capacity of the soul to improve
the body (to lead human beings to a self-perfection) is affirmed elsewhere:*
"it is right that men should value the soul rather than the body; for
perfection of soul corrects the inferiority of the body, but physical
strength without intelligence does nothing to improve the mind." The
ideal of KKot^cifiej (fair of form and virtuous of soul) seems
2
modified with a strong emphasis on the second member of the pair; which
acquires a clearly ethical connotation; it is not something given by birth;
it is achieved in life by the soul which is evidently superior to the body.
3
Soul being the guiding power, is of higher value and worth higher care.
If one is to be justly proud it is of the perfection of his soul rather
1. fr. l«7: AvQpwiroiS apn<56iov |ia\\ov r| cr'natoS
\<5yov itoietarQai
2. Cf. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 353 n.14: Kalokagathia is
undeniably a terra with the strongest of social implications.
Cf. his pa.es 339ff., 351 n.7. c ??■ 3;-33.
3. cf. fr. 57:.... ivPpuVwv (etiyeveioe) r) toO f,9eoS e^tpotht).
1
rather than the beauty of his body. What C»C.W. Taylor proposes as a
translation of fr. 187 can be accepted as an implication; it is a very
Socratic and attractive interpretation, but it is a paraphrase of the
original text.
However, neither the last-quoted fr. (187) nor the previous one
2
(159) make any sense of ascriptions of dualism. Unlike Aristotelian
3 4
active nous and Platonic soul the Oemocritean soul-cluster would
5
dissolve if deprived of the body (if separated from the body).
1. C.C.W. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in D.',' Phronesls,
12 (19G7), 14s It is fitting for men to pay more attention to the
soul than to the body....
Sinclair's explanation (History of Greek olitical Thought,
p. 65) that D. "was thinking.••.of the Importance of the reasoning
faculty rather than the Socratic" <£ H"J^S " emphasises
one point and misrepresents the whole passage.
2. Per contra see: Langerbeck, 75.
3. De anima, 430 a 22-3: * —'p t <S -$tLs & Co ) £6ti p-'v 0
~ 0L"> cy ? \ \ _ / 9 Q. / \
t C U V ° "H t-j3 t ft C K. OOC toutc ^A.ovov' CX -\7 Oc W ait o V K oca_
■> / r
i «>t o\/ . Cf. Guthrie, History, II. 430 ff.
4. Phaedo 67 D,pjjaedrus 250 C ff., Gorgias 493A, Rep. 611 B-C,
Phaedo 66 D—E.
5. fr. 297. ASt. IV 7.4. ( DK 68 A 109 Dox. 393). See also:
G. Vlastos Philos. Rev. 54 (1945) p. 579.
i oy
Mind and body constitute a unity; neither of them is the form
of the other; body is the vessel, soul is the pilot during life.
Happiness is pursued and achieved by the soul, if some conditions are
fulailled; one of these is the body's health; from this point of view
the soul is interested in the body's health and (because of its superiority)
also responsible for protecting it.
To characterise D.'s view (on the problem of body-soul relations)
as a materialism with modern connotations (that soul is an epiphenomenon
e v i d e v\ ce_
of the material body) is beyond the we possess. For L>. body
and soul coexist and perish together; both of them consist of atoms which
arc the only reality for atomists,^" But!
2
(1) Soul atoms are spherical,
3
(2) they are the most mobile and therefore
4
(3) the soul is more mobile than any other atomic structure.
1. Sext. adv. math. VII 135 ( DK 68 B 9).
Galenus, de medic, empir. fr. ed. H. OchSne 1259, 8 ( K 68 B 125).
2. Arist. de anima 404 a 2—3: Anstpwv y&p OVXMV Cjynj-IOCTWV HOct
ic<5|awv x& acpatpoetSf? itOp xat \la>xbv
3. op. Cit. 404 a 6 ff. xouxwv 5b xb otpaipoe ifirj \|rux*lv, 6t* xb
6i3t iravxbs 6i5vacr9ai btaSuvetv xobs xoiot5xous pucr|io05 >
nat Htvetv x& XotuSc nivou^evoc nal atixa,....
Cf. 406 b 16-^2 and 409 b 1.
4. op. cit. «io4 b 7: °a01 °®v xb HiVEiaOat xb r^Jruyov
Airs-BXeilrav , o3xoi xb Htvt)xxaxov uurXaBov x?)v ux^v .
in conne tion with 404 a 1-10, partly quoted
beneath. Cf. also, de anima, 405 a 7-13.
* Cf. P, J. BicKitU, Tl,e SiJkDtnccrlUs
E <r*. 1c s tEE (,'JE S)j f H ,*7 ■ £ J •
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It is not strange if D. reached the conclusion that soul
moves the body1 and governs it; and that soul is responsible for the body
(frr. 159, 157)• "it is an elegant deduction from the first principles
of atomic physics."
On the other hand — unlike other materialists — nowhere in
d.'s frr. can evidence be traced that wealth, bodily satisfactions,
3
sensuous pleasures, or the like, are either the only or the greatest values
man can seek or attain, as will be explained in the following pages.
1. op. Cit. 404a 1-lOj At)P.(5mP LTO'i . . . 0|lo£ i XTct /VeujXLTCTOS
uTtoXauSrftvovTES x^iv etvat tb napixov toTM Cu>oiS
T^v vlvt)CrtV.
2. Vlastos, op. cit. p. 579.
3. • -chumacher, ie heeleJ der £itz des chicksals, Berlin (193b) p. 26.
no
5* Meaning of goad(s)
To know the good is a reasonable demand before we decide to
pursue and attain it* >ve have already seen that euthumla is the Chief
0>od according to D* The inquiry here will be directed to the following
points)
1. hat are the good things and activities in the life of
individuals*
2* hat are good activities approved in the relationship of
individuals*
3. Towards a definition of good (or a description of it).
1* A general and vague dichotomy with a sense of hierarchy of goods
is described in fr* 3?) "He who chooses the goods of the soul chooses
the more divinej he who chooses those of it® dwelling~place chooses
human goods.
The seeming religious flavour of this aphorism has been
2
explained elsewhere* Apart from this aspect, another proolem arises,
because of its vagueness) what are the objects of choice about which
a hint is given in the fr. above? or what activities of the soul are
to be deliberately aimed at?
1. fr. 37) 0 "C«x s ol-c~^c t-oc Slcc'CC/Oac. acc -
£ £ -Cola. • o Si z <L
2. In Ch* 1. This fr. would not be discussed if a distinction
between body and soul with superiority of the soul was not
testified by other frr. attributed to 0. (e.g. 159, 187, 11, 125).
lil
(a) is this possibly cosmological speculation and successful scientific
inquiry? or
(b) expression of admiration for moral deeds? or artistic speculation?
or
(c) clear conscience ana the joys of friendship?
There is evidence to affirm all these questions* u. seems
to have included all mental activities in the meaning of "goods" for
the soul* He declared that he would prefer to acquire "cognitionem
rerum" than gain the Kingdom of Persia (fr* 118), that the great
pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works (fr* 184),* that
a man who neglects justice is unhappy (fr* 174), t.iat a man ie not
2
worthy to live, if he has not one, at least, good friend (fr* 99).
However, these are not the only goods in life; there is the
partner of the soul * the body; it is a condicio sine qua non for
the soul, since disembodied existence of the soul is unacceptable in
D.'s system. If soul is to enjoy euthumia (fr. 189), its dwelling place
should be looked after; attention should be paid to it*
What is good for the body is at first a matter of acquaint¬
ance and later of experience. Here, as elsewhere, a physicist's way
of thinking will be seen in the frr. concerned with the problem.
Nature is our teacher, things in nature are neither useful nor hurtful;
a positive or negative value is given to them according to our
relation to them. Man is able to adapt to new conditions and accustom
1. fr. 194: at vteyaXai, -teo^etS Anb toO GeScr^at xh
xa\& x"v epyov.
2. fr. 99: Cflv o6h a£ioS, oxtp piT)6b eti to-ci XPnd&S
Of. frr. 100, 101, 103, 186.
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himself to them after having some acquaintance with them. A clear
example of this kind of t ought is given by fr. 172; Those same
things from which we get good can also be for us a source of hurt, or
else we can avoid the hurt. For instance...(deep water - swimming)
External nature teaches man, human nature naturalises this kind of
2
learning and so man becomes stronger ior reasons of adaptation and
self-protection. This practical learning is the first good for the
survival of man. In this stage a simple definition of the good and the
bad might be derived (from fr. 172):
good is what is useful for surviving,
bad is what is contrary to our survival
(or good is what has survival-value, bad what has not).
At a higher level men's intentions are to be considered if
good and bad are to find a better (really ethical) definition} good
and bad interchange according to men's ability and their intention to
make good use of their experience and knowledge, i.e. good and bad
are dependent on human skillfulness and volition. Fr. 173 is
1. fr. 172: dcp' (Sv ripXv xdyaQSt yCyverxit Ait& twv atixwv
toutmv xal tSc xtx& ^xaupiTxcaiiEQ'ccv, xwv xaxffv £x-rbs
ettipev. a^Tixa u6u>p 0a05 ets ito\X3t xP"ncTL^ov Ka^
5aSxe xax<5v * xtv^uvoS y3co dxoixv tyfjval . prixav^
oSv rupeB'n, vifaecrBai SiSacrxeiv.
2. Cf. fr. 33;..:. j
JLA. t Z SL U 6 ^ 00 G OC £ b (joo C (.0 ItOC fcL ■
• ' 5
fairly clear on this#
l. fr. 173s (a) &v9pvTioi0i xocx& t? AyaQwv yfexai, £uf)v ni
*t&ya£83E p?) 'ni^xyixai xoStiyFTetv (rn6£ 6ye£v F6n:<5p(T'i.
(p) oii 5'xcttov xaxoipi xh xoia^e xoCvfiv, £v
dyaBotaiv lv' (c) toij xf ^ya^ofaiv ofov re v-nrPn-i
xal xpb<i x* xaxcf, fi tlvi Bov\o|i£v<;}, (4Xx?|.
dome commentb of this are necessary:
a* There is a kind of correspondence in the meaning of the two
extreme propositions; both emphasise that good things (or situations)
can be changed into oad ones, because of bad management (in the first
case), because of ill will (in the other),
b. The middle proposition is an explanatory coi., ent on the others.
In many cases people blame the conditions for their failure or for
undesirable results and consequently (men) misclnssify the things.
Here it is demanded that objective judgement on such things should be
directed not to the results but to men's ability or will* Things are
by themselves (potentially, if we might use terminology of Aristotelian
flavour) good (or neutral), but tne results are actually bad*
This statement makes sens© as an ethical problem:
conditions of objectivity of aior 1 judgement, hat should be the
criterion: the result or the management and intention?
One might recall her© a parallel point from aerates'
conversation with his friend Crito in prison: foerates says: "l
wish to investigate, Cri^fi, in common with you and see whether our
former argument seems different to me under our present conditions,,,,.
For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying
tomorrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your
114.
For the foundation of an ethical theory fr. 173 is of
interest. What is good or bad is not to be found in the things
themselves but in the user's treatment and indention •*"
Note 1 ctd. from p. 113.
judgement astray." (Plato's Crito, 48 D-E).
c. Luria (Democritea, Leningrad (1970) p. 422, no. 24) is right
J - c - p /
to say that o x £ c ^ , TTooii|E.r £i.v; £ ^ ti o p uj s make a
metaphor from navigation.
d. Langerbeck ( A o J u, '£T-rr i p u 6 p-^ p. 74) pointed out
"die starke Hervorhebung des $ o o ^ o p £ v uJ durch die
sehr wirkungsvolle Stellung in Satzs v/enn einer es nur
zielsicher angreift."
So the lastjpyoposition takes its place as a part of an
obvious attempt in D.'s frr. to found an ethical theory based on
knowledge and will (df. frr. 62 - Stob. 111.9.29. - 68, 89,
248, 69, 181, 264).
1. See: L. Stella, Valore e posizione storica dell' etica di
Democrito, Sophia, 10 (1942) pp. 220, 227.
Cf. Meno 88A. 3 e Guthrie, History, II, 490.
H. Langerbeck ( A la, 'Fit (p u r p. i ^ p . 74) noted
correctly:
ii "
frr. 172-3 are the best comment on fr. 119.
115.
Nature gives men the opportunity to find what is good or
bad; td obtain it they have to deliberate and decide. The
necessity to expand effort for good results is underlined in fr. 108:
"Good things are obtained with difficulty if one seeks; bad things
very probably be undesirable. This fr. is a remarkable
consideration about the necessity of wisdom in leading a happy
life (cf. frr. 119, 197).
Finally (in fr. 294) 3 qualities are named as goods (of
youth and old age respectively) characterising periods of human life:
"The good things of are strength and beauty, but the flower of
"H ou."tk
1. fr. 108 (Stob. IV 34.58): $ <•J 1 ve, <ri T ol^ ticcfoi-




A rounded sentence with a term of Heraclitean flavour
(Heraclitus, B 22, B 101). Cf. fr. 182.
11
old age Is sophrosyne."1
From the four aphorisms quoted above it becomes evident that
D. included in the meaning of good:
(a) good things (e.g. health, protection of life),
(b) good qualities (sophrosyne, ability to manage things, good
intentions),
(c) good activities (virtuous actions), since, in his opinion, virtue
is deeds not words (cf. fr. 145).
2. x'hat is the agathos' personality? Agathos was a current concept
in D.'s days; but to define it is a difficult task. A description
would be easier, of course. In D.'s frr., at least, only descriptions
of the agathos can be traced, ascribing good qualities to him.
? I \ 7 / / i n / /
1. fr. 294: Ltf/uJ Kou Lo ^ opcpLf] v£0xptoS oc^o^ija. j ^>qpaco5
St £ C+J (j? j> C Cf W vv7 v ~lh> 5 ■
Optimism for the aged is emphatically affirmed (flower-sophrosyne);
old men are of value, if their experience is crowned by sophrosyne.
If so, life is congenial even for old men. Such approval of old
age seems to mirror a feeling of pride in D. himself. 5?ith some
other frr. this seems to have been written when J. was rather old
and proud of his own sophrosyne. Cf. frr. 295, 299, 133.
Z. cf. pp. 135- ft. .
H7
It is a "must" in moral life for someone to "be agathos or
try to become by imitation."1 This sounds like a judgement of moral
obligation; but it is general and vague. A similar idea in a reverse
way is expressed by fr. 79: "it is a bad thing to imitate the bad, and
„2
not even to wish to imitate the good. Vagueness is no less present
here. A glimpse of practical life can be found in fr. 229: "Only
an agathos has the capacity to discern when to saye money and when to
m3
lead a more expensive life.
It is evident that the inquiry is turned not to the concept
4
of agathon but only to a description of the qualities of agathos.
1. fr. 39: AyaObv r) etvrxi yce? v t) |iip.e"cOai.
See: Natorp, Sthika 119 44.
2. fr. 79: X^bcrftbv ut i |ibv robs Hanoi)* irn5b b9e\eiv 5b
-rob* AyasOotf*.
3. fr. 229: <pei5(? toi Hal xpticrrn * bv xatptp 6b Hal
6aTtavn ' yivwaxeiv 6b dyaQou.
4. (I. Langerbeck, op. cit. p. 66: Zusanunenfassend kann man feststellen,
das auch hier der Blick auf den Agathos, nicht auf das Agathon
gerichtet 1st.
But E. Kapp, reviewing Langerbeck's book (Gnomon, 12 (1936)
pp. 65-77) and referring to Aristotle (Eud. Ethics 1216b), argued
that in human life it is important not to find definitions of virtues
but to lead a virtuous life. Socrates, to be sure, would reply
that nobody can be agathos without knowing what is agathon. We face
certainly an unsolved problem of circularity, unless we accept that
the concept of agathon is acquired by intuition.
> \s
A characteristic of the agathos is his magnanimity; he does
not blame bad men, even if accused by them.*
All these remarks touch the agathos' personality from outside;
there is no effort to penetrate his soul and explore that terram lncognitam.
They would be characterised as banal by some scholars. The following
two, on the contrary, cannot be deprived of some importance; they touch
crucial and debatable problems and present a thinker who took part in the
intere ting questions of his age. "Vore men become good through
,i2
practice than by nature. There are three points to be considered:
a. The long dispute of physis-noraos antithesis reaches its
culmination and a reasonable solution: synthesis. D. is not the first
to propose t is solution; the importance of his proposal is found in
the fact that it comes from a believer in a mechanical universe, an
outstanding physicist, a man well-acquainted with the medical teaching
3
of his days, a thinker who survived after the great Sophists.
b. By his aphorism D. takes his position against the ar stocratic
view of hereditary virtues (gifts, talents); he declares that "a man's
nature is not irrevocably fixed at birth, a man is indeed a creature
The educational aspect of this aphorism will find place
elsewhere (Ch. "On Education").
3. See frr. 26 c-d, 31. See also: Schmid-fitShlin, Gesch. d. grlech.
Liter. 1.5. p. 294 n.5.
"1
who makes himself by a process of constant change."1
c. By this formula the door is opened for the concept of freedom
of will. Askesis (exercise) is a voluntary action, it is, at least,
not non-voluntary.
On the grounds of its content fr. 247 ("to a wise man the
whole earth is open; for the whole earth is tha native land of a good
soul") constitutes an anticipation of ideas of the 4th century B.C.
Only the concept of the good soul is of interest here. The good soul
is equated with wisdom; it is the product of wisdom. At first sight
it is near the doctrine "virtue is knowledge". It seems to mean:
more knowledge implies better understanding, it entails better behaviour,
more forgiveness and subsequently easier relationship (better relations).
According to this explanation, in any specific situation (state of affairs),
conduct (i.e. orientation of will, decision and action) can be in¬
fluenced by knowledge. Knowledge is a condition necessary but not
3
sufficient for action.
1. Guthrie, Sophists, p. 256 (footn. 2).
-> r" * — — /? ( _ \ ?
2. fr. 247: OtVclpt 6 a (p uj 11 oc 6 ol y bGciy' IpUftyS
oufiijs TJ OCCjj Li o €v^T/OC6 Ko rfooS
Strangely enough this fr. echoes similarly an aphorism of
"> r" _ \ 7
Thucydides sub persona Pericles (2.13.3):.-- & V dp u ^ v' <x p irf (-
_ _ /
(pctvuoV 17OL. 6 cu _j'y loL(j>o$.
3. In the light of this interpretation fr. 83 might be more intell¬
igible. Cf. fr. 181 (end).
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3. An attempt to define "good" is put at the end of this paragraph,
because:
(a) after centuries of philosophical inquiry this concept is still
undefined and discussions of good things and good qualities are made
necessarily without a final definition of "goodness".1
(b) D. tried to give a definition of it (it is evident from frr.
like 62, 261); but he gave only an indirect description through the
concept of justice.
It is a duty not only to be just but also actively to protect
justice on behalf of others; "we must avenge those who are wronged
to the best of our powers and not let it be; for this is just and good,
„ 2
and the contrary is unjust and evil (fr. 261). This maxim presupp¬
oses of course good will, since to avenge wronged people is a
voluntary and free decision.
To avoid injustice is one step to goodness; perhaps it Is a
necessary condition of living in a state; but it is not enough. To
want justice and not to tolerate injustice is a higher conception of
goodness; it puts good will as the foundation, as is explicitly
1. G.E. Moore, Principle Kthica, Cambridge 1968 [1903", p.6 (§ 6) ff.,
p. 118 (§70).
W.K. Frankena, Ethics, inglewood Cliffs, N.J. (1963) pp.81-85
(refutation of definist theories).
2. fr. 261: iHoup,evotcrt ti^topeiv xax& 5uva|iiv Hat |it)
"n^P i£vai • xb p,?-v y&p xoiouxov Stxaiov xat fryoc&bv,
T& 5b n?| TOIO0TOV a5ixov xat xaxov.
For a furt er discus ion see: E.A. Havelock, The liberal
temper in Greek Politics, London (1957) pp. 133-134.
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declared in fr. 62: "Virtue consists not in avoiding wrongdoing but
in having no wish thereto" (fr.62)*» D. values the intention which
2
has not yet become action* But there is one more step to be reached
if someone's good will is to be proved; he must willingly and actively
protect justice (fr. 261)*
Some of these frr. are actually a remarkable anticipation of
later thought; they "are conceived on a high plane and some of them
m3
have an almost Christian ring about them. These frr. tend to
introduce the idea of "Willens Ethik", in which only one concept can
be good without any qualification: good will.
i /\V p \ \ ? r _
1. fr. 62 (Stob. Ill 0.29): aja voV ov to ^ a <> <-k Lt v ,
"Co y.v\&l i ^ Uv .
2. The same emphasis on the importance of intention can be seen in
fr. 68: "Worthy and unworthy men (are to be known) not only by their
action but also by their wishes."
3. Bailey, Greek Atomists....p.203.
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Fr. 69.
If there is no clear and final definition of what is good, one
would be hesitant on whether and how good is to be realised. D. did'nt
follow the^ay of scepticism or subjectivism; he proceeded to overcome
the difficulty deliberately and decisively. In a surprisingly daring
for his age «• and optimistic statement he expressed a positive view
embracing knowledge and morality at the same time. He says: "For all
men the good and true are the same; but the pleasant differs for
different men."*
This can — and must because of its importance — be studied
from different viewpointsl
a. Why are good and true both opposed to pleasant?
b. Is there any similarity or antithesis or progress in comparison
to -Socrates' views on these problems?
c. what — if any — is the connection with Protagoras' doctrines?
d. Is there any compatibility and connection between D.'s Ethics
anri eplstemology with reference to fr. 69?
e. On the authenticity of fr. 69.
a. This aphorism unexpectedly combines two main fields of human capacity
and separates them at the same time. There is truth and It is objective
(this is implied, since truth is the same for all men). This is
1. fr. 69: ct v $ j3 uj it otj "TT ou6L r ujJtov ocja-Sov k. oci yjSu St
o< /) «:Oo. This fr. we know only from Ueinocrates' collection.
There are nevertheless internal reasons suggesting attribution
to Democritus; these are explained below. £-P- ?■ 2-2?.
I -z-3
an epistemological credo for > emocritus. The existence of an
objective good is also asserted here, without any comment} it is a
fundamental belief, an ethical credo, which is logically necessary for
the fo ndation of an objective ethical theory. All men, it is said, hove
2
the ability to discern vhat is good or bad; of course it presupposes
a degree of knowledge; it explains why the concept of truth is here
combined with that of goodness, which seems unexpected at first sight,
but justifiable for D.'s cultural environment. Knowledge of good is
1. Cf. frr. 117, 11, 125.
2. This belief was later shared by Aristotle who says (; etaph. 100b b 26ff.):
u)<jt£» wS eolke; toxvteS uiioXaupavooat,v Exetv
aitXSs, el p?) nept aracvxa, &XX& itE|?l tb apEivov nctt
Xetpov. et 6b p?) fmcrTdtpEvoi dXX& SoZafovxeS,
n:oXt5pc?X\ov £rctp£Xr)T£ov av sir) rffS <*Xnn£ CaS.
See: P. Natorp, Die Ethika des D., 91:
das v.'ahre, das Allen gleichartig, und das Erscheinende, Sinnliche,
das jeden auf seine eigenthtimliche Art sich darstellt.
Arist. Met. 1009 b 2 ff.
Do*-
Theophr. de sens. 63 (Dox."'517, 13). Vgl. 69 , 70. (p. 519,
19, 24).
See also Natorp, Vorschungen...• 186 ff., particularly 188.
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asserted as a condition necessary but not sufficient for doing it;
the differentiating point — the other condition, which is crucial and
important — is individual reference and decision. Virtue is not
identified with knowledge,1" but only accompanied by it.
A central problem of ethics remains unanswered anu should be
raised here: what is the basis of objectivity of good?
"D. can take 'man is the measure' in an entirely different
sense. His physical concept of the soul defines a unitary human nature,
#.2
which affords a basis for universally valid judgements. Believing
that all men can discern what is good is not, of course, a definition;
but it is a necessary affirmation, if one is to construct an ethical
theory and escape scepticism or subjectivism; it is, "to b«. s o-r-e. ,
the starting point of an intuitionist, not of a "definist". In the
final a&alysis no later philosopher succeeded in providing a complete
1. Cf. C.C. Taylor, op. cit. pp.14,25.
2. G. Vlastos, op. cit. I. 591 (Philos. Hev. (1945) p. 591).
From some other statements (e.g. fr. 278, first proposition:
"for human beings it is a necessity of life to have children, arising
from nature and primeval law... , fr. 253, last proposition: "to
err is human but to forgive is difficult for men") it might reason¬
ably be inferred that D. recognised a common nucleus in human nature;
perhaps something like a priori conditions of existence, perhaps
race memories accumulated in common experience. Cf. frr. 165,
172 and Diodorus I. 8. 7 (in OK II 136, a-15).
Vlastos (op. cit. footn. 67) makes a reference to D.'s baffling fr.
124: One (man) will be (many) men and all (men) one man, which
DK give up as unintelligible.
11 r
definition; and such a definition is not of importance for the practice
1
of virtue.
b. From this point starts the differentiation between D.'s and
Socrates' views on the subject. Knowledge of good is necessary and
» 2
sufficient condition for doing it is implied from S. s teaching,;
it is only a necessary condition, D. says in fr. 69, because another factor
intervenes between knowing and doing what is good, viz. individual
3
preference, will, decision. In a free paraphrase fr. 69 could be so:
"in so far as kno ledge of good is necessary for practical reasons all
men are able to know; the point of difficulty and diffe entiution is
what they like to do, what they will decide to do." This conception
4 i(
of the problem escapes the implications of the doctrine virtue is
knowledge" and actually leaves more room for freedom of will and
personal responsibility.
1. A. Mclntyre, A short history of Ethics, Oxford, 1971 >
21-22, referring to Aristotle, dud. Ethics, 1216 b.
V* t \ 5" '1 / \ 7 \
2. rist. EN 1144 b 28: £ Kfxx.tr} J p-t-v odv /lo^oui xoof, catpiZouS
p tXo e/lvoci, ' CT\LCfi^<Xi tivctc TT'at6<2A.
I / ■>/ 7 ) \ i I
MV-f « If : ff 0 6 6<- 5 u) £.to £(. wou. Tfoc€ctS Xcu> ocptXxn^, .
See: Guthrie, History, 111, 450 ff. or Socrates, p. 131.
3. frr. 62 (Stob. Ill 9. 29), 68, ^9 concerned with the problem of •
will (volition) are to be discussed elsewhere.
4. A paradoxical perplexity (determinism) is discussed by Guthrie in
his History, III, 459, or his Socrates, pp. 139 ff.
l 1.Q
"The good and the true are the same for all men" (£r. 69) sounds like
an explicit denial of Protagoras thesis: "l call some things better
1 2
than others, but none truer" and "man is the measure for everything"".
Protagorean subjectivism is attacked by objectivism on both sides: moral
3
and epistemological.
Fr. 69 seems to be a two-sided aphorism, something like a two-sided
axiom in the Democritean system; perhaps it was a transitional one from
episteiuology to moral philosophy.
Conjunction of these two fields of mental activity was a
general belief (in D.'s age and after him), which found its culmination
in Socrates' doctrine: * "virtue is knowledge". D., therefore, had
1. Plato's Theaet. 167 b: /■* 6V to! txtpec
T^v extpwVj J oo, Vlastos 591.
2. /'Sext. adv. Math. VII 60 .
ra so a li
ITheaet. 151E - 152A, 161C.
3. See: Kullmann, Zur Nachwirkung des Homo-?:ensura Satzes des Protagoras
bei D. und Epikur, Archiv ft5r die Philosophie, 51 (1969) 128-44,
where earlier literature is refer e to.
Cf. also: VK 68 B 156 ( Plutarch, adv. Colotes 4 p. 1108 F)
Arist. Met. 1009 b 7 ff. ( OK 68 A 112),
Philoponus, de anim. p. 71, 19 ( UK 68 A 113),
Sext. VII 389 ( DK 68 A 114),
Arist. Metaph. 1062 b 12,
See also: HE 23 (1957) cols. 913-916.
4. Guthrie, History, III, 257 ff., 450 ff. or
Sophists, 257, Socrates, 130 ff.
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to assert the possibility of knowledge, if he wanted to construct an
1
ethical theory. Scholars are right to make the parallel between
the two fields: epistemology and ethics.
I. "Fr. 09 as a whole gives an obvious parallel with the famous
fr. 125••.pleasantness is ranked with the secondary qualities as it
obviously varies from person to person, while the good is independent
..2
of all the changes in the percelver of the environment.
II. Pleasant (fr. 69) corresponds to sweet and bitter (frr. 9, 125)
and sight an hearing (fr. 11).
IIIThe good and the true (fr. 69) correspond to truly being
(frr. 9, 125)
1. For this reason - among others - I think that D.'s epistemology
is prior to his ethical theory; the former came as a supplement
of Physics, the latter as a supplement of the whole system. And
both of them (being a reply to subjectivism, scepticism of the
Sophists - see Burnet, Greek Philosophy 1 (1968), pp. 157 ff.)
fall in a period after 420 DC, when the tenchin ofjtfejefiophists
was well-known and they had retired from the stage.
2. Taylor, op. cit. p. 14. Taylor's article (Phronesis 12, 1967,
pp. 6-27) is the best discussion of the problem of compatibility
between D.'s Ethics and Epistemology.




6. • F6rber thou-ht (following In this Heinze's opinion) that fr»
» 2
69 deviates from ). s thought. Netorp , on the contrary, was the first
to observe that a reason for its authenticity is that fr. 69 is in
agreement with D.'s theory of knowledge. Taylor expounded (explained)
in detail the similarity between these two parts of D.'s system
(theory of knowledge — of et ics). In both of them there is a
subjective element (convention — fr. 125, pleasantness — fr. 69)
and an objective one" (truly being — fr. 69) leading from subjectivism
to objectivism (to an exit from scepticism).
1* Ferber, Uber die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der Ethik des
Demokrits, eitschrift ftir Philosophie, 132/3 (1908) p. 95.
(The whole article covers pp. 32-114). , „ qt;
p*AicJ*rlj -1 P' 1,1
2. Die bthika des D. ch. 2 (pp. 88 ff.)/: "fUr die ichtheit ertscheldet,
dass D. genau so in der Erkenntnisslehre gegentiberstellt: das
Viahre, das Allen gleichartig, und das Ercheinende, Sinnliche, das
jedem auf seine eigentlimliche Art sich darstellt."
3. Taylor, op. cit. pp. 24-27.
I If
After all the discussion given under CL—d above, it seems that
not only the grounds for suspicion of the authenticity of fr. 69 are
unjustified, but also that it is completely compatible with what we know
about D.'s thought and its authenticity should be postulated — as
a supplement * even if we had other reasons (Democratas' name for
example) to suspect it as spurious. For my part, I cannot imagine





It seems necessary at this point to investigate some features
of D.'s terminology concerned with bodily pleasures and mental joys
(intellectual pleasures) in order to avoid misapprehensions later on.1
Some concepts used by him interchangeably (at first sight)
should be defined; a careful study may persuade us that these notions
have a different connotation. These are:
c c l <- ( ' 2
Q. • ty c \/ j
. I , I 3D* 6"u|A.t^o^crV;O('<5"-^L<jf0^ rv,
, , 4c* Z
} Z itj .
Two preliminary remarks, at the risk of repetition, may be
recalled here:
1. A chain of undefined terms included in O.'s definition of criterion
of pleasure (frr. 4 [188]) demand elucidation (illumination) before
we attempt to discover its meaning.
2. frr. 69, 74, 232, 243/71, 178, 1 9, 235, 207, 211,214, 262, 293.
3. frr. 4, 188. Cf. also: 237, 253 C xj t ov
y 74 6 u/u. (f> tp ^
/
4. frr. 4, 188, 146, 191, 194, 235, 174. Cf. also 232 rfjonh ;
/ f
211 Ttp-nvoc 200 , 201 T ho (-<-L /
9 / 1 f
233 £TTlT£^)T(£. 6 Tot tot- ) <V T 77 £ £ toutCL .
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a* A standardised vocabulary was not availaole in D.'s days.
1
b. Concepts like that of hedone were in flux; they were under discussion
concrete restriction to the meaning of pleasantness is provided, it
leaves open the way to subjectivism. But D.'s intention seemed to be
different; his effort is obvious in many other frr. to overcome
subjectivism and find an objective foundation for morality.
A first attempt to restrict the acceptability of what is
pleasant can be seen in the following precept: "accept nothing of
»4
pleasant things, unless it is beneficial. A new definition,
nevertheless, will be necessary for "what is beneficial (6 tpy)
if we are to have a clear connotation of pleasant.
1. K. v. Fritz, Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck, pp. 9 ff.
C.J. Classen, The study of lan uage amongst Socrates' contemporaries,
P.A.C.A. (1959) pp. 33-49.
2. VS 84 A 19 (Prodicus-Stoa).
Plato's Prot. 337 A-C, Philebus 11B.
Aristotle's EN 1099 a8, Topica 112 b 22.
2
from the days of the Sophists up to the Stoic period.
"y,e.
We have seen in fr. 69 that pleasant differs for different
.. 3
men , although true and good are the same for all of them. If no
<v
!3i-
The next aphorism (fr. 232: of pleasant things, those that
come most rarely give the greatest enjoyment)^" has a psychological
bias* In another case pleasantness is explicitly associated with
success, when it is said tat: "all kinds of toil are pleasanter than
rest, when men attain that for which they labour, or know that they
will attain it***" This is again a psychological comment not
helping us to understand any better what the connotation of pleasant-
3
ness is in fr. 74 quoted above. >*e have therefore to trace the
I c r I
meanin of derivative terras: Gv^Cpop&v (beneficial) and *]
(pleasure)•
In several frr. we can see D*'s intention to limit the
general notion of hedone and make a distinction between bodily
pleasures and intellectual pleasures* In fr. 235 e.g. we read that
bodily pleasures do not lead to any sense of true satisfaction. D.'s
words are: "All who derive their pleasures from the stomach, over¬
stepping due season in eating or drinking or sexual pleasure, have
1. fr# 232s x("v t)5£( v x& cTTttvn'xccxa. y\,v6\iEva (iaXixxcx
TZPTZE I .
2. fr. 2^3* •naux't)S itavxeS o i it<5voi rjStoves, oxav
eivehev rcoveouat xuyx^vwaiv r) elS^coai nupaovxcS...
3. Cf. also rj Jtiof in fr. 159, where it means willingly, gladly.
I 33
»»1
pleasures that are brief and short-lived.•••
For this reason it is recommended elsewhere that: "one should
.. 2
choose not every pleasure, but only what is concerned with beautiful •
To distinguish between bodily and Intellectual pleasure and to choose
the latter is a condition of euthumla, since: "The best way for a man
to lead his life is to have been as euthutnos (cheerful) as possible.***
t*3
This happen if one rtoes'nt seek one's pleasures in mortal things•"vJ
Pleasures controlled (in kind and time) are recommended (by
implication), because "untimely pleasures produce unpleasantness".4
What leads to uncontrolled pleasures is condemned, on the ground that
l* fr. 235: oaot, A-rcb yxCTTp?)* t&S rjfiov&S noiiowai
U"rt£pPej3A.r|K<5't£S t£>v Hcctpbv £nt PpoxTEcnv r) nSaeaiv r)
dcppoStaCotcrtv, -cotcri ncfoiv at pbv rjSoval PpayEtat te
xat 6t' 6\£you y^vovxat
By this fr. — which can hardly be a moral aphorism; it is rather
a sample of metaethical reasoning "—D. seems to turn his criticism
against someone of his younger contemporaries (Aristippus?
Antisthenis?). Cf. frr. 71, 232.
2. fr. 207: riSov^v ttniaacv t^v t~ HaXcp
atprirrOrt!- XP^'V'
Cf. Epicurus' Third letter (to Menoiceus), § 129. (Usener, p.63,
Arrighetti [4] p. 113): Ov IT oi 6 <xv oll pc v a
3. fr. 189: CDtcTxov dvOpwitw tbv (3fov StayEiv u>5
itXEfaTa E^0upr]6^VTt nat £\axt-dTa dvtr)0£vci * toOto
5' av etrj» ei tlw p?) £"rcl vofS GvircotaL t&S r)6ov&w
HOLCtTO.
4. fr. 71: rpSoval axatpot t'htouctlv cf. fr. 235.
I 3 4-
such pleasure is a source of wickedness.^ Base sources of pleasure are
2
rejected because they are not true causes of joy. True courage is
3
defined as the possibility for a man to control his own pleasures.
It is fairly evident that all these aphorisms intend to restrict
a general term (hedone) to some favoured notion. Let us trace the way.
"Accept no pleasure, unless it is beneficial (unless it
agrees with you)." This could be an advice given by a doctor to a
5
patient. Such a view was defended on the ground that in the fr. above
1. fr. 178: itdvtwv h<xhlcttov r\ eilmexe'r) t?)v
vr<5triTnt * ocutt) yoco £attv ^ t£xt£L t&S rjoov&S TauxaS,
it <?v r) HaH(5TT]s yC"F. a.i.
2. fr. 293: o?ctiv r|£ov?iv ex°ucnv at £up.9opai>
oii ^uvtarrt wS x& xffS ttSxilS xoivd TtaatVj
dxopeoucn olxr)tTy5 xapaS.
Cf. fr. 107a.
3. fr. 214: dvSpeToJ.... o xSv rjiSovSv Kp£aau;v.
Cf. Antiphon (the Sophist) B 58 (DK II 364, 8-9), Plato, Laws,
626 E. Thucydides, II 40, 3.
4. fr. 74: jir|6£:v &ito6exeo9ai, r)v |i?| cruvicpepr}.
5. There is evidence that D. had acquaintance with the medicine of
his days. See frr. 26 b-d, 31.
13r
D. is using a term of medical origin1 (an expression of medical flavour).
/ 2
Our inquiry into the meaning of 6Vp.cj>tp^ leads to fr. 4 ( 188). In
One. 0 ft -followivy para-grccpkO
this we will try to find (inf7^ D.'s criterion of good;
/
but before doing so another term should be explained, i.e. rtp ^ti¬
lt is a higher kind of pleasure (frr. 4, 188, 146, 191, 194,
174); it is the only kind of joy recommended by 0. without any trace
of hesitation. Terpsis perhaps accompanies pleasures but neither all
of them nor always; such an inference might be reasonable from fr. 235:
"These men who derive their pleasures from the stomach.,..the pleasure
passes quickly and they have nothing for themselves except a brief
3
enjoyment•
1. Cf. Hippocrates, On ancient medic. 3. 35: € v pc (p tp outToc. ~cpcCf^ -
oip{i.6joa€~0L <p'<ru On breaths, 6: cc £ v (*. e p> a, i.e. rvj
/ I 1 /
TTIVV) Cf 0(Ttl TT 0 A I ptL OL ■
dee: Vlastos, op. cit., part 1, pp. 586 ff. (Philos. Lev. 54 (1945)).
Cf. Oiog. of Oinoanda (Usener, in Hhein. Mus. 47, p. 431): tb XV[
tou^eu cufKpEpov, "tied £>.txlv dxapocf; fa» xat cvl na\ n;c?cn
xb at)x<5 £axtv.
2. fr. Id8: opoS x55v o"U^<p<5p(rv Hal d<7U|acD<5po>v x£p\JriS Hal
dtxepTtfi).
Cf. Epicurus, Third Letter (to aenoiceus), § 130 (Usener 63, Arrigetti 113)
xt] (ievxoi aupjiExpiiaet xal au|icpEp<5vxrv xal tSrcnj|.itp<5pf v
xaOxa itavxa xptveiv xaOi^HEt.
s. fr. 235... xay^oS xe T) nbovl) napoCyexai, xal o£>6bv
£v a^xotm xP'ntfTo'vlaXX' r| xEpTj/i* BpavEia.
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Terpsis is not only of different duration than bodily pleasure,
but alfio of different quality; it is a pleasurable state of the soul;
it can originate in certain pleasures under certain conditions:
(a) these pleasures must be acceptable by a certain criterion (which
includes terpsisJ cf. 188, 194) (£r» 207)1
(b) they must be limited in due measure (fr. 233: if one oversteps
the due measure the most agreable things become most unpleasant;
fr. 211: moderation multiplies pleasures and increases
pleasure; fr. 191: euthumia is created for men through
moderation of enjoyment....).1
(c) One more but higher-level condition can be inferred from fr. 174
(second half), where the opposite of terpsis (a state of un-
happiness) makes its appearance for men, if they neglect their
duty to be just. Justice is a necessary condition for terpsis. '
1. fr. 207: rt^ovfiv of) iraoav...atpe toGat. ...
fr. 233: e'i xi5 \mepf3aXAoi xb pdxpiov, xA ^Tcix^pitdcrxaxa
6x*x<k av yiyvotxo.
fr. 211: a "ooo"uvrj xh xtrpTivA next rfSovfy'
uCova irotet.
fr. 191: AvQp '/uoici y&p eiiGupip yivexai pexpidxpxi
xen\|n,oS....
2. fr. 174: o p£v euaopoS... .05 5' av Hat 6lht)S AXoyr]
nat x& ypt) £dvxa p?) ep>^, xoi'xw itavxa xA xoiaoxa
Axep/teir)
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The source of terpsis seems to be distinct from bodily
pleasures: the great joys come from the contemplation of noble
works (or deeds?)"
A passage from Plutarch (fr. 146s the reason.. •.which
accustoms itself to derive its (intellectual) pleasure from itself)
2
gives an Aristotelian connotation to terpsis.
Therefore terpsis seems to be the highest kind of pleasant
things; it is clearly intellectual pleasure and is connected with
mental activities. It is not a specific term for the more general notion
3
of pleasure (hedone).
Of course fools are excluded from this noble enjoyment
(frr. 200, 201), since they live without being able to enjoy the true
4
joys of life; they only yearn for long life without enjoying it.
1. fr. 194: at psyorXai teptJ/eiS dftrb toH ^eacr^oc i
xaX& t&v spywv. Cf. frr. 207, lis, 112.
2. fr. 146: ...-rbv \<5yov... a^-rbv ec.i>to0 t&S -rep^iaS
£0irr5|.).evnv Xochf3dcve tv. This fr. is one of the very few which
Erwin tful^de (Psyche, London, 1925, p. 408, footn. 103) recognises
as authentic.
See defence of its authenticity in Philippson's'*Demokrits
Sittensprtiche", Hermes 59 (1924), 393.
3. For e. modified differentiation and classification of the term see:
Kullmann, "2ur Nachwirkung des Hor o-Mensura Satr.es dee Protagoras
bei D. und Epikur," Archly fur die Philosophie, 51 (1969), 136:
"wenn Lust mit Terpsis verbunden ist...IIedonS 1st der allgeraeftne,
Terpsis der speziellere Ausdruck."
4. fr. 2oo: dvoiifioveS (HoOcrtv oil* teptc<5h.evoi
fr. 201: dvoi^povES 6r)vai<?TT]T0S bosyovTat oO tep7I(5|ievol
Srjvat^TriTt.
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After these elucidations ana under these conditions terpsis
can be seen to signify tne hi^iest level of pleasant life introducing
man into the £ealm of happiness (euthumia). One can actually trace
close connections between these two concepts in the frr* we possess:
(a) one, by implication, in fr. 174 (second half)
(b) another, clear and direct, in fr. 191 (beginning): "euthumia
is created by men through moderate terpsis..."
Now, I hope, frr. 4, 188 have become clearer; through these
we will try to define what is the criterion in Democritean uthics (in one
of the following paragraphs).
But a short reference is necessary to another term (/oc^ac)
met once in fr. 293: "These to whom t =eir neighbours' misfortune
give pleasure....lack cause for personal joy."1" Elsewhere this concept
" ^ »
is connected with the life of the i 0 v u c 5 , who rejoices by day
„2
and by night...
1. Cf. frr. 107a.
2. fr. 174: o t v
oj... .. K.0LL "V T1 K atsC
oe. i p IL ■ ■ • ■
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7. Hedonism or Eudaemonisnt?
After the explanations given in the previous paragraphs
(particularly On Eut umia. On Pleasure) not much comment is necessary
to point out that:
1* If hedonism identifies good or welfare with happiness and
happiness with pleasure, then D.'s ethical theory cannot be classified
as any kind of hedonism, since D. disapproves of bodily pleasures
(frr. 71, 235) and shows that they are a dangerous source of wicked¬
ness (173); he discourages men from mortal pleasures (fr. 189) and
any other which is not well orientated (fr. 207); and he recommends only
so much satisfaction of desire* as is beneficial (74) and finally he
makes mental joy the criterion for that measured (moderate) satisfaction
of desires (fr. 188). Nowhere in the surviving frr. of D. can
evidence be traced that he recognised intrinsic value in bodily pleasures
or in Wealth ^frr. 40, 170, 171). He recognised such value only in
what we call mental activities.
2. It is a kind of eudaemonism, which will be described in some
detail below.
Highest Good in life is euthumia (eudaemonia) (fr. 189)
1. Cf. a better formulation from Epicurus (Sent. XXIX, Usener p.77
_ i q , \
Arrighetti p. 131. )t T ✓ f^li £ c c 11/ act ^ t/
, \ n
u <r i k cca, & oca (the only
a proved by Ep•)•••••
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which originates from scientific activity (fr. 110)*, from reasoning
2
(fr. 146) and is connected with justice — should be accompanied by
justice (fr. 174)^ and is orientated to what is kalon in aesthetic or
moral sense (fr. 194, 207).
For the last two aphorisms some explanation seems unavoidable
because they are more interesting here and scholars have not accepted
unanimously any single interpretation.
Fr. 207:" One should choose not every pleasure, but only that
„3
concerned with the noble (kalon). expresses a recommendation and
1. Cf. two other views:
a. Euripides fr. 910 (in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. IV 25, 157):
"0X|3lo$ oaxi» xf)i taxoptaS 'eaxe iictOrjatv,
|ti5xe UOXLTWV trnpocxuvaS
[tirr' edi d6'xou£ vpccE,et> opjiwv
&XX* JcOaviXxov xaQopwv <ptfcr£(rS
x<5cp,ov dynpw, tt's xe avvzaxr) / xat xal otooS
(influenced from Anaxagoras or the Atomists? or an accumulation
of ideas of the late fifth century B.C.?)
b. Empedocles (OK 31 B 132):
"0X8 to* 9e£v>v xpaiuS'. v £.Kxr\aaxo xXoutov
Set A.6; o' <j) GHOxSza-'a. 0ewv XCOL OSKO. ji^uTiXev.
2. fr. 146: t&v \(5yov... .atixbv eauroO x3c> xepiHa^
£ lC<5|i.EVOV \rtfi8 ~V6 t V • This is one of the very
few fragments recognised as authentic by E. RoU<U, (psychs.
London, 1925, p. 408, footn. 3).




includes a purpose to be fulfilled ( £ TTi Tmj k ). it is
highly probable that D. recommends his disciples (or friends or readers)
to perform what is morally good1, because it is a highly valued
2
enjoyment; it makes a man just; and justice is a condition of happiness.
An aesthetic connotation is not (recognised fcr fr. 194: cx l p-tj/oc-
/ » I - a - ft i \ }I 3
^|a.u Ttp^fo5 o-tto rou xttoccrdoee. Toe Kocjac Tijv ep^u/v • The
passage mi ;ht be taken to refer to the pleasure of looking at works of
art. "Great joys come from contemplating fine deeds (perhaps in the
sense that one source of pleasure is the knowledge that one has acted
well.
1. A. Dyroff (Demokritstudien, Mlinchen, 1899, p. 149, note 2):
Die Freude an schSnen Taten stellt Sokrates gleichfalls hoch
(Xenophon, Memorabilia II 6. 35).
lJailey, Greek Atomists, p. 195: Here the idea of "beautiful"
is perhaps mainly moral....
2. Cf. frr. 261, 174
3. The wonderful works of nature, according to Natorp (Die Lthika des
D. p. 99). This interpretation seems risky but not unreasonable
(cf. fr. 118). It is, however, improbable.
4. C.C.W. Taylor, op. cit. p. 8. An improbable but not impossible
interpretation, at first si ht.
Cf. Bailey, 195: "the completely aesthetic side is seen in fr. 194".
I f 2.
The ambiguity originates from the fact that in Q.'s days
Greeks believed (although it seems paradoxical to us) that beauty is
moral goodness •"*"
7 / ^
The structure of the aphorism can be helpful: airo Tou
$ t describes the origin of joy and expresses not a
moment of action but a calm situation, contemplation of what was done
in the field of art or morality or both* Either of the two is equally
a mental joy.2
I conclude that in D.'s frr. we find clear traces that
sources of joy are all these activities which constitute what we call
intellectual life. Therefore his eudaemonism rightly might be
characterised as intellectual eudaenionism.
1. Herbert lead, The meaning of art (Pelican) 1937, p. 19 > 88.
The same ambiguity is present in fr. 112: Oefou VOU tb &e( Tl
xa\<5v.
5 tccXoy iCectQoc I Is this the attitude of an artist? or a moralist?
Cf. Plato's Protagoras 351 b-C: -pb r)5dfhS (JyacGbv eittep
TOTS xa\ots Cwf) r)6dp.evo3.
Cf(f also: Plato's Hippias Major, 296 E (last line): xou JcyncOov ctpa
aittdv £jx\,y -rb xa\dv.
«-iol 297 b l: I ocpcc xb xa\<5v £c7tlv rv'ixiov iyncGoOs y'yvoi-
t' av vTib toCJ xtX.ou xb &ya.Q6v
Plato makes a thinker of that age (Socrates' contemporary) accept
such a causal relation between beauty and goodness.
2. Bailey, Greek Atomists, 195. These two frr. (207, 194)
"place one in the atmosphere of the Republic".
I f 3
8. Work and Labour
No pains no gains
A basic idea in D.'s ethical teaching is "do not engage in
many activities"^" beyond your capacity and nature, neither in public
life nor in private. His elaboration in the following lines of the
same fr. is clear enough, so that neither misapprehension is justifiable
nor confusion with doctrines of later centuries. This precept is far
2 3
from being a form of "quietism" , as Langerbeck correctly remarked."
v t /
1. fr. 3:.... (u. n tto^^o. ~n ^ 6 6 tuv ■ ■ ■■
Cf. Epicurus' (in Diog. of Oinoanda, 56, Arrighetti p. :08):
„ i I /
(•<- h TT1f>1 66 U* - ■ ■ "
and b. Aurelius' (Meditations, TV, 24):" "n p >i 6" e. " .
The authenticity of fr. 3 is beyond doubt and dispute; it is
attributed to D. by two ancient authors (see DK 68 B 3) and contains
the central concept of D.'s Ethics; it describes conditions of"
euthumia (happiness). Natorp (die Sthilca, p. 116) was right to
conclude "dass an seiner Echtheit zu zweifeln hatten wir ohnedies
kein hecht."
2. H. LaUe (Die Kthik des D., in Sokrates (1923) p. 56) from fr. 3
concluded that: "die Suthymie..•.vbllige iuhe ist (tranquillitas
...nulla ne minima quidem aura fluctus commovente.•Cicero,
Tusc. V.6.16) and after this misrepresentation of the concept in
question he asked himself: "Wie ist nun aber eine vbllige
Seelenruhe praktisch erreichbar?"•
3. H. Langerbeck, op. cit. 60: " tro^«. wird
nicht im Sinne des Quietismus des /) a ■k & <^6otA (Epicurus'
fr. 551, Usener p. 326) gegeben." In the following page he
added: it is enough to mention fr. 157 as a counter instance.
I *+</•
His ethical theory is strongly orientated to practical life. Hard work
is compatible with Kuthumia.
A first example is his attitude to prudence (phronesis): it
has a similar orientation# If phronesis is a virtue, it finds its
positive value in so far as it leads to right action. The crucial test
for any theory, 0, would say, is its practical application. 'Namely
in fr. 21 we read that from prudence originate three highly appreciated
qualities: "good counsel, unerring speech and right action." In D.'3
list of virtues phronesis embodies a kind of practical wisdom
2
orientated to practical problems.
On the other hand, we cannot trace in D.'s frr. any hint that
he rejected work as a source of inconvenience in human life or that he
himself avoided labour in his personal life. On the contrary, we
have evidence describing him — in a superlative degree — as very
3
industrious in scientific inquiries in many fields of human knowledge.
1. fr. 2: ...oti xrfs q^povnaewS Tptct xaCfxoc aojipafvet
xb rS \oy tCzcr'at,» xb c6 Xeytiv xal xb itpaxxeiv
a CEL. See: Natorp, op. cit. pp. 3, 98.
Bailey, op. cit. p. 196.
2. Cf. frr. 119, 42, 58, 158.
Cf. also F. Kesiano, La etica raaterialistica di D., p. 5.
Thucydides (11.65.8) sub persona Pericles describes in a similar way
the attributes of a good statesman. Cf. Schmid-Stahlin, op. cit.,p.278.
3. fr. 144: A. ... xa?v £axonou|iev<,ov otibrvbs ^xxov
TcoXunpaypcev
i + r
It is easy to gather from the ruins of his writings many reasons
justifying haifd work and recommending it to other people.
a. Work is a source of goods; absence of it opens the door to
famine; it was a popular belief in Greek tradition.1 No pains no gains.
This way of thinking is naturally stronger in a man who denied
t 2
fortune s gifts. Good comes to men directly or indirectly t rough
their efforts; e.g. learning, which is so important in protecting,
3
organising and ameliorating life, is acquired by hard work. Only in
this way do men reach noble goals. On the contrary, neglecting their
work men must face the results of laziness: everything that is
undesirable, deteriorating their life. In D.'s words: "Good things
are acquired by learning through hard work...." Included in the
connotation of "good" here is intellectual life, as we are obliged to
recognise in fr. 180, where "education — i.e. accumulated learning —
is a pride for men in prosperous days and refuge in unfortunate days."*
1. Hesiod, Works and Days, 303: \i|ib$ yc'p toi n'jifcav Aepycjj
auiiopopos AvSpif.
Cf. Thuc. II. 40.1.
2. See frr. 197, 176, 210.
3. fr. 182: naXA xp^;i2*ra xois itdvcuS rj [laGrjcrtS
epyaCExat > x& 5' atcrypft aveu icc^vgjv ai!>x<5|fa:xa: HapirouxctL....
4. fr. 180: n naicfeCa e^xvyouoi, |iev £axi k6g\xo$ ,
AxuxoOji ££ naxacpuyiov.
I 'i (o
b. As expected from D., his way of thinking on work is genetic;
work is a necessity for surviving.1 It becomes easier through the
2
experience of the race. Finally, it is the main factor (together
3
with human ability) far progress, since progress in every department
is attained by making good use of the experience of the past.
With a realistic view of things, believing that what is
necessary should b. adopted as a reality, in which man lives and to
4
which he must adapt himself, D. accepts labour as a companion of life,
compatible with man's pursuit of happiness.
1. Diodor. I.8.7C OK 68 3 5, in vol. II 136, 13).
| b i d .
2. ,>■< lines 9-12. Also; Luria (Democritea, p. 137 no. 558,
•here Galenus, de medlca exper., arablca interpretatio, ed. with
English traduction, London, 1944): "d. says experience and
vicissitudes have taught men this, and it is from their wealth of
experience that men have learned to perform the things they do."
Cf. fr. 247.
3. Diodor. 1.8. 7 ( iX 68 B 5 in vol. II 136, lines 14-15.)
Cf. fr. 154.
? n I \ ?■ I — \
4. fr. 289: Ot Ao Key J i-UV rcx-t6C Kolxoc
to \j $tcv ex, yUlJ'K ou,S ■
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c. If community is the frame, as a matter of fact, in which men have
to realise their private life, they ..ave to learn statesmanship and
acquire through hard work that kind of skill by which they will succeed.
D. recommends any toil necessary for attaining such a glorious result.
Prm his own words quoted by Plutarch1 it is not clear whether D. refers
to a glorious personal career or a general success for the benefit of the
community. In both cases, however, his recommendation of hard
professional preparation is equally praiseworthy. This precept acquires
much more force, if we remember the dangers to individual politicians
inherent in political activity of which D. was well aware (perhaps he
had had a bitter experience in political life of his native cityvstate
or contemporary Greek city-states) when he formulated a dilemma: "To
good men, it is not advantageous to neglect their own affairs for
other things....But if a man neglects public affairs, he is ill-spoken
of...Because, even if he is not negligent or wrong, he is liable not only
h2
to be ill-spoken of, but also to suffer something..•
1. fr. 157: a. |ilv Ticxpaivet t^v xe tcoXitik?)v texvtlv
\izyCr5xr\v oScrrv £K5i<5otcrwea9at nat -rofo^ tx<5vouS 6u'he:lv>
&<T>* *v peyaXa Hat Xaiiixpd yfvovxai -coti dvGp'xoiS.
2. fr. #53: -rots ypT)rj'coToiv aumpspov djir.XeovxaS xd
eauxinv aXXa uptfa^eiv .... e;t <5£ diieXloi xii x8v
S-npoauov, xiav.SC dxoust,v yLyvExai.... iixet xal
dp,£\sovxi T) d6ix£0vxi x£v5uvo» xaxu5» dxoiJeLV xat 5t)
Hat rac9£LV
I 4-g
d. Hard work results in happiness when it is crowned by success.*
ven the hope of success makes toil much pleasantor than rest. Although
a final result can be affected by factors outside the agent's plans
and intention «• there is many a slip between cup and lip — D. does
not hesitate to recommend hard work (fr. 243: "all kinds of toil are
pleasanter than rest, when men attain that for which they labour, or
foresee that they will attain it...).* s'hen reading these lines one
has the impression that D.'s personal feelings and emotions are revealed.
e. Fr. 241 is better explained psychologically2 "Continuous
m2
hard work grows ever lighter through habituation. Perhaps this
aphorism is directed to friends or acquaintances, who find tiring work
difficult, so as to encourage them in their labours and overcome their
inertia. Vhether this is true or not and whether or not it is
addressed to actual people, this at least is certain, the advice
originates in the personal experience of the adviser, who seems to have
offered himself as a good example of his teaching (fr. 144). A hard
worker is speaking here. Addressing all without exception: "do not
,,3
avoid toil; it gets easier by repetition.
1. fr. 243: xffs nauxtriS uavxeS oi Tt<5voL 'p5fov2s» oxav
% eivfxev Tuovecuai tuvxc'v o'-v r) etSe^ at xupcovceS... -
2. fr. 241: tc^voS ^Xatpp^xepoS feauxoO cruvnOeir]
y LV^tcc i.
3. Remarks d, e with a different argument and different purpose
(compatibility of hard work and euthumla), accomoanied witn some
others, are enumerated by Vlastos (op. cit. p. 58 Phlles. Rev.
55 (1946) p. 58).
149.
f. If fatigue acc©nr>anio8 nurd wo■■■-., ; is marc frequently tho
result of tmwillin nes» to work. If one wishes to work, one will
fin! pionsure in it. Voluntary ork prepares man to en ure even
who; in Involuntary (fr# 24o)."
Another aphorism might be explained as a precaution against
disappointment: "Courage is the beginning of action, but fortune is the
„2
master of the result. * tried to exorcise this phantom by which
men try to justify their failures, instead of blaming their own
negligence or laziness (frr. 119, 107). however ho felt .imself
obliged to allow, as a ra.:tt'sr of fact or hu-mn life, that external
conditions r.re liable to frustrate men's intentions m<: efforts,
go The .Main reason ' ich n. urges in defence of hard work is that
it is tho true fountain of virtues. If virtues are of any value for
the happiness of individuals an the good relations among then, the
origin is to be found in the oducativo power of hard vork. This
connection brtv.-em happiness and hard work perhaps ie fin imitation of
Prodi cub fable of "keroulc* nt tho GtoMwontin*"" but in It
C C / / » «• ? / c
. 2'i1 * ^ 4 £kou£col tt o v o l "c ^ v t^v Ock-OU6lwV utto^.0 -
rt/Oiyv Tr «. 6 K £ „ ajo u 6 L .
2. fr. 2&): -nppjtos "t^ ce^eoS Kupl1-
3. VS 84 3 1 (. ckol. mistook. hub. 361;
Kenoph. ' I'wor. II. 1. 21--4.
See fr. 179 {quoted in next note).
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found a deep and thoroughgoing illumination and justification! a kind of
causal relation. He says: "if children are allowed not to work, they
cannot learn letters or music or gymnastic, nor that which above all
embraces virtues, i.e. a sense of respect. For it is precisely from
these studies that the sense of respect usually grows."*
D. was a believer in the idea of education and produced an
interesting theory of it. At least he formulated some remarks worthy
of attention on the function and results of teaching. „hat is of interest
here is simply the fact that he found a close connection between labour
and aidos (sense of respect), which supports all virtues and which from
the formative point of view acquires that importance which is attributed
to justice (the highest of classical virtues) from the objective point
of view.
His doctrine is better understood, if we recall another
aphorism according to which for a man to become virtuous is not only a
matter of (nature) heredity, but also — and mainly — a result of
2
the exercise of continuous effort and practice of virtue.
1. fr. 179: +6Fwtlk55S+ ttcveiv nottSeS AvievteS out e ypaupotT'
av ugc^oiev oute pouaix^v ours: (jryu-v'r^v o65' creep \x'\inxa
x^)v ^pE^ftv ctuveyei, T?> uhXoc y&p £x toutwv
cptXet ylyv~ctBtt rj octSf'S.
Cf. Philippson, op, cit., p. 388,
2. fr. 242: TtX'oveS tv irrx^crtoS AyocOot yfvovTCU r) Anb
CPU 'I.OS .
\ s-|
In this way he made virtue and happiness dependent on labour
from childhood (179) to old age. So he is in accordance with Greek
1 2
tradition and in agreement with another thinker of his age.
I cannot find a better defence of hard work. In D.'s opinion
work is not a punishment from an angry god or an inhospitable nature, but
a gift that can produce happiness. Absolutely consistent with these
remarks is his declaration (to be presented later on) that virtue is
work, not words (fr. 55, Stob. 11.15.36).
Possibly all this pleading o- behalf of hard work comes from
bitter experience that much of the disorder and misfortune in the social
life of Greek cities of the late fifth century 3.G. was due to the
ambition and activities of that generation which grew up in wealth and
luxury without the discipline of honouring common obligations and
consequently (perhaps in D.'s view) with excessive ambitions and less
obedience to moral rules. Super-fidelity on important and serious
problems is another corollary of such miseducation. Pocratos would
endorse this from his experience and viewpoint. His obsession with
3
definitions was possibly another way to show up the superficiality of
7/ f > ? r I 'I r ■? /
1. Hesiod, orks and Days, 311'. €f>7°v » ouofv 0 v £ cooS J <- *7
§ £ C ^ ovLtSoS .
2. Euripides, fr, 461: OVK i St vacuo /4 K°c/,^>v tjfcu.fi.orUS,
CLLCfy °v XL h7 ^ LLX/ VLQLVICVS.
See Erffa: A\ SJs unci verwandte Begriffe von Homer bis
Demokritos (Dissert., Leipzig, 1937) in Philologus, Suppl. 30/2
(1937) p. 168.
3. Richard Robinson, The what-is-x? question, in Socrates (a
collection edited by G. Vlastos), London, 1972, p. 110 ff.
)5"l
his interlocutors (especially the young and ambitious of his companions).
of permanent value and true originality.
A lively advocacy of work and labour for the profit coming
from them directly or indirectly, does'nt mean that there are not
some limits and reservations. One reason was mentioned at the very
beginning of this paragraph (don't be over-busy is a condition of euthumia).
Two more follow:
a. Interference in other people's business is strongly attacked
without any explanation^ (perhaps because of the character of
Democrates' collection); it is self evident; it leads to negligence
» 2
of one s own affairs and it is lack of respect for others.
b. Political activity is justifiable and highly appreciated in
so far as it is necessary for the advantage of the community (frr.
2. Cf. Thuc. II.37.3.
3. It seems that the best compromise of D.'s doctrine tdon't be overbusy"
etc.) with his recommendation of hard work is found in some verses
of Goethe quoted by Philippson (op. cit. p. 388):
tiohl unglUcklig ist der Mann,
der unterlSsst das, was er kann,
Und unterfSngt sich, was er nicht versteht;
kein <under, da3s er zu Grunde geht.




It is accepted by historians of Ethics that the concept of duty
in the modem sense does not appear in classical Greek Philosophy''' but
only "in germ or marginally", that duty (as kathSkon) first appears in
2
Stoicism. It is true that Zeno (of Kitium) first use this term to
denote what we call duty and his followers emphasised the importance of
fulfil Lin duty for individuals."
1. A.Vs'.H. Adkins, f.'erit and Responsibility, Oxford (19SO), p.253; The
Greek moral sense does'nt provide and never has provided even the raw
material from which a categorical imperative could be fabricated.
Cf. pp. 2 ff.
2. A. Maclntyre, A short history of Ethics, p. 84.
Vernon J. Bourke, History of Ethics, I, 48.
ncyclopaedia of Philosophy (edited by Paul Edwards) II, 444.
3. D. Laertius, VII. 107-110 ( .eno of Citium).
Ci ^ ^ 7" <-i Q- ^ ^ *7 V
Ch. 107: Kocvpk-oV <jaa.6iV £/ o 7r p OL > V"t ^
> R '
OtTto/lO^LS p. OV .
„ C^ Q / \ ^
Stobaeus II 7.8 (p. 85 line 18); dL «<*• Vb ovz^ v r«,
r t /n 4 r h » q / n '
t i V (p ct. (s> I ~Z T /I t-L ^ <2t. 0*1 K QCt K ctZois u.^ d.1- Ol. R ^^~
C ctd •
Sextus, VII 158: /4 p K-I ... Co
o 77 f> S~L V £ U si °ys~>/ ( Xi.1 ITTo 6jLv V ( oL vi 0 u_S /y £ •/© I c /c/ceij.
V. Bourke (op. cat. p. 251 n. 1) refers to Plato's Statesman (295 B)
for the first appearance of the term kathekon; there is actually (in
the passage mentioned) a term of similar derivation (prosekon) which
has a different connotation (an action correct from the viewpoint of
statesmanship)•
i 5" 3 d
Note 3* cont.
Kathekon as a non-moral concept (In its Ionic form) appears
C \ ,/ 0 ^ ^ '
first in Herodotus (VII*22): o M vwj £6t/ o/?c?S C{-
\i N "> <1 ' n -
Kch <2 vo |*a. £ £-© ✓ £S v ac /H o-c g 6 iW K ec t »i (i ov .
(reaching down to the sea)*
I s~Y
Therefore it seems really premature to raise the problem of
duty in D.'s age. There are, hoover, strong grounds on which
to base this inquiry:
a. A number of statements are clearly normative ethical
judgements, ascribing obligation (coming from one's own conscience,
sense of duty);^" some of them are included in frr. of reflective
2
character; all are imperative in their form.
b. Concepts as ociated with that of duty make their appearance in
the frr. of ).
This inquiry will be directed to the follovin topics:
. A eneral view of t :e fra ents and concepts involved.
b. Illumination of two basic terms.
c. How was the concept of duty rer ted?
d. Classification of duties and analyses of the correspon in frr.
e. Foundation of duty.
f. Two final questions.
. x p 0 pn) , C^'O
(Necesse est, oportet).
hen rendin the frr. which include the first of the above
terms one has the feeling of a transition from what is logically or
1. frr. 41 (St.III.1.95), 39 (St. Ill 37.2g), 181, 92, 191, 207, 225,
252, 259, 285, 3, 44 (St. Ill 12.13), 174, 256, 261.
frr. 181, 191, 252, 3, 261, 190.
3. Conscience (syneidesis): fr. 297 t
Remorse: 43 (174 by implication);
Right: 261, 265, 266, 40,
Virtue: (on which see the next paragraph).
4 . 39 , 84 , 92, 191, 207 , 225 , 259 , 55 , 285//
3, 44, 174, 256, 261
/ rr
naturally necessary to what is socially or morally fitting and binding,
which some agent has to fulfil to create the necessary conditions for his
1 2
own happiness and good relations with his social environment.
There is given some description of reality which is desirable
and a conclusion approximately saying: if you wish that result you have
3
to follow this instruction or do this action. Or there are imperatives
ascribing to individuals (without premises and apparent reasoning)
"duties" to be fulfilled.4
Although the last group of imperatives is at first sight nearer
to our conception of duty and more helpful for this inquiry, the former
one is more interesting for the examination of the problem of duty in
a genetic way.
If these instructions become a "credo", permanently accompanying
an individual and consequently influencing his conduct, then they promote
this individual from the level of necessity to that of personal decision
5
(oughtness), i.e. from necessity to autonomy. Then (as regards the frr.
of D.) instead of X p n we find the other term £ov (oughtness).
1. 191, 207, 285, 3, 174.
2. 92, 252, 44 (225), 261.
3. frr. 3, 191, 252, 174.
4. frr. 84 (cf. 244, 264), 92, 207, 225, 261.
5. frr. 44, 181.
i r 6
A progress of moral obligation can be traced step by step
from the level of instinct or biological necessity to that of commonly
accepted and approved custom and conscience.^" At the beginning of
such a progressive process fr. 259 should find a place, on the top-level
frr. *il, 55, 190, 264. Between these two extremes fr. 181 can be well
intelligible, emphasising the power of persuasion as opposed to force
and compulsion.
2
b. It sho Id be noted that two impersonal verbs or expressions
including them, used by D. for ascribing moral obligations, had a long
and distinguished history in Presocratic thought without moral
connotation. Namely they were used to express:
3
1. logical necessity
1. This procedure (way of thinking) from the level of self-preservation
to respect of others and protection of them will be recognised
in D.'s political theory too. Anticipating that ch. we notify
only the similarity of process which betrays a naturalistic
attitude towards the problems.
See Eric A. Ilavelock, The Liberal temper in Greek Politics,
London 1957, pp. 125 ff.
2. Xp ^ - X pe^v (°£Ct)j S ll - S Lev ■
3. See: Parmenides B 1. 28 (VS I. 230.10): X f toJ ft ■■■ nvxhe .
B 6.1 (VS I 232.21): X f> J Xc Xt VOUV ZL £ ov
■>/
£ JX ^ t VOtA. '
cl ol !. o t )
B 8.11 (I. 236. 4): ooX^>5 7 <*,[*.71 cc* TT £//£.
n 7 V 't G X L v -VJ o u ,X L .





A religious tone or slightly moral connotation can be seen in some
3 4
passages from tragedies,' Dissoi Logo! and Anonyrnus lamblichi.
1. Anaxagoras b 4 (vs 11.34.5, II.35.4) x0ux(av 5b outws £x^vtwv
XP^l ScKeTv....
b 5 (ii 35.8): xouxwv 5?: ovtuj 5taxenpLM-EVfjiv yiyv'aKEiv xob\..»
Anaximander, B 1 (I 89.14): x^v rOop^v £ t-a XfTUXCt
y£yvecrOat xaxb xb xpe'v.
Cf. also a curious biolo ical (educational?) remark of Thucydides
(I. 34.4)'. noXtj te 5iacpEp£tv oft 5ct vopfrEiv avQpojuov
dvGpwuot!» xpr'xtcrxov 5' elvxi ocri* tv xotS dvayHaioxaxoiS
itaiSEUExai.
Cf. uiog. of Apoiionia b 1 (ii 59.ii): Sonet {.to(, xp£^)V etvai
-t 4
x^v dpx^)v dva{jtq5ia311^ov napixevqcc i...
2. aorgias b 6: etnetv aSet...-
xb 5iov £v xco 5'iovxi Xeyelv aiyav xoLEtv.
B 11: xb §eov 6p>955S Xil^at.
Cf. Thucydides 11-22: itcpl xa5v del xapdvxuv xb Scovxa
>icx?. tcrxa etxciv.
Cf. bmpedocles B 25: o Set, xoA^v icrriv £vicntetv.
3. ophocles' Antigone, 7---5: tc\elaA xp^vo* ^ $v Set |i' dpecrxELV
xotS xccxu) xwv £vPa6e (v<5{iwv).
Eurip., Iphig. Aul. 565-8: ioopftv !/ xb bsov .
157a
Notes to p. cont.
t r / / T
4. Dissoi Logoi 8.7 (VS II 416.3): ~t <jl etovZc*. TtpoL.feL^.
8'^ ( J1 ■ ty-li-L/- J : T o V- £L KdJ E 6-i9~a^_ £ T7 <.<£ tof/x £>^o v
tTfc. l "Co ^ t k ok, o v 6 nutitS^ cc-<_ op -&loS .
(logical necessity rather than moi-al obligation).
Cf. 8.13 (II 416.13).
Anonymus Iamblichi (VS 89, 4, p. 98, 17 (1) Vol. II, 401, 33)'. k
\ t / V r -
, 7 t r~
pCv1v' Kp<i C t 6toi "Co k o'Ct Cl ^au. -qccvCct. at v Jp Qc
LOL(^ t ^>O k'twf .
158
D.'s frr., paradoxically enough, arc the first source in the
history ol Greek moral thought where these two concepts acquire an
obviously moral connotation. To this conclusion lea! both the imperative
form of the aphorisms to be discussed and their content.1
c. It is remarkable that concepts closely connected to that of
duty make their first appearance through frr. of D. Syneidesis
1. This doesn't mean they are in the imperative mood but there is a
kind of imperativeness in their structure. It is characteristic
that translators were obliged to use imperative forms of their
languages. Sees
a. VS 68 B 3, 39, 41, 44, 55, 92, 174, 181, 190, 191, 225,
256, 252, 259, 261, 265, 285.
b. Enriques-Mazziotti (numbers corresponding to these in VS):
8, 29, 31, 34, 83, 112, 128, 129, 145, 163, 190, 194, 197, 199,
200, 203, 223.
c. Luria (Democritea)J 737, 649, 605, 598, 669, G80, 740,
607, 493a, 657, 598, 601, 595, 622, 624, 616, 646.
Thanks are expressed to Mr. ; iloS IvaniS (Faculty of Divinity,
Edinburgh) for his help in understanding the Russian translation
of D.'s frr. in Luria's book (Democritea, Leningrad, 1970).
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(conscience, fr. 297), remorse (fr. 43): "Remorse for shameful deeds
„2
is salvation in life. Prior to the proper term remorse as a problem
is apparently present in the reasoning of fr. 174, where remorse
although not named is clearer in its connotation than in fr. 43.
Namely, negligence of one's duty (it is said there) to be just is
followed by recollections of remorse which lead to deprivation of one's
euthumia.^
It would not be strange if this same thinker of fr. 174
in another case made a step further, insisting that the only way for a
1. This subject was discussed in the first ch. of this research.
On the history of the concept and its connotation see:
S. Luria, Democritea, p. 567 (no. 583) and
P. SchSnlein, Zur Entstehung eines Gewissensbegriffes
bei Griechen und R3mern, Ihein. useum 112 (1. 69),
pp. 289-305.
2. fr. 43: ^ t t <20^ t /Ul °c ac.c6>cpoL6c V 6<-oV
/
6 <_o x. p ( *7 .
3. fr. 174: "tit. x o <_ r ec «-Ttf 77U'? , oxctv
r r x c
z: J ocv ce,U " *7 ^ vh ^ ceA-
K !jn.
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sinner to save himself is to feel remorse* (and perhaps to do something
to correct his sin after having recognised it, and consequently to
change his conduct).
The next paragraph will touch the problem of virtue;
therefore, there is no reason to spend here time and snace on this
topic.
But some more command must be added to the presentation of
some statements through which the concept of a moral law appears for
the first time in the history of ethics. No sophistication or
elaboration is necessary, since the frr. are simple and speak for
themselves. Fr. 264 says: "one must not respect himself (his dignity)
less than the others' opinion; nor must one be ready to do wrong if
no one will know (it) than if all mankind. One must respectOh£s own
dignity first of all and this must stand as the law in one's soul, so
,.2
that one sustain from anything improper.
1. It is true that these analyses are in the region of psychology; but
our task is to study the frr. of D. as they are and not go beyond the
evidence; on the other hand ethical inquiries deprived of psycho¬
logical explanation are either history of etnics or logic. See;
W. Lillie, An Introduction to Etnics, London (1971)^, chs. II, IV
(psychology of moral action — of moral judgement).
2. fr. 264;. p i I rL ^ 2 ^7ov "t-oui «• v 3 jtw it o wi Oll fti (, $olc e^utou
^ SI tL ^.e^^ov Kq,Kv^ } £l t JJ tL
r 1 r / c / -?/ ^
^ o ti$ L i d <r£ l v ^ c> T7a,v/t£5 a. ^ Tt 9 L °< A si iuivXvS
p-d/} L(S"Cou out SlLtrftou-; pou touted ^ov 1*1
£lv not lev at-v £ 17 LZ ^ J"l,L 0-V .
Frr. 244, 84 are obviously shortened forms of it.
s
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A conception of moral law is generated in men's conception
of their self-respect.^ How D. reached this idea and what content he
attributed to this law, we have no more evidence; our only means to
penetrate his thought is to question the fr. itself; perhaps by cross-
examination of other frr. we can find some more illumination.
The attributes of D.'s moral law (implied from the passage
above) ares
1. It is in the agent's soul.
2. It is demanded of the a ent to regard this law as present at
any time and anywhere that the agent is active (consciously).
3. It is demanded also of the agent to use this law as a guiding
principle (criterion?) for his actions as if all mankind were present
to Judge him (as a criterion of higher sensitivity than if all mankind
present were to Judge him). By this demand a measure of objectivity
is introduced into the agent's judgement through the idea of the silent
presence of mankind.**
1. W. Schumacher, Die Seele: Worte zeitloser Weisheit, Berlin (1938) p.15:
Die Gesetze der Sittlichkeit k3nnen dem S(\enschen nicht von aussen
gegeben werden. Er findet sie in sich, in seinem sittlichen ^flicht-
geftihlf in seinem Gewissen...bedttrfen wir nach D. keines
metaphysischen deus ex machina.
2. In fr.264 (and 244 as well) D.'s aim is obvious: how to reach object¬
ivity through the decisions and actions of individuals; perhaps
behind his formulation there is a belief that hu. iaty ileings on the
ground of their common nature or social understanding have something
common in themselves which gives them the possibility to reach object¬
ivity if they adopt one principle: "judge yourself as if all mankind
were present to judge you."
It seems to be not far from Socrates' argument in Crito (the
voice of law and the fellow citizens) 50 A 5 - 52 A.
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The agent's soul will therefore become a kind of private court
in which the agent's actions should be judged in advance or his sins
afterwards (cf. fr. 174). The power of this court is not criminal,
nor retributive (unless by connection to frr. 174, 43); neither is it
exhortative (unless by implication); it is entirely and directly
avertive from what is not right.
The moral agent's soul in its capacity as a judge (in order to
adjust his actions to what is fitting) is helped by the agent's power
to reason.1 The criterion is simple and effective: "judge
yourself as if all mankind were present to judge you"; thus an
objective element is introduced in the subject's decisions provided
2
that he has a strong feeling of aidos.
d. Classification of duties:
1. To oneself (3, 191, 285, 207, 174, 39, 84, 79, 190,55)
2. To others (92, 44 (225), 174, 256, 261).
3. To the State and fellowcitizens (259, 261, 262).
1. See frr. 2, 58, 119, 197.
2. See frr. 179, 84, 244, 264.
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1. Every man pursttes his euthumia;1 prerequisites for it are
described as "musts"; some of them have already been presented (frr. 3,
191, 207, 174). Explanation is justified here for fr. 285: "One must
realise that human life is weak and brief and mixed with many cares and
difficulties, so that one take care for moderate possessions only,
and that hardship may be measured in accordance with one's (actual)
..2
needs. D. is in accord with his general view of the universe and life
when he describes the possibility of avoiding "hardship" (and therefore
of attaining euthumia) within the limits of nece: sity; he does'nt resort
3
to vain complaint, but escapes by philosophical meditation.
1. See Ch. II sect 1: Gn Euthumia.
/ I 1 Q. ' /> \ i /
2. fr. 285: lj vuj <o < uv xf'y1 vf> ujti l vyj v bcozijv ocpouo^yv ££
£ o u r (Jw K OU O C£ G u (MVtfufft I-
. l-> / t y / 1 ?
(ecu. fC ^1-ipC £UVI v-t e l. f J o l< W J «!/ c(-i ft. £ zf c j cc kv^gtds s-
f £ ti n zotu. (c cu f l~zp yj za^c 6 it l xx>ts ct v <±.j '< ocx olj r ct /!ou_-
p C vj
3. L. Stella, op. cit. (in Sophia, 10, 19' 2) p. 218: La sua
tristezza non si isterilisce in un vano lamento; diventa
sorgente di meditazione filosofica.
Cf. Langerbeck, op. cit. 71.
See also T. : inclair, History of Greek Political Thought, p.66:
This is only another recipe of euthumia.
104#
One's duty to become a good roan (fr# 39: one roust either be
good or imitate a good man1), to avoid imitation of the wicked (fr# 79:
it. is a bad thing to imitate the bad, and not even to vish to imitate the
2 3
good ), to avoid even speaking about bad actions (fr# 190 ), to be
just (fr. 174) by installing a permanent guard on his actions (fr# 264),
all these "quasi imperative" instructions are a preparation by a man for
his own belf-perfeetion and happiness and for making himself a good-
fellow-citizen with good intentions towards other®#
2# fr# 92 soun d like a truism concerning mu ual relations (between
relatives, friends or simply neighbours): "Accept favours with the
,,4
intention of giving a greater return for them# Human conduct or
conditions ol life are such that, although men recognise that it is
1# fr# 39: &ya9bv r) rtvai rj p.tp.E .
Natorp (die Ethika, 119, footn# 44)discusses the syntax and meaning
of this aphorism#
2. fr. 79: x^^bv Pi|i£ITcrQai xofrs xaxouS, n.*|6£ iQeXeiv
6e xouS h.yaQouS.
3. fr. 190: ooruXaiv 'ppy-v Hat xot)S \<5youS xapaiTryreov.
This advice makes sense as a psychological problem; it is of
course a "banal" expression that bad companions corrupt ood manners
(cf• 134); but bad words also make a kind of habituation towards
bad actions#
4. fr. 92: xapixaS SexEddat xP^wv upoZHOn;eu6(j.pvov xpeaaovaS
atixwv AiJ-OiPaS dxoSouvai.
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more polite and happy to give than to receive, nonetheless they find
usually more pleasure in doing the opposite; so truisms like fr. 92
are always useful.
Although men's desire in pursuing the truth is natural1 and
insatiable (in the field of science), their avoidance of saying it (in
the field of morality) or even of seeing it (in the field of psychology)
is nonetheless a fact; and although the last case is of importance
for individuals only prima facie, the former entails serious consequ¬
ences for others. D. faces, as it seems, this problem in the form of
the following precept: "One must tell the truth, not speak at length."*"
Banal at first sight, such an aphorism will retain its importance in so
far as human nature will be unchanged, because to hide the truth entails
serious consequences in the frame of social relations and the demand of
justice. Here is not the nature which likes to be hidden, but it is
human volition which meets the temptation to conceal the truth for
personal reasons. The truth simple and bright has in itself the power
to persuade.
In the aphorism quoted above another problem is combined,
perhaps a Greek vice having its origin far in the past (unless it
originates in the conditions of natural environment): talkativeness.
3 *» *i
D.'s aureum preceptum is short like a commandment: "Oo not say much."
1. As Aristotle would say (Metaph. 980 a 22).
2. fr. 44 (Stob. III.12.13): ou/jvi p,i? 1/"°V X p ^ voce o 0
Tf o u/j o ^crV . Cf# fr# 225»
3. od TTo^YUt/ (from fr. 225).
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If one is directly required to help justice (compensation of
justice) by saying the truth, he has much more obligation to be just
himself1; it is a necessary condition for his euthumia. Perhaps the
motive is egoistic; but the recommendation is the strongest one since
it shows the possibility to combine one's interest with the profit of
others. If this is not a higher-level conception of duty, it has
Li
however a better chance to be put into practice; and this of more import-
2
ance, as a utilitarian would maintain.
A nobler duty is prescribed by the next aphorism: "One must
avenge the wronged to the best of one's ability, and not neglect
,.3
it... T6 protect the wronged cannot be in any interpretation a
strictly egoistic principle even if this is said in the frame of the
city-state, where a degree of mutuality is implied and reasonably hoped
for. A personal expectation — to be sure — of reward may be justified,
but anyway to interfere against the wrongdoer actively is not without
danger in the present.
Fr. 256: "justice is for one to do what must be done;
injustice is for one to fail to do what must be done, and to put it aside"




2. E. Hussey (The Presocratics, London (1972) p. 125) characterises
Df's political thought as Utilitarianism.
3. Fr. 261: CL Sl K 0 0 ^ £ Vet € L XL^uJ^Civ" K SuvoujjuLV
V
, v 'K <u Tf cup i t v cue ■
4. Richard Robinson, The what-is-x? question. In: The Philosophy of
Socrates,edited by G. Vlastos, London, 1972, pp. 110 ff.
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It is an obvious attempt to define justice; it is vague,
to be sure. It is far from being a successful definition and from
being a Socratic scrutiny of the question. Our attention is drawn to
the fact that the definition slips into a demand for performing justice;
it is expressed as a "must" prescribing a duty: Justice is for one to
do what one must do....
In the three frr. discussed above (174, 261, 256) there is a
common point: Justice is met as a phenomenon arising from mutual
2
relations. Justice is not an abstract name, it is a living practice.
The inquiry of D. is not (mainly) addressed to the question "what is
being just" but to the demand (commandment): "be just".
3. Duties to tie State.
On the ground of their imperative form a number of aphorisms
will be briefly commented on here, but on the ground of their content
they will be placed in the ch. on political life, so that they will
be better intelligible there in the light of the historical conditions
in D.'s age.
The first important advantage which an ancient state should
have promised and could provide for its members was protection from
external dangers (raiders, intruders, agressive neighbours or wandering
tribes). The second was the dispensation of justice in the relations
of its citizens. In connection with these demands three duties are
prescribed to citizens, formulated by D. as "imperatives".
1. The same intention is seen in the second half of fr. 261.
2. Cf. Epicurus' sent. 33 (Us. p. 78, Arrighetti p. 133) and
sent. 36 (Us. p. 79, Arrighetti, p. 133).
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I • To protect one's country against enemies according to the
laws and customs of the city-state. D. says: "....one should,
according to ancestral law, kill an enemy of the State in every ordered
society, unless a law forbids it. But there are prohibitions in every
state: sacred law, treaties, oaths."1
]T . To protect one's fellowcitizens from being victi s of injustice
(fr. 261).
]ff • To help one's mother-State to dispense justice according to the
laws of it (fr. 262:«... Whoever contrary to the law acquits a man,
9
judging according to profit or pleasure, does wrong,• •••)•"'
3
The procedure described is explicitly democratic; the
imperativeness of the aphorisms implies a sense of duty.
^ven if one supposed that behind all these duties an egoistic
or utilitarian motive is concealed, one would have to recognise that they
postulate a sense of duty and responsibility and that if fulfilled can
provide a high level of safety, order and Justice for a civilised
community.
1. fr. 259:... xax& v5pou> xobs uaxpfoua (xpe&v) xxEfvetv
KoXrjitov ttcvtI u6c\in), tv <5 v<5poS ATteCpysi ' Auefpyet
6k tcpJfe ck&otoloi kiaytSp ta Hal axovSal nal opxot.
2. fr. 262:... xaTaU-ncpicrc^ov. • .Si 6' av Ttap& v<5pov
anoXtir] nipSei opfHiov r| t)6ovti A6ixet....
3. Cf. fr. 251, 266. Cf. implications from the term
Ka.-coc1ft7Q51.fTe01/ (vote against) above.
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e. Foundation of duty
The noblest moment in D.'s Ethics is his precept that one
must "refrain from wrong-doing not because of fear but because of (a
sense of) duty.1 Though not expressed in this aphorism, the only
alternative to ; ear as a power to lead a iaan in seeing his duty and
doing it is free will. The moral agent is invited to estimate and
decide what is "deon". The connotation of this term is clearer in
fr. 181, which is hardly to be accepted as an aphorism; it is an
explanation and defence of "deon" as a stimulus and guiding power in
moral activity. We read: "The man who is led towards duty by persuasion
will probably (naturally) not do anything faulty either secretly or
. ..2
openly•
That the concepts both of "deon" and persuasion postulate free
will and are accompanied by a sense of responsibility is self-evident for
us (with our post-Kantian moral education); it was not so in classical
3
Greece where the problem of freewill was not met until after Aristotle.
1 • fr . 41; i*. xj o l<i (p> o r-o 8 V V C/ E <f i/'OL-c -
■ (Stob. III. 1. 95).
| ? \ C ^ 7 \ 7/
2. fr. 181:... Eov... ti Co fx/ov OOK EL KoS OOZE
7\ ot 11 outL (pa^EfZoj, Efo]tLO ZL TT »7f*. L'JES ■
3. P. Huby, The first discovery of the Freewill Problem,
Philosophy, 42 (1967) 353-362.
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This fact is not sufficient reason to deny the connotation of duty to
the term of "deon"1 as it is used in the context of the two frr. quoted
above: What is of interest is not the "grammar of ethics'* but the
essence of the terms in their context. Otherwise we would be justified
in insisting that, if no grammar book survived from a society, no
language was spoken there.
The concept of "deon" will become more intelligible, if we
read (in connection) fr. 264: "one must not respect (his dignity)
himself less than the opinion of others; nor must one be ready to do
wrong if no one will know (it) than if all mankind. One must respect
his own dignity first of all and this must stand as the law in one's
soul, so that one abstain from anything improper."
In a period when traditional morals were declining and the
2
power of law was getting more and more insufficient in individual and
inter-city-states relations, during and (perhaps) after a destructive
1. A. W. H. Adklne, Merit and Responsibility, Oxford (1960), p. 2 ff.
Nowhere in this valuable book is D. mentioned.
/ ^ ^ \ 0 p*/ V
2. Cf. Thucydides, III 45.3: ^ u K <*. 61 nt K cu cJcot *ou
c / C r * ■>/ / t/ ? >c) n p. >3 6 L «. ct^t, VU.V • 9i/K C vo f.tos o f tti CLTT tip ■
-r /
J LL tou toiJ .
Ill 84.2: <xv^p>ujrrtiQ^ J6£i u> rrct^ck
I / 7 r
"toi/f ^ojheoi <y o iA.V
See: Erst Topitsch, V\v$puJTie.LCc <p,j6cS 1111(1 Ethik bei
Thukydides. In: Viiener Studien, 61 (1943) 50-67.
Cf. also: Kritias (DK 88 B 25, 9-11).
See: Die moralischen MassstSbe des Thukydides in RE Suppl. 12
(1970) Col. 1250.
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war (which had all the characteristics of financial, ideological, social,
civil w ar) for the first time a voice is raised, perhaps the voice of a
solitary thinker1 declaring that in mutual relations virtue is a
vigilant inspector, derived from the sense of duty, which can be taught
2
through reasoning and persuasion, not by force and compulsion, that men
who will see in this way what is "deon" will be able to do it without
3
fear or inspection, but only because they will have in their soul the
4
law of duty. This optimistic belief explains why D» did not need
5
gods to guarantee human morality.
1. Diog. Laertius, IX 36 ( DK 68 A 1, 36).
[Hippocr.] Epist. 12 (p. 330 Littr5) ( Luria, Jemocritea, p.15
No. Xllla). As far as we know D. after his studies and travels
"per orientem" (frr. 299) spent the rest of his life in Abdera.
2. fr. 181:... tov Is TUnSbt.-..
3. fr. 41.
4. fr. 264: too Coy oo t>p. < <s.S~E 6 V.a. V OCA. J LAJ 6 C 6 ^-1 j iv
r, * * r
£77 CZ^j d £terV .
Cf. Guthrie (Hist. II 496): Here the "psyche" is the centre of
the moral and rational being as it is in Socrates, and "nomos" is
far removed from the sense of mere convention or subjective belief...<
Cf. Langerbeck (op. cit. 55): Nicht der Nomos ist die Norm des
Handelns sondern "to deon".
See: VS 68 A 166: oo X f "i "o ^,014 lc-i) oe-p ycsi V c o i/
e j c v
5. Cf. Kritias (VS 88 B 25, 9-11).
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If the concept of duty in its history followed a gradual
progress from:
(1) the requirement to fulfil a specific role, when the purpose
is entirely intelligible as an expression of normal human desires, to
(II) something to be done by the individual whatever his private
desires, to
(III) a highest step where duty is divorced from desire altogether,
then D. readhed the second step and promoted Greek Ethics from the
question: "What am I to do if I am to fare well?" to the question:
"What ought 1 to do if I am to do right?"1
f• Two final questions:
a. How did D. reach this step, not anticipated and not
followed (for a century or more) oy other moralists? "by questioning
human nature" seems to be the only possible answer. He was a physicist
and entered moral problems retaining his scientific approach and
equipment. "Natura non vincitur nisi parendo". This is perhaps
the secret of that solitary thinker, who was not used to dogmatise
about anything, but was able to observe individuals' behaviour in order
2
to reach some generalisation.
1. A. Maclntyre, A short history of Ethics, p. 86.
2. frr. like 118, 172, 173 betray his way of thinking, fr. 181 sounds
very like a conclusion of personal experience.
Fr. 264 echoes a personal guiding belief.
See S. Luria, Zur Frage der materialistischen BegrUndung der Ethik
bei Demokrit, Berlin (1964) p. 5: Der beruhmte Spruch (fr. 264)
•»...ist ein unsterbliches Verdienst des Demokrit....
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b. bid d* corv it the so-called naturalistic fallacy?1 His way of
advancing the phenomenon of moral obligation is no doubt naturalistic*
2
He presents It generating from the conditions of life (like other progress)*
He really passes from statements of t © form: "it is desired" to state-
ment® of the for®: "one ought to do so"*" H© works as a "definist."
I would agree- that : • committed the naturalistic fal.acy:
(I) if it is Justified to apply conceptual structure of our days
and the corresponding criteria to a period when philosophical terminology
and ethical thought was coming into existence*
(II) if th defendant® of the theory can provide their premises
from which it is res una ly inferred that statements of the for® "it is
desired"# "it is good"# "it ought to be done" are necessarily of
different origin* The fact that the. are listed in different classes
now, after aillenia of moral thought, is not sufficient reason to
certify their birth fro® different ancestors*
14
1* 0* 8* t'ooro, Principia thica, Cambridge (196b) # pp* 66-67#
72-3.
Of* Guthrie, ocrates# 118 (and footn* 3)*
2. iodor. I. 8.7 (VS 68 B S in II* 136, 10-15).
3* e*g* fr* 261* That a wronged man desires to e helped is a
self-evident assumption for a naturalist*
4, Frankena ., .thics, (1003) pp. 80-81*
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10. On VIRTUE
There is evidence that D. had entitled one of his books
"On Manly Excellence or On Virtue"'Disregarding this one might
say that the best evidence is the surviving frr., in which many of the
traditional Greek virtues (aretae) are mentioned, described or in some
2
way analysed.
Before enumerating some concepts or giving a description of
them we have to consider whether D. faced the question of virtue itself
and the cognate problems (origin, teachability, "being or doing"
question). This inquiry is directed to the following topics:
a. Origin of virtue.
b. Teachability of virtue.
c. Virtue is action.
d. State law and individual virtue.
e. What is the meaning of fr. 83?
a. Prior to virtue according to D. is a psychological concept, that
of aidos (a sense of respect, first of all self-respect) which links
and keeps together the virtues.
He says: "if children are allowed not to work, they cannot
learn letters or music or gymnastics, nor that which above all things
supports virtue, i.e. a sense of respect. Since it is just from these
1. Diog. Laertius, IX 46 ( DK 68 B 2a).
2. e.g. frr. 2, 119, 211, 214, 256.
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studies that this sense of respect usually grows."*
AidSs is obviously for him a condition necessary for virtue.
It explains why he warmly emphasises that the first duty of a man is to
have this quality (of aidos) in himself, so that he acquires an ever-
3
present guardian of his actions.
This role of aidos (respect) is explicit in fr. 264: "One
must not respect one's dignity less than the opinion of others; nor
must one be more ready to do wrong if no one will know than if all mankind
will know. One must respect one's own dignity first of all, and this must
stand as the law in one's soul, so that one abstain from anything
improper."1
1. fr. 179: toveTv noftSeS (ivievteS outs ypamiax' av p.a0oi£V
ou-re pouai,x?)v ouxe &ywvCtiv 066' oxep piaJttata x*)V dpex^v
cT'jvc)(£ I » tb cc i £ £ tgocx i [idtX-oc Y&p £x toutwv 9t\et
ytyvzaqai rj at^wS.
Prior to aidos is labour and learning as was explained in the
previous paragraph.
2. H. Lafte, Die Ethik des D., Sokrates 49 (1923) p. 58: Die Aidos ist
ihm das wichtige Mittel, das zur AretS fli'nrt...
3. fr. 264# Cf. Epicurus (Gnomologium Vaticanum, 70. Arrighetti,p.l55):
M-pSev aot £v pCa> -kpayqecr] o cp<53ov -rcape^ei aot £t
YV(ea0r[p£Tat xco itXriaiToV.
4. Frr. 84, 244. A short comment is necessary:
Erffa (op. cit. p. 202) notes that he cannot accept a substantial
distinction between O- <- *£ 9'au, - oc l f x u v t s $ oc-l which
interchange in the frr. involved. In footn. 185 he adds:
175a
Footnote 4. to page 175 ctd.
Ich betone noch einmal dass es nicht richtig erscheint, zwischen
OlI & t l <o und qcLg^ ganz scharf zu
schelden, so etwa dass Oct & t u 6 cla^ lnnere sittliche Scheu
bezeichnet, olZ £>/. i v L Scham vor h'issbilligung.
But cf• Thuc. I• 84. 3. where the use of the corresponding names
9 P / 7 f
( culo^jS
j cua^X vVyl ) suggests such a distinction.
Cf. Stob. Ill 31.10 ( & to Cf>p a Q toV ) ■ OlaXj £«iitcV Kai
OL "2 2 o v e 0 K <*2 *X V v $>f tTjX
176
If one respects oneself first of all and embodies in the
criterion for one's actions the judgement of others (as if all mankind
were witnesses) there has been enthroned in one's soul a law of morality
both subjuective and objective at the same time. The fact that this
fr. is repeated in slightly different or shortened form in two other
cases1 suggests that it was one of the fundamental doctrines in D.'s
ethical writings.
A similar connection between aidos and virtue can be traced
2
in Euripides (in one of his last plays). How and why did D. reach
this higher-level conception of aidos? It seems likely that a
sense of the decay of Greek city-state life and consequently a feeling
of moral emptiness evident in the private and public affairs of the
late 5th century BC was a stimulus for D. (as it was for Euripides in
the artistic sphere) to investigate the human soul and find a new
foundation of moral principles. So he attempted to give a new
3
connotation and fresh life to an old concept.
When Medea was lamenting on stage the absence of aidos which
1. Frr. 84, 244.
2. Eurip, Iphig. Aul. 1089 ff. (chorus):
,/
Tot? to "CcTi oeffoui t X. l , trou
T «-S ex-p t X. ooS vtL TTpo c UJT1 0 V. .
i / r * / . —
<X 1/o 1 ^ °
Cf. Thuc. I. 84.3: cX t fcjs € ^ <jof> o € OvyS /ft? 6xov
f -> / \ /
OU-e^iJv^S clt
3. Cf. Erff,,, op. cit. p. 203.
177.
could free men from the undesirable results of anaideia;1 and when a
realist historian was describing (with a conspicuously pessimistic
2
disposition) human nature as prone to crime and immorality; then
an optimistic philosopher replied asserting the possibility of moral
3
autonomy and perfectibility (fr. 187 ad finem) through the power of aidos.
That the capacity of aidos to influence men's .judgement is
effective not only in the present but extends also to past and future
4
we can infer by comparing 3 other fragments.
fjP*p*itMf
1. Euripides, ^eee^f 436:
7 ir^Tvt'v at5'», sl0f -rots naaiv jjpoxotS
cuvoffcra (rfrAvorfcrxvvTOv £5^po0 (ppEvSSv.
2. Thucydides, III 45.3; III, 84.
Cf. E. Toppitsch, olv -9 uj ri ti 6L Cf!/6L$> und Ethik bei Thukydides,
Wiener Studien, 61 (1943) 50 ff.
3. If aid5s with such connotation is present in the soul, it means
that D. recognised, even if he does'nt explicitly say so, human
autonomy (fr. 84, 244, 264).
Cf. Nestle, Vom ! ythos zum Logos, p. 202: ....vor sich selbst
schamen. Damit ist die sittliche Autonomie des Menschen erreicht.
4. irr. 43: tj.exgij.eXEta f-rc* ortoxootcriv epyp.aat 3'ou awT-nptr).
174: .... t;o-uxo) reavxez xh xoiocfixa, dxepTtetr)» oxav teu
dvap,vna0f), v.at 5'5olke Hat sauxbv vmhCCel.
265: r^5v r)tiapTiifi^V'..v avGpamot ueuvEarat paXXov
T) 'CWV eS TTETTOI T||i£V''V.
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By introducing aidos as the foundation"*" of moral law in the
soul D. set a standard of personal integrity and social responsibility;
and so declared his optimistic humanism.
If this presentation of aidos is correct, it adequately answers
another related question; why religion plays no part in d.'s ethical
2
theory; it is not necessary to forge a godD. would reply to
3
Kritias; it is enough to promote human dignity to the proper level.
If a man attains this degree of dignity, he himself will recognise his
4
own wrong-doings. This will be enough self-punishment.
1. Cf. Protagoras' doctrine (in Plato's dialogue, 320 c 8 - 322 d 5)
who postulates aidos and justice (gifted by the god) as necessary for
social-political life.
See: G. B. Kerferd, Protagoras' doctrine of Justice end Virtue,
Journal of Hellenic Studies, 73 (1953) 42-45.
2. Schmid. StShlin I, 5, 291: Die Religion sp£41t a^»s Erziehungsmacht
bei i|un keine Rolle.
See ch. 1 of this research: D.'s attitude towards Religion.
3. vs 88 b 25, 9-11; "-,reLT' £ix£t6t) -cd|icpavfj |aev ot vojiot
(V-r^tcyov xtirob* "pyct Ttpda^eiv 6(a,
X-fQpa <*:' cuoafcT ov...
4. Cf. Isocrates, ad Demonicum, 16 (Stob. Ill, 34,9): in"|6enOT£
Hr)6£v octTypbv itoii^craS 'eXtciCe Xi'rretv ' Hal y&p ocv xo&S
"XXouS X'GrjS , o'EtDTcp oruvsi6^cfEiS.
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A last remark on the aidos-concept• It should be recognised,
as Latte pointedly remarked, that aidos expresses only "taedium mali" not
"amoran boni".1 If this were not so, then it would be such a
remote precursor of Christian doctrines that we should suspect a
forgery of frr. But, on the other hand, it seems out of place to
ask such questions simply because we are acquainted with a history of
ideas 25 centuries after uemocritus.
2 ,
The concept of aidos does not first appear in D. s frr.,
but "he attributed a new importance to the old Greek concept of aidos
2
....the wonderful idea of aidos which a man feels few himself."
1. H. Latie, op. cit., p. Gls Vom taedium mali zum amorem boni ware
fur D. ein winziger Schrift gewesen; er durfte ihn nicht tun,
well er damit seine Euthymie und damit sich selbst aufgegeben haben
wiirde. The latin terms in Lakie's text seem to have Christian
connotation.
2. otobaeus, III 24.2: TTd v 6 ouj to V cxX^'veo
n u °p6 d 3 ■
Cf. Thucydides II 43.1 where the historians explains that great deeds
were achieved by men having in them the sense of self-respect. Cf.
Plato, Protagoras, 322 C. Plato makes Pr. say that aidos was
distributed by God all over mankind.
3. W» Jaeger, Paideia (Eng. trans, by G. Highet), I. 330.
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By introducing the concept of aidos with that connotation (fr.
264 end: law in men's soul) D. recognises man as more responsible
and therefore he postulates human autonomy in decision an action.1 He
2
demands from a moral agent not fear but (self-respect) sense of duty.
How closely aidos in D.'s thought is connected with duty (deon - what
3
ought to be done) can be seen by comparison of frr. 41, 181, 26ty .
1. fr. 41: ^ Cp<5(30v dXX& 5i\ tb 6eov Anix^oQai
x~v ap,apTr)victT(',!V.
Guthrie, op. cit., 494: revulsion from wrongdoing as such and not
from fear of punishment.
2. Laue, Die Ethik, 60-61: Die aidos ist eine in uns liegende Kraft
die uns Ekel vor der Sfinde, §jcham und Schmerz fiber das begangene
Unrecht empfinden ffisst und vom Sfindigen fernhalt.
3. fr. 41 (quoted above)
fr. 181: T^v 5rov f|Y|i£vov otiit EfxbS
outs XctSpt] oute <pavep3s ep6eiv ti uXtimieXeS.
264!
.. tt uaXXov ^~Epyarea9aL xan(5v» et \x£\\zt
(arrets eIS^ceuv rj ot ti'vxe; "vQpuJuot.
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b. Teachability of Virtue
This was one of the roost disputed problems of the second half
1
of the fifth century 8C • Even professed teachers either denied
2
teachability of virtue or accepted teachability of virtue but denied
3
object i vit;. of v lues generally. Socrates deepened the whole
problem by demanding a definition boforo setting out the question of
4
teachability.
It seems that the whole problem of education becomes more vital
and burning during periods of social change and more crucirl when it has
social implies ions. This wa? the cose for b.'s days. Athens, to be
sure, was the arena of the conflict, but the repercussions were felt
all over the Greek world. D. was living on the edge of that world,
but he felt deeply the consequences of these views.' This explains
1. Guthrie, Socrates, 114: "the burning question of the day".
2. Mono 71 D - 72 A < VJ 82 B 19). See Mario Untersteiner, The
Sophists, p. 132. Guthrie, ophlste, 44-5, 271. Meno 95 D-C.
3. Protagoras, 361 A—U. Theaet. 172 B.
Untersteinor, op. cit. pp. 65 ff.
Guthrie, ophists, 166 ff., 260 ff.
4. Protagoras 361 C: (Socrates is speaking) : Hax. 4at v ZclOZ*
C r 10/ C - V 7 I \ 0 \ <■/ ■>/ >
outJA/lvWta-S >| K <u tVl t«7/ ctylty v o tL i Sx. l< <w T/a^u
£ n i gK. Lif IT tj> <- oca tcu^ £t C £_ <*sKZ^oV CtZL J t So. kxJ>V.
Gf. v.. Jaeger, Paideia, I, 239: The ophiatic movement
first gave wide ublicity and influence to the claim that aretfi
should be founded on knowledge.
Cf. also Anttuthent-s' fr. 69 (UL VI .10, Caizzi p. *i7):
c r r / ' J
^ ^
<v «• o <*, K Z 1 v oCntdttKVJl T >7v <X a £ X 7 V
14
S- J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London (1968) i_1914 , p.157.
Fr. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, I.l*°(1962), p.147.
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why he, although not a professional teacher, made some interesting
remarks on the whole problem of education and particularly on the
teachabil ty of virtue. He touches two important points and disregards
another two of no less importance and of which he wa no doubt aware.
Yihat virtue is or whether virtues are subjective or objective
are not questions to be answered, at least in the surviving frr.,
which nonetheless cover so large a part of the field of morality, that
they should have included something on these questions, if they had been
faced by Democritus.
Let us see the points which he snakes:
(a) Teaching of virtue must be addressed to the free will,
understanding, personal choice of the individual; it is a matter of
persuasion; man acquires virtue, if at all, only if he is convinced,
nev r by conventional law or any other form of compulsion (fr. 181).
1
(b) Human nature and training cooperate in making a man virtuous.
So the means of acquiring virtue are persuasion and practice
2
(181, 242)." Therefore D. accepted that" knowing what is virtuous
is one condition necessary for doing a virtuous action, but willing is
another condition (included in persuasion); and finally training Is
1. fr. 242: <ycrKp<rio> jflvovtou. ^ a.7r\ <f!>cne^-
2. Cf. Langerbeck (op. cit. p. 57) who refers to fr. 33: "Der eg zur
AretS ist die Askesis (242), in Fr. 33 die Didaclie." But this fr.
(to be discussed in the paragraph on Education) touches the problem of
communication of knowledge, experience, Judgement, and the deep
influence of them, from a different aspect (more general and
fundamental).
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anothe condition (perhaps optional for reasons of habituation) for the
realisation of virtue.
D. says: "The man who employs exhortation and persuasion
will turn out to be a more effective guide to virtue than he who
employs law and coercion. For the man who is prevented by the law
from wrong-doing will probably do wrong in secret, whereas the man who
is led towards duty by persuasion will probably not do anything improper
either secretly or openly. Therefor' the man who acts rightly••••"*
In terms of the psychology of morality he explains why
conviction (persuasion) is the best preparation for practising virtue.
His optimism on the power of persuasion led him to fr. 264. His
orientation and his ef ort to supply an objective foundation of morality
can be contrasted with Gorgias' conception of persuasion as a means for
2 ,
deception. In 0. s view persuasion is the result of a free
1. fr. 181: npeiaoov in' dtpsxtiv cpavEtxac xpoxpoicin ypwpEVoS
nat Xoyou tceiGoI hheo v<5pw Hal dvayxn. XaGpn |i£v y&p
apapx^Eiv slxbs x£>v EtpypEvev &6lxlt)S utt?> v<5jiou» x5v
is xb 5eov i*)yu£vov tteiQoI etxb* oute XaGp^ oute
rpavr.p~S "o^eiv ci xXripjj.EXE's.
2. Gorgias, Helen, 8 [ VS 82 B 11, 8, in vol. II 290, 15 ff.]:
eI 6b XoyoS ?}v o ice(rfaS xat xt|V i|ruxt)v dxaxifaaC...
\6yoS SuvaaxirJ pEyaS £<xxi'v»....
See: Guthrie, Sophists, 180.
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acquaintance with the real problem and its possible consequences,
presupposes mutual respect and entails free acceptance on the part of
the person persuaded. In Gorgias' view logos is powerful in deceiving,
creates
in D.'s view logos/persuasion as a permanent orientation towards virtue,
not for theorising on virtue, but for practising it.
D. reaches the subject as a moralist, whose interest is
practical. He believes that a man convinced of the rightness of an
action is more likely to follow his conviction, seen or not seen by
others, since his own conviction is effective enough to avert wrong-
1 2
doing. A higher-level conception of human responsibility is
3
explicit in this fr. It is worth mentionin , the repetition of terms
for teaching virtue ( 77 p o x po u-jf Kctt /jo'jou It
recognises the dif iculty of this task but this is no reason to avoid it.
9 I
More characteristic is the metaphorical term y ^ p<-1 ✓oV t the man who
is led by hand to meet virtue, to make acquaintance with it... Logos
is the leader in this enterprise; man is amenable to the overtures of
virtue, though in every situation he is recognised to be free and
2
responsible to himself. From this point of view something of modern
existentialism" might be recognised in D.'s thought on ethics.
1. Cf. per contra Thucydides' view (III.45.3): 7TC u K<*-6l re x clvtu
Kocx L^iO. V- <nx & ^^ a £ l«L ' o uK I £zl vo 5
a 9 / r /
0 S-LLj, otTTtip J Ll XaUToU . Cf. fr. 264.
2. Cf. A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, Oxford (1960), p.2.
See fr. 264 (ad finem) quoted below in footn. §. o-f He nex."i
3. Better expounded and analysed in fr. 264.
4. Guthrie, Sophists, 256.
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In this context arete is not conceived only as intending good
results but including also good intentions •*" How far must teaching of
virtue go? Until a man acquires strong sense of responsibility, until
"one respects one's opinion most, and this stands as the law of one's
„2
soul, preventing one from doing anything improper.
Learning of virtue is nothing more than preparation for a
virtuous man. Training in virtue is also demanded. In this point
3
D. is near to his famous fellow-citizen. Fr. 242 is outspoken
on this problem: "' ore men become good through practice than by
..4
nature. D. insists like Protagoras on the need for adding training
to natural ability. This doctrine is self-evident for us; but it
was a burning question of ethics in D.'s age; in the development of a
virtuous man (agathos) what part is played by his natural disposition and
training respectively. D. recognises the importance of this factor
(nature) but his aphorism does not imply any priority (242); he refers
1. Arete is connected with duty (deon) and opposed to injustice.
Cf. frr. 68, 62, 89.
Cf. P. Huby, Greek Ethics, p. 21*
2. fr. 264:... ecjoutbv |id?Xim;a aC^etcrGat, nat toOtov v<5}iov tt]
\|ruxT) KaGecnavat» mcfte irpSbv tcoietv AvehitiISe tov.
See Erich Wolf, 11-343.
3 . VS 80 B 3: j?/f iwS £ «■ fx 6 xo/^jt a. St I ron .
4. fr. 242: IT /It ovU> (J di/cfti'S ^1/oytaA. y
' 1 /- / c
a to u> i/irt ol.
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to the proportion of virtuous men not to the comparative strength of
these factors.1 This is more intelligible if we remember that arete
was understood also essentially as a skill. Perhaps this fr. makes an
allusion to the question of "hereditary agathos" in order to defend the
thesis that being agathos is more a matter of personal training than
ancestry. In any case training is recognised as a factor in preparing
virtuous character, in becoming agathos.
8 And both persuasion (acquaintance and will) and training are
so much necessary since nature itself cannot be entrusted to supply the
virtuous man according to the demands of life in a civilised society.
Very revealing from this point of view is an aphorism attributed to D.
by Plutarch: "if you open yourself you will find inside a complex
,i2
store-house and treasury of ills... Inside us there is a man, our
1. Guthrie (II 494) writes: "training is the leading part". This
seems to be misinterpretation of the aphorism. If teaching generally
is thought to result in such a deep change in a man's nature and
become indeed a "second nature", this is implied from fr. 33 (not
yet presented), in which nature and didache are equated in some way.
2. fr. 149: Ol v feu; tov' cn-Vo 77oikl^w r (
K oc!(. TTo^)u7r«-^S x Lc-ov Lvp^iTl KoJ -&] GcJjf l6jj.oc. .
Questa potente grandiosa metafora (L. Stella, p. cit. p. 229).
Natorp (Die Ethika, 119 footn. 43): D. setz mehr eine naturliche
Anlage zum schlechten als zum guten voraus.
Langerbeck (op. cit. G7) Daher die Schwierigkeit der Didache h&ufig
hervorgehoben. Die Didache setzt eine Physis (Aniage) voraus, die
aber doch keineswegs das entscheidende ist.
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reason, and a lion, our passions, a wild animal many shaped and multi-
headed, our desires.1 At this ooint D.'s optimism should be emphasised,
since he recognises human nature as was described above and is hopeful
for the success of human logos through persuasion (fr. 181).
It is this optimism which gives an anti-Heraclitean sense to
fr. 236: "it is (hard) difficult to fight desire; but to control
2
it is the sign of a reasonable man.""
Now we can better assess D.'s presentation (definition) of
true courage: "The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy,
3
but he who is stronger than pleasures....""1
To conclude: firm beleifs, through reason, plus training
on the foundation of human nature form a virtuous character.
Teachability of virtue js (accepted) affirmed.
1. Cf. Plato's hep. 589 A-B.
2. fr. 236: -i}*!+■£ ^ 4/ jX-iv ftJiTrlv- dvffoJ zX' K^a..
I ) n /
tttcv Ac//o^jngZoV . Cf. Heracl. 85.
3. fr. 214: ct v Sp Li o) o op o Co- v 7To/^£ (■ ^ ct J^ 11
v c - C. r * /
l< mm, o y ly d 0 V t~> V p ( 6 6 usV . • • •
188.
c. Virtue is action
Being good or doing good?* There is no antithesis between
the two; strictly speaking there are two sides of the same problem.
Bein is realised by action and action is conditioned by being. The
whole question accompanies ethics from the beginning of its history.
At least it is present in the late fifth century disputes.
In the matter of ethics knowledge of the good is not complete
itself; it is inferior to the will to perform the good. This too
takes its place behind the final end which is the realisation of good
in its actual performance.
In acquiring virtue and in realising virtue the important
(for D.) point is the practical one. If one has to compete in the
field of morality one has to see the actuality not the verbalism of
the question. In fr. 55 he says: "one must emulate the deeds and
,,2
actions of virtue, not the words. It is a self-evident aphorism, since
moral v&lue lies, if anywhere, in actualising virtue, not in
3
expatiating on it. In emphasising this point D. mirrors a general
suspicion of much talk and little action (perhaps a criticism of the
1. k. F. Burnyeat, in Socrates (edited by Gr. Vlastos), London
(1972) pp. 209 ff.
2. Fr. 55i £pyae kou oo joj/ovj jv
,/ /
(Stob. II. 15.36). This pair of opposites - jlo^oS is
emphatically frequent In Thucydides. ee e.g. I, 22 (where he
explains his methodology) or II 35-46 where Pericles on the occasion
of a funeral ceremony describes the political philosophy of his
generation (II 35.1, 40.1, 40.2, 41.2, 41.4, 42.4 a finem, 43.1
43.2, 46.1).
3. A. Faggi, Per l'etica DemocritSa, Atti Acc. Scien. di Torino (1928)
p. 208: Gli uomini val{»p dunque giudicati dalle azioni e non
dalle parole.
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Sophists).1 His conclusion is another aphorism: "logos ( talk) is but
..2
the shadow of a deed.
An action neither has profit nor suffers damage because of the
presence or absence of good or bad advocates. D. says: 'Neither
excellence of speech can hide en evil act, nor a good act be harmed by
abase inwords..
1. Cf. Euripides, Supplices 907-8:
<pi\($TL|iov f)8oS TC\ot5aicv, (pp<5vn|irr 5^
£v xotaiv epyoiS tots \<5yocS icrov.
Antisthents' fr. 70 (ec/. ^ Co.cjji^DLVI. 2): Ty^v T£
An:e5etxvue tuv epyajv etvcti, ui)xe Xoycov ir\'~lctt'i'V 6£oprvy|v
P1)TE |iOC0T)paTWV.
2. fr. 145: ^t>yos '/ p | o u Ski^-
Vlastos (op. cit. part II, p. 60) notes: "Logos is morally
important so far as it is "teaching that makes nature" and thus
affects action". But lo;os in this fr. means simply "talk",
"words", not reason or teaching.
fi. 177. Oute X'SyoS £a9\bs cpocuXrjv -rtpffFtv <i|ircup Cane i ouxe npfJ^iS
\<5yoti 0Xocprpr)pifi^ Xujircifvrxa:!,.
The English tronsl. of this fr. is from H. 3. Hose,
A handbook of Greek Literature, London (1965) p. 254.
Is this fr. an attack against all professionals who used
any "Dissoi Logoi"?
Cf. fr. 150. See: Plato Prot. 318 A—B•
Cf. Euripides' fr. 583 (Erffa op. cit., 1G4):
OcttiS Xeyci v e6 , x& 6' Epyoc £tp* of1! \eyei
ataypa £axi» xouxou xb crocpbv otn afvw.
Cf. Socrates' consistency (teaching-lawabidingness) (explained)
expounded in Plato's Crito and described in Xenophon's Memorabilia,
4.4.4.
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Some moral principles are necessary but not sufficient for
acting virtuously; traits are also demanded. Consistency between the
two is a much greater moral demand, because principles without traits
Inconsistency between promises (words) and actions is
stron ly criticised by the following aphorism: ''counterfeit (false)
characters and seeming-good are those who do all in word, but not in
disapproved.
The climax of criticism against these men whose actions
conflict with their words is reached by this strong attack: "iv-any
1. Frankenu, op. cit. 53 paraphrasing a well-known formula
of Kantian epistemology.
are Impotent and traits without principles are blind.
1
fact. Such conduct is a sort of deception and certainly
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whost actions are most disgraceful practise the best utterances."1 A
degree of anger is expressed by the two superlatives which emphasise
the antithesis between speech and action.
1. fr. 53a: tto^^si t cc j okou s
/ *) /
p L & T & o S CK & t oU f IV ■ C tcb . 3 1 1 •; • 0*5 ) •
u.J.G. Aalders* explanation (The political fait = of .,
neaoayne, 1950, p. 3G9) of fr. 53a as jointing out "the dangers
of unlimited freedom of speech, on of the most remarkable
features of an ancient Greek democracy like Athens" is neither
ttalifccly nor evident. It in difficult to know whether it reflects —
if at all — a bitter experience from the political life in
thens. uch an angry expression would not be justified; after
all • was a visitor, perhaps for a short period (cf. fr. 110).
A out the political life of Abriera, on the other hand, we know
nearly not.iin to help us in explaining 3,'s thought in this
c se. The wording of the aphorism does'nt make ail sior to
olitical life; more likely it is a strong criticism of the norals
of the day.
d. State law and Virtue
It is not intended here to discuss the meaning of law or
the authority of the law-giver or the procedure of law-giving, the form
of the state or the function of the law. The only point to be touched
on is this: the relation between state-law and the morality of men.1
The justification cornes fro;., fr, 248: "The law wishes to benefit
men's life; and it is able to do so, when they themselves wish to
receive benefit; for it shows to those who obey it their own personal
(individual) virtue."2
1, General experience is that law and morality overlao in their function;
in their essence they are different; law is a restriction of
freedom, sometimes compulsion; morality postulates free will (in l>.'s
ethical theory room is left for it) and each case of action is
an affirmation of freedom. For Plato "Ethics is but a part of
politics" (V. J. Bourke, op, cit. I, 31), for Aristotle politics
is an extension of ethics (A. Maclntyre, op. cit*, p, 57),
Socrates (recorded by Xenophon, Memorabilia 4*4.14) questioned the
equation of justice with keeping the law.
2. fr. 248: cq V(^0£ potfXsxort p.£v e*>epyexe£v 3'ov dv9pu>itwv
Suvaxai 6e> oxav atixot 3oi5Xwvxat iracrxeiv e6 ' xotcrt
y&p he tGope vo tctl x?]v tfii/nv ApEX^jv tvnC fttvuxocl.
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It is obvious that by "virtue" here D. refers to justice;1
but whatever is the connotation of this term (justice or generally
virtue) it equates virtue with keeping the law. The question arises:
is this realised in political practice?
In this case D. seems to have roceeded on an idealisation of
2
the law (the law giving procedure and the function of the law) which
can aim at the same ends which are aimed at b> the individuals'
conception of morality.
From the fr. itself the following inferences are justifiable:
(a) A will is recognised in both: the law (giver) and the law-
3
abiding citizen." (b) Both (sides) "wills" can be identified on the
common field of virtue. (c) Law continuously aims at virtue so
4
rendering the city a permanent school of moralit .
1. Cf. fr. 263: 5lkt)5 Hat AoeirffS ;ieyfaTV|v potpav (ictcxel• • * •
fr. 174: o euGuiios slS Epycc £iucpEp<5uEvoS bCnaia.
xat vo ^1 f* —
2. C.f. Pericles' pride (Thucydides II 37.3): xh 5"npoma 5t?t
lidX tfTxa 06 7f,apavopoO|iEv... .
3. Italo Lana, l' etica di Democrito, in Rivista di Filosofia, 42
(1951) p. 27: D. non ignora quale importante fattore sia la
voiontS dell' uomo e como sia necessario che l' uomo voglia essere
giusto. Cf. A. Faggi, Per l' etica democritea, in Atti Acc. Sc.
di Torino (1928) pp. 206-10.
4. brie .olf, op. cit. II 344: Der Nomos besass eben fur Demokrits
ethisches Denken nur Bedeutung als ein ?.ittel individualistischer
Erziehung. Cf. Thus. II 41.1s rr i
TT •CM- cft U & L 1/ C C V ou_ .
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®ut even in a perfect state we might hardly find an
approximation of the law's will and individual's intention,1 under the
following conditions:
2
(a) the citizens (as voters in a democratic constitution) are able
to see what is right (in any particular case and detail) and prepare
perfect laws, for the future, (b) they can put the longterm interest
of the com unity over their personal interest of the moment. Such
3
idealisation of conditions contradicts fr. 266.
The only possible explanation (o escape incompatibility and
save the fr. 248) might be: it is an incomplete abbreviated
abstract from a context where some conditions perhaps were described
(e.g. if the legislatory procedure goes on :n a particular way, then
lawfulness is a part of morality; since law is the work of the same
people and embodies collectively the virtue - will - of the voters, there¬
fore lawfulness becomes a matter of self-consistency; the law shows
to those who obey it their own virtue, because of their personal
participation in preparing the law).
1. Since law covers only a part of the actual cases of relations
among individuals.
2. Any other alternative contradicts frr. 251, 260 (last word), 262
(KaxaYiCpuitov).
3. To suppose that an authoritarian law is meant here (248) would be
straight contradiction of (a) the text itself where TC£i$0|m,tvOL6l has
a connotation known from fr. 181, (b) frr. noted in footn. above.
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11. /hat Is the meaning of fr. 63?1
Scholars who have commented on this a-ree that it sounds
2 ,
very Socratic; i.e. wrongdoin , is due to ignorance. ocrates
3
view is well-known; Gorgias perhaps anticipated him (in defence of
4
Helen) arguing that wrongdoing is involuntary.
1. fr. 83: oc^/-<■ 4-/° r 1 y5 ct^c x.Ly y ol^j. cc-ftcy ~cou t<f>iee0\/oS .
2. Cf Bailey, op. cit., 197: It has almost a Socratic ring.
A. Philippson, Demokritssittensprliche, Hermes 59 (1924) 403:
(quoting frr. 83, lcsl and referring to 116) remarks: . von
Sokrates in seiner Ethik becinflusst sein Kann.
3. Plato, Laws, 363 C : £yVOlav \£yC,:v (XV XlS xSv auapxrHidtXChV
aCxtav oOk av \!/eu6otxo.
c ,- ? c 1 r
Laws 731 C: O £>c ol L.< oS O u X £ K w v acd lK o S ■
Laws 660 d : HaHOt u.'vxeS eU T.avxa axovxcS hochoC.
Aristotle (EN 1199 b 35) defines: froiiCl 5?) duOtJCin etvat
xft l?.Cc Tj 6i" "yvoiav y iv<5p.rva.
Cf. Tiiaaeus 86 D S, Laches 194 D.
Xenophon, Memorabilia III.9.4.
Arist. aii 1216 b 6. EN 11*4 b 28: iltLCJT'ftiaS "jEXO eDvClL
nctcraS x3r.S ApexaS.
The consequences of these views are discussed by Guthrie, History
III, 459 ff. (Socrates 139 ff.): Evidently (he concludes, p.140)
nny who are vicious vill not be vicious voluntarily. Neither in
consequence, will they be voluntarily virtuous.
4. VS 82 3 11, 6 (ad finem), B 11, 7 (ad finem), B 11, 12 (ad finem),
3 11, 15, B 11, 22.
195a.
Note 4, to p. 195 ctd.
Cf. Guido Calogero, Gorgias and the Socratic Principle: "Nemo sua
sponte peccat", Journal of Hellenic Studies, 76 (1957) 12-17.
See: P. Huby, Greek Ethics, 13, 18.
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^th reference to fr. 83 Guthrie (History, 11.490) following
Philippson (op. cit. p. 405) mentions the last proposition oi fr. 11:
"...the man who acts rightly through ''synesis" and knowledge becomes
brave and upright"1 and misinterprets it by implying that it identifies
2
right action and knowledge.
Fr. 83 if accepted in a .ocratic connotation 0ives difficulties
because:
(1) it Ignores another factor ol morality explicitly present in other
aphorisms of u.j namely, it contradicts frr. 248, 62 (Ctob. Ill 9.29),
3
68. 89.
1. fr. 161:-. <^<-o p Lj> <0W£6tL t£_ K ax fniCXypcp up Vpcx^iLov XLS
n r _ ci \ , q ' '
oevdpfccoS ocpoc c*_x Co l7uyou>p,xr<, ^^iZcu. .
2. In this passage two conditions of right action are mentioned:
synesls and knowledge. Synesis is intelligence (< hilebus 19d),
perception (Theophr. de sens. 71), conscience (Euripides' Crest.
396. ee Luria, esocritca, 567), prudence, carefulness (D.'s fr.
77). How is it justified that synesis be included in knowledge
so that Guthrie's implication be accepted? Synesis an episteme
cooperate, do not coincide, it is said in fr. 181*
3. A. Faggi, Per l' etica uemocritea, Atti Acc. Sc. dl Torino (1328)
pp. 206—10 (un aspetto volontaristico)•
Fr. esiano, La etica materialiatica ai j., Firenzc (1351)
pp. 95 ff.
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(2) it raioves human responsibility which we found in frr. 181,
84, 244, 264.
Therefore, either it is not authentic,1 or (more probably)
it needs more careful re-interpretation: "cause of failure (error) is
„ 2
the ignorance of how to act in a better way . It implies that knowing
is a condition of successful action but doesn't imply necessarily that
any case of wrongdoing is due to ignorance.
If this interpretation is correct, it escapes the inconsist¬
encies mentioned above and leaves roOm for other factors evidently
present in D.'s ethical theory: intention (62, 68, 89), synesis (181)^
phronesis (119), which cannot be identified with knowledge.J
1. This is Luria's view (democritea, p. 596 no. 696).
2. means ignorance or stupidity (cf. Heracl. 95).
means failure or sin (later).
3. Another possibility 13 this:
If K. pL660voS refers to the stronger (the person in power,
the ruler) as is the case in frr. 238, 267 and perhaps 185 and 295,
and, if Kp666oVoj is a subjective genitive to ,
then the whole fr. can be: the cause of political error is the
inability (incompetence)of the ruler; such an interpretation
gains probability from the fact that D. in many cases refers to
such problems as who is to rule or be ruled (cf. frr. 75, 267, 49).
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12. Tree of Virtues
Is there a virtue or a group of virtues from which other
virtues are derived? According to the evidence we possess we cannot
give an affirmative answer to this question and/or give a list of
cardinal virtues.
A Ion list of virtues, to be sure, arises irom the frr. —
unexpectedly rich — perhaps an echo of Lhe difficulties in ocial
life of Greek city-states in the late 5th century BC. But it is
impossible to analyse them and find their precise connotation, because
of lac!: of sufficient evidence^ ana it is difficult even to cl ssify them.
iVe are accustomed to speak about cardinal virtues in Greek
i hilosophy, particularly after Socrates.1 ;ut it would be incorrect
to borrow evidence from later philosophy even to illuminate a sin le
item in D.'s terminology, because the meaning and hierarchy of virtues
2
were in continuous change from gen- ration to generation and irom
1. Plato u ually mentions: .isdom, Courage, Temperance, Justice.
it compare: :.,eno 74A: o<v^p£-iq. - - • €ui (j? pv <r
\ / \ / 'I
K eta ^OTlpen UCu y-OA.
Aristotle first distinguishes: Intellectual - oral virtues.
(SK 1103a 14 ff.)
doe: . oss, Aristotle 1971 [1823 pp. 202 ff., 215 ff.
2. Compare e.g. three definitions of Courage:
(a) Thucydides, II, 40.3.
(b) Plato, Laws 626 ..
(c) ei.ocritus, fr. 31-.. Antiphon frr. 56, 59.
uotations will be included in some of the following pr es.
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society to .ociety. Following the principle: "do not ask the meaning
of a term, ask for its use", we will try to illuminate the whole
question relying only (or mainly) on the fragments.
The difficulty in elucidating D.'s vocabulary of virtues
can be seen in a short comparison ol ome terms in various contexts:
(i) "men without "synesis" through misfortunes acquire 'sophrosyne'
(ii) Fortune is opposed to phronesis (fr. 119).
Fortune is opposed to sophia (fr. 197).
Fortune is opposed to sophrosyne (fr. 210).
(iii) "there are young men who are 'synetoi' and old men who are
are possible:
(a) Virtues directed to (i) one's own interest and happiness or
(ii) other people's.
(b) (i) Intellectual and (ii) ractical virtues.
virtues to be included in an ethical theory, unless they are
indispensable preparation for the other class of virtues, which are
morally valued qualities.
asynetoi', because it is not time which teaches 'phronesis',
but good education a-J nature.""
Two ways of working out a kind of analysis and classification
In both ways the first group are not strictly speaking
> r
2. fr. 183: ce cl





Although of Aristotelian flavour the second way could find an
application in D.'s tree of virtues; the former, nonetheless, is more
convenient, in order to ^hov the transition from an egoistic view of
life to an altruistic one, apparent in D.'s naturalistic ethical theory.
One might note in passing that Intellectualism is dominant in
the list of virtues under discussion, but it is not the only source from
which morality arises. Knowing the i^ood is one condition r c< rsary
for doing it (being virtuous), but neither sufficient nor efficient.
Two main beliefs characterise D.'s thought in planting his
tree of virtues: (a) that man by his nature is not an angel,1 (b) that
soul is master of the body and has the capacity to rule it and lead it
2
to self-perfection.
1. Virtues concerning one's own personal perfection and happiness:
a. Sophia (wisdom).
That it is not a gift granted by nature but an achievement
of life through learning, i.e. through labour, v;e read in fr. 59:
("neither techne nor wisdom is attainable save through learning") in
connection with fr. 182: "beautiful objects are achieved by study
i 3
through effort...." It is of the highest value because it leads to
4
athambia which is recorced as an alternative name for cuthumia (fr. 4.)
1. fr. 149; OCV <° ocZ rJ y 6 yfo-thv^ ftoi k v C l K
Tf o 3 o TI K ecKiZi/ Z LttOy (TZty K au. $>/ 6acJ''<-&CC ■
2. 187: ■■■ J tt/llo-cnS 6
3. fr. 59: o'ott ovtt 6o<fi7 ^ 01 -fy X.U, .
(Stob. II 31, 71)
ir. 182: Ha\j, r[\xzXrz xoTi irc5voiS rj [i^GriaiS
pyaC5'Ta 1....
4. fr. 216: crotpft) aQa^goS &E, lt) ttccvtojv. ... Gf* fr* 4*
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Sophia is what makes intellectual sneculation possible; it gives men
two highly valued possibilities: (a) to fight fortune (this unreliable
phantom)^ and (b) - what is more appreciated - to free their
2 3
soul from passions'", which are an obstacle to human happiness.
b. Courage is not only fi htin.; bravely against external enemies:
courage is the power to control one's own passions, to defeat or.t 's
» 4
passions, to be master in one s own household; it is like performing
the last function ascribed to sophia (see footn. 2). As was correctly
remarked, "fr. 181 (ad fin.) and fr. 214 emphasise the unity of courage
.. 5
v.ith the rest of virtue • The brave man 3 s he who is stronger than
his pleasures. . o courage retains its old meanin , (bravery in battle)
and acquires a new one shared by other thinkers of the same generation
l.fr. 119: ocv "-1 Tt o i tl ^|oV £ TT /] <*. 6" oca/ Co ....
Cf. fr. 197, 176, 210. Cf. also: Plato, Meno, 99A: r^. oin J
£> v K a. v uj rt [vp fitfA-O vLOL ^fjvlToc^.
2. fr • 31: .... & 0 Cf J £ ^X*J V -It ct $£ V CL<f>ec-L j5 £1 Cccc
3. fr. 149 (quoted above). Compare Cicero, de finibus, 3,20: perturb¬
ationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram accerbamque
reddunt, quas Qraeci appellant.
4. fr. 214: Icm £,C*0.S 0 hX o "Cu)v Vto ^ i I^CiAj 1/ ^-Cvoi/ J °C
o v yj o v uj V !** ^ t &£ .
5. Guthrie, History, II, 4^o»
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and the next one; (viz. control over passions).
c. Keasonlng (logismos) has to fulfil three serious functions:
(a) to help man in his attempt to win a victory over his desires like
sophia and courage, (b) to lead the individual to self-perfection as can
3
be seen in fr. 187 (ad fin.). (c) From the eudaimonistic view of Greek
Ethics the capacity of logismos to cast forth grief from the soul and
4
lead man to contemplative life is of no less importance.
d. Synesis is not the accumulation of any kind of learning but the
1. Gf. Thuc. 11.40.3. HodxiCTOL 6'av T^V \!'Uxt)V 5 IHxC'jjS
upiGerev oi x<y xe 6riv& nat rj6£a caoiaxaxa yiyvuKTHOvxeS
nat 6id xaOxa Aitoxp£u6p.evol d-rcb xo>v xlv6:5vwv.
Plato, Laws. 626 E» Tb VLkSv ECCUxbv TtacfMV TWV V LHo)V
T) fcpCaXT)... Cf. Laches 191 OE
Antiphon, B 58: aflxbi sauxbv npaxetv xe xat vixav
45uvil9r|. Cf. B 59. Cf. also: Euripides, .upplices, 510:
xat xoox* xdv5pel'ov» rj ftpo^r)9Ca.
2. fr. 236: 9u}it5 \idxecPiai |ibv ' dvbpbs 6b xb
hpax^e tv ei'iXoy C txoo .
Apparently similar to Heracl. 85: |idxO09a l xa/\.e'rt(5vv
o xl ydp av £Q£X-fl wvefxat.
But D.'s attitude is different; it expresses confidence in human
capacities. Cf. Ilrokiewicz, Quaestiones Deinocriteae, uos, 47 (1954-55),
p. 38: Heraclito sic D. respondet.
See: ochmid-Stahlin, 1, 5, p. 293.
Cf. Eur. Medea, 1078-80.
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Notes to pi 202 ctd.
3* Since the soul is the centre of an intellectual being and logismos
renders soul more perfect, it means that logisnios is entitled
to the higher place in the hierarchy of virtues. Cf. Natorp, op. cit.
p. 98.
/ ? c ^ ^ ^
4. fr. 290: ct ° 6TTotov ipu^>q5 Ao^ l£^uu t KKf> °i/L .
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but the combined result of good education and natural capacity# "There
are young men who are synetoi and old men without this quality.""1"
This is not possessed by all men, but when acquired it becomes a guard
against dangers and a coiupanion-guide towards other virtues and ri ht
actions. Synesis is the power which helps men to keep measure and
balance between two deceiving and frequently misleading partners: "glory
.(2
and wealth without synesis are unsafe possessions. /hen on . possesses
these two goods, dan,.er to<f him comes from inside (empty ambitions)
3
from outside (flattery, adulation) ; and then synesis is the only
tutor for a man surrounded by such friends. As for the fools they learn
4
synesis, if at all, only through suffering.
1. fr. 183: %Q%i ixou v£wv ?.i5vecrt-J Hal yep<5vT<ov d'uvecrCr\*.,.
2. fr. 77: wal tiXoutoS aveu JuvrotoS cftu dorpa\£a
KflfyiaTa (Stob. 111. 4. 82).
Cf. Kurip. Here. 511-12: o 6' o\j3oS o |i£yaS
r)T£ 6<5r ' oi'n o£6' oxtp toti.
3. "f. eneca, be vita beata, 25.4.
In ancient tome when a "triumpbator" entered the city standing on
his chariot, during the pompous parade a "servus" behind him was
whispering "respice post te, homlnem te esse memento" £sic transit
gloria mundiI).
4. fr. 54: ol druv£T0t SvcttuxeovteS awtppovecucri,.
cf. fr. 76.
Cf• Soph. Antigone, 1348 ff.
...(lEyaXot ?<.(5yot, psyaXai t55v irrtEpauywv
(IrcoT^aavTES yifo<?. tb 9poveiv 5a""av.
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e. Sophrosyne ~ Autarkela.
Sophrosyne appears as the virtue of keeping measure in
1 1
pleasures, even intellectual pleasures, ince any excess is undesirable.
2 _
Pophrosyne is referred to as the flower of old age. A sophron man
3
ean suffer a poor life in dignity , and discriminate between trustworthy
4
men and those who are not. Sophrosyne is opposed to credulity, naivity.
1. fr. 210, 211, 191 (beginning).
Cf. Epicux-us, Ethika (Us. 456, 20 ff., p. 295):
■p >abv oSv cTaicppocTuvn Bpaxt5xT)> taxtv biuGup iSv htI xaF,iS
Avaipouaa p.bv x&S bitsictcchtouS nal hepittAs> xaip~> 5b
xat jicxptottjti Hoapouaa xAs Avayxa'as.
Of. Arist. EN 1107 b C:
cfa^pOCTUVT) , uxEpBoXb
61 AhoXaofa. 1117 b 235 \\z<x6xr\S he pi xbs riSovAs.
Vlastos (op. cit. I. 588) recollects (in connection with fr. 211)
fr. 233: Moderation increases enjoyment•.••
2. fr. 29'x: ...YifoaoS cb cauppccruvri (&Gx\v) avGoS.
It is characteristic that a metaphor is used here which in
Greek literature was usual for hybris.
ee H. T'orth, Sophrosyne, New York (1966), p. 382.
3 f 391s 0
HEV 'r)V E IKE'. )S CpEpEUV CROCppOVEOVTOS *
4. fr. o?: ^ uaaiv AXX& tots 6ox£|ioicu hioteueiv * xb
|abv y&p eutiGeS , xb 5b crwrppovsovxo;.
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The best example from which men can learn sophrosyne is their
father's conduct. This aphorism is addressed rather to parents to
give a good example to their children.
Sophrosyne prepares the way for another virtue: self-
sufficiency (210), which here appears with clear philosophical
im lications.1 In two aphorisms the precarious gifts of fortune
are contrasted wiih self-sufficiency which cones from nature (176) and
from sophrosyne (21o). In a fr. of personal confession D. says:
"Sojourning abroad teaches self-sufficiency; for a crust of bread and
2
a wisp of straw are the sweetest medicines for hunger and weariness.
Self-sufficiency had a distinguished history in later times:
3
Stilpo the Megarian*" pushed it into apatheia (Stoic principle) and
1. North, Sophrosyne, 76 footn. 108, pp. 118-119.
J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, London, 19-8, p.138.
Gclimid-St&hiin, 1.5. 312: In keiner anderen othik ist die
menschlich Autarkie.....so stark betont wie in der demokritischen.
Cf. an interesting remark of Thucydides (I. 84.3): etcXL 6"uJ <fpO G~U ~
v>2<, Tr^eeVrov p. £ textc .
2. fr. 246: JtVLTtcy €i'ou k: Sc cfocVx tL ■ ficLjo. yo
v n - v / / ? '
X cz-c K KoTto-v c ca .
transl. (quoted above) by C. bailey, Gr. Atom., p. 205.
3. heller-Nestle, die Philosophie der Griechen, II. 1.273: Fur
des hochste Gut erklarte er jene Apathie, die kein jeftihl des
\J k«.L<, aufkommen lasst.
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Aristotle reduced it to intellectual dimensions.1 For D.'s part fr.
2
24G seems to echo a personal experience and explains the non-hedonistic
3
and sometimes ascetic (character) nature of his ethics.
2« From the egoistic to the altruistic view of life:
Justice.
It is the only one of the main virtues which refers to one's own duty
to act according to others'desire; the solo but strong expression of
altruism in D.'s ethical theory.
An attempt to define justice declined into an imperative
"do what you must do" (provided that one has self-evidently known what
1. en 1176 b 28: t) Xeyopevri autcxpxetcx ae.pt xt|V 9eu>ptitlh^v
pa'Urrr' av e'trr nfev y^p *PbS ah Cflv 4voyxat'uv xat
o cfoobs xat 6 5'xaicS xat ot Xoixot 6£ovxai....o >b
aocpbS nat xa9' a-jxbv StSvaxat Gewpetv xat ocnp av
aoqpwxepoS uaXXov.
Cf. Fhilebus 67 A.
2. Cf. DL IX 35 ( VS 68 A 1, 35 in vol. II 81, 22 ff.)
Suidas ( VS 68 A 2). Fr. 299.
Luria, Deraocritea, pp. 15-16: Iter in terras orientales.
3. See : ch. on Pleasure. Cf. Kirk-Haven, Presocratics, 425.
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is one's duty to perform).1 It is not, to be sure, a definition, but
2
one can hardly deny that it is an attempted definition.
Justice is conjoined with lawfulness (174); but they do not
coincide; at the most they can overlap as performances, but hardly as
motives. Anyway justice is described as the crown of the behaviour of
a happy man or the absolute condition of happiness. In the light of
4
this, another aphorism (45) is intelligible, without a necessary
assumption of Socratic influence.
How highly justice is valued in D.'s ethics is evident from
the following facts:
(a) Justice is the most frequently mentioned virtue in the
5
surviving frr. of i).; some of them refer to justice alone.
1 -Cy»
fifxrj jiev to-viv *'fip5eiv xh ypt) iSvxct...
Plato fought a titanic fight throughout his life for a definition
of justice. Sees D. McGibbon, Plato's final deiinition of justice,
Proc. of Afr. CI. Assoc. 7 (1964) 19-24.
2. It seems probable that if Aristotle had known it he would refer to
it in his well-known passages from! de partt. anim. (a l)642a 24,
Met. 1078 b 19 ( VS 68 A 36).
3. fr. 174: , - ,
o u£v zvQvno-, eU soya £~icpF.pc5|iF,vo* SCna^a xat
4. fr. 45:
, ,
b A6tnP5v toC A6s.v.ovnevou xaxooaivioveffTepoS.
Cf. Gorgias 479 E: „ ,. e
del tbv &6 LHoOvta TOO 46 ihouiifvoij
AQXtwTspov eTvat.
5. frr. 256, 261, 217, 62, 45.
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(b) Justice alone impelled D. to make his best effort to
investigate its various features and describe them, since he found the
concept undefinable.
In fr. 261 e.g. he says: "it is a duty for every one (and it
is characteristic that here he uses a generalising and impersonal, but
morally imperative expression) to protect wronged people; his formula
is stated without any qualification. He goes on to say: "it is good
and just" (a kind of ostensive definition)1. No question arises
2
whether just is by nature or by convention! it is anyhow a moral
bligation.
What is the criterion of just anc unjust? no answer can be
traced in the material we possess. 3y applying the meaning of fr. 69 one
might say that D. was a believer in the principle: " veryone is able
to see what is just and he must perform it."
Doing justice is no doubt praiseworthy. Reward is cf moral
Importance: "the glory of justice is candour in judgement and
• #3
imperturbability "(athambia)" , which is a condition of euthumia or
4
euthumia itself.
1. fr. 261: 46 txoupevoicn TipiopEtv h<*t& Svvaptv xpf}'*'*"^
pev ykp Totouxov Sixatov xal dya <5v....
For further discussion see: E. A. Ilavelock, The liberal temper in
Greek Politics, London (I f;7) p. 133-4.
F'esiano, op. cit. pp. 27 ff.: 11 probleme Delia justizia.
Cf. Thucydides view in V 89 -9G (political aspect in wartime).
2. Archeiaus, vs 60 a l: 6tHociov etvai xat atcrxP^v
q?t5<J£ l V<5|1(a). l'or detailed discussion: Guthrie, History III,
55 (or Sophists 55 ff.).
3. fr. 215: 6CxtjS h06oS yvwjirjS BcfpcroS xat &BapB(r\,..
4. Cf. fr. 4 (ad fin.)
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The wording; of this ir. leaves no doubt that it is morally
justifiable ot hold people responsible and to praise them insofar as
they act freely and in accordance with (174) or in protection of
justice (2G1). As justice is praiseworthy, so injustice is blameworthy
and followed by inward or outward punishment, lack of euthumia (17--, ad
fin.) fear of harm (215 ad fin.);''' psychologically the expectation of
harm is more than the punishment itself. For this reason fr. <*5
seems to be intelligible within th framework of D.'s ethics, although
2
bocratic flavour is obvious in it and the possibility of Socratic
3
influence cannot be excluded.
3a
The most remarkable aphorism (preserved in both collections)
is that which sees justice not even in doing what is just but in willing
it; it emphasises will as (morally) the first factor in being just;
it, thus, postulates freedom of will.
1. ir. ..1. : • • .dSiKtrjS ot 6e~|ia: xep^ic:.
2. Cf. aorgias 475 C; *Pa fepQayUei xb dSixetv tou
&5 ixetcrQai hoc I (Uyoucn. uaWov oi dbixouvxeS r) ot dStxoupevot-
••• Cf. also: 472 K, 473 D-E, 475 D-E.
3. ee fr. 116.
3a C. Bailey, op. cit. 202: a remarkable anticipation of later thought,
fr. : by&Qtv ci) xb ji^ Abixetv &\\ql xb irnbb iOeXsiv.
(Stob. Ill 9.29).
5. rom this point of view it agrees with 3 other frr.: 63, 39, 248.
fr-
Philippson (op. cit. p. 417) remarks: ^stellt zum ersten und einigen
Male in der griechischen Philosophie den Jegensatz zwischen LegalitSt
unci oralitSt auf und nimmt den Kantischen Grundsatz voraus: Gut
ist allein der gute ille.
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Of the virtues briefly described above the last one surpasses
selfishness an renders a man a good member of a society, an agent of
what is desirable by the community. Later ages have added one more
principle of action: benevolence.1
The list of virtues could be continued; a greater number
of them are mentioned in the frr., but it is difficult to understand
nrecisely their meaning and importance (in a system survivi in
fragments) for two reasons:
a. rarity of their appeirance,
b. peculiarity of D.'s vocabulary while a standardised philosophical
terminology was coming into existence.
» 2




Homonoia and Liberty sometimes appear as virtues, sometimes
as goods, and anyway refer rather to political life; therefore,
they -.ill find a more intelligible explanation in the chapter on "political
Life".
1. rankena, thics, pp. 5-51.
2. bee frr. 3, 191, 40, 229, 240.
3. ee fr. 46, 92, 65, 225 (44), 192, 91, 63, 186.
. frr. 250, 255.
5. 2 :1, 226, 282.
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13. Oemocrltus's Freewill Problem
Perhaps the most important criticism directed against D.'s
ethics is this: how could he find a compromise between his mechanistic
universe and his ethical theory, since the soul of a moral agent consists
1 2
of atoms and therefore it should obey the laws of natural necessity.
It is a question of incompatibility and inconsistency. On this point
the most serious task for students who try to explain D.'s ethical
theory is reasonably focused.
To a degree this problem is but an exaggeration of the fact
3 »
that we judge this system through our conceptual structure and today s
philosophical preconceptions. For us the freewill problem (as freedom
1. Arist. de anima, 404 a 2-3: c <5<f au.pc tid^ (sc. j/r 0/U cc) n 3p
\. > -> /
K ou ■
404 a 6 ff.: Tou'iuv & i- ~cot 6 <f ^ o ti J~y ox y v •• • •
Cf. paragraph: Qody-^>;ind Relations.
2. Cic. de fato 17, 39 ( VS 63 A 66): "omnia ita fato fieri ut id
fatum vim necessitatis adferret: in qua sententia emocritus..•.
fuit." Cicerone chiama "fato" quella necessity meccanica
C esiano, op. cit. 105).
Aristotle, de gener. animal. 789 b 2 ( VS 68 A 66): &cvcl\'u.
? ' r
_ /
Its xvtxAcyv o is ytpylact y .
Cf. VS67B2: CvStv Xjoy^ot v ft^
» "W \ L S "> /
fK A o^oo XL K qu. v 7T oivoc^KyS.
Cf. VS 68 A 68. See ch. 1 of this research.
3. H. Weiss, Democritus' Theory of Cognition, Classical quarterly
32 (1938) 47-56.
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versus predestination and freedom versus determination) has a long
fifth century BC this problem was non-existent; "it came into being
since fortune and dike were ever-present powers to bring people
4
who strayed into the way prescribed for them.
1. P. Huby, The first discovery of the freewill problem, Philosophy,
42 (1967) 353-362.
2. Huby, p. 353.
3. Cf. the whole story of Oedipus. Or Thucydides* remark (I. 22.4):
0 60 1 St CM5"0/C ... I< CLA. "C V fj- i, \/~CuuV TTo X £ OCX/-
and celebrated history But in the late
2
in the course of the fourth century C.
3
A kind of determinism is apparent in fifth century thought ,
which introduces the notion of probability into history for
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Thinkers like Gorgias and Socrates (the former by rhetorical
drills*, the latter by the paradoxical equation of virtue and
2\
knowledge ,;led to deterministic conclusions^ or they were so misunder¬
stood by their contemporaries or later thinkers.
3
Plato's system left room for freedom of will. But even
Aristotle, who wrote so much on the particular problem of the
•i «,
voluntariness was unaware of the problem of free will, although he
1. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 325: "Gorgias had not stated
such a conclusion, though his defence of Helen entails it; and
there is no reason to suppose that he would have found it
palatable. See: US 82 D 11. 7 (ad finem), B 11. 15.
2. For discussion of this problem, references and literature, see:
Guthrie, History III, 450 or Socrates, 130 ff.
3. Adkins, op. cit., pp. 302-3:... in principle, every man is capable
of directing his life accordin; to the dictates of reason....
observation leads Plato to believe that man who is capable....is
very rare indeed....
4. P. Huby, op. cit., pp. 354 ff.
Adkins, op. cit., 327-8.
» G
criticised the logical consequences of 'ocrates paradox.s
See Guthrie, Socrates, 132.
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Paradoxically enough the first thinker to fight on behalf
of human responsibility* which presupposes (postulates) freedom of
will and denies any interference either by chance or by the gods in
uman affairs, was the''materialist" of Abdera.2
Whether he was aware of the problem of freewill in its modern
dimensions, and, if so, how he could reconcile an ethical theory and
an autonomous will with a mechanistic universe; these are two questions
for which no straight answer can be supplied from the evidence we
possess. but we have material enough from which to discover or
through which to penetrate to D.'s t ought on the problem of moral
autonomy.
In the fragments we can trace these elements which (according
to later studies) either accompany free will or presuppose it. Namely:
a. Emphasis on intention and deliberation is explicit ( frr. 62,
3
68, 89, 96, 173, 277, 66). dut how can one Intend and deliberate
about what to do and how to act, unless one believes that it is in
one's power to do it?
1.^'.kins op. cit. p. 2 (he nowhere refers to • e •)•
See: Ch. 1 of this research.
2. See frr. 119, 197.
3. fr. 66: upoBoiAEueaBai npetaoov -rrpb tuv irpcteecov t)
HETPVOE~v.
fr.36: oi!>x o QXcn^v -repbs t^v &n.oiPr)V^ &XX'
o e5 6pav Ttpo-gpwiievoS.
13,
b» >" yi'M.' 1-"ms of r« or r vt&w in s r, »iS <*nd ©hptou*?ly -•*>«« nh Irt ; p.
17«i (»«»»'! fetlf) pw J. ; ®i tit# Question! b'.n» tu« 9object wo*. ioocing
remorse win have soch & fMlitg without bvlievtng thst it wa- up to him
to have ioae wb. t he »«•» afterw rds tts wrong,
e, l» amy «.•?.»«• out two &ru pressor ibes-* and . Uity is
bsai®nd©sjt| twit 1.1 './'jI■ i ^>1 ■ i!$oor*i&l$lent to sagsJloy th©& i&ta'tti uonet'pts
.r-JUvsa ,) re*:.
. -'i -e- tii .-t oy<l - eat ww ; *-«••« <• s«i.
d, ?< orftl ior a ticn t frrou&h nereuseltw is absolutely inoongMttlhle
"it?j Mi-- ' t»c* *,» • re-tola# in tf; - oa © e**»n the • ■>?* ir- ■<«*>•' by
• 1- worth .-ortrMew1t%i "but. h* mo has rec ;«i - ;iy oy
•r.'-u.; ,i ir« is unlli-.=!-lj to -sin#..," »•« . t' ;• • ereuaalor «< vwal
agent It not con it tone- . but aiqiecte^ to becr-M «r- \ec fr« 1,,. riy
r>rob*-. UH>'-8 f»r njr fut r ■ or -kH cb-', not re<yc<;r.a .■ ikti.
I, -;mr- ^fu-' '•'.•••? n Jt. • rr, 3$, „1, 1-~;1, , 131, 7, . -5, ,
174, S41,
«• *»•.- p»r8.',;,.r*'shi oral sutMeny, i svi- u-.l ro»pijr-i.i--ility *r the
four -viion os . .ctur, rr, ij, 1V-. an- lol would not w m it-Hig—
itt« «r<i«sg author «*# a believer in tee principle as moral
atitanc*...j •
C , ohmuec •* rf ie «. Irs st It?. :es euiufc^aie, • • •. iin
p» IV: .-'.okrlte c.tblk eetat eiso ein oohee fe-aas ioi sitfcli >. n
'•• -r.-nt ortun^obowmaer r'slr v u»«
-*>")/ i a '
. * i*l"« 1 X 1 ^ ji tv ol p 'Cfc./ito"C>-75 p o / i/>7 p < -
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e. The whole corpus of th fragments suggests and leaves room for
freedom of will and thought. Fr. 83 is the only one which might imply
a kind of conditioning if accepted in the Socratic sense. But it has
been interpreted in the previous paragraph as not having such an
implication.
Freewill is not, as it were, a gift of nature but an
achievement of life. It is the prize of victory won by reason and
morality;1
a. over nature (fr. 118),
b. over passions, since man is not an angel
2
by birth, but has in himself the capacity to restrain his desires and
passions, and triumph in the field of self-ilberation (31, 159, 187).
3
The way to freedom" is described as difficult but worth the effort and
4
praiseworthy.
1. Schumacher, op.cit.,16s Bei D. entscheidet das Individuum allein \lber
den sittlichen Wert einer Handlung nach dem in ihrn liegenrien
sittlichen pflichtgefuhl.
1 \ 1 I f 9 t /
2. fr. 31s tV)X.pL|CV| p-tv <S LV WCV Vo£ouc, 0<KLIXOU-J
Ip V TIcl^ZoV cv-Cf oucp £6tOK_ .
Cf. frr. 149, 159, 187.
3. Mesiano (La morale raaterialistica di Democrito) despite the title of
his book doesn't acknowledge determinism in D.'s Ethics; and he
first devoted a separate chapter (pp. 104 ff.) to explaining D.'s
ethical theory in terms of freedom of will. Cf. book review by K.
Btichner, in Erasmus, 8 (1955) pp. 615-6.
216a
Notes to 216 ctd.
4. It should be nottd that we do not refer to the proper term of
Liberty A t V u ec fr. 251) because it is used with a
political meaning as is the case also in all presocratic philo¬
sophy up to Kritias and Anonyraus Iamblichi.
For the same reason we don't comment here on fr. 248 which
is a reconciliation between freedom of individuals and State
law which imposes restrictions. D. does'nt share the attitude
of many people who "im Gesetz nur die Fesseln sehen" (Max
Pohlenz, Griechische Freiheit, Heidelberg (1965) p. 75).
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If freedom means: (1) independence of thought, (2) autonomy
of will, and (3) absence or limitation of external constraints which
limit one's deliberate activity, then freedom is the nrevailing
characteristic of the moral agent emerging from D.'s fragments, because:
(1) his irre^tible effort to explore nature's secrets speaks for
itself through fragments .118, 216, 299 ;
(2) moral autonomy is clearly declared (264, 2^4, 84, 181),
(3) the virtues (described in^previous paragraph), particularly
autarkeia, permit a measure of self-control and therefore a certain
emancipation from external influences.
From all previous explanation of D.'s ethical thought this
conclusion is clear: he believed that man has the capacity to win
freedom of will and action. But the crucial question returns: Did
he notice (as mo era scholars have)the incompatibility between his
ethics and physics? and,if so, did he find a reasonable compromise?
P. Huby"1" following the traditional view that Epicurus
2 ««
introduced the swerve of the atoms•••• (in order) to allow room
for freedom of action by men, whose minds were composed of atoms and
therefore subject to the same laws as everything else" (p.358), accepts
that D. was unaware of the problem of freewill; she goes on to
1. Op. cit. 358 ff.
2. Diog. of Oinoanda (fr. 33c 2 VS 68 A 50) (Q-r-< IIp. 77 ■ Ci,i Mo f , p.
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conclude (p. 368) that: "it is possible for men like Plato and Aristotle
to hold many educational and psych logical beliefs in common with us
without being aware of any freewill problem because they had no notion
of thoroughgoing psychological determinism."
1 "U.e-
F. Mesiano says that D. believed in the possiblility of /1soul
to escflpfc the limits of necessity (although he could not demonstrate how
it was possible) by defe ting the passions (p. 110) since the soul is
acknowledged to have superiority over the body (p. 113).
From these views it is concluded that 0. either was not
aware of the problem under discussion or could not find a solution of
it. He had, however, specific cause to have noticed t e incompatibility
between two parts of his system, since he was the first thinker to have
been busy with both a mechanistic theory of physics and an autonomous
theory of ethics. It is reasonable to suggest that he was aware of the
2
problem which he put. What was his answer - a belief (as I.esiano
described it) or a theory?
1. op. cit. p. 11<: Deraocrito ha certamente sentito, anche se no ha
potuto dimostrarlo, che, a quella necissitd, l'anima poteve sfuggi^e
soltanto col liberarsi. dalle passioni e dagli istinti.. .mediante
la potenza della ragione el* esercizio della volontS. Obviously
Jfeslano refers to frr. 31, 149, 242 (?)•
2. otherwise his fight against fortune (frr. 119, 197), for which we have
also indirect testimony from the most reliable source (Arist. phys. B 4
195 b 36, On 196 b 14 Simpl. p. 330, 14)t ( VS 68 A 68) would
be unintelligible.
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His belief is transparent throughout the fragments. His
theory, if convincing, might be gathered from pieces of his thought





c. therefore the soul is more mobile than any other atomic
structure.3
Therefore these atoms are privileged atoms. And, the
question reasonably arises; why this distinction? id D. reco -nise
some independence of these atoms? a kind of. self-determination
within the limits of human embodied existence?
T e testimony is not enough to defend the thesis that in D.'s
view the soul was able to escapfe from necessity to freedom, because of
its different atomic composition, but it is not unreasonable to suppose
that 0. made this distinction (of soul atoms) in order to justify
something. Perhaps in his theory these privileged atoms provided a
solution of the problem which we see as "incompatibility".
1. Arist. de anima, e04 a 2-3
2. Ibid. 404 a 6 ff. Cf. 406 b 16-22, 409 b 1.
3. Ibid. 40^ b 7J Ktv^-fi-K'-vToi-tov u 0\J tp v • •.
Cf. 404 a 1-10, 405 a 7-13.
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The fact is that even if this hy othesis is incorrect, even
if L). was unaware of the incompatibility described above,, in his
ethical theory there are some elements constituting ways for the soul to
escape from necessity to freedom.
a. Victory over passions by Sophia. Having asserted the
superiority of the soul over the body and having ascribed absolute
responsibility to the soul (fr. 159), D. was able to confirm that the
soul could "cure" the passions through sophia1 and lead to a gradual
self-improvement (187). It is characteristic that he included this
form of victory in his definition of courage (fr. 214) for the first
time in the history of this concept.
b. Victory over nature by discovering the causes of events. Fr. 118
speaks for itself; so any comment is unnecessary here.
c. Victory over prejudices (e.g. belief in fortune or divine
intervention and vain hopes) and simultaneous emphasis on human
2
capacities (119, 197, 292).""
How does knowledge free men? Through knowing men understand
that what; they fear, take pleasure in, or find pain in, is in many
cases the result of accidental association or of their own miscalculation.
1. See paragraph: Tree of Virtues: Sophia. Compare frr. 149, 31.
2. fr. 119: a. 71 ^ £v C^uvtToS oJu J~i f> K eoj
K o- C i $ u u tc .
fr. 58( -Slot. IV -Hi-It): clv'A* ~ I p X c«,y
t<f>LKZ ct/} <*aC Suva^rtcL.
fr. 292: a. i> 01 Oi f U V t X.co\J OCX. i 3ni d £.5 .
221
To know this is to break the association and acquire the possibility
of creating desirable conditions or avoiding undesirable consequences.
Ken recognise then that pleasure and pain arise mainly from their own
power and ability. So they don't blame either conditions or other
people; causes for envy, hate, guilt therefore vanish.
The wise man by self-knowledge (fr. 149, 31) by understanding
of the actual conditions of nature and life recognises that even external
causes are necessary limits (285) to human capacity and does not treat
them as hindrances. So he is not frustrated. At the same time
he understands better other people's conduct and directs bett r his own.1
The intellectual contentment of the nan who has freed
himself through knowledge of nature and of himself as a part of nature
is a condition of happiness. At this level, knowledge, freedom and
happiness are combined,
d. The discovery of duty, finally, leads from the kingdom of
necessity to that of freedom, we had remarked in the paragraph "On Duty"
2
with a particular reference to frr. 41, 181,
1, Perhaps this was Socrates's view on knowledge as tutor of virtue
(knowing for him included both cognition and volition in our terms),
2, If these instructions (frr, 264, 92, 207, 227", 261) become a
"credo",... then they promote the individual from the level of
necessity to that of personal decision (oughtness), i.e. from
necessity to autonomy.
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The general impression from D.'s ethical sayings is that he
was a believer in man's capacity to acquire a partial freedom within the
limits of natural necessity; his view can be summarised in what is
nowadays called "soft eterminism.""1"
1. ilichard Taylor, Metaphysics, -nglewood Cliffs, N.J. (1963) p.43:
The 3 claims of soft determinism are (1)... (2)... (3) that, in the
absence of such obstacles and con traints, the causes of voluntary
behaviour are... within the agent himself; namely, his own acts
of will or volitions, choices, decisions, desires, and so on.
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14. What is the Criterion ?
To find a standard whose presence or absence may be taken as
a mark of the presence or absence of what is regarded as morally good,
is a permanent and fundamental question in moral philosophy;1 we can
trace its appearance in Greek Philosophy, where a close relation between
2
morality and happiness is also evident.
3
Modern scholars* who have studied D.'s ethical theory and
tried to interpret it have reasonably paid attention to statements in
which a kind of "criterion" appears. Pioneering in this direction
A ^
was Natorp s work.
fcj
1. G.E. Moore, Principia dthica, Cambridge1"^ 1968)[ 1903 pp.91-95,137-8.
9
W. Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, London (1971),pp.106-7, 110.
A. Maclntyre, A short history of Ethics, London (1971), p.147.
2. See paragraph "On Happiness".
Cf. Vernon J. Bourke, History of Ethics, I (1970, New York) pp.15 ff.,
33 ff. (Early Greek Eudaimonlsm, Teleological Eudaimonism).
3. P. Natorp, Die Ethika des D., 88 ff.
A. Dyroff, Oeiupkritstudien, Mtinchen (1899) pp. 133 ff.
J. Ferber, Leitschrift f. Phil. 132/3 (1908) p.92.
H. Langerbeck, op. cit., p.56.
C.C.V/. Taylor, Pleasure, Knowledge...in D., Phronesis 12 (1967)
did 17 26—7
F. Mesiano, op. cit., p.80. * '
D. McGibbon, Pleasure as the "criterion" in □., Phronesis 5 (1960)
pp.75-77.
4. P. Natorp, op.cit., ch.3. It is characteristic that in the list of
D.'s fragments (pp.7ff.) the first places are given to those frr.
in which Natorp himself and later scholars tried to find D.'s
criterion.
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This inquiry will be directed to the following tripartite
question} are there, even in nucleus form, some criteria to justify
and explain moral, social and political activity in D.'s fragments?
A> The crucial aphorism (from D.'s ethical writings) is preserved by
Clement of Alexandria (VS 68 B 4) and Stobaeus (VS 68 B 188). In
interpreting it scholars have found difficulty because of the fact that
all terms included in this formula are ambiguous,* some of them are
2
used once in the whole corpus of the surviving fragments, one only is
met in other fragments (and perhaps it will be the key).
A sample only of the dispute on the meaning of the crucial
statement (4, 188: intellectual pleasure or lack of it is the criterion
3
of what is beneficial or not) is given by the followir list of




Grenze (DK VS 68 B 4, G8 B 188)
Grenz -bestimmung (Philinpson, op. cit. p.386)
Scheidelinie (Langerbeck, 64)
Landmark and by derivation measure (Vlastos, 538)
4
criterio, indizio (k'esiano, 80 f.)
1. C'0pos Cvp.<f op lW KouI 6 V q of Tfc(0Yi.j Kotl <a.T T7m^ (fr.188)
C/ / o /
2. Opo °< G v o p ljv (frr. 4, 188, which are
identical) t Lp w 1l ^ (174) ot r £p tj l^ (188)
3. See note 1. above.
4. Mesiano, op. cit., 80: Io interpreto e traduco il termine
nel senso del indizio o di criterio e credo.
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Grenzmarke (K. BUchner, Erasmus, 8 (1955), G15)
mark (Guthrie, History, II 459).
It should be remembered that although the problem of criterion
in various fields of thought was apparent in 5th century 3C*, this term
2 3
as such was not used until Plato's days.
1. Euripides, Here. Furens, 655-72 \
Hippol., 925 ff.
In both cases an external sign is sought to indicate the
character of a good person.
^ / / /
Protagoras (VS SOB l)i fcez.f> ov olv$f>«,-rioS. .
Thucydides, I, 22-23.
RE Suppl. 12 (1970) col. 1238: Was ist historische ahrheit?
Cf. Herodotus VIII 110 ■ac 6 avo sj . Thucydides I 20
'\QL.@ot-60L.vi(> S J . r,T5d I. 20—21 ( x t p t o *) .
2. .hen this term is attributed to the resocratics it seems to be
rather an interpolation of later sources. .See e.g.
(a) Heracl• A 16 (VS I 148.31) ( Sext. VII.134):
■tbv xotvbv \5yov xpi-enptov duocpatvetat.
(b) Parmenides A 1 (VS I. 218. 9) ( DL IX.22):
xpix-nptov 5b tbv X<5yov etne.
(c) Parmenides B 1 (VS I. 227.38) ( Sext. VII. 3):
h. toO ijbv 6oF,acn;o0 X<5yot> uaxeyvw.. .xbv 5'
biticJT'nij.ovtxbv.. .uu^Qeto xpifnptov.
(d) Pythagor. D. 4 (VS I. 469.32) ( Stob. IV. 25. 45 H):
-cobs 5b TtpeoPuTai etfOuinicrecfL nat xptT-npiotS xat
cru|if3ouXCaiS 5eiv... .oneXd|ipavov....
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Notes to p. 225 ctd.
3 « Theaot« 178 B 2 CC utcy V ~c o Kp l ~c f t ov Lv c cl v Vuj ^
Earlier In ,ep. 582 A: i Xcl aw zli -c0i-c.^v {bg. .
6 £-cc->i
^ (ff o w y £ LcoJ> ^ si o jf e-0J ^ i. si ~CLov 1^- p t Zy f> i o V j
Protagoras' famous formula (VS 80 B 1) ascribed to every man's
opinion the criterion of truth; but this solution licenses considerable
subjectivism, although it flatters humanism. Plato tried to locate
the correct criterion in the judgement of the agathos Statesman, 296dff»);
but this postulates a prior definition of agathos. Finally he accepted
C.
God as the only reliable reference for human affairs (Laws* 716 C 4s °
TTctl/twv X/>h/d-«7wv olw £(.7 ft or. sic 6 Z«, ■ - •
Aristotle follows his teacher's first view chart in only
agathos into "p ronimos" (Protr. fr. 5a W ( B 39 Dtiring) }: d'rt &e
/ \ ■>[ / <-/ 7 , s / r — ' 0 -
X (.4 v^" (-C t v K«.VOJV W) ~CLi opo$ Gt Kf (.6 i zxtf oS fwV ocj/ai/utV
y aC <ff ° v L {*- a S> j
(dee: Kullmartn, op. cit., pp. 134-135). £yen oday this criterion
is invoked t.t law.
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Therefore it seems that the only hopeful way to penetrate
Da's thought and decipher his criterion1 is to begin questioning his
terminology in his fragments and secondarily in other contemporaries
or later#**
1# Epicurus (DL X# 27, in the list of works of Sp# records):
~TT t p l K^plTiptoU ry kC oc v uj \S ■
2# The authenticity of the frr# 4, 188 was denied by some scholars
(Dyroff, Lane; details in Philippson, 385) on the ground that
v op o S are post-Aristotlian terms#
Disregarding the fact that here evidence from two sources is
strong (Stobaeus, Clement of Alexandria, who is particularly
emphatic in introducing D.'s aphorism; see VS 8 B 4) we can
trace frequent use of these words from the archaic period to
Aristotle#
(a) Hesiod, Works and Days, 300: 6~Jp.(fopoS ,
*7 /
593: OU
(b) Sophocles, 0. Kol. 464, 592: € o y Cp o p at , oo Ju^^0^ov'
(c) Thuc. 111.47: TTo^\/]^j ov .
/ /
(d) Hippocrates, On Anc. Medic# 3.35: ip^o&cc ~C-po<py
-> / ,
On Breaths, 6: a f .
(e) Antiphon (VS 87 B 44 A col#4 vers.1-8): J u tp WZot
(f) Plato, Statesman, 296 E: 6 a op ac.
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We heve seen (fr# 69)^" D.'s assertion that good and true are
the same for all men. His intention fo find an objective criterion
can be regarded as certain. He seems to have made many attempts to
formulate such a criterion; having arrived at a formula (4, 1*38) he
repeated it with emphasis (which impressed Clement of Alexandria as is
seen in hi3 words introducing fr. 4). The reason is obvious: the
question is fundamental and D. believed he had found at last the basis
2
he had failed to include in frr. 69, 74. An echo of these two formulas
1. fr. 69: ol v dp ^ 7T clS ~V cl € L X, vo V X^o V o<? jj cl $ O v »<- cuJL Pi vi "9 £ S
cr\ r I ~> ( ' n 71 * /
2. fr. 74: yj a v ^ d t x/ airiodl x t <r ^ y <f t pp •
A passage from Sextus (V8 68 A 111) attributes to 0. the
following 3 criteria: a. for the apprehension of unseen....
b. for the investigation.... c. for what one may choose or avoid
the criterion is one's feelin s.... The third one is obviously
borne out by fr. 188 (see: Guthrie, Hist., II. 459; Langcrbeck,
56). It seems to be the fons of Epicurus' criteria. Cf. Epicurus'
fr • 260 (Us. p. 190) and Epist. ad fvienoiceum, 129 (Us. 63,
Arrighetti, 113).
Cf. also Arist. EN 1157 b 16^17:
jixXiaxa y&p i) <pt5cycS <pa£vexat
xb |i£v Xutmnbv etfyEiVf IvCcoQai 5b xo0 t)5£oS.
In connection with frr. 69, 74 cf. Diog. of Oinoanda, (Rhein.
Kus. XLVII, 431) ( QriUi 31 , C kHU* 3_) ; . « -to XT] 9^"^*
crutup^pov. • • •Hal evI nal nafot xb aux<5 bcrtiv.
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seems to be present in a passage from D. of Oinoanda (quoted in the
previous footnote). Perhaps they were two steps in D.'s attempt to find
a criterion. Fr. 188 seems to be the third and very likely the final
step in that effort. Let us see them together and try to find (if
at all) a guiding idea in them.
89: Good and true are the same for all men; but pleasant differs
for different men.
(general assertion but vague)•
74: Accept nothing of pleasant thin ,sg unless it is beneficial
(agrees with your nature).
(acceptability restricted to what is beneficial or agreeable).
188: Criterion of what is beneficial or not (agrees with human
nature or not) is the enjoyment or lack of enjoyment that we feel.1
The first question raised by scholars is that(the compatibility
of the two last fragments (for tnis part of the discussion I have to use
the translation used by other scholars).
(obviously it contains an elucidation of the meaning of
"beneficiality" ar agreeableness).
fr. 74: y & u 1 6 i V Ct TT^ JYx I s
fr. 188 (J %): o /0 oj € u o^ uy v t
\ ■) f
i i> l< ou-c <* r fc jO TT l .
K ocx d 6"u <f ° fi ^ V/
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B 4 (188) implies: ".Some pleasures are not suitable. But if
pleasure is the criterion of suitability how can something be both
a pleasure and not suitable?"1 This difficulty is removed (McGibbon
believes, p.76) by interpreting pleasure (B4, 183) as: "the state
someone is said to be in when he enga es in a pleasurable activity"(p.75).
But this illumination is only a circular definition. McGibbon ciid not
notice that an apparent incompatibility comes from an incorrect and
unreliable translation.2
Vlastos in order to avoid the "vicious circle", as he calls
•t <# /* \
it, suggests that pleasure be regarded only as a sign^opoi j 0f
suitable action, "the appearance only of what agrees with us". The
source of difficulty and misinterpretation is the same: inac urate
translation of the fragments involved.
1. 0. McGibbon, Pleasure as the "criterion" in D. Phronesis,
5 (I960), pp. 75t77.
2. fr. 4 (188): Pleasure and the absence of pleasure is the landmark
of what is suitable and of what is not.
fr. 74: accept no pleasure, unless it is suitable.
3. Vlastos, op. cit. I. 58a ff. McGibbon, 75, footn.2.
4. Ibid. p. 589: "The parallel in the theory of knowledge is:
appearances are the sign of things unseen."
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This "prima facie" contradiction is to be resolved by regarding
each of these fragments as dealing with a different aspect of pleasure.1
Fr. 74 is about a particular action or experience...something
may obviously be pleasant in itself and yet tend to make one's life as
a hole unpleasantj
fr. Ia8 is concerned with pleasantness or unpleasantness...of
one's life considered as a whole (pp. 17-18).
Taylor sees the idea of overall enjoyment in fr. Is8. This
interpretation suggests an interesting solution but it is only a
hypothesis and again fails to give an account of t.he actual terminology.
Taylor concludes (p. 37): "the good for a man is identical with
pleasure in the sense of the enjoyment of life." At last we have a
2
distinction between the two words used for pleasure by D.
In our paragraph "on Pleasure" we had concluded: • t f> fu
(188) can be seen to signify the highest level of pleasant life
introducing man into the realm, of happiness. One can actually trace
close connections between these two concepts."0
Let us look again at the disputed meaning of the two aphorisms:
1. C.C.W. Taylor, leasure, Knowledge, and Sensation in D. pnronesis
12 (1967) pp. 6-27.
2. (74) r epyjLi (188).
3. Kullmann, op. cit. 139: Die Tatsache dass die Terpsis vor alien
in den geistigen unci sittlichen Bereich weist (146, 174, 194, 200,
201, 211, 232 , 233) stellt sie eine "tufe rnit der^vwjU.^ ^y)(T''rL
im Bereich der Erkenntniss.
a. Not all pleasant things are profitable (for human nature) or
beneficial; therefore, not all of them are acceptable. But this item
of advice remains vague. Many pleasant things seem profitable and
attractive at first sight; where has one to stop? D. himself was
not satisfied with his formula (fr. 74). He sought a more fundamental
criterion. Such a criterion should be derived from his theory of
happiness. If happiness (euthumia) is such and such a state of the
soul, then the criterion should provide such and such conditions for
the soul. So a second formula came as an improvement on fr. 74.
b. Now, he says (188, 4), among pleasant, things those which lead to
terpsis (intellectual pleasure) or do not push terpsis out fo the soul
are beneficial. The criterion for what is beneficial is its
contribution to intellectual pleasure or its non-opposition to it. Such
a formula seeins to be the bridge between profitability and intellectual
pleasantness.
Other details in D.'s fragments about the objectivity
(applicability) of his criterion cannot be traced. A number of other
statements^" include the nucleus of a criterion, but they rather describe
conditions of hap iness or they simply express an intellectual orientation.
1. frr. 37, 207, 189, 40, 170, 171, 61. See: J. Ferber, Uber die Wissen-
schaftliche Bedeutung der Ethik Demokrits, Zeitschr. ftir
Philosophie, 132/3 (1908) 82-114.
In p. 92 (commenting on fr. 207) he writes: "Line Art Kriterium".
But: "v.'as versteht nun D. unter dem Kalon? Die "Hedone"....
muss also eine geistige Lust, das "Kalon" etwas Innerliches sein."
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So far what we have described as "the criterion" refers to one's
own conduct and is expected to influence immediately and mainly one's
own happiness and only secondarily one's conduct towards others (it can
be seen particularly in fr. 61).1 From this point of view alone
one's criterion of action can affect the well-being of others.
B) A different criterion of what is good in one's activity from the
2 ,
point of view of others i found in fr. 264. D. s claim that one
must bear in mind what others would say about one's actions leads
reasonably to the conclusion that one's ©Fitarion of action will be
orientated to what is profitable to others.
4) A clearer criterion of one's social-political activity is explicitly
declared in fr. 252: "one must give the highest importance to
affairs of the state, that, it may be well run; one must not pursue quarrels
contrary to right, nor acquire a power contrary to the common good.
The well-run State is the greatest protection, and contains all in itself;
when this is safe, all is safe; when this is destroyed, all is
,(3
destroyed.
r <./?!•>/ / v c
1. fr. 61: o c <£ i v o npo7ro$ roj too cotffc Koq o
J £u writ COZKCOU. (stob. Ill 37.25) .
2. fr. 264: • . . /-<• 7 rc 6^fjr <*J £ 6" ou. Kotg £I
r \ c. / o
^ V, 0 tL$ tL d j e 7 °' Tt J, civ T/f> ^ 7Tc L ■
This fr. seems not to be placed correctly among the political views
of d. li would be better classified (with 244 and 34) after fr. 181 .
3' nax& xt)v Tt(5\tv xpewv twv Xotirwv u£yipxa riyefaOat, oh«S
aFsxai eS, \xr\xe tpiXovsiHeovxa napti xb ^TUEtHbS tn^xe taybv Eauxcp
TtepLxi0E|ievov xtocoSc xb xpticrxbv xb xoO ^uvoO. xtc5\li y&p sb dyon.£vr)
M.eyt^xri opQwcrfs £crxi» Hat tv xouxcp iravxa evi, Hal xobxou




Here the criterion emerges clear; and is also given its justification.1
If one compares these last two frr, to those referring to
justice (256, 261, 174 ad finem) one will reasonably infer that d.'s
criterion for one's activity towards one's social and political
companions can be summarised as: "do what is worthy of praise from
others either as members of a society or citizens of a state (have this
criterion: what is proper and just from the viewpoint of others).
His first criterion is postulated from his orientation towards
happiness,
2
His second and third are stated as duties.
The first criterion is eudaimonistic (intellectual
eudaemonism) and egoi. tic; the second and third are altruistic. They
ex. ctlv ■
are not incompatible, since they cover different fields of .
No question of conflict between these criteria is raised in
the material we nossess; but from the insistence with which U.
describes justice as a duty (2bl) and as a necessary condition of
happiness (174) one must argue that the first criterion is subordinate
to the second.
1. It is not strange that D.'s argument here is similar to that of
Tnucydides in II.6u.2-3. The latter states (or records) the
ideal of a great statesman, when the city-state was declin in;
the former shares this ideal. Some kind of acquaintance between thern
cannot be denied.
ViS
Cf. Anon. Iamblichi, 7. p. 1G1, II. 403, 15-19).
Cf. Sophocles, Antigone, 189-190.
233a.
Note 1. to 233 ctd.
C lj
(Creon is speaking): 1 ^fjcu ^ ^
L'S' ffciv (ic. ^ TTo^ti)(/?^' TotutM5 fiVc*j * tea* ^c. n -ifjisjl**-'
"77" // t 0 »/ T L-S Of #«f J Touj 0 Ll5 TTo/O U^Zl. £ V OL .
2. See paragraph On Duty, where these fragments (174, 261, 252)
are discussed.
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15. Moral autonomy, individual responsibility and the foundation
of character.
In this paragraph no new material is to be presented; some
aphorisms analysed in previous pages (on Duty, on Virtue, on Freewill)
will be looked at from another aspect and put together so that from
these "membra disjecta'* we find the material to reconstruct an agent, a
moral agent as his figure emerges from the ruins of D.'s ethical theory.
If moral autonomy is defined as subjection of the will to
its own law (fr. 264) which presupposes a degree of self-oeterrnination
and independence of external restraints, then autonomy is clearly traced
and asserted in the fragments we have already studied (on Freewill).*
This autonomy, to be sure, is not unlimited; it is restricted
within the limits of our natural existence, which in turn prescribes
the framework of our freedom. Knowledge of natural capacity or
incapacity frees from unprofitable expectations and protects from
frustration (cf. fr. 285).
2
If responsibility presupposes voluntary action and voluntary
1. P. Natorp, op. clt., p. 110: ,,,so klar Ausdruck der "Autonomie"
des Sittlichen...
Schmid-Stahlin, op. cit., p. 312: In keiner anderen Fthik ist
die menschliche...Autonomie so stark betont wie in der demokritischen
(cf. frr. 84, 244, 171).
2. Schumacher, op.cit., p.17: Demokrits Ethik setzt also ein hohes
Mass von Sittlichen yerantwortungs+-bewusstsein voraus.
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action means: (1) the cause of an action is internal to the agent and
(2) the action is not the result of ignorance (as Aristotle later
1 2
analysed it)^ then a strong feeling of responsibility emerges from the
fragments under study. Such responsibility postulates, of course,
moral autonomy.
Both these assertions (which actually are two sides of the same
coin) are compatible with a "soft determinism", a doctrine which might
be ascribed to D. on the ground of the evidence we possess of his
system (Ethics, Physics).
4
If will designates a sequence of mental acts eventuating in
decision or choice, and if an act of will is analysable into:
5
(1) envisaging of alternative courses, (2) deliberation' with reference
t c t
1. Aristotle, EN 1110a ff., particularly, 1111a 23-24: to Uoofuv
r / r T <- 0 * 1 ' - * f/ x
SOJ Htv OfcV tLVOO. oo >j ^ vj CLO0T.L
q"> <y 9 C. C- n T
K OCT? £ KOtftOc £ V 0 Li yj 71 j) Oct L<, .
See: Frankena, op. cit., p. 56.
2. Frr. 43, 174 (ad fin.), 181 would not be intelligible unless their
author was a believer in the (principle) doctrine of moral autonomy
and its consequence: responsibility.
3. Frankena, op. cit.f 61: "a determinist may allow that we are normally
free to do as we choose and act in accordance with our own beliefs,
desires, character."
4. See frr.: 62 (Stob. Ill 9.29), 68, 89, 96, 173 (ad fin.), 248.
5. Fr. 66: Kp£.LCToy rtp o&o o ^ e h p* Xiov 7T|0aJtwv v}
^ £t«/cUv/, Cf» frr. 43, 174 (ad fin.).
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to the dominant ideals of the moral agent, (3) decision or choice*
consisting of giving assent to one of the alternatives and the
rejection of the rest, then will is the dominant feature (or at least
2 3
a companion factor, knowledge being the other) of D.'s moral agent"
to whom freedom ox will is explicitly attributed (as was shown in a
previous paragraph)•
The portrait of this moral agent might be presented as follows:
1. He is gifted by his nature with capacity which can be advanced
by experience (fr. 172), exercise (242), instructions and persuasion
(lol, 248), generally by a well-designed education (179, 33).
2. Through the labour of learning (including allforms of education,
fr. 179) an important psychological quality is expected to waken (or
to come into existence), which in due course will affect the agent's
1. Fr. 96: -XCLp L6XL S ooX ° fytTt LOV TTfvS Vyv OlJa. ol&JjV j
d\ _ /
llVC o Co 0/C OL.M Vfoyfl/itVoS.
Cf. in frr. 18} and 248 the conception of persuasion which leads
to a status of freely and continuously "making decisions".
2. 3ee paragraph on "the caning of fr. 83".
3. I. Lana, i/etica di uetnocrito, Riv. di filosofia, 42 (1951),
p. 27: Deroocrito non ignora quale importante fattore sia la
volontS dell' uomo....
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virtuous behaviour; it is the so-called aidos (self-respect)* which
makes the moral agent able to judge his intentions, deliberations,
decisions as if other people were present (244, 264, 84).
3. This self-respect leads to understanding of the moral agent's
** ii 2
"duty" towards himself and others.
4. "Duty" is expressed in a number of virtues which concern and
affect both the agent (happiness) and others (justice). Fulfilling
"duty" and actuulising a virtuous life lead to nersonal happiness
and good relations with others. This last consequence makes possible
social and political life (on which see next chapter).
5. This moral agent personifies an ethic of intention (62, 68, 89,
96, 173) but also he is looking for the consequences of his actions (55,
71, 235, 190, 252, 248, 255, 265, 272).
6. He is expected to e sincere in his intentions and relations
3
(91, 174, 181, 264); his motives* correspond to both the pursuit of
4
happiness (egoism) and the "duty" to be just (altruism). Such motives
are combined harmoniously (174); our "moral agent" is "unus homo qui
plures personas habere non potest".
7. With these qualities he is capable of rights and liabilities
in the frame of society and state.
1. Nestle, Vora Mythos zum Logos, p. 202: Sich vor sich selbst
schSmen. Damit ist die sittliche Autonomic des Menschen erreicht.
2. See paragr.! on Duty.
3. ee paragr.: on & oral otives^ c^- 4 J
4. See paragr.: Egois . or Altruism.
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CHAPTER THIIEE
Social and Political life
Frequently in the history of Ethics this field of thought is
connected with social considerations and political generalisations. In
Greek Philosophy it is the rule. D. is not different from other Greek
philosophers in this respect.
In the following pages the problem of ocial and Political life
and .ducation will be discussed under the following heads:
Part one: ocial life:
1. The Philosopher and the family.
3. riendship
5. 1 very.
2. The position of women.
4. Other social relations.
6. Eros.






6. defence of the tate.
7. Uuties-lights. Summum donum in political life: Freedom in democracy.
8. ho is to rule?
9. The philosopher and the tate.
Part three: Preparation of the comin, generations;
1. education.
2. ^ E cl^COsl lerr, <*4 ^ 4uv,C,li on (
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Part one: Social life.
1. The Philosopher and the Family.
D.'s attitude to the nroblem of matfiage, of children and
their upbringing seems to be unexpected and in some ways astonishing.
A number of fra ments, surviving in Stotaaeus' Florilegium, and
some testimony from other sources confirm that he disapproved of having
children because of the difficulties in their rearing and the un¬
certainty about their future character and behaviour; he reco nised
nevertheless that it is necessary and unavoidable to get married and
give birth to children. It is difficult to explain with certainty
his position and his motives, since we lack evidence about his private
life and the general conditions of his life (perhaps an unsuccessful
marriage, either his own or his brother's, or an unhappy love
acquaintance may have influenced his attitude).
Let us look first at the evidence. Clement of Alexanireia
says: "D. disapproves of marriage and having children because of the
many disappointments coming from them and the distractions from other
1 2
more necessary engagements". He adds: "Epicurusb.grees with him."
1. Strom. II 138 ( VS 68 A 170): A * _ f.. yatlov Hal -natfio-rrottav
rcapaiTEiTat 6l3: t&S hoM&S ££ atitwv drjSfaS xe Hal AtpoXnis
&nb to5v dvayHaiOTepwv. avyKaxaxdrxexai abxio
Hal '^TtLHOUpOS.
2. Cf. DL X.119{ P ■ ' K^ ^ oc^^6 6tv ^ & b rg kv0 -
iToi^£Lv 6t>£j>ov. (Cf. Usener, fr. 526, p.319)
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In connection with tnis information strong disapproval and
criticism is found in another source: %'e strongly blame 0# and
picurus who recommend people neither to get married nor to have
children."
D.'s own. thought is more definite about his own position:
a. "l don't think it is correct for one to have children; because in
having children 1 see both great risks and many griefs; on the
contrary, the blessings are rare and, if at all, they are weak and poor
(feeble)."" This view is correctly criticised' on the ground that
if accepted as a rule it is against nature and the interests of
society and state.
1. Theotloretus XII .74 p. 317 iiRder ( Luria, e .ocritca, p. 155,
no. 723, second part): Arijioxp LTtp fit net.t ' E-rtiHOupw XLav
|j.E!i(po|j,E0a, uapaiTEtaGai nat xbv ya|iov nat x^v
irot tSoyov lfxv h^Xeuoucti . . .. (Cf. Us. fr. 536)
r. 276: oO Soxet hoi xpffvat TtatT^as xxacrBai* £vopu5 y&p
dv rcafSwv hxt^ctel xoXXotiS (ffcv Hat ney'XouS xtvSuvouS,
xoXX&S fit XtfrcaS, 6Xfya 6?: x& E69riX£ovxa Hal xatTta
Xsiixrif xe nat kaQevia.
3. iailoy, op. cit. 206. chmid-Stlhlin, op. cit., p. 301:
ie unpolitlsch das gedacht ist zeigt die entgegengesetzte Ansicht
ues Perikles (Thuk. II. 44.3), dass der dtaat uin nicht zu veroden
unci urn gesichert zu si in, I achwuchs brancht, in clem die 61 tern
der gefallenen....
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b, Da goes on to explain his attitude: "The rearing of children is
full of pitfalls a Success is attended by strife and care, failure
means grief beyond all others a"* It doesn't mean a general anti¬
pathy towards childhood, but expresses o^ly a personal disinclination
for the experience itself. Of course, this apology is not enough to
2
elsperse the impression from the previous quotation.
The truth is that D,'s voice is not unique in expressing such
scepticism about the rearing of children; he shares the attitude of
3
another thinker of the filth century BC, Perhaps it was a symptom
1, i'T, 275: XEKVOTpOfp Ct\ crcpaXEpov ' p£v yip iti>x tt)v
Aywvos IIECTX^V Hat cppOVx'SoS H£HTT)Ta I f T?)V 6& (iitOTUX^V
AvUTC^pGETOV ET^p-fl 6StJVQ.
2, Bailey, 206: one remarkable utterance,,,,adding the cynical
reason that,,,, (fr, 277 follows),
3, Euripides, ?. edea (presented 431 JC (?)j see BE Suppl, 11 (1903)
col, 659): 1090-1115, particularly 1113-5:
ETi 6' in to(5to)V elx' cpXafipoiS
£ IT' XPTl^O^^
poxQoOat ( sc- ), xS6' £cttIv aSnXov,
From the woman's viewpoint I edea says (290f,):
"Fighting in the battlefield is by far preferable to once bearing
children,"
Cf, Antiphon B 49: oct'ty y y f* (-f °L ^ otJxy y~ v uj> k-oll~
C ' li - t / \
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of 'taedium vitae" for the society in which Euripides lived. And,
anyway, it was followed by the Cynics from the fourth century onward.
Perhaps the phenomenon was felt even (already) in the prosperous society
of prewar Athens (before 431 BC) or just after the outbreak of war, if
Pericles' words (Thuc. 11.44.3)^ are explained as encouragement (from
the aspect of the tate) to have children.
rom another point of view D.'s attitude seems excusable,
if not completely justifiable, as an exception and privilege for a
2
vise man.
1. Thuc. II.44.3S 06 y&p 0?0V XC ICTOV XL T| SlHtXlOV j3ot>\£UECT0(XI
oi av (it) Hal n;ai6aS tn xov o|io£ou Tcapa3a\\<5nevoi
KivSuvetfoxrtv.
Cf. Clement of Alex., Strom. 11 p. 190 (ed. Stalilin):
ranriTEOv oCv nav-rioS Hal xffS -ira-cp i5oS evena xal xffS twv
-rcafSwv StaSoxtK Hal xfJS toO x<5a|j.ou rb ocrov £q>' r)utv
auvxeXe tffcreoiS....
2. Kirk-Haven, Presocratics, 426: it is an amusing example of
philosophical rationalism, which in a !, editerranean way rejects
as secondary the emotional and psychological overtones which some
would, consider of first importance.
Cf. t. Paul's, Corinthians, A 7.38: so then he that giveth
his da !; liter in marriage doeth well; but he that giveth her not
doeth better.
Plato provided (Hep. 460 D) a relief from the burden of
? / \ | J _ /
rearing the children: a ^ n i/i i^cu rov wv7c v n'ouvv
ri'r j oce5 K .&A Tp-a °tj tt oc cf^ c 0 u e c v .
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That this is only a personal attitude without more implications
becomes clear both from the reasons su plied for an adoption (fr. 277)
and from the recognition of (the naturality and physicality) of marriage
with all its consequences in the following passages.
c. Fr. 277: "vhoever wants to have children should, in my opinion,
choose them from the family of one of his friends. He will thus obtain
a child such as he wishes, for he can select the kind he wants. nd
the one tuat seems fittest will be most likely to follow on his natural
endowment. The difference is that in the latter way one can take one
child out of i;tany who is according to one's liking; but if one begets
a child of one's own, the risks are many, for one is bound to accept
him as he is."*
i . 4r. z 77 ■' oxeco XPilM-T) tea taxi xatSa noifiaaaQai, £x xwv
cpC\uiv xef) |ioi Sonet a|ieivov etvai. xat xq> |i£v nati
ecrxai xolouxoS ofov av |3otfXT)xat ' ecrxt y&p tnXtKocaQcu
ofov £9eXei ' xat oS av Soxr} ^irixi^Se toi etvai, xav jiaXicrxa
xax& (pucTtv exoixo. xat roOxo xocroOxov Siacpepet, ocrov
£vxa$9a fifcv "axl xbv xatSa Xa0ctv xaxaetfutov tn noXXSv,
otov av S^t]• r)v 5e xlS xotflxai cfcitb ecovxoO,
xoXXot rveioi xfvSuvot' Avayxr) yap, Si av yevr)xai,
xot5xw xpffcr9ai.
d. Just after that we find a generalisation of the problem; here
again the physicist appears and speaks the language of an objective
observer: "For human beings it is one of the necessities of life to
have children, arising from nature and primeval law. It is obvious
in the other animals too: they all have offspring by nature, and
not for the sake of any profit. And when they are bom, the parents
work and rear each as best they can ard are anxious for them while
they are small, and if anything ha -ens to them, the parents are grieved.
But for man it has now become an established belief that there should
be also some advantage from the offspring."*
The main points of his argument are: (1) having children
fulfils a natural (instinctive) necessity, which therefore is respectable
and acceptable, (II) man in this point shares a general biological
characteristic, although it entails cares, pains, and fears.
fr. 278: dvGpo'moiai xt3v dvayxat v 60xe£ etvai itatSai xxifaaaGat
dub <pt5aioS xal xaxaaxacuo£ xtvo* dpyafriS. 6r)\ov 6b xal
xotS aWoiS CojOiCTt ' xavxa y&p exyova xxaxai xaxd cpuaiv
£nw<pe\eir|S ye oii6entc?S eivexa' d\X* oxav y£vT)xat>
xaXamaipet xal xpecpei exaaxov toS Suvaxat xal uixep8e5otxe,
p.^XPt oi-itxpd xal T|V xi itdG-fl, dviaxat. r\ |ibv cpuaiS
xotauxri xavxwv baxlv oaaa eyei ' xcn 61: 6^ dvGpamp
vo|itCov rjSri irExoirixat, "axe xal dxatfpeatv xiva ytyveaGat
dxb xoO £xyc5vou.
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There can remain little doubt that D.'s attitude to the
problem under discussion was positive rather than negative; his general
sympathy for childhood is clearly known from: (i) the fact that he
faced seriously the problem of education (which is dealt with in one
of the last paragraphs of this study) and (ii) the warm recommendation
he addressed to parents on behalf of their children's education. He
says: "it is possible without spending much of one's money to educate
one's chil ren, and (so) to build round their property and their
persons a fortification and safeguard."*"
To close this page on family relations one may quote an
aphorism of D. on finding (and choosing) a good son-in-law for one's
daughter: "The man who is fortunate in finding a (good) son-in-law
gains a son; the man unfortunate in his finding loses his
daughter too."^
1. fr. 280: e^ecttiv o"b tcoXXSc tov crcpeTepwv AvaXw0avTai»
itaLSeucro'L te xobS 7iaL5aS xal teIxoS xe xal awT"npir)v
it£piprxX£ar0aL xouS te xpfoavi' crwuaaiv atixwv.
Cf. fr. 180.
Bailey (op. cit., p. 206) commenting on fr. 280 writes:
his cynicism seems to break down...«still an egoistic motive,
but with a touch of humanity.
2. fr. 272: ya|J.PpoO O {l£v ixiTUXthV EtSpEV uibv» o 61:
duoxux&v diK'XECTE xal Qvyaxepa.
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2* The Position of '.omen.
Closely connected with family problems is D.'s view about
women and their position in society. First of all he defends the
thesis of female inferiority. Woman in her inferior position is
recognised only to be ruled; never to rule or even to have any
influence in her household, because it would be a disgrace for her
husband. We read in fr. Ill: "To be ruled by a woman would be the
ultimate outrage for a man."1
With a conspicuously contemptuous expression D. refers to
those men (obviously politicians) who "are masters of cities, but are
enslaved to women.
A woman (according to the etymology of the Greek word, given
in fr. 122a ) is only the instrument through which nature provides
for the continuation of the species.
1. fr. Ill (Stob. IV 23.39): v tto S f * £ <f -ziWc ufycs « ^
»/ i f \ ' /
t i y a v d f> t f ^ .
2. fr • 214: ... f ~n o^ l v ^ w S t £ J a <f l ^ l Si
So v /\ t Jo u £l\J Two things must be noted here: (1) the
characteristic term used here for this class of men ( tjouct y
-they do the work of slaves), (2) the fact that their slavery is
(opposed) contrasted to the meaning of true coura e, which is
defined in the first half of the same fragment.
3. fr. 122a: ^ u V y '• • • • ^ ov y tts y ° v y 5
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On the other hand women are condemned for their malign thoughts;
the conclusion emerges self-evidently that women must not be given
2
lessons in rhetoric, since thqn they become much more terrible.
The following advice to women follows naturally:
"Lack of garrulity is the adornment for women". And as a play
of words is added another piece of a vice: "Paucity of adornment is
also beautiful."3
l. fr. 273: yuv^ no\\h 4v5pbS 6eUT^pri xaxoqppaSiiocJuvriv.
On this point of antifeminism D. shares the
views of a more famous antifeminist of the fifth century, who
declared his attitude (or psycholo ical explorations) through the
lips of one of his characters. See: Euripides, Medea, 263-66, or
407-9: yuvctfxEs;.. .hocxwv 5b toxvtp v t£htoveS aofpuTatact.. •
fr. no: yuvb nb) &ctxeCt(jO \<5yov ' Se ivbv yap.
5 5/ _ 7-1
Compare Platoqs opinion (dep. 452A): I <- r<att^ ^uvau.{Lv
9 \ \ 9 V ( Q \ o /
£ TT I rot cu^tct X 1 & a ^ i K QtU. T-O C.S <V
} \ \ p c ' ? '
~C ccv to(. VC oo(. a (, ia-K. Cf ov Q-jJ C ceh, ■
3. fr. 274: >i<5ap,oS 6\iyo|iu0l/n yuvaixt ' xaXbv 5b xal
H<5p>fOW \LT<5xT)S. 3ailey (°P* cit* 206) translates:
"few words are women's adornment; and simplicity in adornment is
good too." And he adds: "a Periclean sentiment with an added
sly touch of humour." I suppose he refers either to Thucyd. II.45.2
or II 40.1 or both.
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3. Friendship
Human feelin ,8 towards suffering companions are well expressed
in two aphorisms (107a, 293)1 which recall Isocratean advice. We read
"it is proper, since we are human beings, not to laugh at the
misfortunes of others, but to mourn." It is only an impersonal
expression of sympathy and pity or a meditation on the changeability
of human (affairs) fortunes; it is not friendship. This same basic
idea is found in the other aphorism (293) accompanied by an interesting
psychological remark; "Those to whom their neighbours' misfortunes
give pleasure do not understand that the blows of fate are common to
all; and also they lack cause for personal joy."
Friendship is defined briefly, accurately and clearly in
2
this: ''Likemindedness makes friendship." No more no less. Perhaps
3
it is an egoistic view or anyway non-altruistic; but in its mutuality
1. fr. lo7a: ariov dv9p(rn;ouS ovxaS dvGov oupcpooauS
|i^) yeXav dXX'6Xo(pupECTBai.
fr. 293: ofaiv >|6ov?)v Eyoucuv oci tmv ttexcxs ^up^oont t, oO
^uvtacn p£v wS tSc ttjS tuyps honacrtv» Airopeouai
otxp'pS yapaS.
^ f 0 /
2. fr. 186: o p- o (ji |3 o l J i >j v ~Voc i c
3. Bailey, 208: "d.'s conception of friendship has no doubt a selfish
basis." But such a verdict seems hardly compatible with frr. like
92, 94, 96. On the other hand friendship is based on mutual
contentment (186).
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it is just and gives the only objective foundation for this kind of
relation. In the final analysis friendship is neither love (eros) nor
sympathy nor charity.1
Kinship is, to be sure, a source of affection (and any quarrel
v 2
among kinsmen is sorrowful), but it does not give the foundation for
friendship, since: "not all one's relatives are friends, but only those
h3
who agree about what is beneficial in human life.
1. Aristotle distinguishes tae varieties of friendship as based on:
shared pleasure, mutual usefulness, common virtue. Cf. A.McIntyre,
op. cit. pp. 79-80. See: Aristotle EN 1155 b 34, 1156 b 7,
1156 b 20, where the reciprocity of the relation of friendship and
the similarity of character of friends is emphasised.
r ^1 / — C ^
Cf • Plato, Laws 837 A: <f ° v ^ lv iTo-u o v
c / \ ■>' =/
o c K £ 6 o v £ 6 u) ....
2. fr. 90: -q x&v cyuYyevwv ex^pf) ^Qveftov
XaXeTtf-nrepT)
C
3. fr. 107: cpfXoi ot'< itavteS ot CfYYsveeS, dXX'oi
Cup,cpWveovTsS itepX TOO Cflicp^povToS •
The last term must not be understood in a utilitarian sense;
it must be explained in accordance with fr. 74: what is bene¬
ficial in human life, therefore acceptable. See paragraph "on the
criterion"•
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The conditions of friendship are simple but difficult and
therefore not frequent; they are described equivocally again:
"censorious men are not well fitted for friendship"^ and even if they
//
acquire friends, they cannot keep them, since their temperament is
unsuitable"
Sincerity between friends is quite essential; it originates in
reverence for truth and leads to mutual respect; there is no room
3
for flattery or adulation.*
The criterion of friendship (as it was for virtue generally)
4
is action, not words.
1. fr. 109: ol <fi 3o p. tfA. (joiLs £-5 cu^ueis .
A much more difficult and formative task is one of blaming
oneself for one's own faults; that is true courage and even self-
perfection. See fr. 60 (Stob. Ill 13.46). Perhaps of Pythagorean
origin or Socratic influence.
2. fr. loo: 3xecp ^ 5 iati£vouaiv £itt itoXXbv ot iretpa0£vTeS
cpfXoi SuatpoicoS.
3. fr. 63 (stob. hi.14.8): e^Xoyeetv £irt xaXotS epypacii xaXov'
xb y&p £irt cnXaupoiat xipSiiXov Hat dita-tewvoS.
-fr. IU'- eotl pa6 tov £iratve£v a XP*1 nat \Jr'yeiv,
exarepov 61: irovripoO tlvoS r|9ouS.
Cf. fr. 115.
4. fr. 53a (Stob. II 15.33): itoXXot 5pwVT£S a'Laxiaxa
X<5youS AoicrTOUa dcaniouatv.
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A number of other aphorisms refer to the usual tempations
which betray a variety of intentions which are like friendship but not
genuine. These sayings seem to continue the gnomological tradition
rather than to originate in a philosophical inquiry. It would not
be right to classify them under the head "banal", but, on the other
hand, they do not have either the thoroughgoing character we have seen
in other fragments of D. or a detailed description (analysis); and,
of course, they1 cannot be compared with Plato's or Aristotle's scrutiny
2
of the problem of friendship.
We read e.g. that men who are not able to feel friendship are
3 4
also unworthy to be treated as friends. Elsewhere one learns that
when in good fortune one sees crowds of friends aound him, but when
one meets misfortunes one cannot find even one friend; it is the most
difficult of all problems in life. Even men who were friends are
1. It should be noted that these fragments come from Deaiocrates'
collection (103, 106, 101, 97, 98).
2. Plato's Lysis, Laws 837 A£f., Aristotle's EN books VIII.IX.
3. fr. 103: oof o(fP tv05 ft 7«"'tS&ou. SoV-l^L fc o t o°
VOL.
4. fr. 106! £y (. O ~C {Jptjj tytsjov LyOtLV CvnofLiVj £V SI Jug C
/ ? t
-rfotvCuvV oc rropx^r. In this saying an
"antithesis" appears which can be parallelled to Thucydides' style
(II 40.1): K out a fjL O 'ijv
\ , V
(fLvfU V i £ P Y? OL^<rx,zrv-
A
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ready to flee when a friend is in misfortune'*" ■ Go are betrayed and
2
separated true friends and seeming friends . With these remarks in
mind one may appreciate the friendship of a "synetos" who is expected to
♦ 3
be more worthy than crowds of ''asynetoi".
Perha >s all these fragments echo a bitter personal experience
of D. It is not unreasonable to suppose that he did not make friends
f3asily; not because of bad character, but because it was difficult to
4
find companions of similar interests and attitudes. It seems that the
privilege of wise men is to be admired, but not easily to be friends.
It is possibly the r e w uri of their greatness; they cannot bear
much of the trivialities which preoccupy the life of common men and
1. fr. 101: ^HTpeuovtai itoWoX tobs cptXouS, £xbv &L ebuopf'nS
etS XEvtnv (leTctTCECTaxHv.
/
2. fr. 97: noXXot SoxeovxeS stvat <p'Xoi obx eCctl* xat ob
SoxeovteS etaiv.
3. fr. 98: £ v o 5 ^ ( ^ ^ ^ J u v L to J Kp I ^ ^ Lt/V <J V £ CclJV TTclv Tw .
See paragraph: Tree of virtues: synesis.
Cf. Heraclitus B 49
4. See fr. 186 by which the first (and main) condition of
friendship is defined. Cf. fr. 118 (for D.'s main interest).
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they are also frequently misunderstood."1' So people around them seem
to be critical and unbearable companions.
In accordance with principles explained in the introduction
of this study and followed throughout, it should be remembered that
2
this group of aphorisms belong to the so-called collection of
Democrates (with only one exception, fr. 186); their content is not
incompatible with what we have explained as D.'s ethical thought; but
also it is not of the same importance. There is no convincing reason
either to deny their authenticity or to defend it, except for fr. 107,
1. The tradition of the "laughing" philosopher makes this hypothesis
possible. To laugh at the stupidity of others is not a
condition helpful for making friends. See e.g.
a. Seneca, de ira, II. 10.5s ....Democriturn...aiunt
numquam sine risu in publico fuisse; adeo nihil
illi videbatur senium eorum, quae serio gereoantur
(VS 68 A 21).
b. Juvenal, 10.51:
Tidebat curas, nec non et gaudia vulgi,
interdum et lacrimas, cum fortunas ipse minaci A
ntnndaret laqueum mediujnque ostenderet unjfuytau j j1 / ^
(VS 68 A 21).
For more testimony and further references see:
Luria, aemocritea, pp. 21-22: Fabula de philosopho ridente.
2. frr. 103, 106, 101, 97, 9d. : CoroL £"■ , D. ec^J. U-eroL-
cli^S c C'<^- -WnJ, C ) pp. 3^ - 31V.
2S4
for which we find two noints of correspondence: (1) its content accords
with fr. 186 (from Stobaeus' collection) and (a) its last term brings
it nearer to fr. 74 or 188 (4).1
1. S. Luria, following his principle stated in the preface of his book
on Democritus (Democritea, Leningrad, 1970) that "whenever by name
attributed to D. a passage should be accepted as such, i.e. genuine",
quotes (in pp. 150-152) a number of passages from Antonios Nelissa
(Patrologia Graeca, Vols. 91, 136). Namely:
a. Luria, op. cit. p. 151, no. 666 ( Ant. i'elissa I. 25 p. 27
vq 136 P. 853 B): xb ^ StWQat ponQotv xot>
craXoi^' dxopfaS, xb 6b 3oi5\ea0at xaxtaS xex^fnpiov.
b. Luria, p. 150, no. 658 ( Ant. Melissa I. 24 p. 46 PG 136 p.849 D):
xbv axoubatov cptXov upbS pbv x&S eticppoauvaS x\t)0£vxa
6e£ xapetvat, xpbs 6b x&S iTepLcrxacr£i,i a&xoxXt)xov
6ei oup-irapetvccL.
c. Luria p. 150, no. 659 ( Ant. I elissa 1. 24 p. 4d) '•
ot d\t)9ivol cptXoi xal x&S eticppocnjvofs r)6fovaS xat
x&S cn>|i<pop3:S £\acppox£paS notoOatv, xtov |ibv
cruvccTcoXatfovxeS, xwv 6b liexaXaiiPavovxeS.
He alsoincludes in the list of genuine frr. a number of
passages characterised "Unechte" by Diels-Kranz (VS 68 B 302):
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Note 1« to page 254 ctd.
a. VS 68 B 302 (II 222, 15 no. 174)
b. (II 222, 22 no. 181)
c. (II 222, 30 no. 189)
d. (II 222, 33 no. 192)
These passages (1) on the ground of their content might belong
to D., but (2) in their wording and structure they vividly recall
Isocratean style (and are collectively attributed to Epictetus,
Isocrates, see VS II. 222, 10) with clear Gorgian influence.
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4, Other social trillions
.?ri(® ship is not the only relation to other people; there
are others equally frequent and no less important. irst of all one
hru either to help or be helped; an attitude of sincerity and
generosity is demanded and described in the follow in;.; aphorisms.
One niuut be careful e.g. in one's conduct so ss to ive one's
neigbours a sense of trust and respect: "do not be suspicious
towards all, but careful and fire."1 To overcome suspicion is o
necessary condition for social relations, because suspicion either
makes one's life difficult or makes it impossible to be ssked by one's
neighbours ir help; or it has both these negatj e results.
"The onerous man is he who does not look for a return,
.. 2
but ho does ood fror. choice • A favour, even o f inal 1 on , is of
importance, accordin to the difficulty in which the receiver was,
3
if given fst the time of emergency*" To accept a favour is recommended,
if it is necessary, but with the in 1 ention to return it ,-ith much more
4
eru rosily. Once more 'he emphasis on intention is noteworthy.
1. . . 91: jif) uhotcxoS TtpbS airavxaS > &XX' etfXocptiS ytvou
xat AacpaX'nS.
r. ;b: xaptattHbS otiy o PXettcov itpbs xt)v &(j.ot|3pv, &XX'
o e6 5pav upo^prip.evoS.
he emphasis given t:o the intention is characteristic.
. . -j-.: viLHpal xdcpixeS £v naipcp iieyia'Tat, xotS Xan^avouatv.
. r. 92: S^xscfQat XP£^)V -n;poaHOTC£U<5|i£Vov
KpetfcrovaS atixwv x &Tto5ouva i.
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The motive can hardly be selfish.1 On the other hand one is
discouraged from doing favours without seeing the character of the
recipient: "when you do a favour, study the recipient in advance,
..2
lest he prove false and repay evil for good.
In the social environment the pursuit of honours is recognised;
but not all honours are to be accepted. Worthy to be pursued are
3
only honours from people of high reputation. A more interesting
aspect about recognition and attribution of honours to the citizens
according to tneir virtue (or ability) perhaps was expressed in fr. 263,
4
but we cannot be sure about its meaning.
1. uailey, op. cit., 208: "o.'s conception of friendship has no doubt
a selfish basis." Such a verdict seems hardly compatible with frr.
ii\>c
like 92, 94, 96. In the final analysis friend - the distinction
should be remembered - is neither love nor charity: it is a
contentment (fr. 186).
2. fr. 98! X £-voi 71 f o £ to v v c.oc, p.v,
k et K o v Omv t' K l & ^]oj Lwv «- TLo & <-£ ■
\ V — r ' / C t
3. fr. 95: T-oc-g t-u nfi. o uv^vzocu^
ft tcp.iv . Cf. Aristotle, EN 1095 b 26:
etl 6'£o£xaat t?)V Ttp.f)v 5iwxetv tva Tciaxetirftoaiv eauxo&S aj/«n9®u$
etvai ' CnxoOat yoOv uitfc twv cppovfpcjv xipctaQai....
4. At the same time we fail to find a bridge of connection between the
aphorisms under discussion (91-96), surviving in Democrates*
collection only, and those we possess from Stobaeus' Florilegium.
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(.uarrels are of course disapproved of; fr. 237 gives the
explanation: "all contentions are foolish; for in studying the
disadvantage of one's enemy, one loses sight of one's own advantage."^"
The following passage sounds a warning for those who dispute with
people in power: "The man who strives against the stronger (the man
• 2
in power?) ends in disgrace."
Jealousy and envy are condemned without any hesitation; and
this is done in a psychological way which finds its justification in
itself. These unapproved feelings are explained as a kind of self-
punishment in fr. 68l "the envious man torments himself like an
« 3
enemy * Envy directed towards others actually returns to the
sender who thus spoils his own serenity.
If one is to recognise one's enemies one has to look not at
their actions, but at their intentions; for intention is the true
criterion. Fr. 89 appears as a definition of enmity: "an enemy is not
he who injures, but he who wishes to do so." ^
——
l. fr. 237s quXovtxtr) naaa dvdr)xoS ' xb ydp xcexd xoO
5oo'|iev£oS pXaSepbv 9eo>petfaa xb tfitov aupfpepov ob pXexei.
2. fr. 238: xeXeuxo Y&P xaxo5o£fv|v [xax^jv] o
xapexxeivcfyevoS xa5 xp£aaovt.
3 • fr. 88! o (f) &o v t. >-*j ^ 6. wu C-o V £ X 9pc w /I u irt .
(Stob. Ill 38.47) .
? Ci \ ? c. 9 c t ' n n ^ d /
4. fr. 89! tX^poi ccjj 0C
Cf. Eric Wolf, op. cit., II. 345: Koviel starker erschien ihm und
soviel hoher wertete er die Gesinnung als die Tat, dass er den
Anspruch gewagt hats Unrechte Gesinnung sei gew&hrlicher wie
unrechtes tun.
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A quarrel between relatives is characterised as the worst of
all forms of conflict; no reason is necessary to justify this
classification.^-
5. Slavery
One might perhaps expect a thinker who made so much effort
to explore nature and human conduct, who wrote about self-respect (17$,
264) and the power of persuasion (181), who recognised responsibility
and spoke so warmly on political liberty (251), to say something in
2
favour of slaves who constituted in some Greek societies of his days an
important percentage of the whole population. Such expectation would
be more justified if one remembers that Euripides speaks with sympathy
3
for slaves or creates sympathetic characters of slaves or goes further
in claiming that a slave may be (as a person) equal or even superior to
4
his master.
1. fr. 90: s/ € X'fyy xijj
X 3 i t7XJ ctp-y) f- <(/}<*. .
15
2. E. Barker, Greek Political Theory,London (1970)[1918 pp.32-37.
Guthrie, History III (Sophists) pp. 155-160.
3. alcestis 192 ff., Ion 854-6, 725-34, Helen 730.
4. fr. 511, 831| Ion, 854-r 6
ev yap tplf -totS SouXotcrtv atcxxovriv cpspei* ^ 7i
xoovo|ia ' 5 ' aXXa itavxa twv £Xeu0e ^oov
o66kv hochCmv SoOXoS , oaxtS toQ'kbi
259.
But the fact is that "for most Greeks society without slavery
was unthinkable"* at least duting the fifth century. All criticism
of this institution belor s (to our knowledge) to later times. It
2
began perhaps with the last Sophists.
{• '
The conditions of life, the dependence of private and >ublic
finance on slave labour made impossible any thought in favour of that
class of men until Christianity came to equate them (with free men) at
least as chil iren of the same god. hven Aristotle two generations
after D.'s death maintain the idea of slavery as natural." There
were many cases of favour towards a slave, but they had a personal
character, not an ideological feature.
In the surviving frr. of L). 3 times we trace a reference
direct or indirect to slavery or slaves.
a. Slavery metaphorically taken is the condition of a man defeated
4
by his base desires.
b. Slavery is as undesirable a (condition) position as freedom is
5
the most desirable even if accompanied by poverty. rom these
1. Guthrie, op. cit., 155.
2. Barker, 86 ff. (General Iconoclasm) $ Guthrie, 157$
Untersteiner, Sophists, 341 (Alcidamas).
3. Aristotle, Politics, 1252a 30 ff.
4. fr. 214: ...evtot noXCwv pfcv 5eov.6£ovoi , yuvat^tv
6ou\e<5ouaiv.
5. fr. 251:^ £v S-njionpaxlt] iteviT) xffS napS: xo£s Suvaax^crt
xaXeop^vriS eG6a tpovf-nS xoarotfxov tax i atpexcax^pr) # oh<5cjov
£\£u9eptT) 5ou\efriS.
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references one cannot, to be sure, infer that D. accepted the
institution of slavery. But the following one is clear.
c. "Use slaves as parts of the body; each to his own function
This passage betrays not only D.'s ideas on the question, but also the
general position of slavery in the social structure of that age
and the thought of Greek society.
6. Eros.
It is curious that in two very different contexts we find
this concept. Perhaps it should be placed in the paragraph "on
Pleasure" or "conditions of Pleasure"; but in both aphorisms to be
discussed it refers to relations with others.
Fr. 271 says: "a woman who is loved may indulge desire without
blame" (trans, by Guthrie, History II, 491, who in footn. 3 goes on more
v »»2
literally:) or purges the blame ati-acned to sexual desire.
1. fr. 270: o Lh^tcc i £iv p.rof0i toO cmi^veos XP~ aXXcp
7to?>> rcXXo.
Cf. Aristotle's en 1161 b 3-4: q ySep SouXoS £^.\}ruxov opyavov»
xb 5' opyavov chj/vxoS SoOXoS.
2. fr• 271: c c icy v y [ ? ] DCll.
DK chai'acterise it "nicht verstSndlicft" • K. Freeman translates: A
lover's reproach is solved by (? corrupt word). Guthrie (II.491.3)
adds: I cannot understand why "nicht verstSndlich" or...
is corrupted. Luria (hemocritea, p. 154, no.707 accepts the
following writing: y ^«nul
(Nccuck,^ Dials '~3) i ■
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Doubts about the meaning of this fr. were expressed first by
Natorp.^ It seems that Guthrie's optimism (on the integrity of the
aphorism) and his translation cannot be shared without misgiving. Such
an interpretation sounds more compatible with today's attitude to love
and sexual problems (at least in the Western world) than to D.'s
aphorisms (paragraphs on Pleasure, on Virtue).
Much more interesting is fr. 73: "Good eros is a longing
2
for what is fine without hybris . The wording of this aphorism in
3
connection with some others where the term kalos is used allow a
clear elucidation of its meaning (eros for what is beauty).
From the aphorism itself these deductions are reasonable:
a. the last three words preceded by a copula give a kind of
definition of eros. The last word is of particular importance in this
4
case; we know from a previous discussion that "kalos" denotes what is
beauty and/or good in the field of art and/or morality,
b. a specification of eros is aimed, at by the first adjective
("dikaios"),
c. the third word of the statement (anybristos) defines the attitude
in terms of respect.
______________
1. A/oc^or^ 0 i'e tih I l< gl , p. II } ■
I. Fr- 7 3 ( 5 t. UL • 5"- 1 3) : £lkou.dS £fu>S O-VU^p 16-TujS
6 (p fi. o~ $ t i^v K <_> v ■
3. Fr. 2 or, lc)*, 3 / , IIZ, Fi .
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There can remain no doubt that this kind of "eros", which is
"just" and pursues with respect what is beautiful, can be classified
with the "Platonic eros".*
1. Schumacher (Die Seele, pp. 19-20) expressed enthusiasm for this
aphorism and devoted to that a short paragraph. He writes: '"Man
glaubt in den horten Oemokrits bereits Platons timme aus dem
"Gastmal" und aus dem "Phaidos" zu hftren.... Htichstes griechisches
Kenschentum tritt uns hier entgegen, der klassische Mensch...
Der Katurforscher D. wird zum Verkunder dieses rechten Eros als
der edelsten degung des enschenherzens.
Cf. Guthrie, History, II, 490: "twin brother to Platonic eros".
See: G. .A. Grube, Plato s Thought, London (1970) ^19S5
pp. 87 ff. (ch. III).
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Part two* Political Thought of Oemocritus.*
1« Peace in city life* Homonoia*
It is self-evident that private life and individual prosperity
are deeply influenced by the general conditions of order or isorder
prevailing in one,s political environment.1" Therefore any class-
conflict which threatens the life of the community should be avoided
by any peaceful means.'
» 3
D. s generation had a bitter experience of civil war; this
perhaps explains his vi w of political probtems. He seems to
summarise a com on feeling, a ''taedium belli", of Greek society of the
* This part of D.'s work is in some degree better studied by modern
scholars, because it is limited to a small number of "rounded
passages" all of which (save one suspected of lacuna - 266) are
clear enough in their content. But in this field another obstacle
makes appearance: one's preconceptions which in turn influence
one's interpretations.
A good presentation is that of B. Wolf (Griech. ..cchtsdenken,
II. 337*52)• Very interesting is a chapter in Havelock's book:
The liberal temper in Greek Politics (pp. 125-154). A sample
of biased interpretation seems to be Aalders' article: The political
faith of D. (Mnemosyne 4/3 (1950), pp. 302-313). or a first acquaint¬
ance Bailey's pages (Greek Atomists, 208-13) are useful.
1. E. Wolf, op. cit., p. 346: Aussere Lebenssicherheit kann der Mensch
aber nur In einer friedlichen Polls flmden die...
2. See fr. 255 quoted below.
3. The Pelop. war (T31-404 BC) was in its first stages a conflict between
tv/o imperialisms representing also (roughly) two different social-
political systems; but in due course it got the character of a
civil war in many city-states (see: Tliucydides III.32).
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late fifth century i3C, when writing: "Civil war is harmful on both
sides; for both to the victors and to the vanquished the destruction
is the same."1 It is not necessary to justify this statement to any
man who has some experience of civil war, but some justification can be
traced in another passage of iemocritus: "all contentiousness is
foolish; for in studying the disadvantage of one's enemy, one loses
t 2
sight of one's own advantage.""
Leaving the negative aspect of the question D» proceeds to
positive advice: great achievements, he claims, either in private
life or in public are attained only by cordial cooperation.
homonoia is a condicio sine qua non for every successf 1
undertaking by a group of men. "The reatest undertakings are
„3
carried through by means of concord.
It is characteristic that homonoia here is desirable within
4
the limits of a city-state. The time had not yet come for surpassing
1. fr. 249: eta/fi-S K
viK-t*uCL ?Jy/-
2. fr. 237: cpiXovtxfr) iiftaa AvtfiytoS ' x?> y3fep uocxh toO
5i)a|iev£oS pXaPepbv 9ewpe(5aa rfc tfiiov aup,<p£pov
oft pX^Ttet.
3. fr. 260: AtiS) <5p.ovoCr)S x& jieyctXa epya Hal xatTS x^Xeat
noX^uovS Suvax&v naxepyaCeaGai, aXXwS 5* ov.
Cf. hocrates' teaching on homonoia in Xenophon's
Memorabilia, IV.4.16. Cf. also Thuc. VIII.93.2.
4. J. Ferguson, Values in Ancient orld (1958) p. 119: "This is an
important passage for it shows homonoia not merely within the state
but confined to it; it extends no wider."
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1 cal conflicts and pursuing unification of a larger scale.* Because
of the atrocious conflicts, nevertheless, and the destruction of civil
wars after 431 BC the wish for peace was common and the idea of homonoia
l 2became a "locus com. unis"•"
3
Homonoia is not conceived as a gift given from gods or a
compulsory (duty) obligation demanded from citizens. It is, as it
were, only the result of good understanding between the groups of
society involved. Fr. 2. 5 sayst "when the powerful (rich) prevail
upon themselves to lend to the indigent, and help than, and benefit
them, herein at la.-t is pity, and an end to isolation (separation), and
friendship, and mutual aid, ana harmony among the citizens; and other
1* Cf. Antiphon, on Homonoia* He puts homonoia rather in the
field of personal morality*
Gorgias was preaching homonoia among the Greek city-states
(VS 82 B 8a)
Isocrates made this declaration a slogan of his Pan-
hellenic policy*
2* Aalders, op* cit*, p* 350*
Thuc* III* 82* Plato, Laws, 629 C-D*
3* Plato Prot*, 322 C***.. 'ii/a. uev no/lt^n/ Ko£(^oi
S t <£ fy o t (f l ^ l ot-3 & u v y e (
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blessings such as no man coul enumerateHomonoia is welcomed as
t o fountain of all oods for a society, as the foundation of ordered
am' prosperous social life.
The horizon, nevertheless, of D. does not surpass the border
line of a city-state. Local feelings were still too strong to allow
a ider view. At least the solution of social problems (within the
limits of a small com-unity), as proposed in the passage quoted above,
could be labelled: "socialism based on good will, understanding and
„2
solidarity. Thus D. believed that the cause of social conflicts and
1. fr. 2; 5: £xaV 0£ 6uvap.evoi xoiS exouch nat -rcpoxeXeiv
ToX|a£oi>cn, nal bitoupyetv xal xaP freaOat» £v xouxco t)5t) Hal
xb ofxxtpEiv evEPTi Hat (i?) bpi^ouS Etvat nat xb £xaipot>*
y fyvEcrQat, nat xb Ap.t5vEtv AXX^XoiSi nat xob> 7toXir)xaS
<5(iov6ouS stvai nat aXXa &ya.G<x> aaaa obSstS av Suvatxo
xaxaXs^a t.
Bailey, op. cit. 212: Considering the general state of class-
fe ling in fliost of the Greek cities, this is perhaps the most
remarkable of all sayings...
T.A. Sinclair, History, 65: This is perhaps the earliest
reference to a charitable spirit in social relationships.
Guthrie, History, II. 495: "remarkable passage."
2. Schmid-StShlin, op. cit., 239: Aber im Staat muss I-'reiheit und
Gluck aller BtSrger.. .das Ziel sein.
Cf. fr. 287S CLT/opLy J uv~n £*<a.G~Ceu X «. ^ I X. t^o y •
o j y V p 1/ 7To t/iTltac £ 3 rt l i iifLKoupl^S.
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disorder could be met. His optimism failed to see how far his scheme
(based on good will and mutual help) was from a hopelessly bitter
reality, which Thuc. described in a realistic way.
Such conduct - preventing confrontation of social classes -
D, believed, is a matter of education; men must pursue the kind of
education which leads to a better understanding on behalf of the co; unity
and each individual. He believed that it was possible by teachin to
transfer to other citizens all the experience of his long life, of
his many years of travel, ana all his personal indifference to
property. So he recommended wnat we read in fr. 157: "Learn thoroughly
t ie art of statesmanship, which is the greatest; and pursue its
toils, from which men win great and brilliant prizes,"''"
2, Constitutional form.
Preference of a constitutional form Is prior to any discussion
on other problems of political philosophy, A choice, to be sure,
does not imply an elaborate system; but it ex resses the ideological
orientation of the person, whose choice it is, and indirectly it posits
a hierarchy of values,
i. Fr. 157:
U£V TOpatvet Te noXixi^v x£*vnv \xeyCaxr]v
oSckxv MiddancaOai kal tobS ™5vous Siwxeiv, 4<p' 8v
Ha* Y^ovtat tots AvQpwiroiS.
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In the case of D. fr. 251 is an outspoken advocacy of democracy.
He says! "poverty under democracy is as much to be preferred above
what an oligarchy calls prosperity as is liberty above ondage (slavery)".1"
> ore exactly it is a hymn to democracy} it is the best - in the
2
form of aphorism - to come from an ancient source. Aalders objection
to the meaning of the passage must be answered briefly here:
a. In three other frr. of D# technicalities betraying a democratic
procedure (beyond any doubt) are used: in defending the state from
external enemies, in applying the law of the state, in appointing
3
magistrates (rulers).
b. The procedure of law-giving is clearly democratic (see fr. 248
which will be analysed in the next paragraph).
1. fr. 251 i ^ £v SrpioHpofTf";) nevCr) rffa 7iap& xot£ Suvctcrx^eu
xnc\rott£vnS e^SaiiiovtriS xocroCx(5v £axiv aCpexu>x£pT)» 6n<5oov
£\ei)9ep£ri
2. C.J.U. Aalders, The political faith of 0.» pp. 304-5: "whatever
may be the meaning attached to the term "democracy" we are not justified
in considering him a democrat. He only preferred democracy to
extreme oligarchy, but he doesn't say that the former is the best form
of government."
3. fr. 260! "by vote" (_ ,
fr. 262! "vote against" (k oc r a if i Cp i- 6 x. fc o V ) ,
fr. 266: was elected (,ic t-K).
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c. Two items of advice are given for a good citizen (fr. 252)
neither to pursue quarrels contrary to the ri ht, nor acquire a power
contrary to the common good; both are intelligible only in a
emocratic environment as admonition given by a democrat whose wish
is to protect his favorite constitution. The justification given in
O
.he same passage is a ".ericlean" doctrine."
Gne might say, of course, that such admonition could be given
by a good citizen whose main interest is to protect "eunomia"; but
"eunomia" can hardly be realised outside the political constitution
which gives all parties the right and the liberty to express their
views.
3
d. Leditations on improving some constitutional details are
unintelligible, unless we put them in a democratic background.
e. The antithesis between oligarchy an democracy in 251 is do
beautifully and warmly formulated on behalf of democracy that it can
be intelli ible only as the work of a sincere believer.
I rovided that fr. 251 is advocacy of democracy a second question
must be raised: "what is the meaning of democracy?"
/ _ q / V \ ? \
1. fr. 252: yi/|oi/tK£.oi/ta, W cl{> <*. 1 £. <. K
I / ? \ C o / \
b . j-«- y Z L i 6>X v V t clo Cuj TT t ^ LZ L -irtf+ IT cc
\ V \ (v "T — / v 3" '
To xpvi6row r° ~Ceo JUvox). 71ol S jj °Z f £u o ^ t v y
' > / d / 7
p. t <- & Z*p o jO iAv <£ t J £ £ X. L ...
2. hue. II. 60.2: y&p i^You(iat ic<5\iv irXsiToj Ctf^iTcaaav
6p9oup,evnv dxpeXetv tobs t6twTaS» rj koc9' exacrxov t~v
TcoXtrwv E^mpayoOcrav» <f0p<5av 5£ awa\Xo\xevr\v.
3. frr. 252, 266 will be discussed in the following pages.
A
27, j.
Th< ne'-t pars Taph ill offer an otibw v to this uestion, In
the meantime ericlca' and uiodotua* formulas would be a good stimulus
for comparisonsi
a, "it is true that our government is called a democracy, toeo-use
Its administration is in the tends, not o the n-w, but of the
•il
any...,
b» "A gtaod citizen muot try to persuade others that his proposal
(advice) is better (addressing tie Asseiibly) on equal terms and
without usin threatening means against those who are (likely)
..2
■ ectcd to bring in -ifierent proposals,
V 3/ \ C \ \ i 3
1. fhuc, II, 37,ll K oti OVO|UCL ft- £v oia t-o ^
oJ]/^do,S ^22° £S yr^iioVa^S ocK^CV SyK/p / oc.
K t
2m hue, 111,421 (biodotus speaking after Cleon):
Xpb 6b xbv |ibv dyaGbv TroXirnv, p?) bxcpopoOvxa xobS
dvxepoOvxaS» AXX* dub xoO "crou cpatvecGoci apeivov
Xeyovxa,
Itm - urird-es, upplices, 420-55, 4..§-8,
Surplices, 403-408) (Theseus speaking):
TtpwTOV pbv r|p^to xoC \6yov i}reu6~S , ^eve ,
Crix~v xupavvov bvGafie. ob y&p apxexai
^vbS itpbs dvSpds, dXX' £Xeu9epa xoXlS.
SfJpoS 6' frvdaaei 6 taSoxatcriv £v piepei
bviauauxiaiv, obxt tip xXouxw 5i5ob£
xb xXetaxov, dXX& x& xevr)S exwv taov.
270a
Note 2 to 270 ctd.
Suppl. 438-411 (Theseus speaking)
totiXeuQepov 6* ^heTvo * xiS 9£Xei ix(5\et
Xpr)<xx<5v xi PouXeup' stS pecrov (p'pouv 'exwv;
hoc! xactf©' 6 xpfiCwv Xapn:p(5i £c?0', <3 0eXwv
aiy<a-' x C toutuiv ectt' tcrauxEpov ti;<5Xei, ;
nristotle, olitics 1291 b 31: STJIiOlipaX Ca |i£v o5v £0x1
Ttpwxt) |i£v 1^ Xeyopevt) p-aXtaxa naxh x5> larov. laov
yap cpriatv d v<5poS....
1290 b l: paXXov xouvuv Xekxeov oxi SffiioS p.£v taxtv
oxav ot t\Eu0Epot Hupioi Satv.
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Given the constitutional forio of a state legislation takes
the first place as a practical and theoretical problem. Participation
of the citizens in political life is a condicio sine qua no; democracy
can exist. Justice is the main purpose of existence of any state.
robleans of ruling, defence, duties, rights, and a hierarcay of
political values are connected with my existing constitutional form.
In the following pages inquiry will be directed to these
questions!
a. Meaning and function of the law
b. Participation as foundation of political responsibility.
c. Magistrates.
d. Justice.
e. Defence of the itate.
f. Duties - lights. Sunimum bonutn (in political life): i-reedam.
g. ho is to rule?
h. The philosopher an., the tate.
3. ieanln and function of the law.
The central concept of a political ideology is its
constitutional form; correlative with this is law.
A satisfactory account of the nature of law must:
r. trace its relations to morality which serves both to supnly law
with a content and to be a standard for criticism of it,
. see t 10 law as the main instrument by which a state attempts to
realise its ends: security, (defence), prosperity, ju tice, liberty.
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c.. include in the list of en s principles and methods necessary for
the improvement and survival of the constitutional form (democracy e.g.
in the case under research)•
First co ment on the law is that it is restriction of liberty,"
if liberty is misused. Fr. 245 says: "The laws would not prevent
each citizen from living accordin to his inclination, unless individuals
harmed each other; for envious malice between individuals (citizens)
,.2
brings about the beginning or faction.
It is recognised even in the first words that law is a restraint,
an undesirable action of the state which by the law wishes to prevent
3
citizens from harming each other. The sovereignty of law grows
larger as bad conduct of citizens in their relations makes it more
necessary. Law comes to impose a "minimum of morality" in order
to prevent injustice*
1. I. Lana, L* etica di emocrito, 15:..."le leggi, restritive della
libertJ individuale, sono, per cosi dire, un "male necessario":
esse limltano la liberty di ciascuno per assicurare..•.la
possibility di vivere nella society in mezze agli altri ttomini*"
* 5 > ( P c_ / <7 ct
2. fr. 245: £)UK £Ku//| UOV oi Vo j_co/ mV £ l<£ OS. 6 \/ Kot/C
t § 'vj v £Jc u £ t,'y v j jt* y £ c £ r £■^vv l T-c <y> zPo V() S
kpefgivs oy>/*7v a n<KJCXXIU. .
1. ee Guthrie, History, II. 49G.
97°<J ( SJ
This pass, e seems like an apology for tae "restrictive" presence
of law; in the thought of the author a higher value Is behind and over
the laws freedom; but since security also is desirable (condition
necessary for the survival of political liberty) and since men are
irone to injure each other, law comes as a protector and referee, i
part o freedom is (must be) sacrificed on behalf of security.
Nomos1 is not contrary to persuasion (as might be the impression
from fr. 131); it is the necessary force to regulate mutual relations
in the field not covered by persuasion and autonomous will. ince man
is an imperfect being (fr. 149) which nevertheless has the possibility
2
for self-perfection (fr. 137) but not always the power of will, law
is a necessary and helpful invention for both private and social-
political life. The account of the way in which law co.cs into bein
1. Langerbeck, op. cit. 55: "Entscheidend ist dass Nomos hier den
ganz speziellen inn von Gesetz und damit verbundenen staatlichen
'
wang hat." This interpretation is based on a strict literary
translation of words; it would be justifiable only if we had no
other fra rient (like 131, 248).
2. Of. ,ric olf, op. cit. 343: ;)er fensch ist eben nicht gut.....
abcr hr.be der " ensch die Aufgabe gut zu werden."
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is genetic in its first stages; it becomes teleolo ical later.* No
2
divine hand, no revelation is supposed in the lawgiving procedure.
For the protection of social order the law must be powerful,
if possible by persuasion, if necessary by punishment. e read in
fr. 262: In the case of those who commit acts that deserve expulsion
or imprisonment and in the case of [all] who deserve penalty the vote
must condemn them and not absolve them. If a man in violation of
custom? law absolve another , using motives of gain or leisure
to formulate the issue , he does wrong and inevitably this will be
1. Cf. Lycophron's view: law is a contract (VS 83.3 \riwtotle,
<- r Q /
Politics, 1280 b 8: . . . . o vo 5 6 -o v J -y K y . ■ ■
^ / if W 7 ^7 ^ A A ^ A 5 v Oi-c C< A oux O LCj,
TfoLLcv Ctji'ot^oxiS Kom. ~Co\rS TCo^iZcc^ .
For general discussions of the meaning of law in Greek
Philosophy see:
:. darker, op. cit., pp. 43-4G,
T,A. Sinclair, o . cit. pp. 48—51,
. Untersteiner, ophists, pp, 336-3C.
Guthrie, history III (sophists), pp. 68 ff.
. Cf. leraclitus, 114: ixdvxeS od &vQpumeioi v<5|iot
xpecpovxat ££ £vbs xoO Getoo.




(a) a law should be obeyed anyway; a sentence must be carrier out
by the officials without any hesitation,
(b) c tizens mu t be able (as judges obviously) to vote against a
harmful action an<-' to overcome a tendency or temptation for leniency,
(c) t e h ole procedure (as described) is a democratic one.
Now consistency is demanded by the citizens when they are
to apply the laws (created by themselves, because of their participation
2
in the whole machinery of jolitical life)" for others. Leniency in
private relations must be separated from such feeling in the public
service and/or court. Here law is law even i it is hard, If one as
judge or official is guilty ol such clemency, one must know that he
becomes actually a lawbreaker, he is ranked virtually with the
3 ,
wrongdoer. Ins ea one s duty is to apply the law.
1. ft". .62:
, n " c n r — 2, Q ~-hceI ot (puyri* nc ioc epocvaiv r) oeap.wv, r) ©wrja,
crioL, KaToafrnqucxTeov xat p?) AnoXuetv ' oJ 5' av TtapSt
v(5|iov dTtoXiro xep5ei 6pCCcjv in ^6ovr], dSixst, xal ot
toCto £yxap6l0v dvayw^ etvat.
The translation quoted above is taken from iiavelock's (op.cit. pp.
14i -1-1) except -for- puUiuj s rou^d -term "cosier*,'1
a^d -tu of IxxUrroflUiort.
2. ee next paragraph! Participation as the foundation of the
obligation to obey the law.
. ee .chmirt-St&hlin, op.cit., p. 296.2 where this oassage is ralleled
ith frr. 174, 297 (syneicesis) and 7S 73.1 (Vol.11 p.2*-- .4).
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Respect for law is generalised in another passage: it is
proper to be obedient to law, tothe ruler, and to the wiser." Thus one
must obey rulers provided, to be sure, that they are lawful representatives
of the £>tate and that they first act according to the laws of the tate. i
One exception is perhaps recognise;., but not against t,.e
interests of the community; a wise man, an exceptional citizen, is
entitled to the exceptional privilege to be particularly respected and
consulted, and something more: to live without the restrictions of the
lav/. At first sight such an information seems unbelievable; an
probably it is a misrepresentation of j.'s thought, given that this
2
testimony is written in obviously pole ical tone. Bearing in mind
3
fr. 247 where wisdom is identified with "good ess oi soul" we can
1. On this point no doubt can be left; fr. 252 is clear: "do not
acquire a power contrary to the common good"; and fr. 251 expresses
.'s "preference", if not unCcn- itional approval, of a concrete
constitutional form: democracy.
2. A 166 ( Bpiphanius, adversus haereticos, II1.2.9):... Kacl
X.o JcKciJV S L K cc-e ©v o u K. £ 6 v oct, S (. K- oca. ov/ o( £l K oy
J
,- \ \ ? / ~ c~ /
3 g. "Co £V0wt cow ~c *1 S> ^fuGLujS . _ eller-h'estle,
op. cit., p. 1149, n.4: das ist offenbare Verdrehung...•
Cf. Langerbeck, op. cit., p. 55j Guthrie, History, II. 495.2.
3. fr. 247: a. V $pi 4ocf t: 6 at ^ £clZ.^- -^u^-^5
at ^ -vvj TT oc Tip L!> a £ KcC^oS .
See paragraph: "The philosopher and the state".
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reasonably accept the following meaning for the information under
interpretation: "'The wise man does not need to submit himself to the
laws of the itate since he has imposed on himself, as a result of
self-respect (264), much more morality than that required by the laws."
This meaning accords with fr. 248:... "the law shows to those ho
obey it their own particular virtue."1
If the law demands so high a respect, there naturally
arises the question: what is the source? or what is the procedure
of law-giving? There is no direct information, but indirect evidence
is convincing that the law is an expression (collective) of general
will, since:
2
a. the constitutional form (democratic) soeaks for the legislative
capacity of the citizens, and
3 for
b. some terms used in other pass ges speak a constitutional
form in which voting was an institution.
So the law mirrors tse voters' will and their aret£ and
in turn demands their (obedience) which in this ideal circuit meets
their ori inal will. Now we can understand the meanir of a
,.ar .sola expression of political opti ism: " V .a law to ...enefit
men's life; and it is able to do so when (and if) they themselves
wish to receive benefit (by obeying the law); for it shows to ' rose
1. fr. £48: o toTrt tcti irx rijy I fc>71/
IAifAcui/coe-t Cf. frr. 181, 264.
2. oe ;r« 251 an : revious para raph: tate
3. fr. 260: "by vote", 262: "vote against", 265: (he) "was lected"
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who obey it their own particular virtue."1
The last phrase cannot be interpreted as betraying a two-
mo.T.bered r lation (law- iver, citizen); it is incompatible . ith the
constitution envisaged in other fragments (251 e.g. or 2G0); on the
other hanci the allusion to persuasion excludes the hy othesie oi a
l. fr. 248: <5 v(5p.oS pou^etaL p.£v eiepyeteLv Rtov dv0p(on:tov
6i5vaTai, 6e» o-tav atitol pouXwvTat ■rcacrxEiv e$ ' total
y&p -rcetQopevotcyt t?)v l&Cr)\> dpet?)v £v6e lhvutcci .
It should be re embered that in that age and in the conc;itions
of political life in Greek city-states democracy meant an "Assembly
General" of the free citizens; their participation was lirect; also
lirect was their responsibility for fulfilment of the law's r ands.
ee Xenophon's M emorabilia, I.2.-i2 where Pericles in answer to
Alcibiades describes what laws are: "all the rules approved and
enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare wh t ought
■ in what ought not to be one."
Cf. Plato's rot. 319 J.
3
Jee V. whrenberg, rom Solon to Socrates, London (1969) [ 1967
pp. 216-217.
See also: .emosthenes '.XIV (against Timocrates) 2 -24 where the
orator first quotes constitutional laws prescribing the law-giving
procedure (in Athens) and adds (} 24): "these are all old-
established laws....."
ruler who diet: tes (if we remember the analysis of persuasion1 in
onrection with frr. ldl, 26 ). Therefore thi passage ohli es us to
ask this question: which are the two "wills" or the two sides ( Tver
of benefit and receiver of it) suggested by the wording o the passage?
There are not two different persons, but two different "moments of
action" in the life of the same person-citizen: when he proposes
a law and/or gives his vote for a law (or simply is an ey -witness of the
decision of the majority), this is one moment of his activity in this
capacity; when he obeys the lav., it is the moment of self-c ns tercy;
2
an act of virtue, not oi fear or coercion.
No doubt a degree of idealis tion is apparent here; it
is the same optimism in fr. "64 (34, 2-^4), where ti;e possibility of
human autonomy is described and hoped for; in both cases the individual
is conceived as the person wh . gives and obe„, s the law. e must
recognise that the first of the two moments for any cases, humanly
speaking', is much easier than the second, because it is a sin le oment
in which a citizen-voter may see the eneral immediate interest of the
1. The value of persuasion in tolitic 1 affairs is discussed by
Xenophon in Mernor. 1.2.10:... ^ <- <*. <s / c LS eo5
ae-tjo £ CbS ftiGouCTL ✓ , oL -IT tLa-lk-ST-LA,
c_ /
L C I*, c t /joo / . Cf • I • 2 w'i"**1.; G•
2• ah an ap arent and "prima facie" mi lea. i^^ distinction ... tv, ?n
law-giver an lawabider is found in a lassage in Pericles' Fun/ ral
peech (Thuc. II.37.3) albeit it doesn't imply at all : real
distinction between two different persons, but only two functi -ns
in he activity of citizenship.
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com iiinity without knowing or even suspecting a personal future involve¬
ment; w Wre. there are more difficulties in obeying the
law in countless cases when perhaps it is against the temporary or
permanent interest of a citizen. Perhaps this explains the time-
conditional character of the second proposition (of the fragment under
discussion): ''when and if they wish.
The whole procedure of law-giving and obedience is conceived
2
as a function within the field of moral life. bven if the law is
expressing the will of the great majority of citizens or their totality
(on rare occasions), although good, it is not powerful and valid, unless
it has a permanent applicat on in the citisens' activity. Just this
point is emphasised in fr. 243; it is an appeal to th sense of self-
consistency.^
1. fr. 243: " oxotv tit-o t«t - "
2. This close relation prevails in Greek Philosophy after D.; for
Plato e.g. "ethics is but a part of olitics" (V.J. Uourke, istory
of hthics, 1, 31); and Aristotle presents politics as "a secu<1
to the ethics" (A. Mclntyre, short aistory of .tales, p. 57).
3. Thus the law becomes (if this interpretation is correct) a teacher
of morality remindin he citizens of their obligation to
keep their promise (voting act).
Jf. b. olf, op. cit., p. 44: >er Noraos besass eben fur lokrits
ethisches Denken nur Bedeutung als ein i ittel individuali tischer
Urziehung.
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The purpose of law is obvious from the first wordsj "law
wishes to benefit men's life";1 the procedure implied from the whole
2
passage is democratic. The conception of law as described above agrees
\/ita tao general attitude of D. towards state organisation; it
helps individuals, and does not sacrifice them for other purposes.
4
The burning problem of the Physis-Nomos antithesis cannot
find a place here, since noinos is the expression of the will of citizens
anl'. is valid for themselves; if they do not apply it the question that
irises is that of (personal) inconsistency.
1» fr . 248 ; o vo oi $o /I i„T.acL-. f U £f*y tztcv ^iov/..-
Cf. PWoHep. 590 Ei K oc-t o v/ o f-K. o 5 otL ~CoLo \J X.o\J loo V -
Jl tea -CCLS lv X-vJ TT u) v . ■ - ■
2. 31. alders, op. cit. 305: "here a ain there is no trace of anything
specially democratic". Such a view; (a) ignores the meaning of
persuasion, which outside a democratic frame is but a defeat and
subjection because of fear (cf. frr. 208, 181), (b) isolat s the fragment
from the Corpus to which it belongs (245-268).
3. I. i.ana, op. cit., p. 28; h'assoluto, per lui, £ l'i .ivi uo,
non lo tato; non l' individuo esiate per lo tato, ma lo tato
per l' individuo.
4. On this problem;
E. Barker, op. cit., 74 ff.
>'• Guthrie, History III (Sophists) pp. 55 ff.
2b2.
u. seems to have been aware of the fact that this conception
of law was an idealisation rather than a eallt^; this ensues from
(a) the structure and wording of the passage (antithesis b tweens
the law wishes...it is able to..., and the condition; 1 which follows!
when and if the citizens wish...J,1 (b) the recommendation iven
by other fragments (249-52, 256, 261, 262).
1 • 240! 0 vo^i-oS ^oJ^jtCcu. . ... ) aXa^v
7 \ a '
0U<J Co L COuj v ta-L ....
A last comment on £ u£py$fig:{v in Hellenistic times
it became "the typical activity of the ^ood King" e h< si d by a
nickname: "benefactor". For J. it was the function of the law.
See: T.A. Sinclair, op. cit., 17D footn.5.
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4« Participation
The obligation to obey the law of the ftate was founded on
the best foundation; it was explained as a matter of self-consistency*
According to the political conditions in Dm*s age democracy implied
personal participation of all free citizens in legislative procedure,
not indirect representation** u* urges the citizens to make use of
this right; or rather he presents it as a ritutys "one must give the
highest Importance to affairs of the tate, that it asey be well run;
one must pursue no quarrels contrary to right, nor acquire a povor
contrary to the common good* The well-run 'tate is the gre test
protection, and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe}
when this is destroyed, all is destroyed*"" from which we can infers
a* ell-bein of the community is put in the first rank of
individual interests*
/
77 en. V Coc
Cf. Thuc* II* 60 2-3.
3* Cf. Arista EN 1094 b 8 ff.J
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b. Main internal dangers to a state are: individuals' pursuit of
power against the interests of the com. unity. Justification for all
these is given in a Periclean way;* with a difference: here the
2
argument is not formulated as a personal belief, but as an impersonal
principle or axiom or duty to be fulfilled by all citizens, although
D. himself saw political activity (involvement) rather as a necessary
3
burden than as a welcome and attractive profession.
Even if involvement in state affairs implies a degree of
negligence of private business (affairs) or danger to one's reputation,
nevertheless the duty described above must be performed, since "if a
man neglects public affairs, he is ill-spoken of, even if he steals
nothing and does no wrong."4
1. Thuc. II. 60.2: & $ ^ ^ yj j"'» O <vc~ n v i l J u f, ti ql -
£ ao/ o f> -d o y^,1 cr iq v' ZovS t tou^ • - • •
Antigone, 188-90: (Creov\ is spe.oci\Lij^
t o a ro l ^ v <S K ujv ox: l
Yj £ £ G Z. L Y fa TTc^jos) >j 6l£Jou£cc K <m tac-OZyS t TT LV^tovzts Of S -zouJ f/;ouJ
Cf
_ P \ \ L.
2. £^ UJ H COf> 1 (f ° ^ '
3. Aalders, op. cit. 313: For D. himself scientific work was far
more attractive than political activity.
Cf. fr. 118.
/ rv
4. Cf. Thucydides, II. 40.2 (Pex'icles is speaking): to i/ Zt f- i ° £ v
_ C f 5, a / ? ^ n ■> 9
ftz if.oVX.QU OX/K OLtl fOoj^OV fig j & A A «5cf.f £ L 0 V
/ 7
V 0 ^ L / 0 ^ t v .
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He goes on to examine the other possibility: "and if a
(good) citizen is not negligent or does no wrong, he is liable not
only to be ill spoken of, but also to suffer" (a bodily harm? a
persecution or financial damage?).1 D. closes his meditation with
a remark on human weakness: "To make mistakes is inevitable, but it is
difficult to forgive."
The question (philosophically considered) remains unanswered;
in both directions (involvement in public affairs or not) risks lie
2
in ambush, but duty calls to participation.
1. The v>hole fr. 253 is this: Tols XfxjfzoiLiv ou U. /-
ovrces etovcZv -TT^eeecv- kcluZS
t L Si C65 rZ V Syj^.o6LLKlv) KocK^c; aKoo-
LLV jytt-u/ciL 'vjv nSev ^'C€ K 3 (it Tlf lSLKy.
J, \ \ \ ? O / ^ 1 C / / r
tTTIL Kou if.-*) ccptsitovZL -Vj KUJuveS Kccgij
\ r\ , \ ^ ? / r \ c.
OCKcueuw Kou. ^ (<cec Cl O. £ t aip ^ -
~C «-v g t V
^ 6" uH^ I^ v\jo 6£*Li if occ Co u S otv SjTTovS oUK £.o TT£C C5
A realistic estimation of the possibilities is crowned by a realistic
aphorism on human nature, which is inclined to err but finds it
difficult to forgive (is there a tone of pessimism in it?).
2. Perhaps these thoughts reflect a situation of growing indifference
for public affairs which is not unusual in peridds of social-
political conflicts, when moderate people lose power and retire in
silence, while militant extreme wings continue the struggle by
all noisy means.
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Participation, it should be emphasised, was an important
feature of city-state deocracy} with more important consequences.
This democracy was a kind of General Assembly, where every free citizen
was expected to take part (normally twice a month), to propose laws,
to vote laws, to impeach laws, to elect ,..agistrates to offices for *
a specific period, to address the Assembly, to vote in favour or
ajainst proposals brought in by others on current problems of the Gtate.
In those conditions of political participation:
a. a citizen had a kind of life-lone education on political
problems,
b. he acquired awareness of the current problems of the corm unity,
c. ho was expected reasonably to have a higher sense of
responsibility, when he made proposals or sun orteci t ;ose
brought in by others.
In some cases he who proposed or defended a way of action
(an expedition e.g.) was expected to undertake to carry it out.1
These implications of participation underlie fr. 248 which
we analysed in the previous paragraph. The same idea of personal resp¬
onsibility is used for the foundation of morality (181, 2'.-4).
1. Therefore political activity was not without high responsibility and
personal risks. Cf. Zeller-Nestle, Die Philosophie der Griechen 1.2.
1149: die T&tlgkeit flir den Staat mit Gefahr und ehaden verkntipft
sei. u. ist also Tiber dieBen Gegenstand mit den hasten seiner
Geit einverstanden.
Cf. the view of a younger contemporary, Antisthenes lr.168
(ed. by Fern. Decl. Caizzi, 'llano 1986; Stob. Anth. IV.- .28):
286a
Note 1. to pi 286 ctd.
*6f>*>V^9£ls *£$ tiS -nfOllJoL TTO^LTtLOt iln f. :
\<ot-dotv(p Hopi, 7 <•'«*.„ V/ V'S J L'vc<- /U-9 K 3 ^
~n o p^ w j t i/fic ^ ^ tj/ uj e^j s ''
See Schmid-StShlin, op. cit. 289.2, 290.10.
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5. Justice.
. e have faced the difficulty of a definition1 of Justice as
a virtue. Now, it will be reconsidered as a political question.
, .en Archelaus had introduced the axiom that justice is
2
not by nature but by convention, when Thrasymachus was professing
3
that justice is but the interest of the stronrjer but also was confessing
that justice is the highest "bonun among men, when Thucydldes
presented an Imperialist to define Justice (in terms of inter-state
relations) as a question arisin only when equally powerful parties are
5
involved in disputes, at this time our philosopher appears on the scene
of political thought to explore the problem of justice in the
following directions:
1. See paragraphs Tree of Virtues.
\ \ C / f 9 / 5 1 p /
2. VS GO A IS Keel "To iiKaiov £ c vii © o (f> oCtc. <y a. vo ■
3. 85 B G a ( .epublic 338c): <f 1 f- <- tl-yaLL- Co ^iK^ov
ouK i-Uo re "V} T-O E? L) ~t Z 0 \/ o s JvfCflfOOW .
(see P. Huby, Gr ek Ethics, p. 10).
3u 8 8.
y^rp £v ji£yLaTov TWV £v A vOp-'irca S Aya9Sv
TtrKpftScv ( sc, 6tHcrtoai5vt]v)•
5. Thuc. V 89 (the Athenian ambassador is speaking):
crt Sfnata p£v £v xc~) AvGpume&j) \<5ytp Au6 xffS tar)i dvayurji
wptvexat, 6uvax& ot fcpouxovxe* irpacrcrouo't Hal oC
AaGevelS £uyxu!pot?<7i.
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a. Justice in the relations of citizens between each other.
b. Justice in maintaining the power of law (sovereignty) against
law-breakers.
c. Justice in the relations of citizens to civil administration and
vice versa.
a. he law is planned to fulfil a double duty: (1) to protect
1 2
citizens from being wronged and avert conflicts among them, (II) to
benefit citizens by imposing a minimum of morality and regulate future
relations in peace (fr. 248). In either case justice is seen from
the viewpoint of private interest.
b. If a state is to succeed in its effort to protect its subjects from
being wronged, it must be consistent in punishing wrongdoers, because
unpunished wrongdoing (law-breaking) creates new candidates for
imitation. Punishment is seen as a means to prevent repetition. Fr.
262 says: "Those who do what is deserving of exile or imprisonment
might" is rejected.
2. Havelock, op. cit., 137: "For the endemic danger the remedy
is law, and the initial law has to be viewed negatively as a
1. fr. 245:
<-/ c/ 7 a /
f Ltf oS t ~C L f> o V [ oc*. VIZ.0 ■ ■
Obviously the principle of "right is
VlZ.0 • ■
restraint of the use of one's own elbow-room."
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or other punishment must be condemned and not let off...With a
strong sense of reality he sees that public servants having the duty
to impose the power of law are likely to meet the temptation of being
lenient for a variety of reasons; but so they undermine (the power of
law) and shake social order and peace in the long term. The
instruction given by this passage recalls a principle of Roman Criminal
Law: "Dura lex sed lex". D. seems to have been a believer in such a
principle for reasons explained above. Cases of clemency are actions
against the law of the state; clemency tends to create new crimes in
addition to the unpunished ones. Perhaps numerous examples of
2
corruption " in contemporary administration were the stimulus to this
strict formula, which does not provide any margin of clemency. All
cases are included in one single-worded instruction: "vote against"
(k <x.x oc^vjcpie-cfov) repeated in negative form for more emphasis (do not
release). But in such generalisations another principle of criminal
law is ignored: "Summum jus summa injuria". Of course, it should be
remembered, we have fragmentary material only and we do not know the
context. The interpretation of the passage, however, is clear: be
1. fr. 262: K ocl ©t* <f s & ^ ^
a - >/ r / \ ? n /
-iTTovfp otti ol J ktqn: tfov K ou. 0 A, uUv ■ ■ ■
Havelock, op. cit. 141: it is the language of Athenian democracy....
p. 142: D. is now addressing himself to the Athenian judge and
jury.
2. Cf. what Crito says to S. in the opening scene of Plato*s dialogue;
later on he proposes to S. to escape; guards are already bribed.
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dutiful (as a judge) without exception; the lawbreaker must be punished
if the state is to survive. For D., as seems clear from other passages
too, the remedy of bad conduct in society is not clemency to a criminal,
but a more generous and radical provision: his pre-education (on which
the last section of this chapter).
The law is not the property of any one; it is the decision
of the totality of the voters (potentially of the free citizens) or at
least of the majority of them; no one has the right to apply it or
not according to personal inclination or sympathy, because then one
breaks another principle (transferred from ''jus civile" mutatis mutandis):
"nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet."^"
c. Justice is a demand also In the relations of citizens with public
services and vice-versa. It is astonishing at first sight to read*
Men remember one's mistakes (offences) rather than one's (successes)
right actions. This is just; for as those who return a deposit do
not deserve praise, whereas those who do not do so deserve blame and
punishment, so with the official: he was elected not to commit offences
1. Such formulas are used on the assumption that such principles
exist before being formulated; just as a language exists
before its grammar is written.
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but to do things wfell (to be just)"*.
This consists of 3 parts:
- a psychological remark,
- admission of it as being all right,
- justification, where the last example is the case of
a public servant, who was elected to do only actions beneficial to his
subjects and not to expect thanks *
Nobody can deny correctness in the reasoning of the passage
and austerity in the criticism. But one can ask oneself how this
formula was reached. One must bear in mind that all these aphorisms
were written during a period of difficult ^om unal life, when the !c
arrogance of power from one side and all consequent frustrations, the
corruption of services and finally the overthrow of an empire and its
succession by another tyranny, gave a bttter experience to citizens of
nearly all Greek city-states.
In the light of these conditions this point is more intelligible;
a candidate for election must know that by his very candidacy he
promises to do good for the citizens; if he does so, he is not
1* fr* 265:
xwv i*||j.a3"CT]|f£vihv oi crv9pwTCOi pE|iv£axai jiaXXov
rj tujV e6 -rtETtoirniEVuv. xat yarp 5'xauov ouxoh ' :ocr»i£p
<y&p xbv> x?eS xapaxaxaB^xaS An:o6i6($vxa oi!> XP^)
£xaiVE tcBai, xbv 6£ p,f) AitoS i6<5vxa xaxSS <£xoueiv xat
xaaxetv, outgo xal xbv apxovxa. ofl y&p tnI xouxip
/
-ap£9r) tas xaxCSS xoi?Gfwv, &XX' (as e6.
/,
TToOjG ^ v
Havelock, op. cit., 149: he (D.) envisages a contract with time-limit.
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praiseworthy} he simply does his duty, which is to keep his promise#
<hat seems austere at first sight is simply consistent ith O.'s demand
for personal responsibility. If he recommended one to feel the sense
of self-respect, when silently Ju in., oneself (264), he is right to
demand of people who come to power to be consistent to what they have
promised to do and were elected for.1 To keep the promise is an
obligation, since it creates some expectations, i.e. a right for the
others.
frois another bitter exp rience which U.'s generation had. In periods
of crisis in political life men of reputation avoid interfering in
public affairs; then the road is open for scoundrels, who are able to
promise and break their promise without any hesitation, who can swear
oaths and com;.it perjury; as for their behaviour fr. 254 sleaks
clearly; " hen base men enter upon o i ice, the more umorthy they are,
,.2
the more neglectful, and they are filled with folly and arrogance.
Three vices are enuaez'atod, probably in a progression of wickedness:
negligence, folly, arrogance. The last one seems to be more emphasised
by D. 'dhat Thucydides describee! as arrogant behaviour of Athenian
1. Guthrie, History II 495; A bad ruler should be blamed, but a
good one deserves no special praise, since he is only carrying out
the duty for which he was elected.
C \ , / ;? \ \ c/,l
2. fr. 254: o (, KotKei tovtts ^oca "tc-p-a-S
Perhaps the cool reasoning we found in fr. 265 is justifiable
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Imperialism, this same vice D. points out in the individual.1
Reasonably from these discussions the following question
2
arises! are these passages a criticism of democracy? do they
3
betray undemocratic feeling?
The answer will be brief!
a# Ve have noticed al eady that many of D.'s fragments with
political content are understandable only in a democratic background
(260, 262, 265).
b. If D. was an enemy of Democracy, his enmity would have emerged in
many ways throughout his aphorisms; and, to be sure, such an enmity
would be incompatible with some central concepts of his ethical
theory (persuasion e.g. - fr. 181).
1. Whether arrogance is the result of power or of having honours
beyond one's worth is a question of little interest, since both
these causes are usually closely connected. Both are bad companions
for human weakness. Demosthenes (On Olynthus, 1.23 (16) ) accepted
a generalisation! "to enjoy success beyond one's abilities is a
source of arrogance".
fj • f-tzc. Ke.i ,
2. RE Suppl. 12 cols. 211-212! Er missbilligt die Exzesse
des politischen Konkurrenzkampfes in einer Demokratie attischen
Musters.
3. Aalders, op. cit. p. 306.
Gf. fh. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 368-9.
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c. On the contrary, one of his fragments (251) betrays - we
have seen - a warm preference for democracy.
d. /hen one tries to improve a machine (we accept the view that D.'s
remarks intended to point out what improvements were necessary for the
democracy he knew) he does so because he likes it or does not dislike
it. The next passage betrays explicitly such an intention: "how to
improve the policy of the constitutional form we love".1
The disputable fragment says: (I) The constitutional form
presently established has no device against wrong being done to (or by)
men in authority, even if they are perfect...... (II)....... ..(Ill) Some¬
how the constitution should be so ordered as to cover the following
case also: if a man (either magistrate or a common citizen) does no
wrong himself, no matter how thoroughly he censures wrong-doers (citizens
or magistrates) he should never find himself in their power. If his
acts are right, some defence, of ordinance or otherwise, should be
there to protect him."2
1. Cf. Schmid-31Shi in, op.cit.,291: Nur einmal riigt er nicht nur einen
Ubelstand in der zeitgenossischen Demokratie, sondern macht auch einen
Vorschlag zum Besseren....
2. fr. 206: (i) lit)xav^ tp) vuv kqcGecjtCtt f5u6|i~ oflx
dfitxeiv xobS apyovxaS > r)V xat xavu dyaOot ewctv.
(2) obSevt ydp eoixev ¥j ^outc? tbv (* * * ) abxbv dcp*
Zilpoiii y ifyveaQaf [5) 6e? 6t xwS ouxa) xat taOxa
xoc!iTi9~vat» oxwS & iirjbbv d5ixewv, r)v xat Ttavu ^xa '•,) xou£
dbiHEOVxaS» (it) Ax dxsCvouS yev^exaL, dXXd xtS rj 3cP*ibS
t| xt aXAo Apuvet xw xd 5'xata xoieuvxi.
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It consists of 3 parts:*
a. discovery of a difficulty in the constitutional form the author
had in mind,
b. explanation of the difficulty (perhaps a lacuna appears here),
c. a proposal or rather a wish, that some measure be put in
operation to stop this inconvenience which appeared in the
beginning of the passage.
1. Once again we find this tripartite schema of a "rounded aphorism"
(cf • 265, 173, 181: kp .... J <x $ p ^ Slo it £_p ,
191: «V 3p Xp 01 in* toT5 ^uVdLTOts ouv.... Toc'-z^is ft"-?--)
It consists of 3 parts: thesis or problem, explanation
or justification, solution or proposal. It is tempting to
infer that this schema is characteristic of D.'s style; it is a
way of thinking and expounding thought with clarity and brevity.
Perhaps 5u.ck. aphorisms occupied the place of "theorems" in
a larger text; and were accompanied (followed) by longer and
more detailed explanations. Collectors found it easy to collect
the "theorems", which thus found a way to exist independently
and finally remained the only survivals of D.'s thought.
A simpler schema is that which consists of two parts:
a thesis and a justification or explanation (172, 176, 178, 179,
187, 261). This is more frequent, but not peculiar to D.'s style.
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The dispute cm the meaning of this text comes from the fact
that the second part of it is perhaps corrupted and so we do not know
the content of the explanation of the difficulty;"'' consequently we
carrot(understand well) penetrate the meaning of the problem (first
part) and the proposed solution (third part).
So the first question is; who wrongs whom? Is "archontas"
the subject or object to "adikein"? Many scholars following Diels
2 3
take ''archontas" as the victims in this relation. According to the
1. So Natorp (op. cit. 116) pointed out the difficulty and tried
(in footn. 40) to give a free translation.
2. By this term are denoted public servants who had been elected
for an annual period of service after which they had to give
account of their actions. In some cases they could be wrongly
accused by people whom they had treated not wrongly but rightly
and perhaps strictly.
Cf. Aalders op. cit. p. 309.
3. o Sinclair (op. cit. p. 66) who nevertheless in a footn. says
that this explanation is not certain.
Earlier Th. Gomperz (Greek Thinkers, pp. 368-69)
characterised fr. 266 as a remarkable pas sage "in which the worst
evil of democratic institutions is assailed. It attacks the
dependence of the authorities on the judgement of the populace -
on the very persons, accordingly, whom it is their bounden duty to
hold in check." But from such "counterattacks" the victims are
not the "archontes" but democratic institutions, on the authority of
the thinker who wrote fr. 251.
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grammar inversion of the roles is possible with the implication that
even good "archontes" when criticised are prone to wrong their opponents
by a counterattack.•.using the power with which they are entrusted.
But we lack certainty for the second part of the fr., for
which various proposals have been made by scholars.1 So one possibility
a. Th. Gomperz accepts the following correction: o^tvi a i (
0ir tfVttoZcc yi-
Ij-v 66 v<u. (see DK 11.200. footn.) and translates (Greek Thinkers,
p. 369); "as things are, it is like delivering the (royal) eagle
into the power of the reptiles."
b. K. Freeman (Ancilla to Presocratics, pp. 115-116) remarks that
Uiels was wrong to mark a lacuna and she tries to justify the following
translation:..."for it is not likely to anyone else (any more) than
for oneself, that he will show himself the same man in different
circumstances." She takes "archontes" as subject of adikein,
adding the remark: "power may corrupt even the best." Lord
Acton, as it seems to me, would recognise something of his thought
in the last motto, but he would not accept the oversimplification
proposed by the translator.
c. Ten years ago K.E. Chatjistefanou (Stasinos, Cyprus, 1963,
pp. 137-41) after a careful reexamination of the problem proposed
the following correction: o(j5f.vI yap aXXci) EOtuev t) xbv
<apxovx<x xb SiVxtov d*o6i6<5vat, rjv npoet6tbS -cuyxavr),
ixlpouS m£v toSv iykxripcttwv 6'kt)v xayx^vetv autw




And he translates:•••••because it is natural for a magistrate to give
justice to himself and nobody else in cases where he knows that
although he himself has the possibility to bring other people into
court and to become himself the judge of complaints (turned) against
him, he will never (be in need to) come under the sovereignty and juris¬
diction of others.
d. Luria (Democritea, p. 146, no. 613) accepts Gomperz's text and translates
(p. 362): according to now established order there is no possibility
whatsoever that the rulers, even if they are completely well-doers,
would not commit injustice. Such a ruler first of all is like
an eagle directing his threat (anger) against a snake.... (My thanks
to MiloS IvaviS).
All these scholars - translators:
1. accept that there is a lacuna (Freeman's disagreement is not
based on any argument),
2. accept that the text with or without the lacuna constitutes a
justification or explanation of the first part,
3. take different positions on whether "archontes" is subject or
object of "adikein".
Only a reply to this question (if possible) would give the final and
correct interpretation of the passage as a whole. But the text
as it is does not help.
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remains: to try two alternative interpretations of the third part
(corresponding to those mentioned above for the first) and explore
the implications. Of course, it is not an orthodox solution, but it
has the possibility of teaching the true meaning of the passage (and
discovering the intention of the author) given that the second part of
it (the lacuna) is only an explanation for the first, and not an
essential part of the reasoning (problem - solution).
It is evident that the meaning of the last part depends
substantially on the first; there is a kind of correspondence between
their subject-verb-object sche ata. In the first part the question
was "ho wrongs whom?"; in the third it is: "who is he who does no
wrong?" (in order to be protected from becoming the victim of wrongdoers
in the future)•
a. If he is the "archon",^" then the whole passage is a wish for
some improvement of the institution of the so called "euthunai" on
behalf of the authorities.
b. But if he is a citizen, outspokenly criticizing tne "archontes"
and for this reason is mistreated (punished) by them wrongly, then the
whole passage is a proposal for a way to be found to protect these
courageous people who with a free tongue" criticize the "archontas" on
behalf of the pe pie (community).
1. "Archontes" as a political power mean: executive authority rather
than legislative sovereignty. Cf. Havelock, op. cit., p. 150.
2. Gf • fr. 226: i eft. o v £y]fu^"£pi v\<> ~ir Kc'v^ovoS
£ t ToJ K OOLP S <s tS ■
299
From both these hypotheses the following inferences are
reasonable:
a. In either case we find an appeal for correction of an institution
on behalf of Justice and therefore the community.
b. In neither alternative is there a proposal to aoolish dialogue
and criticism. Therefore:
c. One thing must be excluded: that the passage is an attack
a .ainst democracy.
The question nevertheless remains: which of the two hypotheses
should be adopted? (who wrongs whom? who is wronged to be protected?).
The ambiguity we found both in the first and third parts (possibly in
the middle too) might be intentional, since both sides (archontes-
citizens) wanted (potentially) justice and needed protection from each
other. D.'s proposal is not to cancel but to improve an institution,
not to avenge but to compensate justice by a more elaborate system."1"
1. He uses a characteristic term: xJ yj v orL which
(means) implies a continuous change towards perfection and/or
beauty; his mind moves not in static forms but in dynamic relations,
changing and demanding a continuous rearrangement and flexibility
(adaptation). Cf. Havelock, p. 140:••.both "cosmos and "rut mos"
are dynamic terms describing an animated order and a moving shap#.
30O.
A final remark: at the beginnin ; of the passage are found the
"credentials" of the authenticity and intention of the author.^ What
is the meaning of "constitutional form presently established"?
a. Is it a tyranny (of any type)? then "archontas" only can do
wrong (subject of adikein); and the proposal is to introduce criticism
2
by free speech (which means democracy).
b. Is it a democracy? then a proposal to improve dispensation of
justice is introduced (maintaining the constitutional form).
Whatever interpretation be given to the crucial fr. we must
recognise an effort (perhaps the first in the history of Justice) to
C0u.Y~-t
introduce a court of Appeal, a Constitutional or something like
that, for cases of dispute between citizens and the State.
1. fr. 266: 0 v <£ £ p*. i ce
a. No device..•.therefore a device is needed; such a device is
proposed or wished.
L A, '
b. p u vp_o$ is a term the presence oi which in different parts
of D.'s work seems to endorse genuineness and authenticity:
I
- In Physics: pd£ p*-oS (A 38. B 139)
1 /
- In Epistemology: t Tf t p u & (B )&)
c
- In Ethics: p o 6 pcoi/vt-hc-c 197)
- In politics: p "U t9 (B 266)
- In Education: pt it aup ucr^oi — ju. (tap u erf* cov x. col, 33).
All of them (save p \J ) are Hapaxlegomena in Greek Thought.
2. Cf. Thucydides III.42.1-5.
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6. Defence of the city-State.
Some aphorisms (257-60) describe a number of "principles" which
are necessary for the very existence of a community1 (in the frame of
a city-state, a conecption which prevails in D.'s political thought).
Defence of a community from outside is the first duty for
survival. It includes repulsion of two dangers: from animals and men.
Organised war against animals had been recognised as a necessary stage
in man's social advance; it was a reality; D. takes this reality and
uses it in a genetic way to establish criteria for right and wrong. He
says: "if an animal does wrong or desires to do wrong and if a man kill
..2
it he shall be counted exempt from penalties.... To kill dangerous
animals is an action on behalf of the community; the killer is praise¬
worthy. And this same recommendation, continuous war against potentially
aggressive creatures, is repeated in the form of a duty: "One must at all
••3
costs kill all those creatures which do hurt contrary to .justice....
1. Havelock (op. cit. 127 ff.) gives a systematic analysis of them; he
believes that they represent "axioms for how a community could be
able to found itself". But D. seems simply to describe conditions of
hia environment. Cf. Thue. 1.6.1: iTcl6ol /"-p 1 Circes }€i^-
/ P \ \ 1 _ / ' / \?
' ~ ~
6 £6 S Kou 0(JK
2. fr. 257: HaT& ecrxtv cpovou nat pt) cpSvov
exe*-' ^ Afttneovxa Hal n^Xovxa afiu'Eiv dQcpoS 6 hxe'vwv,
Cf.1.5.1-3.
Z y) v
xat itpbS eOeoxovv xooxo eo5eiv paWov r)
3. fr. 258: htetvelv XP^ TtripaCvovxa rcapd S'ht)v udvxa Ttept
n;avx<5S" nal xatfxa <5 itoiwv e69uiiLr)S (?) nat 5'. Hips nat
QdcpcreoX nal KxVfcrewS (?) £v navxl n<5crp(p |i£Cw poipav
'leQeF.e t.
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It is obvious that here the protection of community is pre¬
scribed as a duty to each member of it; prizes also are recognised. In
their simplest form appear paired duties and rights. In both passages
we recognise a formulation of principles rather than methods of action.
Necessarily they appear as impersonal generalisations.*
From the viewpoint of the social group the concepts of just
and unjust in a very primitive way could be described "as symbols of
aggression on the one hand and repulsion or correction of the aggression
on the other."2
With a simple metaphor mutatis mutandis these principles are
transferred to men as aggressors: "as has been laid down regarding beasts
and reptiles which are Inimical (to man) so I think one should, according
to ancestral law, kill an enemy of the com! ,unity in every ordered society,
unless a law forbids it. But there are prohibitions in every State:
sacred law (religious asylum), treaties, oaths."
1. Havelock (op. cit. 130-131): "strictly speaking D. has no word for
individuals, i.e. for individual self-subsistent personality".
This is a misinterpretation, because principles of political conduct
are necessarily generalising; the conduct of the individual is nec¬
essarily visualised as social. The agent in the frr. under discussion
is not neglected: he acts impersonally, but he is rewarded individu¬
ally, both directly and indirectly, since the agent as amember of the
com .unity will share security, justice, and freedom.
2. Havelock, 131.
3. fr. 259. oHCbSTtop xept xiva5eojv is xal yEypacpocxat
xwv noXepfwv > ot>tio nal naxic dvQpamwv 6ohel poi ypewv
etvai xolelv' xaxd v<5u.ovS tofts xaxp'ouS xxeifvetv xoAeuiov
£v xavxl x<5apcp, £v (7> pt) v<5poS AneCpyet' &%eCpyei
tepd ^xdaxoicri £iuxwpia xal crxovSat xat opxot.
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In the treatment of men as aggressors some more elaboration
and modification is provided: (I) there are some customary-lawful
limits (oaths etc.), (2) condemnation is not applied on the assumption
(suspicion) only that someone is a potential aggressor£ although in
other cases the intention itself was enough criterion})(3) seme more
sophisticated procedure is described in the following passage: "if
a man kill any highwayman or pirate, he shall be counted exempt from
penalty whether (he kill) by direct action or by orders or by vote."^
Perhaps the provision of "orders" and "vote" is reserved for
captives or war prisoners when there is time for consultation, discussion,
voting (cf. the case of the Thebans kept in Plataia during the first
year of the Pel. War).
Again we notice strong feelings for the protection of the
2
community, and confessedly strict principles of treatment of aggressors;
1. fr. 260: Kcti /I p 6 v flocatoc KztL^tJv ~C L<, at $to a J
tl'vj Koci ouJlOpUjO l\ KOU. Kl2iOurv Kail i/'/jouj .
2. Bailey, op. cit., 209: There is a Draconian sterness about this..
Guthrie, History, II 495: "His humane sentiments applied only
to law-abiding citizens within one's own State."
But it should be noticed, that for lawbreaking citizens, the
penal code never provides sentence of death; there is a distinction
between: (a) criminals who must be punished anyway (exile,
imprisonment or other punishment, fr. 262 beginning) and (b) those
who fail to fulfil their own duty, i.e. to apply the laws, for which the
punishment is described as their own remorse (fr. 262 end).
303a
Note. 2. to p. 303 ctd.
V\
On the other hand the austerity (sternjess) of these Draconian
principles whould be placed and judged in the historical background
of D.'s age. Cf. the treatment of Theban captives by Plataians (1st
year of the War), of Plataians by Thebans-Spartans (3rd year of the War).
Cf. also: Plato's Prot., 322 C-D: where it is proposed that whoever
could not share in aidos and dike must be put to death as a threat to
the city's interests.
In D.'s frr. death for citizens is not provided.
*
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again the wish or necessity to protect the community is generalised and
expressed as a duty (fr. 259)
So far the principles discussed have a character of collective
protection and selfishness. But the next one "carries us beyond selfish
2considerations."'" D. says: "one must punish wrongdoers to the best
of one's ability, and not neglect it. Such conduct is just and good, but
the neglect of it is unjust and bad,'*" This passage proceeds from
problems of security from outside to the demand of Justice inside the
4
borders of a State; it ascribes an obligation and recognises a right
(to protect and be protected), (see next paragraph).
To conclude the problem of security: it consists of 2 basic
ideas:
a. repulsion and punishment of aggressors,
b. punishment of law-breakers in the interior.
Problems of foreign policy are not mentioned. They should
5
be faced in terms analogous to relations among citizens: the principle
C/ \ \ ? Q / X ~
1. fr. 259:... 0 V -Cw, k ou. Secret. ct.vi/puBujv' ooklc f*-°i
v T ~
^ Clj v Lc V TT O L fc C V • • • •
2. Havelock, 133.
3. fr. 261: dc5 ixouuevo ten tt|ia)petv xatft Sdvapiv XP^) wa^
h?) naptevea* tb pbv yJtp toloutov Slh-xiov xal AyaGov»
tb 6b |it) toloutov abtxov xat xaxov.
4. Aalders, 306-7: D. does not regard law as something arbitrary, but as
founded on objective principles of justice and righteousness; (260,261,262)
...That he assumed.•.that right and good had an objective ground, is also
apparent from frr. 69...193...217....
H. 5-teck«.Lj
5. , .IE Suppl. 12 (1970) col.212: Probleme der Aussenpolitik
scheinen bei ihm, wenn er sie behandelte,...von der gleichen Dimension
gewesen zu seln wie die des gerechten Zusaminenlebens innerhalb eines
Staates.
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of justice and non-aggressiveness on a mutual basis should be accepted.
In cases of aggression from one side, defence by all means and if
possible punishment of aggressors is the only right policy.
7. Obligations and Rights. Sununum Bonum in political life: Freedom
in Democracy.
It is too early to seek a clear distinction and classification
and correspondence between these two concepts. But from those passages
which refer to political life we can pick up some elements or some
obvious implications of D.'s political thought and classify them
according to our conceptual system.
A. If we accept that social or political duty is whatever is necessary
or required or what one is morally obliged to do (in the frame of social-
political life) as opposed to what one may be pleased or inclined to doj
then from the material we possess the following duties are summarised:
a. To pursue political knowledge (techne) even at the cost of
much labour (fr. 157).
b. To give attention and interest to the problems of the State
(252) even if it means a direct or indirect negligence of one's
private affairs (253).
c. Not to pursue power against the interests (and the wish) of the
community; therefore also not to misuse office entrusted by the
State (252).
d. Particularly when one is a candidate for office one must bear in
one.'}
mind that one s duty is to keep promise and this is one s
only justification (265).
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e# By all means one has the obligation to contribute to the defence
of the State from any external danger (257-260),
f. Inside the borders of the State one has to contribute to the
performance of justice; namely:
I, one must be law-abiding (248),
II, one must help the wronged (261),
III, one must help the poor (for reasons of social justice, order,
peace (2. 5, 237$ and contribute to homonoia which is the first
good for the life of the community and the source of collective
power for the repulsion of aggressors (250),
g. Parents are warmly recommended to educate their children (280).
B • Rights!
a. From the same passage (280) one concludes that children have an
unwritten right to be educated in order to become better for themselves
andthe community.
b. The right to Justice emerges automatically from the mutuality
implied from frr. 261, 256,
c. If one contributes tqthe defence of th State and the validity
of law, one has the reasonable right to enjoy the security provided
by the ftate and the protection of law,
d. The crown of rights is obviously liberty;1 it is given the place
1. In connection with frr, 248, 252, 253, 255, 2U6, liberty may be
defined as: (a) freedom of activity in private life according to
the necessary demands of social life, (b) freedom of participation
in political activity on behalf of the community and in accordance
with the lav/s, without fear of violent or improper opposition
(aggression),
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of criterion (fr. 251). Here a pair of constitutional forms are
compared; one is condemned, the other explicitly preferred on the ground
that the latter secures liberty for the citizens. No other explanation
is given; and the structure of the aphorism permits the conclusion
that liberty is the absolute "criterion", the presence of which makes a
constitutional form absolutely preferable to any other.
v.'hat precisely d. meant by this term we cannot trace in
the ruins we possess of his political thought. In fr. 226 we read that
"openness (frankness) of speech is the sign of freedom."1 Sincerity
accompanies freedom, but it is not clear whether freedom of will (moral
problem) or freedom of the individual (political demand, right) is
meant by this term in this passage. But from the second part of it
2
(: the danger lies in discerning the right occasion) one mi ht infer
that here the meaning of freedom is social or political, since a free
tongue occasionally entails risks. This remark leads also to the
conclusion that freedom in D.'s view was not a "donum" without dangers,
particularly when used for criticism against arbitrary rulers (cf.
fr. 238, perhaps 266 too). It is one more reason for someone to prefer
that kind of constitutional form which provides political liberty as
1. fr. 226: OCK^LOV £^LV-hf)i^s Tf ocf f) VJ e J Klv^VVd s y
tou Kou|>oJ 6ls-
2. On the other hand wo have agreed that the freewill problem was
i ,
not discovered until after Aristotles days.
See paragraph "On Freewill'".
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an inalienable right of the citizens.* Whether this right is natural
or conventional is not questioned in the material we possess. But
from the analysis of law (248) and the problem of state-defence
(previous paragraph) one might infer that in D.'s thought liberty is
a natural and self-reasonable condition, the limits of which are in
some way "conventionalised" by the necessity of living in a civilised
community for reasons <S>f collective security and mutual benefit. So
a man is conceived to be "at liberty to do any action which is not one
..2
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons.
3
What does 9. really mean by liberty? (251) Political
liberty is the area within which a man can lead his private life
unobstructed by others. If he is pr vented from doing what he could
otherwise do, then be is in that degree unfree; and if this area is
contracted by intervention of others (the ruler e.g., or his
administration) beyond a certain minimum, he can be described as being
coerced or in that way enslaved. Such an image of the transformation
of a freeman into a slave is obvious behind the wording of fr. 251.
Coercion of any kind and degree is openly rejected.
1. Cf. the justification given by Thucydides (II.40.3) for freedom of
speech (Pericles speaking): Ov tojj To"lj l^OLS
TTpo^l Sot.^ Vy VCLX. |u£/Uov -rtpor£yDov *
"£tu a*
2. H.L.A. Hart, Are there any natural rights? in Political Philo¬
sophy ed. by Anth. Quinton, p. 53.
3. Schmid-Stahlin, op. cit. 289: Aber im Staat muss Freiheit und
Gluck aller dfrrger.•.das Siel sein.
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Liberty,1 to be sure, doesn't mean licence; liberty is
accompanied by law; if law is a kind of coercion it is self-coercion,
since it is voted by the citizens on behalf of the community.
Such limits of political liberty provide the right of a
citizen to lead his private life and pursue happiness in his own way
provided that he obeys the laws and does not coerce Others, In this
sense liberty includes the meaning of mutual respect and finally emerges
as the "summum bonuro" in political life.
If liberty is a right and entails reasonably the obligation
i
to respect the same right for all the members of the community, then the
preference of a specific kind of state-form is automatically inferred!
the constitution which provides for all citizens this right-obligation!
2
to be free and treat others as equally free; it is called democracy.
Direct participation of citizens (which was a possibility
in Greek city-states) is regarded as the only way to produce (pass,
vote) laws which do not mean coercion of anyone by anyone else, but
self-1imitation. Such an interpretation of democratic legislative
procedure agrees with the sense of persuasion we have seen in other
pages. And such a constitution guarantees the conditions - even in
1. It seems difficult to follow Aalders' reasoning (op.cit. p,,311)
and conclude with him that! "the great Atomist does not regard
liberty in the first place as a political principle, but as a
principle of personal life."
2. Cf. Thucyd. II. 37.1! K ctl o ju <*, ^ |A "
0/1 ^ TT^tLOVOti OLKlL\/
t ,
K i K. /\ p £ .
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poverty - for a free man to live a Li-^e wor"U I > »" "ij •
If we could know with certainty the historical background of
fr# 251, it would help us to understand better the conception both of
democracy and of freedom in democracy. To suppose that by "despots"
(dynastai) D. means "the oligarchic rulers installed by Lysander
O
(404 BO)'"1' is reasonable but not demonstrable. One thin^, may be
regarded as certain: this beautiful aphorism is a reply to some
opponents: believers in tyranny, oligarchy, but not ;emocracy.
Their advocacy included the same liymn which is used throughout the
centuries of dispute on such problems: "Tyranny (perhaps under a
different title) guarantees prosperity among other privileges". D.
1. Gf. Plato's irony (Rep. 562 a-c): 8r|p.0XpaT I ocv etnov
xovxo ydtp not) £v 5"n|j.oxpaT;ou;i£V}j tcSXei AxotfaatS av &S
eyet te xaXUffxov xal 5t3c toOto £v ySvy xcrvxy a^tov
otxetv ccrCiS cptScret £XeuQepoS.
2. Aalders, 304. On the other hand, the use of the term "dynastes"
seems not to be without a specific purpose; for D., we have noted,
had a strong sense of the literary meaning of the words (see
frr. 26, 129-140); and "dynastes" here speaks loudly of the use
of force (dynamis), which, to be sure, strengthens the preference
for freedom and its political dress: democracy.
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answers! "i would prefer poverty but in a climate of freedom,1
2
therefore I would prefer democracy, where law is the king (not the
caprice of the tyrant), where law is a ruler created by us, ruling on
our behalf (24a)."
Of course he does not seem to have accepted that prosperity
really is a privilege of tyranny; he uses an expression (: of the
so-called prosperity) betraying that it is only a concession to his
(personal or impersonal) interlocutor. Thus, on the other hand, he
succeeds in giving much more emphasis in his preference-advocacy of
democracy•
ICven in the best days of classical Greek democracy advocacy
of tyranny could be heard; but it became more frequent after the
Athenians' unsuccessful expedition to .Sicily (415-413); and the
dispute was at its height after 404 PC• If we say that fr. 251 mirrors
political disputes of the period nround 4O0 BC., we are likely to be near
the true chronology of D.'s utterance.
r / t ' >- <- c r
1. Cf. Arist. Politics, 1310a 29; duo OL£ J * if*-°-
K p a. t l oc s 0 yO C £ $ A- o "C .u ~C 0 77 ^ £. / 0 V ^ UI q v
\ ? 1 0 '
v com- K r ^ i /) t v vl c L •
2# '/V ° ° 5 ^ i? (^£ US
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8. Who Is to rule? (axiocracy)
whatever constitutional arrangement there may be, there
will remain the crucial question: whose authority is to rule?''" and
why has one the obligation to obey the laws, when someone else is
in power?
There are (roughly speaking) two answers:
a. The stronger has the right to rule.
b. All(the) citizens have the right collectively to decide for
their problems.
In the first case obedience equals subjection; it means
superficial order, but internal dissatisfaction and possibly conspiracy
or decline. In the second the procedure of decisions sometimes is
turbulent and order is shaken, disobedience appears and perhaps a
feeling of disappointment temporarily prevails.
Some thinkers, seeing the apparent advantages and
disadvantages of both solutions and believing that the "stranger" may
coincide with the "best", propose an "authoritarianism of the best".
Others, believing in the "best" but not in authoritarian methods, try
to find them in a climate of freedom and of democratic procedure. D.
seems to have been a believer in "the best by free election". In
what degree it is attainable is another question.
In fr. 268 we read: "fear engenders flattery, but it has
no good will." We should remember how strongly flattery as a feature
1. Frr. 47, 49, 75 to be discussed among others in this par. come
from both collections; on the other hand their content is
by fr. 267.
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of human characters was criticised; it is impossible for D. to
adopt methods in political life which encourage this hateful characteristic
» 2
of the individual s behaviour. This aphorism speaks for freedom,
against any kind of forceful rule, on the ground that fear (result of
suppression) is not a creative power.
t
This view does not imply acceptance (and forgiveness) of
mistakes of a democratic arrangement. A free thinker, free also from
passions and prejudices, must be able to see these mistakes (misuse of
freedom e.g. or power).
Bad citizens when in power display themselves at their worst
(254). Such an experience is a source of disappointment for good
citizens who conclude (fr. 49): "it is hard to be governed by one's
„4
inferior.
1. See paragraph "On Friendship". Cf. frr. 192, 97, 113, 114, 115.
2. Freedom of speech is the essence of democratic procedure. Cf.
Thuc.III.42.
3. fr. 254) ol KclKo) toi/zts id
jj, /?7ov oc v a. KVj $ e 1 vo v Ccm_ K o*Y o( (j>p 06 K °t-c '
€ £eS 771 A T7/I t
'
H \ 0 c \ /
4. fr. 49 (St. IV.4.27): X /I £. TT« v o( f> X t £ vcla- v tt 0 xtptlovos .
Bailey, op. cit. 211: "strangely Platonic aphorism...This suggests
that D. didn't think that public office was in itself the best thing for
his philosopher, but that occasionally the philosopher must be king for
fear of a worse ruler." It seems difficult to follow these implications;
the aphorism under interpretation expresses dissatisfaction if one (good
citizen) is to be governed by a bad-mannered ruler. D. would not happily
accept a position of ruler; at the most he would not reject that of a
counsellor (adviser) (see fr. 47 Stob. Ill.1.45).
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It is not unusual for political thought to begin from the
disappointment a good citizen feels when ruled by a bad ruler or a
corrupt administration or both. One can, then, condemn the whole system
which opens the way to power for all, or can seek for an improvement
of the system. D. seems to have followed the second solution. He
says: "for fools it is better to be ruled"The justification is
self evident; they will not render themselves nuisances and will more
probably feel the benefits of other more effective rulers. It is
2
better for people to be ruled by a phronimos leader. Such arrangement
of political affairs is in accord with nature, on the ground that: "by
/ •>/ n ~ ■> / jV >/
1# fr. 75: l< f t-6 Tecs OLVoy X.OL 6 lv y .
Cf. Plato, Laws, 690B: tov K (> t l rro^«- y_\ v ^ To*
See also: Alcibiades I 135 B 7.
Aalders (op. cit. 3C8-9) writes: ...some traits are to be found
in his frr. which seem even antidemocratic (quotation of 49, 75)
...a strong contrast to the words which were spoken (Thuc. III. 37)
by the pur sang (?) democratic Athenian Clean, viz. that mediocre
people are the best to rule the state.But,
(a) Cleon speaks for his political interest,
(b) Cleon does not represent democracy,
(c) democracy does not claim the right of fools to become rulers.
c \ / Q
2. Cf. Plato, Rep. 590 d: oc{*■ ttvov wo 9/°°WL
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nature it is more fitting for a better man to rule."*"
D.'s ethics are founded on self-respect and persuasion and
leave room for freedom of will and responsibility (frr. 264, 2^4, 84, 181);
it would be unexpected and inconsistent for him to introduce force in
political life. We remember the analysis of fr. 248 (Law) and 251
(Constitutional form). In the same sense D. recommends: "to obey
the law and the magistrate and a wiser man is an ornament vis political
\ ) / 5 / _ /
1. fr. 267: <f o & e c to OLKyLov Kf£6Zci/t.
/ \ N
Cf. Gorgias, on Helen 6 (DK II. 290 1-3): if £ ^ u Kg . . r0 ^ tv
K- p t L £> <o o v ^ L G S j Z. o £ t £ Z o C Tf E Z Ooz_
See Plato, Gorgias, 483d.
Two remarks are necessary:
a. Cp -J 6 ll does not imply any kind of force, but (In accord with D.'s
educational views) the use of reason and persuas on.
b. Kp£.t6£>ov and x tip <s v (or 6 6cV ) do not necessarily mean
stronger and weaker respectively, but also better or worse in character.
This is the first choice of meaning, unless the context itself shows the
sense of strength (see e.g. fr. 238 or paragraph: on the meaning of
fr. 83).
Thucydides, who saw in power the source of arrogance and
aggressiveness, found clearer expressions for his aphorisms: cctc Ka^t-
C Clo Co S CcV yj6 C uo yno Zero Vva. Zoj x ip b~U Kolz (l- 76- 2).
Cf. IV. 61. 5. See: E. Toppitsch, op. cit., p. 51.
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. isdoai)".* His recommendation sounds like advice addressed to free
citizens, an appeal for good understanding for reasons of mutual
cooperation on behalf of the community (cf. fr. 255)•
1* Guthrie, History, II. 495: As a child of his time D« had to
show where he stood in the controversy of "Law versus nature".
Should one bow to "nomos" (custom or convention crystallised
in law) or follow physis, nature, which some Sophists exalted
in contrast with it? ......in practical life.....he (D.)
upheld it, in the narrower sense of law. "it is proper to be
obedient to law, to the ruler, and to the wiser."
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9. The Philosopher and the State
If a city-state with its conventions and laws is the place
for a good citizen to live, and if this place is also the seat for a
wise man, since he has to stay somewhere, this does not mean that a
wise man recognises this as a necessary limitation for his thought}
his thought can embrace t e whole universe.1
D. as a scientist was a child not of his birth-place, Abdera,
nor purely of Greece, but of the world. He owed much of his
scientific experience to his visits to eastern countries. His
2
confession of this fact takes a tone of pride in fr. 299, but it might
also be interpreted as an expression of favourable memory. Such
gratitude may well sometimes overcome the artificial or emotional
borders of a native place and recognise the fact that the scientist
and the wise man has the right and the duty to belong to the world.
His native place, on the contrary, could not understand his greatness
1. Natorp, op. cit. 117: "...der "weise", d.h. der Wissenschaftliche
lorscher auch dem Staat gegentiber seine Freiheit wahrt und selbst
an das Vaterland sich nicht schlechthin bindet, denn sein Vaterland
ist die Welt." Perhaps in the light of these thoughts and
of fr. 247 (to be quoted in the next page) and 264 a correct
interpretation might be found for A 166.
2. Fr. 299 (spurious according to DK) will be discussed in the next
paragraph: On Education.
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and occasionaliy brought him sorrows.* Such an experience and such
feelings stay have dictated this aphorism: "To a wise man, the whole
earth is open; for the native land of a good soul is the whole earth
„2
(universe)• ttisdoa overcomes barriers as do bravery and glory in
3
a famous aphorism of Pericles.
4
la this passage a declaration of cosmopolitanism jn the sense
1. On the trial for D.'s "squandered" property see: BL IX 36, IX 39.
Cf. Luria, emocritea, p. 17: D. in patriam redit, in Jus vocatur,
gloria potltur.
2. i'r. 247: cLv<Tpt eo(f,Z -ncl&cu J'olf
\ c t / ' / ,
1r4C|Oy ° 6 Uy*-77 a~6 Ao
J r- \ ' /
3. Thuc. 11.43.3: Oiv ipZy/ jj'&tyfi t t7 t jp <i^v ias V 7Ta, 6 «_ ~Ca, pvS ■
Is the relation between these two passages one of accidental similarity
?
or ol imit tion. both may be true; a number o similarities mentioned
throughout tiiis invent! ition suggest that a hypothesis that Thuc. and
D. had acquaintance of each other's work (or thought) should not be
rejected.
H . JtecK-e.1
4. 1 (in KZ Suppl. 12, col. 212): Fragllch 1st (neben des
iambischon Trimeters in B 247) ob bei ihm schan dor Gedanke einea
Weltbtlrgortums des velsen ausgebildot 1st.
Cf. I. Lana, l' at lea di bom., 16, footn. 4: Nan v' 6 fagiano di
dubitare dell* autenticit^ dell' franraento.
To suspect the genuineness of a passage on the ground that it is in
a kind of poetical "metre" is risky and mistaken} if generalised such a
criterion would deprive of authenticity numerous fin aphorisms - not
318a
Note 4. to p. 318 ctd«
only of D. - the genuineness of which is beyond any doubt# .(hy
suspect e.g. the following passage (attributed to X?):
"0 innocent lamb of God / sacrificed on the Cross..."?
And why deny that an author, a famous stylist, deliberately tried
sometimes to agglomerate an aphorism giving it euphony and beauty
as much as possible, particularly if it embodied the central idea of
a chapter?
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we know from later centuries? In fact, no; but it is from the point
of view of a wise man a declaration of independence of artificial barriers.
He feels himself a child of the world, since he was a pupil of the
world; and he regards it a duty to recognise that he owes to the world
the acquisition of science and wisdom (299).
D. lived in a period of general challenge to traditional
distinctions between men of noble origin and others, freemen and
2
slaves, Greeks and Barbarians. Therefore it is not strange or
1. a. Cf. Hippias of Elis (Plato, Prot. 337 C): ac v Sf, LS'j
c - ,v'-/ \
|0U Jiic. £ H w ° ft L ^ Oll<ecou5 k:
Cf. W» Jaeger, Paideia, I. 326: T.A. Sinclair, op. cit., p. 66.
b. Diogenes (disciple of Antis|henes) the Cynic (in DL VI.63):
p.<5vT)v e\eye 6pe?)v TtoXiTEi'av eTvat t*)v £v tco H<5a^o>...
'EpwxriGet» u<50ev etr), StocrjionoXfTTjS*1 erot).
Epictetus, Discourse III. 24. 66 (about Diog. the Cynic):
naaa yfj itatpls f|v* ^afpetoS o' oAfiepfa.
c. Crates (Theban, Cynic, c. 315 BC) according to DL VI 98:
cdx e?S 7iaTpo5 |iot TTDpyoS, oil) \iCa axzyr\// Tiaar\i x^P
Hal ii<5\tcypa Hal 6<5^o^etoi}ioS I'mtv £v5 tatTCcaQat Tiapa. aov
See: Sinclair, op. cit. p. 246.
2. Barker, op. cit., pp. 77, 78.
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unexpected for an experienced and obviously unprejudiced man to declare
the destruction of local barriers, at least for wisdom. In his view
he would say: "laws of nature are the same everywhere; wisdom
and goodness can be found everywhere; local customs and laws are
respected as such." Between Pericles' utterance on heroism
( oevcT^cW -noiea- £ratios ) and io enes'
cosmopolitanism (_ n a, 6 <*, yoj -nofC£>i$ J d.'s (scientif ic?
or ethical?) cosmopolitanism if ^vcTpt 7/cteq. y _)
sounds like an intermediate stage.
I. Lana's interpretation of fr. 247 as a full cosmopolitanism*
seems to be rather optimistic and premature for D.'s age; this idea
developed in the course of the fourth century. A cosmopolitanism
should be accompanied by fitting ethical and political theories. Such
ideas were developed 1 or 2 generations after D.'s death. His
beautiful utterance might be better characterised as a personal emotional
outburst, as a flight of recognition over the barriers of the city-states
into the immense field of mankind.
Two final notes will be helpful for a better interpretation
of fr. 247:
a. .'hat does D. mean by "wise man"?
b. Why has he conjoined the ";i e man" and the "good soul"?
1. Lana, op. cit., p. 16: £ uts io C Vei fcioso-fo
p. 23: ma egii ha anche conscienza della difficoltA
estrema....
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a. Renzo Vitall* referring to dmpedocles (A 86), Kritias (B 25) and
Democritus (247) thinks that the "wise man" is the "homo sapiens",
"peritus", "capace" (capable).^ This does not seem to cover the specific
meaning which must be attributed to the "wise man" in this particular
passage (247); in this occurrence at least, tgere is an obvious
differentiations the conjunction of wisdom with goodness, which leads
to our second question.
b. This conjunction comes so naturally in the fragment under discussion
that one reasonably has the impression of an identification of the two
concepts (wise man= good, kind soul or good *ill). A paraphrase of
the passage would run: "for a wise man all the universe is accessible,
because his goodness opens the roads, destroys the walls and barriers."
This leads to: either the wise man by his wisdom and good understanding
of other people is welcomed everywhere, or by his wisdom forming a
good will he renders himself so good that he is welcomed everywhere. The
3
wording of the passage makes more likely the second interpretation.
1. Gorgia: Retorica e Filcsofia, Urbino (19717) pp. 19*22.
2. Vitali in his pages discusses many other cases, which also have
no relation (in their meaning) with D.'s fr. 247. See for
instance: Krit. B 29, Democritus B 26 (VS 11. 148. 11), B 47,
Heracl. 108, Gorgias B 23, Emped. B 146 (VS I. 369, 24 ff.).
3. Cf. a title of D.'s works given by DL (IX.33 VS 68 Ai33):
nTT(.f>} Zyi roJ Go^oZ: <fi CL S~t 6c oS " (mood or
intention?).
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Wisdom is the antecedent, good will the consequence,
wisdom is a condition for good will, perhaps necessary and certainly*
not a sufficient, but an essential condition. And, if wisdom is a
high level of knowledge and understanding of human problems and conduct,
Socratic
w &
then we> are not far from the/view that knowledge (such a knowledge)
Influences (will) conduct so deeply that the doctrine "virtue is
knowledge" must be asserted.
This does not mean that we try to trace imitation (although
it is not impossible or deniable in principle). But these two thinkers
lived in the same age, had some conurton acquaintance (philosophers-
sophists), faced similar problems, both tried to reconstruct confidence
2
in human knowledge and morality and met the same difficulties; onfi of
them was that in the philosophical vocabulary of their age no term was
(;orged) standardised for what we call volition. And, although human
passions play their part in human behaviour, nevertheless, it is also true
that the more knowledge the better morality, forgiveness (particularly if
knowledge mainly is confined in human feelings and is accompanied by a
virtue: moderation). If this connection is true, then knowledge
influences volition (Qemocritus: wisdom is followed by goodness) or forms
and includes volition (Socrates: virtue is knowledge). Both those
thinkers followed the same road, stopped in different places and reached
similar conclusions, differing in the degree (of inclusion of virtue in
knowledge).
1. See paragraph: "what is the meaning of fr. 83?"
2. Cf. J. Burnet, op. cit., p. 157.
See the preface of this research.
323
Part Three: Education:*
Whatever the necessary conditions for acquiring education
and the labour necessary for attaining it may be, education is believed
to be the best companion for men whether they meet good fortune or
misfortune; "education is ornament lor a happy man, refuge for an
unhappy".1
That this idea betrays a degree of personal xperience and
pride is very likely given that: (a) D», when pro seca"tei
(according to the law of his birth-place, Abdera) for having wasted all
2
his property, he presented a "product" of his education (and wisdom)
* Two good contributions on tais subject ares
F• Mesiano's "La Paideia" ch. j£ll in his book on De ocritus' bthics.
G« Silberer, "Natur" und "Lehre" bei Demokrit, in Paedagogica
Historica, 10/2, Gent (U07O) 243-250,
1, fr. 180: TroLL^ecoc tu ft t&r.L Kocp-oi
? — rd f
^ ^/oo 6 ( d t l< ostcL.y> ev .
Cf, Plato, Gorg, 470 D-E where paideia and justice are described
o(A.
(by implication)(sufficient conditions of
happiness,
v/hen reading the second part of the aphorism one reasonably
recollects Boethius' work (written in prison): "De consolatione
Philosophise",
Cf, Bailey, op, cit,, p, I <j g ■. ecq^icip oii o ■£ t/,0U.jkU
47/!? cc L <*. re- y~
2, DL IX 39-40. Luria Democritea, pf.lf'lo.
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and was admired for it and acquitted, (b) he was proud of his
educational travels in eastern countries.^"
It should be remembered that education was a burning problem
during the second half of the fifth century 8C, and other thinkers had
2
explored it before Democritus.
1. fr. 299; 'Eytb 51 xffiv Hat' AvGpcSnwv yrfv uXe(axr\v
i-rten:Xavr|crc?iir)V Caxop£wv xA jjnfaicrxa next 4epaS xe xal
YEa* -rtXefcrxaS eTSov xal XoyCwv Av5p~v itXEfcrxwv Airnxoucra
nat ypawxewv ouvGecuoS \nxh 47io5efr,ea>S oA6eU km \ie
uaptfXXaF.EV oft5' ofi \tyuitxCtov >taXE<5ficvoi ' ApitE<$ov<fn;xai
abv xofS 5' M itffcnv Ate' Exea t AySwxovxa t%\
£E'vt)S Aysv^Oriv.
Diels has classified this in the list of "Unechte";
Cleve (The Giants of Presocr. Greek Philosophy, p. 4r0) defended
its authenticity.
Three reasons favour acceptability of this fragments
a. It does not express unjustified pride (or unbearable boast).
b. Its content agrees with other evidence (frr. 180, 68 A 2,
68 A 1, 35).
c. A rare term in it^JI C|i'wv ) is found in another genuine passage
of D. (fr. 30). C(■ 317.
2. DK, VS 80 B 3 (Protagoras).
W. Jaeger, Paideia, I.
E. Barker, op. cit., 41-43.
M» Untersteiner, op. cit., 64 ff.
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Education, as this idea emerges from D.*s fragments is
a life-long function, divided into three levels:
1. acquiring skill (necessary for adaptation to the needs of life),
2. acquiring virtue (as a quality necessary for mutual relations in
society),
3. acquiring knowledge as a mental joy, which is a condition of
happiness.
In the first stage education fulfils practical purposes,
in the second it prepares the individuals for their social activity by
"persuading" them to subdue their passions (145, 159) ant overcome their
natural egoism and reach an altru stic outlook on life.^" In the third
(and highest) level acquisition of knowledge is not only an improvement
of adaptation, but also in some way a power of liberation (from passions
and fears); on this level the roads of freedom and happiness and
knowledge cross each other (113, 216, paragraph: conditions of euthumia).
Now it is easy to understand why D. advises parents to spend
a part of t eir money for giving education to their children on the
ground that by doing so they will build round their children "a
fortification and safeguard.'"* It is reasonable to suppose that he
himself thought he was lucky to have spent his money for bis education.
1. See paragraph; "presuppositions of Happiness".
o ) (BCpEtlP^lv2. fr • 2dO: £ ^ e £ r i v o u n o * A v
u tJs K. -CfcCxoS re
^ ^ ^ <S~"
~> <-
Ot. £ i V C V
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1. Education as a result of need and experience.
As expected from D. he sees the problem in its genetic way.
Men*s first teacher is need,^" his second external nature in its
multifarious appearance, and his third (in fact an accumulation of the
previous two) experience, coming from acquaintance, observ tion, and
imitation.
Let us examine his view through the evidence: In fr. 172
he says: "Those same things from which we get good can also be for us
a source of hurt, or else we can avoid the hurt. For instance, deep
water is useful for many purposes, and yet again harmful; for there is
danger of being drowned. A technique has therefore been invented:
instruction in swimming."^ The passage speaks for itself; the
physicist now becomes an observer of the human fight for adaptation;
with an optimistic view he finds out (ascertains) that nature itself
helps men in their necessary adaptation. Hitter acquaintance becomes
experience for the future.
Experience is enlarged by observation and imitation of the
life of animals. The struggle for survival is common to other species
too; and man with his superior ability can acquire useful knowledge by
studying animal behaviour. We read in fr. 154: "we are pupils of the
1. See: Diodor. I. 8.7. ( VS 68 B 5 in II. 136, 8-15).
2. fr. 172: dtp' ^|j,£v xdyad^c yCyvexai, xwv octixCv
xouxwv xat xh xax& ^xaupiaxcaneQ' av, xwv 8b xaxwv
£xx&S eiT)|f£v. aOxixa u8wp PaQti slS xoWSc xpfai-pov
xat 6aSxe xaxov ' xlv6uvoS y&p duoxviypvai. irnxav?)
o5v EtJpeQT) vi^xeerQat SiSaaxetv.
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animals in the most important things: the spider for spinning and
mending, the swallow for building, and the songsters, swan and
nightingale, for singing, by way of imitation."*
Another kind of experience is attained by personal acquaintance
with difficult conditions of life; tnese are sometimes a source of
virtues: "Life in a foreign country teaches self-sufficiency; for
t.2
bread and bed are the sweetest cures for hunger and fatigue.
2. So far we have not met the idea of education as we understand
ie nowadays. Nevertheless, it is necessary and desirable to transfer
to coming generations by way of teaching what mankind has learnt
throughout the centuries of its bfctter experience (by way of teaching).
The aims of such an education are: (a) to give the necessary knowledge,
(b) to make easier mutual understanding by introducing young people to
the demands of social life, "if children are allowed not to work, they
cannot learn letters or music or gymnastic, nor that which above all
things supports virtue, (namely) a sense of resnect. or it is
1. fr. 154: 6 A. dxocpaivet paQiycdS ( xwv Ccjxov) £v -rots
jieytCTTotS yeyovduaS ifyiaS ' <£pdxVTlS tfqpavTixrj xat
dneaxtHT], xe^L^<5voS £v otxoSopCa, xal tcov \iyupaiv»
xuxvou xal dr)5c5vo5» ?£v ^ ■
2. fr. 246: Jtvt XtLTj t oy Olu ZocpK tea. V &iSoc 6 <et" °ljA-
K aa K <otx K o n o u ^uKuzetZec. col^o^Zoc
Cf. frr. 54, 76.
3. Diodor. I. 8.7 (VS II. 136, 8-15).
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precisely from these studies that the sense of respect usually grows."*-
Learning is labour; it has the power to waken in the soul
the feeling of self-respect (aidos), which is a condition of all
virtues. And virtue is the most important aim of education. The
insistence on this aim is justified since man is gifted by nature with
much vitality, passions, desires (fr. 149) which must be in some way
isciplined through the virtues of the soul (frr. 159, 187).
It is remarkable that virtue in D.'s view will come not as
a result of particular instructions or compulsory regulations, but as
a product of labour (179) and by -ersuasion (181). .' elf-respect and
virtue are desirable as aims of education because they give the
foundation of social life. All other qualities of character form the
basis of private life.
Following fr. 181 (where the power of persuasion is
emphasised as opposed to the ineffectiveness of compulsion) one might
accept that virtue - strictly speaking - is not the subject of
teaching - the com unication of ideas - but of explaining
situations and showing ideals.
If persuasion operates effectively - this seems to be an
optimistic belief of D. - law as a restriction of freedom is
unnecessary; and If necessary for others, it is simply a good
protection for those who are virtuous by persuasion (248).
l. fr. 179! n*) TOvefv TtcttSeS <*vlc'vteS oute yp^a-tr* av
ndtQoiev oute houchh*)v oute dyajvCnv oi56' otiep |ic?Uata
T*)V ApE-rhv cWxei, Tb al&etoQai ' pa'\a yip tn totW
cpiAET ytyvEaGat ad6c5s.
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So far education is described only as an achievement
attained by continuous labour; the goods °f learning are acquired by
industrious men through effort. But two other factors are
presupposed: natural ability (fr. 56, 183)1 and training (242)J1
all these factors together are conceived as sufficient and necessary
conditions for tiie whole procedure of the educative function. It
2
would be deceitful to suppose tha.t either labour or training is prior
to natural ability as a factor. If this was D.'s belief then fr.
3
277 would be incompatible, since in it the assumption is clear:
4
nature is by far the first and decisive factor.
So education is by no means the only basis of knowledge and
virtue: nature gives the raw material, perhaps "wild" stuff (159)
which needs manipulation. A systematic education therefore is necessary
and professional teachers are required; parents have the task to pay
what is necessary on behalf of their children; if they fail to do so,
5
the result will be to the cost of their children (2&S).
t \ p C ( ^ ^ ~ / \ ^ ~1
1. fr. 183:.. X f> * 1/05 £ OL p OU Jlocl <2'/>/ usporty KflU.
\ | /7 v 7 1 — c <f "(Jcs
fr. 56: tci Kct/W K qila
3 / "\ 3 /
£u<jpu£.£.s TT|3oi TL.ce, ■
fr. 242: it>.eoveS it Acrx^cuoS dya-ot y'vovtri t) dub cpucuoS.
2. Per contra see: Guthrie, History, II, 494.
3. ee paragraph: "The philosopher a^d the family".
4. cf. Protagoras' aphorism: qptjae&S Hat dc/H'paewS biSaanaXia
beTrai (VS 80 B 3). See analysis of fr.33 in the following pages.
5. fr. 2$8: of tmv (pei6a)\wv HatSeS d{iaO£eS yiyv<$|ievoi,, oocntep
of 6pyr)rxat ets t&S |iaxa£pa* 6pouovxeS... .outw 6b nat
o6tol. .. .cpiX.£ouai 6tacp0eipea0ai.
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3. On a hi tier level farther education is a target for gifted
personalities only; it is rather a problem of personal interest,
orientation and devotion. Fr. 110 (D. U3ed to say that he would "rather
}
discover one cause than gain the kingdom of Persia." > sneaks clearly
for D.'s attitude towards science. It becomes the ain purpose of
life and absorbes all other interests; it is a life-Ion education.
Now acquisition of knowledge does not (serve) help simply for
adaptation or good social terms; it helps personal happiness and
indirectly all mankind In its effort to defeat nature and use it on
behalf of human life.
Another aspect of education we have already touched when
discussing political life; through "participation" citizens acquire
acquaintance with problems of the society in which they live.
hhat is education as o function?
Here, as it seems, Is the most important contribution of D. to
the whole problem of education. He sayss "t.orst of all things is laxity
as a eans to educate youth, for it brew's those pleas ires from which
. h2
vice comes.
1. fr. 113: A. "\eye potfXecfQat yffWov \xlav etfpefv aUio-
Xoy Cctv t?)v riepa^v o t pacrtAstav yev^oOat.
Cf. 68 A 2, B 299.
2. fr. 178: TiavTfrv h^klcttov ^ e^-tcxe fr, Ttq i^efJarai rf)v ve<5xr)xa'
^uttj yap £ tiv rj xCnxei ifiovhs xccfrraS, ££ 5>v
Handxt)? yivexat.
3. 1
From this two implications arc probables
a. the passage is addressed to some educators who thought
superficially on the uestion of education,
b. the belief is expressed that wickedness (result of pleasures)
can be avoided by seme correct education. What is that? From this
question another ar ses: what is the denotation of pleasure in this
pass e? it seems that here this term includes something more than
bodily pleasure; perhaps vain hopes, vain ambitions, hunger of power and
vanity, which (when fed by inefficient educators) can, in due course,
;ive rise to . ickedness.
If tjjkt.8 interpretation is correct, then this passage seems
to be an attack on Sophistry.1 For D.'s part, the problem of
education is not riot as u step to a political career but to a moral
arson; lity.
How deep (thoroughgoing) a function education is is
explained by fr. 33: "jlature an; teaching are very similar; for
teaching transforms man and in transforming effects his nature (i.e.
embodies or transplants the ob.iect of teachir in the natural structure
„2
of nan). As it concerns the personality of a man - accordin . to
this passage - one's educator is in some way na;'e the author of
one's nature. but it would be mislea ing to suppose that teaching is
1. Cf• Protagoras' programme of education in ilato's Protag, 316*320,
particularly in 318D-319A. As contrast to 313 D-E see D.'s fr.
179 ( uotod acove).
2. fr. 33: 9 ^ gc<> TTa.pa,n A in &LO\s ettc ■
KctX H«.f> n h eta/fu r (*e~ T°u ^ €-
-coe.po' ff- p-cy a. ft <f u Ci o~na( li, .
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a substitute for nature or that it is of higher importance. It is
accepted that teaching changes the "rusual",1 perhaps affects their
position and influences their function in due course and therefore is
embodied (incorporated) in the natural structure. But otherwise nature
is the main and leadin , factor; it says the first and last word.
To summarise these pages on education: D. seems to have
believed that:
a. Nature is the foundation for a man's personality,
b. Teaching can add skill, knowledge to natural abilities and perhaps
modify natural inclinations and increase natural capacity.
c. As it concerns moral conduct instruction by persuasion can
influence a free and self-determined agent. (131).
d. Training is helpful to the whole procedure of personal development
(2*1;;) .
e. An organised education can in one way and to some degree
show (ways) uetho s of improvement of co in generations
(individually and collectively).
f. ucation is offered: generally by nature itself, by social
environment, by the State (as an Institution); particularly or
specifically by professional teachers who must >e paid by the
parents o.; t pupils.
A final question should be raised: is education p. kind of
"condit 3 on iny" of future conduct and therefore of per oral har iness?
does it really determine the future of a person? and if it had the
l«U_£tocp tJ6|LcOC . Cf. 68 A 3s.
possibility to "condition" the whole life of an individual or of a
whole generation, should such a possibility be used?
In these forms of the sa; e question it is not assumed that
D. faced su h implications of his doctrines (33); but his formula
reaches the vicinity of such thou hts v ilch really are modem problems
in sychology an:, education.
Teach in. is not a "conditionin fa tor in the strict sense
(cause or set of c: uses - result or set of results); but it is a
"cord tion" in * loose sense: knowledge, instruction, trainin can
influence a future ecision (life is conceived as a chain of decisions -
actions within perpetually chap;/,in conditions). Education can create
the frame within which a number of possible decisions we n1 cec ;
but these antecedents cannot rescribe the only one actual <ocision
to be taken by a person at a given moment. Better knowing of things,
better habituation in virtues, bettor understanding of social necessities,
can increase the >robability of a virtuous and social decision; but this
decision, in the final stage, is a choice for the person involved,
who, at the moment iven and under the con ition .iven, will act
freely.
0. speaks to a free person, who freely can accept some
restrictions on his activity an' freely can impose fcules of conduct
on himself. He could not therefore conceive of a person "conditioned"
by education to such a degree that his decisions and actions are
"predetermined"•
And if he could imagine such a powerful educational system
able to "condition" the .hole life directed urmistakenly to - let us
334.
accept it - happiness, would he have adopted such a system? In the
light of analyses of D.'s beliefs (181, 248, 2G4, 244, 33) one could
not answer this question positively. Such a "conditioning** ed cation
would i eoi'ive a person of the right to decide for himself. And
it would mean deprivation of happiness, because one's happiness is
happiness in one's conception of happiness, provided that one is
free and responsible for it. A man can be described as happy only if
he is creator of his happiness. There are no "happy" computers.




Historical position of D.'s othical theory
It is proposed that a number of • -uestions be briefly answered
before a final judgement i: made on the problem in the title:
1. Is b.'s ethical theory worthy of the title?
2. . hat are t ;o moral motives prevailing in it?
3. Is this ethical theory compatible with D.'s physics?
4. What is D.'s position cm the question of the Noaos-Physis
antithesis? and finally
5. v'hat is D.'s place in the history of Ethics?
1. Is D.'s ethical theory <vorthy of the title?
A comparison with the modern conception of : talcs would ,e
wrong and misleading; a comparison with Aristotle's Ethics favours,
2 Q
to be sure, the latter; but it is the best available.
1. In 2N*s Phil. d. Griechen, 1. 2. 1154 the problems raised by the
study of D.'s ethics are summarised under the follovlng heads:
a. whether we can r, eak of a aystei ,
b. what is its cen ral concept,
c. whether and to what extent there is a connection between the
Ethics and Physics of D.
Cf. Schmid-StHhlin, 1. 5. 277s Guthrie, History, II. 492.
2. Aristotle had any predecessors in the field of Ethics (Socrates,
Plato, Antisthenes, Aristippus) . D» ha only gnornolo ies and (his
contemporaries) the Dophists.
See: FriedlSnder, Aufsatz a.um CYn <o -$Vj |< ola. .robiem (Hermes^
(1913) nP. G03-616).
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3. Some similarities to Socrates' teaching have been pointed out
throughout this thesis; they mi ;ht be summarised for the purposes
of this conclusion:
a. mental joys are by far of higher value than bodily pleasures.
b. justice is a necessary condition of eudaimonia,
c. the intellectual character of Ethics (fr. 159, 83, 197, 229,
282, 289, 290); but for U. knowledge is only one factor of
morality (good will being the other; cf. frr. 173, 62, 68, 89).
.
On the other hand it is not intended here either to
, l ,
investigate Aristotle s ethics or to show which of the two (0* s or
Aristotle's) is more complete or to tree imitations which perhaps are
non-existent, Our intention is strictly limited to these points:
Old D. include in his ethics the orobloms currently included
in Greek t ics?
b. Can these points be understood as having ben parts of a
consistent ethical theory?
c» hat is the central concept of such a theory?
Following the preceding study (chs* II-III) we are justified
in saying that round the nucleus of oudaiinonla (e thumia) D. touched
or these problems:
presuppositions of euthumia (virtuous life),
meaning o:;" vi tue (virtue is action),
virtues (moral - intellectual),
measure (a® ration);
pleasure (bodily - mental),
the problem of responsibility (freewill),
some problems of social life (friendship etc*),
problems of political life (law, justice, obligations and
rights, constitutional form)*
These problems with much sore elaboration, to be sure, and
1. e will use for our purpose here a recent publication on Aristotle:
G*E*U* Lloyd, Aristotle: The growth and structure of his thought,
Cambridge (19G8).
Or an earlier one: D* Koss, Aristotle ^(1971) Lfirst ed. 1923 •
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thoroughgoing scrutiny one can find in ristotle's ethics. Of course-
there is, as it were, a fundamental point of difference between thenu
no question of teleology can be found in U. but it is a matter of
general orientation. The formulation, nevertheless, of ethical
problems covers the same area in both cases. There* is no reason (from
this point of view) to deny that 0* produced a theory complete within
2
the boundaries of Greek thics.
That his theory is self-consistent * *s been ointed out
thro ,h the pages of this thesis.
The central concept of D.'s ethics is euthumia, an alternative
for eudaimonia; which is a characteristic pervading Greek ethics.
2. -at are the moral motives in D.'s etiiical theory?
The question is this: why should I be virtuous? or ..hy
shoul i a society adopt such an insti tution as morality?
For the purpo cs of th's inquiry a motive can be defined as
a conscious mental process which roves a man to act in a particular way
either to satisfy a personal desire (egoism) or from a sense of duty
towards others (altruism).
1. See: Lloyd, op.cit. pp. lol-l/i.
Ross, op. cit. pp. 137-269.
2* P. Shorey summarised Plato's investigation of morality in the
folio.-in points: a. ocratic paradoxes,
b. definitions of virtues,
c. the problem l hedonism
d. the attempt to demonstrate the inseparability of virtue and
happiness (Vlastos, latoll, p.7 )»
With reference to oints b, c, d cf. Ch« Two, sections 10,12, 6, 2-
of this study.
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Let us trace th< evidence for D.'s view:
a. ..goistlc .otives:
In frr. 3, 191 the motive of doing or avoiding some acts
is clear: principles are formulated or instructions are given which
lead to personal profit. The consciousness of consequences is not
vague awareness, but a well thought out plan or olicy where a man has
a scheme of activity covering a period of years, or a whole life-time.
On a larger scale (of a city state) the egoistic vi *.v (is
present) appears in fr. 250.
Friendship also is treated in an ogoi tic way (frr. 107,
106).1
An egoistic explanation might be given also to passages
like 276, 293 (cf. 107a, 88). But it is equally justifiable to recognise
in them either an expression of ersonal attitude (276) or human
sympathy (293, 107a) or an observation of human nature (88).
• A11 ru t ic o Lives:
Nobler motives are oresant In a nuir.br of aphorisms
2
describing justice an recom endin; >erfor ...ace of Justice. Jlosely
connected is the problem oi will an. oo will.
1. Put cf. Aristotle's definitions: EN VIII 2. 3-4: £ o voloov ,£v
OL vi iTl fcTToV So£l (pL^CotV
VIII. 3.6i t Juou <£"' I&TLLV q T £ ✓ £, L^j l °L-
*
-> a \ c '
K Koer ocpilvjV of-t<0LLOV.
2. un p. 210 we had concluded: "C.iustice) surnasses selfishness and
renders a man a ood member of a society, an agent of v-.r t is
desirable by the coiu unity."
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Between desire and action will an !eli jeration have to find
a place; but will as a per. anent disposition anci a determinant of
decisions is not clearly placed and described in Greek dthics# Some
of the frr# we have discussed, nonetheless, penetrate the soul to
1 2
express the value of intention (62, 89*", 68, 96). ihey transfer
the problem of doin ; right into willing it#
Obviously good .ill is touched from two sides (individual and
collective) in fr# 248# And in mann:>in , afiairs >111 ir presented as
a cpmpanion of cr.o lr ' ;,e (173)#
Passages like 256, 231, 174 do not put the question: "what
ought to be?" but "what ought wc to do?" The will is orientated to
what is just without any hesitation or calculation; the only or the
prevailing motive is to reach the best result, which is justice#
Injustice, on the contrary, should be eliminated even from hidden
3
intention (62)# Only thus a man is approved even by the gads (217),
which means the t :oo. will is nighly appreciated#
1# Bailey, 202: a remarkable anticipation of later thought#
2# E# Wolf, }t|34l| Soviel starker orschien ihm und soviel wertete er
die Gesinnung als die Tat, dass er den Anspruch gewagt oat: unreclite
Gesinnung sei gefahrlicher wie unrechtes Tun (fr# 39)#
3# It is very improbable that M^cGibbon's interpr tation is correct;
he argues (op# cit# p# 393) that: "these words (fr. 217) suggest
that###a man#•.might enter into communication with the ods."
Cf# ZN 1 #2# 285: it is merely a form of expression#
Schmid-2tiili1 in 1 #5.282: Von einem gottlichen Sittengesetz scheint
D# nicht gesprochen zu haben.
Luther, .ahrheit, 156, note#
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Good intention makes unnecessary the presence of witnesses.
And if any wrong is done the wrong—doer is more unhappy than the
wronged man (45).
The highest level of noble motives is expressed in fr. 96;
it gives a clearly altruistic definition of generosity as an action
inspired by good will without any expectation of reward.
Finally, fr. 255 prescribing a fransework of a kind of
"'socialism of good motives" generalises the problem of good will and
mutual help within the limits of a city state; through good motives D.
believed (it is perhaps an Utopia) that social justice and social
order and other goods for the community could be provided (250) •*"
3. IsD.'s ethical theory compatible with his Physics?
The main difficulty which one rai.ht face when attempting to
settle the question of compatibility is this: In a materialistic
system is there room left for Ethics? or, if determinism is logically
extended from Macrocosraos (natural necessity) to B, icrocosmos (human
conduct) does there remain room for free will? and therefore for
responsibility and morality?
1. T.A. Sinclair, History, 65. Ferber, op. cit. 103.
On p. 233 commenting on D.'s criteria we had concluded: The first
criterion is eudairaonistic (intellectual eudaimonism) and egoistic;
the second and third are altruistic. They are not incompatible,
since they cover different fields of activity (private life, social-
olitical relations).
At the risk of sore repetition it should be remarked first
that these problems were non-existent in .'s days, : e, for his
part, either did not notice this problem or more probably ho saw it, but
he believed that in the case Of human beings the soul atoms, privileged
2
as t -.cy are, h ve the ossibility to escape;- lie I s of a icch nistic
3
world and establish the foundation far a kind of pelf«*determinat ion •
That he admitted to possibility of freewill t eve can
remain no 'doubt after the explanation of his ethical theory <3ee e.g.
frr. 101, 244, 264). hether such a conception of freewill could be
compatible with a strict determinism is a question put today, but had
not yet been discovered ape was not until after 'ristotle.
I. Lortnir.g, Gymnasium, Berlin (1073) p. It Allerdings 1st das
System dec D« materialistisch; «bW diose Eigenschaft teilt es
init dor •'■no-en vorsokratis-.; ' n "■'•■iV :r.o->hi • , »r cic.-r mterschiod
dos kBrperlichen und unkSrporlichen Uberha t noch nicht xum
klnron w.Bst- in r, r.
p. Huby, The first discovery of the Freewill problem,
Philosophy (19G7) ap.
P. horey, lato's thics (in Vlastos' Plato 11 p. 0): The
modern Freewill controversy arises out o! two conceptions not
connected with this problem by Plato: the Infinite foreknowledge
of and the r..soletc cant in a? ty >r a ••L c- M >n.
. . dticuU » 't (: - !-• i • , ct -
13 (Tlv reowill jroblt; ).
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D. saw another aspects responsibility* (which presupposes
free will, whether one is a .-are of it or not); and tried to solve this
question in two directions:
a. he recognised that, if a man overcomes his passions and
lives with moderation, he Is able to be free and responsible,
b. he freed his moral aent of prejudices and misbeliefs that
2
either gods or chance have anythin to do with human affairs.
Therefore the following question must be answered: are there
elements which (seen from D.'s point of view and age, not from our
scope and conceptual structure) assert consistency between ethics and
physics in D.*s system? and conseque tly consistency in his thought?
There are two classes of such elements!
a. Terminological b. Factual.
a. Terminological consistency:
In fr. 191 (cf. 101) is found a term (metapiptein) which
0
obviously pervades D.'s thought; it is used in his theory of sensation
4
and his theory of knowledge. In all these cases it seems to be a
technicality.
1. See Ch. 2, section 15 (Moral autonomy, responsibility)
2. See Ch. 1.
3. A. 135.63 (Theophr. de sens. 135.63): ^ e r U-n to v .
4. B 3: U fc-coc "ir Ttt tov > b 19l! p. £ttu' ttrU v .
It ta not without a articular importance that the concent
of necessity returns again an again1 to the purpose not of denying
human freeloe* but of denoting human limits (that freedom should be
understood as a possibility within the limits of reality, of natural
necessity)*
Consistency of thought must be recognised also in the
steady effort of >>• to introduce into the field of ethics a characteristic
term of his physics (in a remarkable number of compounds)A
comparison of the .eon in u of these cagna. e terns shows that 0* sou; ht
not to Introduce natural necessity from Physics to ethics but to
modify its strictness and find a coiapraesise between nature as a
general term and human existence as a privileged existence within the
limits of nature. isdou as a panv r for self determination is
emphatically opposed to natural necessity (fr. 197).
b# factual consistency an compatibility
In leaving room for freewill D. in not inconsistent with his
syntea (soul also consists of atoms, given perhaps the unique privilege
of escape from blind necessity) but he was perhaps unaware of a
1. necessity: 253, 362, 277, 181, 239, 289.
necessary: 144, 278, 2rf5#
2. j>-v£f**S (07 A 6, 08 A 38), I nip j <rfc ly (68 B 7),
^c€ C 0C^> vcol - oufit (33), ayg &c <p I u £]b c ^ (130),
(107), £ V T?/+eS (206),
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problem which came into existence a long time later as a logical con¬
sequence* of his physics{ cI ftLrtyrtLfk ■ tylqol-SoJy rtUA'oyj).
On the other hand his insistence on founding an ethical
» > 2
theory independent of the gods will and fortune s caprices is
completely consistent with his physics, where such entities had no
place to dwell.
Thus terminological and factual simil rities show that
there was a guiding thought (throughout the system) which attempted to
settle a "modus vivendi" between two "realities": natural necessity
and self-determined and responsible human conduct.
4. D.'s position regardin,.; the Womos-Physls antithesis.
The reason for touching on this question is obvious: "these
two "key words" (or "catch-words") came to be commonly regarded as
« 3
opposed and mutually excluded • The antithesis denoted by them was
applied to many fields of Greek thought: religion, political
4 5
organisation, social equality (free citizens-slaves) , morality.
1. In the same degree all the tragedians were unaware of the fact that
when claiming interference of gods or chance or dairaons in their
plays they were depriving their characters of t e possibility and the
right to make responsible decisions. Such questions when pushed
to their logical consequences first are anachronistic and second
close the road for any constructive discussion. Cf. p.57 *%, i. .
2. A 66, A 68. See ch.l.
3. Guthrie, History, III (Sophists) p. 55.
4. Ibid. pp. 57-58.
5. Barker, Greek Pol. Thought, pp. 74 ff.
3-i5»
D. on this question followed (with an exception) a reconcilJatory
way and extended the application of the "catch phrase" to other fields:
a. In the paragraph or education it was explained that a raan,
a mature personality, is the result of cooperation of two factors:
natural jirts and education.1
b. In the field of morality fr. 264 (combined with 181)
allows a reconciliation end compromise of natural motives and social
convention; a bridge between them is traced in fr. 174 where justice
(social obligation) is put as a condition necessary for enthumia (individual,
n tural pursuit).
c. In a similar w y Individual pursuits and political
convention (law) are linked in fr. 248; again a link between them
might be sen in the concept ol persuasion (248, 181)»2
d. In the field of religion such an antithesis was nan
existent for D. If people have some belief in go's, chance, or
•ni'-jons, it 1... a question of epistemolo.j*.
e. In the field of social class-dietin -tier, nr> the
existence of state barriers and t e distinction between Greeks and
Barbarians the evidence we have is not sufficient to decide definitely.
Fr. 247, shows, nevertheless, a reconciliatory policy and tolerance.
1. The pairs: nature and education (183),nature and teaching (33),
n turn and tr iwitv . (242) are repeatedly ,mentioned; the second ember
in all three cases represents ti nomos.
2. Cf. Ierodot, VII.104: ^f TTacszot ijiuA-
(Jot tleiv • in tttc jsoc'p GCfi SiZTTorvl rJv urtoSu-
l^octi/ouiSL TTollC exc £o\ 6 £ .
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f. To complete this review one can look at D.'s theory of
knowledge and find that senses and mind cooperate (frr. 11, 135) in the
human pursuit for knowledge, although at the first contact the senses
grasp a conventional image of reality (frr. 6-10) and the truth is
hif en in the depth (117).'
To sum up: his View is that nomos-physis are not w, ujk
excluded but can cooperate and coincide in a tyuihesis; this view
acquires particular -valuation if we remember that D. is a child cf
the sophistic movement. The same reconciliaLory attitude can be seen
in certain ethical passa. es here natural necessity and life or reality
are brought together (2s9, 278, 267, 277, 278, 253, 297, 285, 144).
necessity is the face of n lure; .en's duty i to acknowledge v-iiat
nature is and rg nise his free li e within the Xr.. cwork prescribed
by his human nature.
The place of D. in the history a I ics_.
heth r an. to what extent ais ethical t cory was known to
and influenced ais contemporaries und/or later .reek Philosophers has
been a question for dispute. The thesis has been defended that
2
even Socrates received influence from the Abderite, Sow scholars
have tried to Linu similarities between D.'k doctrines and passages in
1. Felix Heinimann, Komos and Phys s, Dacel (1945) p. 88.
Max Pohlenz, Nomos unci whycis, Hermes 81 (1933) p. 427.
2. L. Stella, Valore e posiziono storica dell* etica dl 0,
(Sophia, 10 (1942), 208).
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Plato; in their investigations they were inspired by D. Laertius*
2
comment on this question, •rhich anyway will remain unanswered, since
Plato himself nowhere Mentioned D*
3
Son-.1 scholar# correctly spealc of a School of Audera.
Epicurus denied any dependence on his Abderite forerunner; but the
siinil rities are frequent — .m--risint;ly convincin • nr have been
shown nasslm in this study, D.'s influence on the Cynics has also
4
b' en mentioned*
This study (apart from the attempt at a reconstruction of
D.'s ethical theory from the surviving frajuents) has been intended
to show:
a, D# produced the first Greek ethical theory to be written
own; it was cordetent in itself, complete ( -thin one tor ... of
Greek Philosophy) and compatible with his physics.
b* Of course he did not create from nothingjthe raw material was
dispersed all around him. Cudalmonia as a goal, measure as a means,
1. P. Natorp, hie t ,ika, ch. 8, p. 157 ft.
J. Stenzel, Jlaton u. ,'J. (Elaine . chriften, pp. 60-71).
0. Gigon, PlatflB U. D* (flelv.Mns. 29(1972) 153 ff.)
2. IX.40.
3. Clem, of Alexandria, Strom* 11.130 (VS 68 B 4)
VS 67-78 (II. 70-251).
Natorp, Die Sthlkat til- Guthrie, History, II* 382 n. 1.
4. ... Stewart, ... art the Cynics ( H- 5 C P (,3 (nrtf) pp- I •
Th. Cole (hemocrltus and the sources of Greek anthropology, C/ewe/a^J^
Ohio (1967) tried to explain how .'a doctrines s rvived in
Diodorus, I. 7-8. C:". VS II 135-136.
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certain virtues as ornaments of the personality, the problem of
pleasure, the question of law and state organisation, friendship, eros,
criterion, are not concepts which make their first appearance in his
theory. He offered:
I. his personal moral orientation (self-reliance and moderation, a
strong sense of justice, altruism),
IX. his scientific character (accustomed to contemplate, to trace
causes, to discover links and classify and organise)
III. in some cases his personal terminology,
IV. moral ideas collected from his environment (Greek tradition and
contemporary discussions)•*
c. He raised first with consistency and insistence the question
of human autonomy as a presupposition and culmination of any discussion
of moral problems. Autonomy postulates both independence of thought
2
(freedom from prejudices and superficial beliefs) and free will
(whether or not one has explicitly put such postulates)•
d. His theory, far from being a materialistic hedonism, at
many points overlaps Socrates' intellectualism and idealism,as
1. Traditionally Ueraocritus is regarded as a brilliant expounder
of Leukippus' atomic theory. But his own ethical theory -
it must be recognised - is his own original work in which we
have found (discovered) D.'s own originality and systematic thought.
2. See e.g. frr. 118, 119.
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we had often occasion to note# From this point of view D# stands
side by side with SocratesThat his ethical theory remained in
the margin of the main stream of Greek ethical thou^it was a result
of historical conditions or coincidences (as we have explained in
the introduction^ and of chance (the phantom which D. consistently
and insistently denied).
1. Cf. Ferber, Uber die Wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der thik
Demokrits, Zeitschrift fur Phi loso~>hie, 132-3 (1908) 114: so
darf D. neben Sokrates mit als Begrtfoder der Ethik genannt werden.
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